

Dealing with the Intermediation Crisis. The Political Outcomes of Collective Action in Chile

Joaquín Rozas-Bugueño

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THESIS SUPERVISOR
Ph.D. Antoni Rodon Casarramona
Department of Political and Social Sciences



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Abstract

This dissertation examines the political outcomes of collective action in the context of an intermediation crisis. Using a mixed-methods approach, it analyzes how social mobilization in Chile—particularly the 2019 social outbreak—has influenced political preferences, electoral behavior, and political trajectories. The thesis is structured around four articles: (i) the analysis of the short- and mid-term effects of the 2019 protests on public opinion and voting behavior; (ii) the evaluation of the impact of the 2019 social outbreak on the political composition of the Constitutional Convention; (iii) the assessment of the political trajectories of former delegates following the rejection of the constitutional proposal in 2022; and (iv) the analysis of the demobilization of two major Chilean movements—the student movement and No+AFP. The research combines quasi-experimental designs, original datasets, panel surveys, and qualitative data. Findings indicate that less organized, newer, and territorially rooted actors are more likely to influence politics under conditions of an intermediation crisis. However, their impacts tend to be short-term. This dissertation contributes to the literature by integrating the study of political outcomes of collective action with the intermediation crisis framework, showing that while social movements can shape institutional politics, their long-term influence is often constrained by organizational limitations and shifting societal expectations.

Resum

Aquesta tesi doctoral examina els resultats polítics de l'acció col·lectiva en el context d'una crisi d'intermediació. Mitjançant un enfocament de mètodes mixtos, analitza com la mobilització social a Xile—particularment l'esclat social del 2019—ha influït en les preferències polítiques, el comportament electoral i les trajectòries polítiques. La tesi s'estructura en quatre articles: (i) l'anàlisi dels efectes a curt i mitjà termini de les protestes de 2019 sobre l'opinió pública i el comportament electoral; (ii) l'avaluació de l'impacte de l'esclat social de 2019 en la composició política de la Convenció Constitucional; (iii) l'estudi de les trajectòries polítiques dels exdelegats després del rebuig de la proposta constitucional el 2022; i (iv) l'anàlisi de la desmobilització de dos grans moviments xilens—el moviment estudiantil i No+AFP. La recerca combina dissenys quasi-experimentals, bases de dades originals, enquestes de panell i dades qualitatives. Els resultats indiquen que els actors menys organitzats, més nous i arrelats territorialment tenen més probabilitats d'influir en la política en contextos de crisi d'intermediació. Tanmateix, els seus impactes tendeixen a ser de curta durada. Aquesta tesi contribueix a la literatura integrant l'estudi dels resultats polítics de l'acció col·lectiva amb el marc analític de la crisi d'intermediació, i mostra que, tot i que els moviments socials poden incidir en la política institucional, la seva influència a llarg termini sovint es veu limitada per debilitats organitzatives i per les expectatives socials canviants.

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INTRODUCTION

In many moments of history and across different regions, protests, social movements, and social activism have triggered political changes at various levels and scopes, from the French Revolution that inaugurated modern society (Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 2010) to the Arab Spring, passing through the anti-austerity protests in Europe (Della Porta, 2015) and the recent social outbreaks across Latin America (Bringel et al., 2021). These phenomena are part of daily politics in contemporary societies, and their impacts on politics can take different shapes: the creation of new political parties, policy changes, democratization, or even government interruptions (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010; Bosi et al., 2016; Giugni, 2008). However, collective actions and actors do not consistently achieve their goals. As Amenta et al. (2018) note, the political influence of collective action is relatively uncommon and often depends on several external factors. These may either facilitate or constrain the impact of collective actors and include having politically influential allies in positions of power (such as legislators, judges, or ruling parties aligned with the actors' demands), the state's repressive capacity, and the degree of fragmentation among political elites (Tarrow, 2011; Davenport, 2015; McAdam and Tarrow, 2018, 2010).

The landscape of political change through collective action becomes even more complex if the political representation crisis in Western democracies is integrated into the analysis. Political science has defined the representation crisis as the inability of political institutions to process the citizens' preferences and organize them into programmatic platforms and policies. This has led to the transformation or collapse of political party systems in many Western democracies and the rise of political outsiders to prominent political positions in several countries (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2019; Castells, 2020; Urbinati, 2023). Donald Trump's rise to power on two occasions in the United States, the emergence of *Podemos* and *Vox* in Spain, the transformation of the French political party system, the displacement of the traditional parties in Chile and Mexico from new organizations from the left, and in Argentina and El Salvador from the right with the arrival of Javier Milei and Nayib Bukele to the government, are some examples of the political representation crisis of the current liberal democracies. However, the abovementioned problem is not inherent to democracy but rather a broader, structural deficiency of contemporary societies. As Sánchez-Cuenca (2022) argues, the current crisis is not a problem only for political institutions but a reflection of the organizations' inability to connect preferences or expectations with results and services in modern societies. Thus, the crisis affects not only political parties and state institutions but also social actors such as social movements and activists (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). Thus, the crisis is not only one of political representation but also an intermediation crisis that affects intermediary organizations across different spheres of society (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022).

Under what conditions can collective action impact politics in a context of intermediation crisis? What type of collective actors and actions are more prone to having political influence in this disintermediation environment? These two research questions guide this thesis through the exhaustive analysis of collective action political outcomes in Chile, applying a mixed methodological approach. In the following sections, I first discuss how this thesis bridges the literature on collective action's political consequences with the emerging discussion on the intermediation crisis, and present the theoretical expectations of this dissertation. Second, I discuss and justify why Chile presents a good opportunity to study the political outcomes of collective action in an intermediation crisis context, highlighting that the Chilean case may yield findings relevant to both developed and developing Western democracies. Third, I describe the methodological design of the dissertation, which relies on causal inference and observational strategies, employing mixed methods to analyze political outcomes at different levels of collective action-related phenomena.

I.1 Collective Action Outcomes

The research on social mobilization has involved the study of many different phenomena: the individual participation in protests (van Stekelenburg et al., 2018; Schussman and Soule, 2005); the protests as an event that happens in a particular location and at a specific moment (Tilly, 2010; Doherty and Hayes, 2018; Koopmans and Rucht, 2002); the protest cycles, which are series of protests that have an element in common, in general the demands and organizations (Tarrow, 2011; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015); the social movement organizations (SMOs) and their resources (Edwards et al., 2018; Walker and Martin, 2018; McCarthy and Zald, 1977); and social movements as a complex entity that links SMOs, tactics (e.g., pacific demonstration, violent protests, legislative advocacy, online campaigns), and the conformation of collective demands (Tarrow, 2011; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015; Snow et al., 2018).

These different phenomena, although strongly interrelated, were studied separately until the late 1990s. A broader analytical approach began to take shape with the conceptualization of contentious politics introduced by Tarrow (2011) in *Power in Movement*. The definition of contentious politics is centered around those collective actions that powerless people employ to challenge more powerful contenders, such as the state or big firms (Tarrow, 2011). Thus, the contentious component of the collective action is derived from the deployment of tactics by normal people to reach (or try to reach) their collective demands in opposition to well-equipped adversaries. The tactics go beyond the protests and can evolve from the construction of organizations to the consolidation of a collective identity

(Tarrow, 2011).

In a similar vein, McAdam et al. (2001) defend the necessity to move toward the study of contention politics as a process, where mechanisms explain the mobilization and its consequences. This broader and more procedural approach to addressing the different phenomena linked to collective action has marked the developing of social mobilization research in the last decades (Snow et al., 2023).

A similar shift occurred within the subfield focused on the outcomes of social mobilization. The contemporary study of outcomes of social mobilization began with the seminal work of Gamson (1975) on the impacts of social organizations in the United States. In his work, Gamson (1975) introduced the concept of success to refer to the situation where a social movement reaches its objectives. The chance of achieving their demands also depends on the interaction with the adversary. However, it was not until the 1990s that the field of social mobilization impacts had more development (Giugni et al., 1999). Unlike Gamson (1975), the research began to refer to the effects of the social mobilization as impacts or consequences, instead of success; considering that the effects are not binary, nor fixed over time (Giugni et al., 1999; Giugni, 2008; Amenta et al., 2010; Bosi, 2016). Many collective actions can produce interrelated outcomes. For instance, an initially favorable impact may later face backlash or reversal (Bosi, 2016; Amenta et al., 2018). Likewise, social mobilization could generate partial or secondary impacts, e.g., not achieving its primary demand but strengthening its organizational capacity, popular support, or collective identity (Beckwith, 2016). Additionally, the impacts of social mobilization are provided by other actors, such as political institutions or mass media (Giugni, 2008; Amenta et al., 2018). This shows that the academic literature has abandoned the idea of success.

Bosi and Uba (2021) propose unifying the study of the impacts of protest, social movements, and participation in collective actions under the overarching concept of collective action outcomes. In line with McAdam et al. (2001) and Tarrow (2011), these authors aim to establish a shared analytical field for scholars examining collective action-related phenomena, with a particular focus on its impacts. This concept enables researchers to approach the subfield from a broader perspective and to integrate insights from different strands of research into a unified framework. It thus offers a more interactive and process-oriented perspective, bringing dynamism to the analysis of social mobilization. The concept is grounded in the idea that collective action outcomes result from the interaction between internal factors—such as organizations and resources, tactics, collective action frames, and identity formation—and external factors, including the political context and structural conditions (Bosi and Uba, 2021). Moreover, it acknowledges that one outcome can generate another (Bosi, 2016). For instance, collective action may lead to cultural change, facilitating political change through policy reform (Bosi, 2016). This dissertation adheres to the interactive and broad approach

of collective action outcomes (Bosi and Uba, 2021), as well as the perspective of interrelated outcomes (Bosi, 2016).

I.1.1 Explanations of collective action outcomes

The literature on collective action outcomes identifies several types of outcomes, which can be grouped into three broad categories (Bosi et al., 2016). The first includes biographical outcomes, related to changes in lifestyle, life course, and individual trajectories. The second comprises cultural outcomes, referring to world-view shifts, values, and beliefs. The third encompasses political outcomes, which involve political institutions, preferences, and behavior changes. Collective action can affect all three types of outcomes simultaneously, and they may manifest across different phenomena and scales (Bosi and Uba, 2021; Bosi, 2016; Giugni, 2008).

This thesis focuses specifically on political outcomes, while also exploring the connection between political-institutional outcomes and biographical outcomes—understood here as changes in individuals’ political trajectories. The political outcomes examined in this dissertation include changes in political attitudes and preferences (Branton et al., 2015; Rodon and Guinjoan, 2022; Bonilla and Tillery, 2020; Madestam et al., 2013), political participation (McAdam, 1989; Wasow, 2020; Enos et al., 2019; Castro and Retamal, 2024; Chau and Wan, 2024), and political trajectories (Passy and Monsch, 2018; Giugni, 2008; Vestergren et al., 2017).

The literature has explained the political outcomes of collective action through two main sets of factors: internal and contextual. The former refers to the organizational structure and strategic choices of collective actors. Resource mobilization theory argues that actors with greater resources—monetary, logistical, organizational, and human—are better equipped to sustain mobilization efforts and achieve their goals (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Edwards et al., 2018). Scholars have shown that well-organized actors are more likely to influence politics, as they are better able to coordinate participants, articulate demands, and implement effective strategies (Zarate Tenorio, 2014; Hooghe and Oser, 2016; Engeman, 2021).

Strategic choices are closely linked to tactics and the capacity to mobilize people. As Tilly (2010) notes, tactics are part of the repertoires of collective action, referring to the diverse actions movements adopt to present their goals, gain public support, apply pressure on opponents, and pursue their demands. In this regard, Rossi (2016) emphasizes the strategic reasoning behind choosing one form of action over another. These repertoires vary, often falling on a spectrum between peaceful and violent tactics. The literature generally finds that peaceful tactics are more likely to elicit political responses aligned with collective actors’ demands (Huff and Kruszewska, 2016; Giugni, 2008), as they tend to garner broader public

support and are seen as more legitimate (Muñoz and Anduiza, 2019; Steinert-Threlkeld et al., 2022). However, under specific conditions—such as highly repressive political environments, strong popular support, or selective use of violence—violent tactics may also bring about political change (Gamson, 1975; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Enos et al., 2019). Additionally, the scale of mobilization is crucial: the larger the number of participants, the greater the potential to exert political pressure and signal broad societal backing (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Madestam et al., 2013; Steinert-Threlkeld et al., 2022).

The second set of factors refers to the political context in which collective action unfolds (Tarrow, 2011; McAdam and Tarrow, 2010, 2018). The core idea of this approach is that political structure generates opportunities and constraints that movements interpret and navigate in shaping their actions (Amenta et al., 2018; Tarrow, 2011). Thus, the interaction between institutional and collective actors can either enable or limit the political impact of the latter.

A key theoretical approach to understanding the interaction between political institutions and collective actors is the political opportunity structure theory. This concept highlights four key dimensions: (i) the openness of the political system, (ii) the availability of influential political allies, (iii) the stability of political alignments, and (iv) the state's capacity for repression. Greater political openness—often associated with democratic regimes—tends to increase the likelihood of influence, as institutions are more receptive to demands from contentious actors (Giugni, 2008; Zarate Tenorio, 2014). The presence of political allies is also crucial, as access to actors in positions of power enhances the chances that movements can influence decision-making from both the streets and within institutions (McAdam and Tarrow, 2018; Amenta et al., 2018). In terms of political alignments, divided or unstable elites may present opportunities for movements to exploit fractures, align with one faction, and negotiate with others to advance their agenda (Tarrow, 2011). Finally, repression—understood as actions that raise the costs of mobilization—generally reduces the likelihood of political impact (Zeller, 2020; Davenport, 2015). Nevertheless, repression can sometimes backfire, leading to renewed protests, stronger collective identities, or increased public sympathy for the movement (Reny and Newman, 2021; McAdam, 1989; Hess and Martin, 2006).

I.1.2 Political outcomes of collective action and the crisis of intermediation

The subsection above synthesizes the main explanations of the literature on what collective actions and actors are, and under which circumstances they impact politics. However, we know less about whether these general findings can be trans-

ferred to the current context marked by the intermediation crisis. As mentioned at the beginning of this introduction, this crisis is defined by Sánchez-Cuenca (2022) as the lack of intermediation between needs or expectations and services or outcomes, which affects different organizations in society; collective actors among them.

The concept of an intermediation crisis encompasses the crisis of representation and related discussions because it is a broader approach that not only focuses on the institutions of liberal democracy but also on organizations and institutions across different spheres of society. For this reason, this concept is theoretically better equipped to analyze the political outcomes of collective action in contemporary societies.

The debate around democracy, social mobilization, and conflict is crucial in the political science and political sociology. As Guzmán-Concha (2024) explains, protest cycles have preceded process of democratization in Latin America, Africa, and Southern Europe during the 20th Century. However, in the 2010s, mobilizations have coincided with advances in authoritarianism, which puts into question the traditional association between mobilization and democratization. According to the author, there are two positions in the literature: (i) the positive position, which states that social mobilization strengthens democracy; and (ii) the agnostic position, which does not see social mobilization as a source of democratization and emphasizes that political elites and institutions are the guarantors of democracy (Guzmán-Concha, 2024). Concepts and approaches such as democratic recession (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019), de-democratization (Mudde and Rovira, 2012), and democratic backsliding (Andersen, 2019) are relevant and useful but focus exclusively on the political-institutional dimension of the crisis. In other words, these concepts are centered on the role of political elites in defending or weakening democracy (Guzmán-Concha, 2024).

Likewise, these concepts tend to assume that the mistrust and the weakening of liberal democratic institutions often lead to an authoritarian turn. In this sense, Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) argue that the world is experiencing a third wave of autocratization propelled by political actors operating from within democratic systems. It coincides with the analysis of Levitsky and Ziblatt (2019), who contend that democracy begins to fail when political actors undermine the informal institutions of mutual acceptance between adversaries (i.e., not treating political opponents as enemies) and forbearance (i.e., refraining from abusing legal and constitutional powers to neutralize adversaries). For their part, Mudde and Rovira (2012) argue that populists besiege liberal democracy because their strategy of confronting “the people” against “the elite” generates polarization. This polarization weakens the political institutions, affects checks and balances, and calls into question their probity by portraying them as serving elite interests. From the democratic backsliding approach, Andersen (2019) focuses on the legal di-

mensions of the electoral and liberal pillars of democracy and how these can be eroded separately or simultaneously.

These dynamics are observable in cases such as the United States, Peru, Argentina, Bolivia, or Hungary, where populist leaders have emerged from within the system, gained power, and eroded liberal democratic institutions (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2019). In addition, these countries have experienced process of mobilization in the last decade—e.g., Black Lives Matter protests in the United States, and the social outbreaks between 2019 and 2022 in Perú and Bolivia (Guzmán-Concha, 2024). However, this has not been the case in countries such as Chile, Colombia, Spain, or France. In these countries, relevant social mobilizations have emerged over the last fifteen years in contexts where party systems have undergone profound transformations, traditional parties have come under pressure, and institutions have faced a crisis of trust, yet their democratic regimes have not regressed (Castells, 2020; Luna, 2024; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). This suggests that, first, collective action does not necessarily lead process of autocratization, and that the outcomes of mobilizations depend on their specific contexts (Guzmán-Concha, 2024).

In this context, the notion of an intermediation crisis and the study of collective action outcomes resonate more closely with the idea of democratic malaise (Bienstman et al., 2024) than with the approaches mentioned above. This concept refers to mistrust in political institutions and processes. The work of Bienstman et al. (2024) show that democratic malaise is negatively associated with income inequality. This finding is highly relevant for understanding contexts in which inequality, mistrust in political institutions, and social mobilization converge, as in the Chilean case.

Before discussing the theoretical expectations regarding the political outcomes of collective action in the context of the intermediation crisis, I briefly review the main sources of the crisis and the aspects in which the crisis is manifested.

The factors that are generating the intermediation crisis are structural: (i) an unprecedented technological transformation that impacts different spaces of social and political life; (ii) a process that accelerates the interactions among people, increasing the pursuit of immediate satisfaction of needs; and (iii) a deepening process of individualism marked by a strong mistrust toward different institutions and actors (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022; Luna, 2024). This last point is substantial for understanding the intermediation crisis. As intermediate organizations can no longer process society's inputs and offer an adequate response, these actors are increasingly perceived as less trustworthy and as part of traditional actors disconnected from the needs and preferences of common people. In this manner, society perceives these intermediate organizations as part of a closed elite, as Urbinati (2023) explains.

In addition to the political arena—where traditional actors, mainly political par-

ties, have proven ineffective in addressing political demands—the crisis of intermediation is also evident in other spheres, such as the private market and the cultural field. In these domains, classical intermediaries such as banks, insurance and finance companies, and professionals specialized in culture and the arts have been challenged or even surpassed by emerging mediators. Examples include cryptocurrencies in the financial sector and decentralized online platforms that rank or curate cultural products (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). Likewise, Luna (2024) argues that the intermediation problems across Latin America have also generated problems in the labor structure and illegal markets. The author explains that the technological acceleration, combined with the inability of Latin American states to address the needs of less advantaged sectors of the society and increasing employment precarity, opens an opportunity for illegal economies to present themselves as an attractive alternative to legal, low-paying employment.

Overall, if collective actors faced various challenges in achieving their objectives in the past, the current context of the intermediation crisis presents even more significant difficulties. Although authors who study the intermediation crisis did not address the organized civil society sphere (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022; Luna, 2024), the intermediation crisis in collective action can be observed in at least three situations: (i) current protest cycles tend to be massive but unstructured, and involve a wide range of demands that form a general but amorphous general political challenge. The most notable examples are the social outbreaks that emerged in Latin America since the latter part of the 2010s (Bringel et al., 2021; Guzmán-Concha, 2024) and the anti-austerity protests in Europe as a response to the 2008 economic crisis (Della Porta, 2015); (ii) the emergence of a new type of activism characterized by the participation in horizontal and more porous organizations, with less intense involvement of time, coordination, and face-to-face interactions (Passy and Monsch, 2018); and (iii) the decline of the relevance of key collective actors from the last century, such as trade unions, marked by a decreasing levels of trust and participation (Zarate Tenorio, 2014). These three phenomena share the fact that the central actors of past collective action—the vertical and bureaucratic social movement organizations—are facing problems in their ability to intermediate mobilization processes.

I expect that the collective actors capable of influencing politics under conditions of intermediation crisis will differ in some respects from the average profile identified in the literature. Earlier findings were developed before the acceleration of the disconnection between intermediary organizations and individuals. First, I expect less organized mobilizations to have more influence on politics because the lack of central organization allows for broader collective action that can mobilize more people to the streets and gain public support, as a more horizontal movements could be perceived as more trustworthy. Second, new collective actors may be better equipped to navigate the intermediation crisis because, due to their nov-

elty, they are perceived as non-traditional actors and as closer to people's needs. Third, social movement organizations with flexible structures can be more adaptable to an accelerated and demanding social context, increasing their capacity to mediate expectations and exert political influence. Fourth, the mechanisms of territorial connection that collective actors develop can be crucial for their political impact because they can function as a transmission chains between society's inputs and collective action. This can generate more adequate strategy and increase the likelihood of political impact. Fifth, I expect that employing violent tactics will not be a limitation on the political influence of collective action. It is possible that the widespread mistrust of institutions and the generalized challenge to authority that have characterized recent protest cycles in Western liberal democracies (Guzmán-Concha, 2024; Bringel et al., 2021; Almeida, 2023) could make violent tactics more tolerable due to the inability of political institutions and elites to mediate society's demands.

Despite these potential advantages, I expect that the political outcomes of collective action under conditions of intermediation crisis will tend to be short-term. The collective actors best suited to operate in this context—those with flexible structures, limited organizational experience, and a strong territorial focus—often lack the consolidated resources and strategic capacities needed to sustain long-term influence. As the literature has shown, resources remain crucial for structuring demands and strategies (Edwards et al., 2018), and the capacity to negotiate with institutional challengers and influential political allies is essential to achieving enduring political change or outcomes that align closely with collective demands (Tarrow, 2011; McAdam and Tarrow, 2018, 2010). In the next section, I describe and justify why Chile offers a relevant case for analyzing these theoretical expectations.

I.2 Why Study Chile?

Chile presents a good opportunity to examine collective action outcomes in an intermediation crisis scenario because the country shares characteristics of political and economic stability with developed countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), but also displays high levels of social discontent, mistrust toward institutions, and inequality, which makes it similar to Latin American and developing countries. First, Chile had been characterized by political science as one of the most politically and socially stable countries in Latin America, together with Uruguay and Costa Rica (Luna and Altman, 2011; Luna, 2024). Since the return to democracy (1990), Chile has had an outstanding macroeconomic performance, with average annual GDP growth of 7.5% between 1987 and 1997 and a significant reduction of poverty, passing from

53% in 1987 to around 6% in 2017 (Edwards, 2023). The country continued to grow economically, but not at the same pace: the average annual GDP growth between 2000 and 2010 was 4.4%, and only 3% from 2010 to 2019. Despite the economic growth, Chile is a country with high levels of income inequality. Even though the Gini Index has decreased in the last ten years, this indicator was above 0.5 between 1987 and 2003 (Edwards, 2023). Chile is one of the most unequal countries in the OECD with a Gini Index of 0.45 in 2022, being only lower than that of Costa Rica (OECD, 2022).


Social unrest began to brew early in this context. The Human Development Report by UNDP-Chile (1998) warned of a growing discontent beyond income inequality: at its core was the dissatisfaction with the unequal experience of education, pensions, and healthcare. Pinochet's dictatorship (1973-1990), carried out a neoliberal revolution that liberalized the economy, privatized many public services, and reduced the incipient welfare state (Edwards, 2023; Ramírez, 2022). As Harvey (2007) mentions, Chile was the first country to adopt a full neoliberal model, describing it as a "neoliberal experiment." The poster child of this neoliberal transformation was the privatization of the pension system, which not only entrusted for-profit entities with social security but also transformed the previously underdeveloped Chilean financial sector by channeling millions of dollars from workers' pension contributions into various markets (Tromben and Schiapacasse, 2022; Bril-Mascarenhas and Maillet, 2019).

The dictatorship enshrined the neoliberal re-architecture in the 1980 Constitution. This new Constitution formalized several authoritarian locks (Garretón et al., 1997) or constitutional traps (Atria et al., 2013) that made changing the model difficult. These legal provisions shaped the democratization process and subsequent political developments. Among the most significant authoritarian locks were the appointed senators; the rule stipulating that former presidents of the republic would become senators for life; the appointment of Pinochet as Commander-in-Chief of the Army; supramajoritarian quorums required to amend organic constitutional laws; the Constitutional Tribunal acting as a third legislative chamber; and the binomial electoral system, whose allocation of seats in Congress and the Senate tended to produce a draw between the two main coalitions (Garretón et al., 1997).¹ In this context of neoliberalism and authoritarian locks, Huneus (2014) argues that democracy in Chile is semi-sovereign. Accordingly, the discontent stemmed both from the neoliberal transformation of the 1980s and from the political rules established in the dictatorship's Constitution.

¹The appointed and senators for life were eliminated by the constitutional reform under President Ricardo Lagos in 2005. The binomial electoral system was replaced by a proportional representation system in 2015, during President Bachelet's second administration. The supramajoritarian quorums were removed in 2023 under the government of Gabriel Boric. However, the 1980 Constitution remains in force.

Second, combined with the abovementioned point, one of the main indicators of this crisis is people's increased mistrust toward various actors and institutions with different characteristics (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). According to data from the Integrated Value Survey, Chile has low levels of interpersonal trust, comparable with the regional average of South America, Central America and the Caribbean, and Africa (see Figure I.1). In addition, as Figure I.2 illustrates, Chile's interpersonal trust indicator was among the lowest in Latin America in 2022, with only Peru ranking lower.


Figure I.1: Interpersonal Trust over Time: Chile vs. Regions



The situation is no better regarding trust in different institutions. As Figure I.3 shows, the level of trust in various institutions in Chile decreased over time. At the same time, fewer than forty percent of people displayed full or partial trust toward most institutions. The only exception to this trend is trust in the police, although it has declined in the latest survey. A new report by the UNDP-Chile (2017) reaffirms people's discontent with inequality in various sectors and shows a stark increase in distrust toward most institutions.

Third, Chile experienced a long decade of social mobilization between 2006 and 2019 (Canales, 2022; Donoso and von Bülow, 2017). During the 1990s,


Figure I.2: Interpersonal Trust over Time: Chile vs. other Latin American countries



Chile saw almost no mobilizations that escalated significantly. The center-left governments of the Concertation of Parties for Democracy, a political coalition that held power during four consecutive terms following the return to democracy (1990–2010)², carried out a strategy based on deactivating mobilizations to avoid an authoritarian backlash, but not without social costs. Many social movements and activists who had been allies of the Concertation during the struggle against Pinochet began a process of detachment from the coalition (Garretón, 2016; Bidegain, 2017; Somma and Bargsted, 2015). The most evident cases were those of the indigenous Mapuche organizations in the 1990s, which generated the radicalization of a faction of the movement (Bidegain, 2017), and the progressive detachment of the students' movement during the 2000s (Donoso, 2013; Von Bülow and Bidegain Ponte, 2015).

²This coalition was formed by the Christian Democratic Party, Socialist Party, Party for Democracy, and Radical Social Democratic Party. The origins of the coalition lay in their joint opposition against Pinochet's regime during the democratic transition and the 1988 referendum that ended the dictatorship.

Figure I.3: Trust in Institutions in Chile over Time



The decade of the 2010s was strongly characterized by several protest cycles. Students' movement led important protests between 2011 and 2013. Some of the main leaders of the current center-left government (2022–2026) were former presidents of student federations (Donoso, 2017; Ponce, 2024; Von Bülow and Bidegain Ponte, 2015). Likewise, different environmental and local mobilizations also emerged. The most iconic mobilization being against the installation of the hydroelectric project HydroAysen in the Chilean Patagonia (Schaeffer, 2017; Schiappacasse et al., 2024). In 2016, the National Workers' Coordinator No+AFP led a protest cycle against the private pension system, known as the AFP system.³ Similarly, the feminist movement originated in the universities of the country after cases of sexual abuse in several institutions in 2018. The movement's main demands went against the abuse and harassment in the universities, but as part of a bigger fight, they also protested against the patriarchal society.

The long decade of mobilization in Chile ended with the so-called *Estallido Social* (social outbreak), the most important protest cycle in the country since the return of democracy in 1990 (Somma and Bargsted, 2015; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020). In October 2019, during the second year of the second administration of Piñera, an expert committee decided to increase the fare of the Metro of Santiago

³This is the Spanish acronym for Pension Funds Administrators. These administrators are private for-profit institutions that invest the workers' funds in different financial instruments and compete to increase their affiliate portfolio.

by EUR 0.030. Secondary school students jumped the turnstiles at a few metro stations in downtown Santiago to evade fares. At that moment, the mobilization seemed to be a minor protest in some metro stations in the capital, so much so that Piñera sustained in an interview in the same week that Chile was an oasis in Latin America (Luna, 2024).

However, the situation dramatically changed on October 18th, 2019. The fare evasion cases increased, and workers and non-students joined the demonstration. The government responded by deploying the police. The repression within the metro stations increased, and the government closed all the subway networks on a Friday afternoon during rush hour, when around two million people tried to return home using public transport. With the closing of the Metro, the transport system collapsed in the capital, generating widespread discontent and initiating further protests. The clashes with the police ensued. The protests escalated into violence in various places around the city, with twenty metro stations being burned, and several lootings of shops taking place (Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020; Somma et al., 2021; Canales, 2022). The next day, the protests expanded to the rest of the country.

The government declared a constitutional state of exception, restricting the movement of people and employing the armed forces for public security. Neither the protests nor the repressions ended. Many international human rights organizations expressed concerns about human rights violations during the demonstrations. More than twenty people died during the first two weeks of mobilization, and thousands were injured by the police and armed forces (Somma et al., 2021; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020).

To process the conflict, Piñera called for a political dialogue among all political parties with a presence in the Parliament. On November 15th, 2019, the political forces announced an unprecedented constitution-making process, starting with a referendum for the people to decide whether they wanted to begin the process of drafting a new constitution, and through which type of constitutional body they wanted to carry out this work.⁴

The social mobilization in Chile coincided with similar processes in the region—Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Nicaragua between 2019 and 2021—as well as in other parts of the world, such as Hong Kong in 2019, the Yellow Vest protests in France in 2018, and Thailand in 2020 (Guzmán-Concha, 2024; Bringel et al., 2021). All these experiences of massive and disruptive mobilization began with a specific issue—for example, an increase in fuel prices in Ecuador and France, a tax reform in Colombia, and an extradition law in Hong Kong—and evolved into systemic, complex, multi-issue demands related to improving living conditions and democratization. These contemporary cases also share the absence of leading

⁴I will elaborate on the details of the process in Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation.

social movement organizations; in general, new actors and organizations tended to emerge during the protest cycles rather than before them. At the same time, in all these cases, the state responded with violence, leading to numerous reports of police abuse, injuries, and in many instances, deaths (Bringel et al., 2021).

This type of mobilization is also similar to the anti-austerity protests in Europe that emerged as a reaction to the 2008 financial crisis and the public spending and social policy cuts carried out by governments (Della Porta, 2015), as well as to the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States (Calhoun, 2013). These two protest cycles were likewise characterized by the absence of clear leaders and organizations at the forefront of mobilizations, massive and disruptive demonstrations, and multi-issue demands connected to broader frames—in this case, austerity and precarity.

Thus, mobilizations marked by the absence of leading social movement organizations, the combination of peaceful and violent tactics by protesters, the emergence of new political actors or organizations during the protests, and often harsh state repression are not phenomena exclusive to Chile. This type of social mobilization is characteristic of the 21st century and is closely intertwined with the crisis of intermediation (see section I.1.2 of this thesis).

That said, Chile is a useful case for exploring the political outcomes of collective action in a scenario of intermediation crisis. I focus the empirical analysis on the political events that have taken place in the country since the 2019 social outbreak. Additionally, the Chilean case illustrates a generalized state of distrust affecting most institutions, which allows me to inquire into the capacity of collective action to impact politics in an apparently stable country but one experiencing an acute intermediation crisis.

I.3 Mixed-Methods Strategy

Since studying collective action political outcomes implies addressing different political impacts (Bosi and Uba, 2021), an integrative methodological design is required, as well as distinct levels of aggregation. In this thesis, I analyzed three political outcomes: political preferences, electoral behavior, and political trajectories. In addition, I analyzed the demobilization process of the students and the No+AFP movement as cases of collective actors that have failed to face the intermediation crisis. In this context, I used a mixed methodological strategy to examine the effects of collective action since the 2019 social outbreak on different political outcomes. It is a contribution in itself, considering that qualitative studies have dominated the subfield of collective action outcomes (Bosi and Uba, 2021; Amenta et al., 2018; McAdam and Tarrow, 2010). In this manner, I divide this dissertation into four empirical chapters (articles).

In the first article, I analyzed the 2019 social outbreak's impact on political attitudes and electoral behavior regarding exposure to protests. I developed this part of the research with Professor Toni Rodon. This article employed a quasi-experimental design that combined three methodological approaches: (i) an Unexpected Event during Survey Design, which consists of using survey fieldwork that coincides with the occurrence of unforeseen phenomena, naturally dividing the respondents into two groups; people surveyed right before (control group) and after (treatment group) the unexpected event (as if the treatment was randomly assigned) (Muñoz et al., 2020; Muñoz and Anduiza, 2019). I used a Chilean survey whose fieldwork coincided with the social revolt. Thus, this allowed us to address the immediate effect of the phenomena on the prominence of welfare state issues as a proxy of political preferences. I focused on welfare state issues because the social outbreak strongly challenged the country's inequality in its different dimensions (Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020; Canales, 2022). The welfare state issues were therefore a good approximation to the effect of the protest's demands. (ii) A longitudinal panel survey design, which was helpful to test how enduring the effect of the social outbreak was on political preferences. The survey included questions on political positions regarding welfare state issues, which was helpful because it allowed us to test more concretely whether the protests affected political preferences. (iii) We use a difference-in-differences design to assess the impact of exposure to the social outbreak on political behavior. For this purpose, we constructed an original dataset on georeferenced data of the protests and polling stations of the 2017 and 2021 presidential elections, which we merged with data of electoral results of both elections. This allowed us to analyze how the 2019 social outbreak may have impacted politics, following the interrelated approach of Bosi (2016). Thus, this analysis focused on the impact of social outbreak on preferences and electoral behavior. Yet it did not address the main institutional change derived immediately after the social outbreak, which was the constitution-making process (2021-2022).

This was precisely what I did in the second paper. More concretely, to address the role of collective actors in the unprecedented constitution-making process, I analyzed which social activists were able to get elected into the Constitutional Convention (2021-2022).⁵ This analysis was structured on an observational mixed methodological design, which integrated quantitative methods based on the multivariate analysis of an original dataset of the former Convention delegates' trajectories and a Chilean longitudinal panel survey, with twenty-five in-depth interviews with Convention delegates and candidates who did not win a seat in the Conven-

⁵This chapter is based on the published article: Rozas-Bugueño, J. (2024). Between Hope and Disaffection: The Chilean Constitution-Making Process and the Intermediation Crisis. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 57(2), 274-281.

tion. In this manner, this paper allowed me to reflect on who benefited from the political opportunity of the Convention and the intermediation crisis and why they could benefit from it. The analysis also raised further questions about the post-Convention political trajectories of these actors: have they remained in politics or not?

In the third article, I studied the political trajectories of the former Convention delegates after the rejection of the new constitutional proposal in the September 2022 referendum. This article aimed to analyze the interrelation of two outcomes: the creation of a political institution—the Convention—and continued political engagement in terms of individual trajectories. In this chapter, I employed a mixed-methods quasi-experimental design to estimate the impact of having been part of the Convention on subsequent political involvement (treatment assignment) based on two strategies. First, using an innovative methodological approach, I compared the political trajectories of former delegates (treatment group) with those of candidates who narrowly lost the Convention elections (control group). The data came from an original longitudinal dataset of the political trajectories of both former delegates and control group members. The analysis I applied in this case consisted of a difference-in-differences approach to compare the political trajectories of both groups. Second, to examine the mechanisms underlying the causal relations, I analyzed twenty-two in-depth interviews with former Constitutional Convention delegates.

Finally, in the fourth paper, I addressed the demobilization of two iconic social movements of the past thirty years in Chile: the student and No+AFP movements.⁶ This article enhanced the discussion around the collective action political outcomes in Chile through an in-depth analysis of two cases that could not maintain their political influence in light of the crisis intermediation. The chapter adopted a most-different systems comparative design, as the student and No+AFP movements differ in their demands, characteristics, and historical impacts. I relied on qualitative analysis based on thirty-one in-depth interviews with activists from both movements, protest event data, and secondary sources.

Overall, the thesis's methodological strategy combined quasi-experimental, observational, and qualitative approaches to address different types of political outcomes of collective action. This integrative strategy allowed me to align research questions, levels of analysis, and methodological tools: political preferences and behaviors were analyzed through multivariate techniques; the entry and

⁶This article is based on the published book chapter: Rozas-Bugueño, J. (2024). Efectos de la crisis de intermediación en los movimientos sociales: desmovilización de los movimientos estudiantil y No+AFP en Chile. In *Encrucijadas de la resistencia en América Latina: Movimientos sociales en época de crisis y polarización*, eds. Camila Ponce, Natalia Miranda, Benjamín Tejerina and Camilo Tamayo Gómez, 33–53. Ariadna Ediciones–Universidad del País Vasco: Santiago de Chile.

experience of social activists in the Convention were examined using mixed methods; political trajectories over time were studied through quantitative analysis; and the comparative analysis of the student and No+AFP movements was conducted using an in-depth qualitative approach.

Chapter 1

PROTESTS AND POLITICS. THE IMPACT OF THE 2019 SOCIAL OUTBREAK ON PUBLIC OPINION AND VOTING PREFERENCES

Abstract

Do large protests reshape social preferences and voting behavior? Using Chile's 2019 *Estallido Social*—a major wave of social mobilization—we examine the protests' impact on public opinion and electoral outcomes, contributing to a broader literature with mixed empirical findings. Our study employs a three-pronged approach: an Unexpected Event during Survey Design (UESD), longitudinal panel data analysis, and a difference-in-differences strategy. We find that protests temporarily shifted public opinion, heightening attention to welfare state issues central to the protesters' demands. However, this effect was short-lived, with attitudes reverting to pre-protest levels. Despite this, areas with greater protest exposure later exhibited increased electoral support for both the non-traditional left and the traditional right. These findings suggest that protests can generate both centrifugal and centripetal electoral shifts, highlighting their complex role in shaping political landscapes in the short and the medium term.

Keywords: Social outbreak; Public opinion, Electoral behavior, Quasi-experiment design, Chile

Chapter 1 is co-authored with Toni Rodon, Associate Professor at Pompeu Fabra University and the supervisor of this dissertation.

1.1 Introduction

Do protests shape public opinion and voting preferences? Protests are part of the politics of contemporary democracies and very often emerge as an expression of grievances by a (large) segment of the population. Protests and social movements may represent non-institutional actors' vehicles of political change, and may even shape public opinion and political behavior (Bosi et al., 2016; Enos et al., 2019; Wasow, 2020; Amenta et al., 2018).

The specialized literature on the political outcomes of protests has predominantly focused on policy change and legislative production, while public opinion and electoral behavior remain less studied (Amenta et al., 2018; McAdam and Tarrow, 2010). When these topics are addressed, the analysis tends to rely on qualitative and in-depth approaches and often focuses on developed democracies, such as the United States and Western Europe (Amenta et al., 2018; Bosi and Uba, 2021; McAdam and Tarrow, 2010). In these contexts, the empirical quantitative literature has found mixed results overall. Although some research highlights that protests can influence politics in ways that align with the demands of most protesters (Anria and Niedzwiecki, 2016; Castro and Retamal, 2024; Gillion and Soule, 2018), other studies suggest that protests may reinforce the status quo of

the political system, even provoking policy changes in the opposite direction to the one intended by the protesters (Almeida, 2008; Amenta et al., 2018). The limited number of studies that have examined the relationship between protest events and electoral behavior have also reached different conclusions (Enos et al., 2019; Wasow, 2020; Rodon and Guinjoan, 2022; Castro and Retamal, 2024).

This article contributes to the literature on the relationship between protests, public opinion, and electoral behavior by examining the 2019 Chilean social outbreak (*Estallido Social*), a wave of massive protests that marked a turning point in the country's recent political history (Somma et al., 2021; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020; Guzmán-Concha, 2023). Studying the Chilean case, the article contributes to the comparative literature in at least three important ways. First, utilizing different empirical strategies (observational and quasi-experimental), it sheds light on the causal effect of protests on public opinion in a literature in which observational analysis is still common (Enos et al., 2019; Bosi and Uba, 2021; Castro and Retamal, 2024; Wasow, 2020). Second, we focus on the consequences of a protest rather than its causes, specifically analyzing its impact on electoral behavior. As mentioned above, this topic is less explored in the literature on social mobilization, although with important exceptions, such as the works of Enos et al. (2019), Wasow (2020), and Gillion and Soule (2018) in the United States, Chau and Wan (2024) in Hong Kong and Castro and Retamal (2024) in Chile. Finally, we contribute to analyzing the political consequences of a contemporary social mobilization phenomenon, often called a social outbreak. In several Latin American countries—such as Ecuador, Colombia, Chile, Nicaragua, and Peru between 2018 and 2021—these protests have been unstructured, disruptive, and marked by a broad range of social demands, distinguishing them from other protest cycles of this century and the late 20th century (Bringel et al., 2021; Almeida, 2023).

The Chilean social outbreak began in October 2019, when high school students launched a protest to avoid the rise in subway fares in Santiago. This act of defiance responded to the government's announcement of a 30 Chilean *pesos* (EUR 0.030) increase in ticket prices. Initially, these protests appeared confined to downtown Santiago, with limited political and geographical reach. Reflecting this perception, Clemente Pérez, a former president of Metro Santiago and Christian Democrat politician, remarked on a television program on October 16, 2019: "Guys, this didn't take off. You don't have the support of the people" (El Mostrador, 2019). The conditions dramatically changed on Friday, October 18. The students continued with the subway fare evasions, and later in the day, adults and workers joined the protest. In the afternoon, the government increased the police presence in the stations and nearby locations, and clashes between police and citizens followed. Starting at 5:00 p.m., Metro stations began to close, causing a collapse of the public transportation system across the capital.

Twenty metro stations were burned on Friday afternoon, and several looting


and disturbances occurred across Santiago (Somma et al., 2021; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020). The next day, both peaceful and violent protests expanded across the country. The government decreed constitutional exception estate for the entire national territory, giving public security control to the armed forces. At this moment, people no longer demonstrated against the increase in metro tickets but also expressed broader discontent. Welfare state issues were particularly salient, such as issues related to education, pensions, health, housing, and inequality (Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020; Somma et al., 2021). The state reacted with harsh repression. According to CIPER (2020), 126 people suffered eye injuries from police action only in the first two weeks of protests. Repression in the country raised the concerns of international organizations regarding the violations of demonstrators' human rights during the outbreak (Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020). The so-called “greatest demonstration of Chile” took place on October 25, 2019, when around 1.2 million people mobilized in Santiago (Somma et al., 2021).

After around a month of daily protests nationwide (see Figure 1.1), the government and most political parties signed an agreement to open a constitutional process. However, the protests continued until the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. Considering the period from October 18, 2019, to March 14, 2020—the day when the Chilean health system recorded the first case of COVID-19 in the country—4,369 protest events took place, based on data from the Observatory of Conflicts of the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES).¹ The social outbreak mobilization process resulted in a constituent body where representatives without political experience and party members occupied almost a third of the seats (Rozas-Bugueño et al., 2022). September 4, 2022, was the referendum on the constitutional proposal, and citizens rejected it with 61.9% of the votes.

Our research design follows a three-pronged strategy to examine whether the Chilean social outbreak led to a change in public opinion and political behavior. First, we use a quasi-experimental approach based on an Unexpected Event During Survey Design (Muñoz et al., 2020) and take advantage of the fact that the fieldwork of a survey coincided with the beginning of the social outbreak. In other words, the social outbreak randomly divided the survey sample into two: people surveyed right before and after the social outbreak. Second, we use panel data, which allows us to compare the same people over time. We examine within-individual changes in political attitudes over time, with an eye on the effect of the 2019 social outbreak on such attitudes. Finally, we use election data and geo-localized information on the different protests to examine whether the results of the 2017 and 2021 first-round presidential elections were affected by the proximity to protest events.

¹For more detail of the data, please review Section A.1.6 of the Appendix.

Figure 1.1: Distribution of Protests in Chile (Jan. 2019-Apr. 2020)



Findings show a realignment of public opinion in line with the protesters' demands. After the Chilean social outbreak, people prioritized welfare state issues as the country's main problems. This effect, however, was relatively short-term since welfare issues reached similar levels in 2021—around two years after the *Estallido Social*—compared to before the social outbreak. Regarding the impact on electoral behavior, the findings show that social outbreak protests positively impacted non-traditional left and traditional right voting in the 2021 election. The demonstrations also negatively impacted far-right voting. In other words, there was a centripetal dynamic on the right of the political spectrum—with the mainstream right performing better than the far right—and a (small) centrifugal effect on the left—the far left performing better than the mainstream left.

1.2 Protests, Public Opinion, and Electoral Behavior

Protests are part of the repertoires of collective action that non-political elite actors can use to put their demands in the public space (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015; Enos et al., 2019; Wasow, 2020). Protests are not homogeneous and differ in terms of

being violent or peaceful, the presence (or absence) of social movement organizations, and the capacity to mobilize people in terms of numbers of demonstrators and their diversity (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015; Wouters, 2019; Dahlum, 2019). The study of protest events has a long tradition in political science. Literature mainly tried to understand, among others, the emergence of social movements, why protests come in waves, who are more likely to participate in a protest, and the relationship between protests and institutions (Bosi and Uba, 2021; Amenta et al., 2010, 2018; Giugni, 2008).

The consequences of protests have also received scholarly attention, mainly distinguishing between three different outcomes: biographical, that is, the impact of protests on political socialization (Anoll et al., 2025; McAdam, 1989; Grasso et al., 2019); cultural, i.e. how protests shape a particular contentious culture with the institutions and close networks (Amenta and Polletta, 2019; Greve et al., 2006; van Dyke and Taylor, 2018); and political-institutional (Amenta et al., 2018; Giugni, 2008; McAdam and Tarrow, 2010). On the latter, works have examined the impact of protests on elections, public opinion and political attitudes, the creation of political parties, political regime changes, and policy outcomes (Bosi and Uba, 2021; Giugni, 2008; Amenta et al., 2018; McAdam and Tarrow, 2010; Zarate Tenorio, 2014). We are interested in protests' effects on public opinion and elections.

For analytical reasons, we divide the following theoretical discussion into two parts: (i) the impact of protests on public opinion and (ii) the effect of protests on voting.

1.2.1 Protests' impact on public opinion

The literature identifies different mechanisms that suggest a potential positive relationship between protests and public opinion, which can manifest in changing the salience of the issues or in shifts in people's political positions regarding policies or moral discussions. A first explanation argues that protests often impact public opinion because they persuade the audience through an effective message, gaining support from demonstrators and bystanders (Amenta et al., 2010; Madestam et al., 2013; Mueller, 2024; Steinert-Threlkeld et al., 2022; Wouters, 2019). Social movement scholars have addressed this process from the collective action frame theory (Bonilla and Tillery, 2020; Franceschet, 2004), which argues that not only the protest actions are important but also the topics that protests mobilize and how they can make sense among people. Protesters' demands may be internalized by the people exposed to the demonstrations, being participants or observers, changing their perception in line with the claims of the protest (Muñoz and Anduiza, 2019; Enos et al., 2019; Wouters, 2019). Mobilizations may also influence media and politicians by setting the agenda and pushing people in favor of their

demands. For instance, Wasow (2020) shows that civil rights non-violent protests in the United States (1960-1972) generated an agenda-seeding effect, capturing the media's, politicians, and public opinion's attention and generating support for civil rights demands. Similarly, Wouters (2019) sustains, using a survey experiment conducted in Belgium and the United States, that the protests are more persuasive when they can present an attractive collective identity, which awakes solidarity and support by the public.

While the previous explanation offers a mechanism for why protests should trigger a change in public opinion, many have contested its rationale. Protests are often filtered through people's ideological lenses or the media, and politicians strive to set the agenda when protests occur, in favor, or against, or by ignoring it. Protests can be muddled in the battle of the narrative, and its potential effects may be diluted (Bonilla and Tillery, 2020; Wasow, 2020; Wouters, 2019; Wouters and Walgrave, 2017; Franceschet, 2004).

Second, the literature has also highlighted that the capacity of protests to put pressure on institutions depends on the presence of violence during the protest and especially the source of violence (Gamson, 1975; Huff and Kruszewska, 2016; Muñoz and Anduiza, 2019; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Dahlum, 2019). The seminal work of Gamson (1975) on the challenging organizations in the United States exposed that organized groups that used violent and disruptive tactics changed public opinion, which helped them achieve their demands compared to those that employed pacific ones. Yet, recent studies have shown the opposite. Violent protests may generate less adhesion to the mobilization claims because they are perceived as a less legitimate political action (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Huff and Kruszewska, 2016; Muñoz and Anduiza, 2019; Dahlum, 2019). Using a survey experiment implemented in Poland, Huff and Kruszewska (2016) found that people are more likely to support negotiations between the government and protesters when the latter employ non-violent tactics. For their part, Muñoz and Anduiza (2019), using an unexpected violent riot in Barcelona in 2016, show that exposure to violence diminished the support for the social movement. Yet, the findings of other works point to different directions. Enos et al. (2019) conclude that the 1992 violent riots in Los Angeles (US) generated an impact in favor of the mobilization, especially among liberal people. Something similar occurred in recent protest waves in Latin America. Although protests in Colombia, Chile, and Ecuador in 2019 were characterized by their violence and disruption, they changed public opinion in favor of the protests' demands, triggered policy changes, and preceded the change of governments (Almeida, 2023; Bringel et al., 2021).

The other type of violence linked to protests is violence coming from state institutions. As Tarrow (2011) explains, state repression is a dimension of the political opportunity structure that is generally considered a threat to social movements and activists. However, the literature disagrees on whether the state's repression

can be a threat or an opportunity for the goals of the mobilization. It can demobilize protesters but encourage mobilization, activating solidarity actions and increasing media coverage. The work of Reny and Newman (2021) illustrates this. The authors show that the George Floyd protests in the United States had a negative impact on Americans' support for the police, thereby showing that repression can generate an effect in favor of demonstrations.

A third theoretical explanation related to the protests' impact is the magnitude of the demonstrations—the scale of the events and the diversity of the protesters (Wouters, 2019; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Madestam et al., 2013). Authors such as Agnone (2007) and Enos et al. (2019) agree that when the protests are considered “dramatic events,” they are better able to attract the attention of the public. In their comparative research, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) show that the size of the non-violent demonstrations makes a difference.

Against the backdrop of previous explanations, we have different expectations. Firstly, we expect that the Chilean social outbreak generated a realignment in public opinion (issues salience and modification of the people's political position regarding policies) in line with the protests' demands because of the demonstrations' characteristics. As Castro and Retamal (2024) mentioned, the social outbreak was an event that Chileans could hardly remain indifferent to. We expect the social outbreak to increase the salience of welfare state issues and the position of pro-welfare policies. The reason is that protests primarily focused on the redistributive or left-wing side of welfare state issues, linking the people's discontent with several welfare issues, from the inequality of wealth to the disparity in the access to and experience of public services, such as health, education, pensions, and housing (Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020; Somma et al., 2021). We suggest that:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): The social outbreak realigned public opinion in favor of the protests' demands, primarily focused on welfare state issues

There may also be differences in the public perception of the problems, depending on the intensity of the exposure to the social outbreak. Recent research has shown that temporal and physical proximity, in addition to the number of protests that the people were exposed to, can amplify the impact of protests on people's attitudes and preferences (Branton et al., 2015; Disi-Pavlic, 2021; Wasow, 2020; Enos et al., 2019; Rodon and Guinjoan, 2022; Wallace et al., 2014). Thus, we expect that time facilitated the internalization of the protesters' demands, leading to a stronger prioritization of welfare state issues. Similarly, we expect that individuals who experienced a greater intensity of protests may have been more profoundly impacted due to their heightened exposure.

Hypothesis 2.1 (H2.1): The perception of welfare-related public issues be-

comes more pronounced as exposure to a social outbreak increases over time.

Hypothesis 2.2 (H2.2): The perception of welfare-related public issues becomes more pronounced as the number of protests is greater.

1.2.2 Protests' effect on voting

Regarding the impact of protests on electoral behavior, the research on movements and protests of advanced democracies of the Western world has dominated the literature. There is evidence from studies in the United States that there are differences in voting after the emergence of protest waves, such as the civil rights mobilization in the 1960s and 1970s, which positively influenced the vote for Democrats in the long-run (Wasow, 2020); the anti-Iraq war movement, mobilizing adherents during the campaigns of Dean in 2004 and Obama in 2008 (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010); the 2009 Tax Day protests coordinated by the Tea Party Movement and their positive effect on Republican votes in 2010 mid-term elections (Madestam et al., 2013); the riots of 1992 in Los Angeles, generating an impact on a local referendum in favor of liberal preferences for racial minorities-targeted public goods (Enos et al., 2019); and the research of Gillion and Soule (2018) that shows that liberal protests increased the vote for the Democrats and conservative demonstrations the vote for the Republicans in the United States House of Representatives between 1960 and 1990.

There are also studies in Europe and other developed countries related to how contentious politics can generate change in electoral dynamics, such as the Greens in Germany and in Western Europe in general or the case of the 15-M movement and *Podemos* in Spain (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010; Flesher Fominaya and Feenstra, 2023). Ellinas and Lamprianou (2024) show how protests against the far-right in Greece negatively impact voting for the Gold Dawn Party in national elections (2009-2019). Similarly, the study of Chau and Wan (2024) accounts that state repression in Hong Kong's 2019 protests reduced the electoral support for the regime.

Literature focusing on Latin America has examined cases such as the MAS movement in Bolivia and its (positive) effect on the support for Evo Morales (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010); the Uruguayan Broad Front, whose roots in civil society and its mobilization have helped it politically (Bidegain et al., 2022); or the long-term impact of students' protests in Chile on the political renewal culminating in the 2021 electoral victory of Gabriel Boric (Ponce, 2024). Recently, Castro and Retamal (2024) have shown that the 2019 social revolts in Chile and Bolivia had an electoral effect. On the one hand, the riots increased turnout in Chile; on the other, the protests favored voting for non-incumbents in Bolivia.

Castro and Retamal (2024) argue that protests changed electoral outcomes by positively impacting people's political efficacy. This argument aligns well with the findings of Enos et al. (2019) and Wasow (2020) for the United States, which show that protests impact electoral outcomes because they trigger a change in attitudes and public opinion; one of the most common ways for social movements and protests to influence politics. In a similar vein, literature argues that the proximity of people to protests can increase the magnitude of protests' impact (Enos et al., 2019; Wasow, 2020; Branton et al., 2015; Disi-Pavlic, 2021; Rodon and Guinjoan, 2022).

Considering the criticism of inequality and the welfare-state demands raised during the Chilean social outbreak, we expect that the protests favored left-wing candidates, especially in places geographically closer to the protests. However, we also expect that the protest increased voting for the non-traditional left because the social outbreak had an anti-establishment component as one of their core characteristics (Luna, 2021; Rozas-Bugueño, 2024; Castro and Retamal, 2024). As Rozas-Bugueño (2024) argues, mainstream political and social organizations were blamed for the crisis in Chile, an aspect that was very pronounced in the composition of the Constitutional Convention, a constitution-making body created after the revolt to address the popular discontent. More than 60% of the delegates did not have any political experience and came from new territorial social organizations. The process had in its core not only harsh criticism against the political elite but also against traditional social organizations, such as trade unions and students' unions. The social outbreak protests are therefore considered part of an intermediation crisis (Rozas-Bugueño, 2024). Thus, we propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): The social outbreak electorally benefited the non-traditional left.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): The higher the proximity to the protests, the higher the positive impact of the social outbreak on support for the non-traditional left voting.

1.3 Research Design and Analysis

Our research design follows a three-pronged strategy. First, we use an Unexpected Event during Survey Design (UESD) to examine the immediate effect of the social outbreak on public opinion in terms of issue salience. Second, we employ individual-level panel data to analyze the social outbreak effect over time by ex-

ploring within-individual changes in the support for the protest demands. Finally, exploiting georeferenced protest events and election returns, we use a difference-in-difference (DID) strategy to analyze the social outbreak's impact on voting sharing, comparing the 2017 and 2021 first-round presidential elections.² In the following sections, we explain the methodological strategy behind each design and the corresponding analysis of each empirical approach.

1.4 UESD: Immediate Impact of the Social Outbreak on Public Opinion

1.4.1 Data and operationalization

The Unexpected Event during Survey Design (UESD) seeks to take advantage of an unforeseen event during the survey fieldwork. It allows researchers to recreate the conditions of a quasi-random treatment (Muñoz et al., 2020). The core aspect of this design is to assess the effect of an unexpected event on an outcome of interest. Political science research has used different phenomena as unexpected events, such as terrorist attacks, armed conflicts, natural disasters, corruption scandals, as well as protests, to test their effects on the political approval of government and policy attitudes (Muñoz et al., 2020; Branton et al., 2015; Motta, 2018; Muñoz and Anduiza, 2019).

According to Muñoz et al. (2020), a UESD must fulfill the assumptions of excludability and ignorability to be considered unexpected. The excludability assumption requires that the survey fieldwork does not overlap with any event other than the phenomenon of interest. The ignorability assumption suggests that the event only affects the outcomes, not the likelihood of responding to the survey. This is ensured because respondents are unaware that an unexpected event will occur; therefore, their treatment status (exposure to the event) is determined solely by the event's occurrence.

The Chilean social outbreak fulfills these two criteria. Firstly, it fulfills the excludability assumption because the only relevant and unexpected event during the period of survey fieldwork was the social outbreak. Even though the high school students' subway fare evasions preceded the October 18th revolt, these events were not unusual because the Chilean students had organized recurrent mobilizations since the 2006 penguin rebellion (Donoso, 2017). In the 2009-2019 period, students' protests represented almost 20% of the total protests in Chile, which were only surpassed by workers' demonstrations (Somma et al., 2020).

²For a detailed review of the data sources, operationalization, and descriptive statistics, see Sections A.1.3 and A.2.1 of the Appendix.

Secondly, the social outbreak fulfills the assumption of ignorability because of the nature of the mobilization. Different scholars have pointed out that the spontaneity, lack of formal leaders, and multi-issue demands characterized the revolt of October 2019 (Somma et al., 2021; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020). These characteristics strongly differ from the previous protest cycles, which were led by social movement organizations and had delimited sectorial demands (Donoso and von Bülow, 2017). Thus, the 2019 social outbreak was unforeseeable. The data on search hits for social outbreak-related keywords in Google supports the ignorability assumption, as searches related to the protests showed a clear increase only after the event began.³

To carry out this design, we use the *Pulso Ciudadano* Survey conducted by *Activa Research*, a Chilean consultant public opinion company, whose fieldwork took place between 10 and 30 October 2019. This survey is a cross-sectional online poll with a non-probabilistic sample with national coverage based on quotes from the population's demographic characteristics,⁴ which were selected from the online panel of the *OpinandoOnline* company. The sample had a response rate of 12%. The sample was 1,304 individuals over 18 years old who live in different regions of the country and are part of all socioeconomic groups. The social outbreak cut the sample into two parts: 495 respondents surveyed before October 18 and 809 respondents surveyed after the event.

We delineate the exposure to the social outbreak as our main treatment (= 1), considering the people surveyed since October 19, considering this day also as treated.⁵ This event represents a compound treatment, with the exposure to massive protests, police repression, and the simultaneous combination of violent and peaceful tactics by the demonstrators (Somma et al., 2021; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020). The outcomes of interests are the people's priorities measured through the question, "Which are the three main problems of Chile at this moment?" We selected the issues of crime, drug trafficking, immigration, insecurity, environment, Indigenous people, human rights, pensions, health, education, housing, and inequality from the list of possible responses to the question to have a broad and diverse set of priorities to address the respondents' preferences. We coded these issues as binary variables (selected issue = 1). Although we analyze all twelve issues, our main focus is on pensions, health, education, housing, and inequality outcomes, as these serve as a proxy for the welfare state demands of the social outbreak. Thus, the other issues provide a comparison point to evaluate the salience of welfare state-related topics in public opinion after the social outbreak.

Regarding the variables that measure exposure intensity, we use the COES

³See Figure A.6 of the Appendix.

⁴The sample was stratified by gender, age, socioeconomic group, and urban-rural zone.

⁵We took this day as the beginning of the treatment assignment because the protests massively started around at 18.00 in Santiago (Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020; Somma et al., 2021)

Conflict Observatory protest events dataset to generate a variable, counting the number of protests during the day the respondents were surveyed in their region of residence. We code the day of surveying as the distance between the surveying day and October 18.

In addition, we include several covariates to control the effect of the social outbreak on the salience of welfare-state issues. These are an individual's gender (woman = 1), age, education, occupation, nationality (Chilean = 1), ideology, identification with government coalition (= 1), and geographical zone of residence. It is worth noting that there was a slight imbalance between the covariates of the respondents surveyed before and after the beginning of the social outbreak, with particularly relevant differences in age, education, occupation, and ideology. To address this potential threat to validity, we implement a propensity score optimal matching based on gender, age, education, occupation, nationality, ideology, political closeness to the incumbent, and geographical zone of residence. We chose this matching over non-parametric and coarsened exact matching because the former is less efficient when dealing with multiple covariates, and the latter significantly reduces the number of observations in the groups. After matching, the groups are completely balanced, with no statistical difference across the covariates. The matching reduced the total number of observations, having 495 observations in each group.⁶

1.4.2 Analysis

Figure 1.2 shows the main results of the UESD. It displays the coefficients of several models exploring the effect of the social outbreak on the perception of different issues as the country's main problems. All models include fixed effects by the geographical area where the respondents live and heteroskedastic robust standard errors.⁷

Results show that individuals were more likely to be concerned about inequality, pensions, and education after the beginning of the social outbreak. In substantive terms, individuals interviewed right after the beginning of the social outbreak were between 10-15 percent more likely to mention these issues than individuals


⁶Without matching, the results are substantially similar. For more detailed information on balance and matching, see Tables A.13 and A.14 in the Appendix.

⁷We prefer LPMs as the interpretation of regression coefficients as it is generally more straightforward than in other models, and the results tend to describe the same patterns (Wooldridge, 2012). In addition, we implemented weights in estimating models to account for the non-probabilistic condition of the sample. We construct the weights based on the population marginal distribution of gender, age, education, Chilean nationality, and geographical residence based on the 2017 Census, and the estimations and projections of the Chilean population of the National Statistics Institute (INE in Spanish).

surveyed the days before. In contrast, the social outbreak decreased individuals' attention to crime, drug trafficking, immigration, and insecurity.

We see that the social outbreak led to a realignment of issues' salience and not only to a change in some isolated attitudes. Results can be viewed as three different attitudinal forces: welfare-state issues (pensions, health, education, housing, and inequality), post-material issues (environment, Indigenous people, human rights, and immigration), and public security issues (crime, drug trafficking, insecurity). The social outbreak increased the salience of pensions, education, and inequality, precisely those issues capitalized by the social movements as the country's most important problems. Crucially, after the social outbreak, the salience of the other outcomes decreased or did not change. Overall, and as expected, we find that the social outbreak only increased the salience of welfare state issues and did not significantly affect or decrease the salience of the other topics because of the welfare-oriented demands of the social outbreak.

Figure 1.2: Robust Linear Probability Models to Predict Welfare State Problems Perception



Note: Coefficients are extracted from LPMs, shown in Table A.11 in the Appendix. Lines represent 95% CI.

Regarding the intensity of the exposure, we replicate the same models but with the inclusion of interaction terms: first, between the treatment and the day the survey took place for each respondent and, second, between the treatment and the number of protests by region. Figure 1.3 shows no significant effects of any interaction term between the treatment and the day of the survey. In contrast,

it shows that the interaction between the treatment and the number of protests by day and region is only statistically relevant for the health outcome ($p < 0.01$). Thus, for each additional protest the respondents were exposed to after the beginning of the social outbreak, the probability of perceiving health as one of the three main problems in Chile increased by one per cent.

We implemented several robustness checks to test our results' internal validity and coherence. First, we analyzed if the respondents' ideology moderated our findings. We replicated the models but included an interaction between the treatment term and individuals' ideological self-placement. The results indicate no difference in the treatment effect across a respondent's left-right position.⁸

Second, we replicated the analysis with the sample without matching and weighting and considered treated observations until October 25. We made this decision because that day "the biggest demonstration of Chile" took place (Somma et al., 2021), which could have affected the results of the people surveyed on the last days of the fieldwork. We see almost no differences, and results show a positive effect on pensions, education, and inequality, albeit the effect not being significant on education in the case of the model without matching (10-25 October). Besides, the interactive models in the different scenarios follow a similar pattern as the main models.⁹

Third, we estimate the main models but predict the outcomes using three variables that group the twelve issues by common topics: welfare state, public security, and post-material issues. The results expose similar trends to the main analysis.¹⁰

Finally, following (Muñoz et al., 2020), we use the treatment to predict a set of outcomes that are *a priori* not theoretically associated with the social outbreak. We use three measures related to personal health: healthy nutrition (rather good daily alimentation = 1), consumption of dairy products (at least two or three times a week = 1), and physical activity (at least two or three times a week = 1). If our treatment works, we should not find an association between exposure to protests and the previous outcomes. Results show no changes in personal health behavior after the social outbreak, which enhances the internal validity of our treatment.¹¹

Overall, the findings in this part align with the expectation outlined in H1, indicating more salience of welfare state issues after the social outbreak. Particularly, the salience of pensions, education, and inequality increased after treatment. Nonetheless, the results do not support the hypothesis of the intensity of the exposure (H2.1 and H2.2).


⁸The results are summarized in Figure A.4 in the Appendix.

⁹For more details, see Figures A.7 and A.8 in the Appendix.

¹⁰For more details, see Figure A.9 in the Appendix.

¹¹For more details, see Figure A.5 of the Appendix.

Figure 1.3: The Effect of the Social Outbreak on Welfare State Issues Priorities: Interactions



Note: Coefficients extracted from LPMs, shown in Table A.12 of the Appendix. Lines represent 95% CI.

1.5 Panel Data: Did the Social Outbreak Change Public Opinion in the Medium Term?

1.5.1 Data and operationalization

Regarding the panel data, we use the COES' Longitudinal Social Survey of Chile. This survey has six waves (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021, and 2022) and 10,912 observations (without attrition).¹² The fieldwork in 2019 took place after the beginning of the social outbreak. Regarding attrition, we explored whether individuals' characteristics are associated with dropping out from the panel. Although some systematic patterns are identified, results do not change once we model them.¹³

The survey did not include questions of individuals' issue priorities like the *Pulso Ciudadano* Survey. Therefore, this part of the analysis assesses the effect of the social outbreak on people's position on welfare issues (more progressive-redistributing or the opposite). These questions allow us to deepen the short-term analysis of the issues' salience after the social outbreak, taking advantage of these indicators addressing the respondents' viewpoints on the welfare state. Unfortunately, some of these questions were not included in all waves, although they all provide enough time points to track the effect of the social outbreak on political attitudes.

Thus, our outcomes capture respondents' welfare state preferences. We use questions on pensions, health, education, housing, and inequality issues. All scales go from 1 (strongly agree or completely satisfied) to 5 (strongly disagree or completely dissatisfied). The housing question scale had the inverse order, and we reversed it. The questions are the following: "Each person should be self-responsible for their future pension;" "It is fair that people with higher income can access better health care than people with lower income;" "The Chilean State, rather than the private sector, should be the main provider of education;" "In Chile, the income differences are too large;" and "How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the household where you live in terms of...? Housing quality."¹⁴

We created a categorical variable of the years of the survey waves to explore how the issue's salience changes (or not) over time. We included as covariates the respondent's geographical region of residence, respondent's sex (woman = 1),

¹²For more details of the panel data, please see Section A.1.2 of the Appendix.

¹³Results show that women, people older than 41, and individuals with secondary education are slightly more likely to drop out of the survey. Likewise, politically independent people and individuals living in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago are more likely to drop out of the panel. Figure A.12 in the Appendix contains the dropping out analysis.

¹⁴Note that all questions measure respondents' position on the different issues, except for housing, which captures satisfaction toward a respondent's housing.

level of education, ideological self-placement, and geographical zone of residence.¹⁵

1.5.2 Analysis

When previous works show that protests can change public opinion, many point to a short-term effect rather than medium or long-term impacts (Branton et al., 2015; Motta, 2018; Muñoz and Anduiza, 2019). Thus, it is worth exploring how long the impact of social outbreak lasted on public opinion, testing whether the change we observed before was transient or something more perdurable.

To conduct the analysis, we estimate several linear regression models with individual fixed effects to explore people's preferences for different welfare state issues over time. Thus, the survey wave indicator is our main predictor, with the first wave of the survey (different for each question) being the reference category.¹⁶ Figure 1.4 summarizes the results of the models. The first finding is that in the year of the social outbreak—recall that the fieldwork took place after the outbreak (November 2019)—and compared to the beginning of the period, people were more likely to think that income differences were too large, were more likely to disagree that higher-income individuals should have better access to healthcare and were more likely to agree that the state should be the main provider of education (as opposed to the private market). We also found no differential effects on the outcome of housing quality or that people should be self-responsible for their pension. These results are similar to what we found in the UESD analysis, evidence in line with a public opinion realignment around welfare state issues, precisely those that were central in the social outbreak.


Yet, the analysis also shows some important nuances: all outcomes decreased in the waves after 2019 or are non-different compared to the reference category. This pattern indicates that the impact of the social outbreak on public opinion was short-lived and, in some cases, could even have backlashed. Nonetheless, it is relevant to mention that the subsequent waves from 2019 onwards were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, which could have changed the social outbreak's impact on public opinion and turned public opinion likely toward other concerns.

As robustness checks, we replicated the main models separately, incorporating an interaction between respondents' left-right self-placement to assess a potential moderation effect of social outbreak exposure. Additionally, we performed regressions using the full panel data, and models estimated through within-between

¹⁵For more details, see Table A.5 in the Appendix.

¹⁶A fixed effect model is chosen following a Hausman test. We also ran a variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis, and none of the models had relevant multicollinearity between their predictors. The complete information on these tests is available in Section A.2.3 of the Appendix.

Figure 1.4: Linear Regression Models to Predict Welfare State Preferences



Note: Coefficients are extracted from different individual FE linear models, shown in Table A.19 in the Appendix. Lines represent 95% CI. Highlighted in red is the year of the *Estallido Social*.

regressions.¹⁷ All of these models lead to the same conclusion: after the social outbreak, Chileans expressed higher levels of agreement that the income differences were too large, disagreed with the differences in healthcare based on income, and agreed that the state should play a more important role in education provision.

1.6 DID: Social Outbreak Effects on Electoral Results

1.6.1 Data and operationalization

Finally, to capture the effect of protests on voting, we assembled the electoral results of the first-round presidential elections of 2017 and 2021 based on electoral data from the Electoral Service of Chile (SERVEL in Spanish), information on the municipalities from the Socioeconomic Characterization National Survey (CASEN in Spanish) of the Social Development Ministry of Chile, and data on protests from the COES' Observatory of Conflicts. We opted to use the first round of the presidential election instead of the second round as, in the first round, voters have a broader political supply, which better reflects their political preferences. In contrast, in the second round, voters are constrained to choose between the two most-voted options from the first round, leading to more strategic voting.

In this part, we analyze two datasets at different levels using the previous information. First, a dataset at the *comuna* level (municipality), the lower administrative level unit of the country. In Chile, there are 346 *comunas* distributed in the sixteen regions, among which the Metropolitan Region of Santiago has the most *comunas* (52). The mean of inhabitants per *comunas* is 50,792 people (Instituto Nacional de Estadística de Chile-INE, 2017).

We incorporated the data on protests into this dataset. To do this, we started from the original unstructured protest dataset and identified the geocoordinates of the protest events of the social outbreak.¹⁸ We coded the latitude and longitude of 3,912 protest events from 4,369.¹⁹ Then, with the geographic data, we intersected it with the *comunas* vector file, identifying whether a municipality experienced a protest or not. The mean number of the 2019 protests at *comuna* level was 11.2.

¹⁷For more details, see Figures A.14 and A.15 in the Appendix.

¹⁸We consider as part of the social outbreak protest wave all events occurred from October 18, 2019, to March 14, 2020. The last date of the period is when the Chilean sanitary authority recorded the first case of COVID-19 in the country. The literature on Chilean social outbreak has agreed that the COVID-19 pandemic closed the social outbreak (Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020; Somma et al., 2021).

¹⁹For more detailed information on the construction of the georeferenced social outbreak protests dataset, please see Section A.1.3 of the Appendix.

There were 118 *comunas* that did not have any protest during the revolt period, while the maximum number of protests registered in a municipality was 237.²⁰

Second, we use a dataset at the polling station level. The total number of polling stations in the 2021 presidential election was 4,959. We excluded 21 stations because of their territorial location, making an estimation of the distance between protests and polling stations difficult since they are island territories or part of the Chilean Antarctic, leaving a total of 4,938 observations.²¹ For each polling station, we calculated the linear distance to the closest protest—as a proxy for exposure to social outbreak. In Chile, the polling stations where the people vote are not necessarily assigned based on an individual’s place of residence. Citizens have to register an address in the SERVEL, and following this, the institution assigns a polling station to the voters. Chileans may decide to be registered in a district where they do not live, following many idiosyncratic reasons, mainly because it is convenient for them. Thus, it is fair to assume that people spend part of their lives in places close to polling stations. Hence, the polling station is a good proxy for the physical proximity of the Chileans to the social outbreak protests.

The number of polling stations and some electoral tables (*mesas electorales*) in some polling stations changed from one election to the other. Although the results are the same, the main analysis only considers the *mesas* constant over time (3,830).²²

The outcomes are the share of the votes (%) of the different election blocks—Table 1.1 summarizes the operationalization and the vote share of the candidates based on SERVEL data. In addition, this table shows the position of the 2021 presidential candidates regarding the 2019 social outbreak. Although candidates varied across the elections, the ideological supply was very similar across both elections.²³

Following a difference-in-differences (DID) approach and using data at the *comuna* level, we estimate the effect of protests by interacting a binary indicator for the 2021 first-round presidential election ($2021 = 1$) with a dummy variable indicating whether the municipality experienced at least one protest during the social outbreak period. As covariates, we include several municipal-level variables: the logarithm of the total population, the logarithm of the foreign-born popula-

²⁰For more detailed information, please see Table A.10 of the Appendix.

²¹The polling stations that we excluded were those located in the Chilean Antarctic, Easter Island, Mocha Island (part of Lebu municipality), Juan Fernández Island, Santa María Island (part of Coronel municipality), Maillen Island (part of Puerto Montt municipality), Guar Island (part of Calbuco municipality), Puluqui Island (part of Calbuco municipality), Guaitecas, and Puerto Edén (part of Puerto Natales municipality).

²²For more information, see Section A.1.3 of the Appendix.

²³For more information on the operationalization and the ideological supply, see Section A.2.1 of the Appendix

Table 1.1: Operationalization of Share of the Votes (%) Outcomes for Difference-in-Differences Analysis and 2021 Candidates' Position on 2019 Social Outbreak

Outcome	Candidates (Share of the votes)	2021 candidates' position on 2019 social outbreak
Far-left	2017: Eduardo Artés, Patriotic Union (0.51%); 2021: Eduardo Artés, Patriotic Union (1.46%)	In favor
Progressive Party	2017: Marco Enríquez-Ominami, Progressive Party (5.71%); Alejandro Navarro, Country (0.36%); 2021: Marco Enríquez-Ominami, Progressive Party (7.60%)	In favor
Broad Front	2017: Beatriz Sánchez, independent-Broad Front (20.27%); 2021: Gabriel Boric, Broad Front (25.82%)	In favor
Ex-Concertation	2017: Alejandro Guillier, independent-Radical Party (22.70%); Carolina Goic, Christian Democratic Party (5.88%); 2021: Yasna Provoste, Christian Democratic Party (11.60%)	In favor
Let's Go Chile	2017: Sebastián Piñera, independent-Let's Go Chile (36.64%); 2021: Sebastián Sichel, independent-Let's Go Chile (12.79%)	Against
Far-right	2017: José Antonio Kast, independent (7.93%); 2021: José Antonio Kast, Republican Party (27.91%); Franco Parisi, Party of the People (12.81%)	Against

tion, the average years of education, the percentage of Indigenous people, and the percentage of the population living in overcrowded conditions. All these variables are sourced from the CASEN Survey. At the polling station level, we use an interaction between the logarithmic distance (in kilometers) to the nearest protest event and the election year. This specification allows us to test both the overall effect of protests on voting behavior (H3) and the moderating effect of proximity to protest events on electoral outcomes (H4).


1.6.2 Analysis

As we have seen before, the social outbreak changed public opinion in favor of the protesters' claims. In the years following it, the effect generally disappeared. Yet, did the protests lead to a change in electoral behavior?

To explore this, we compare the first rounds of the presidential elections of 2017 and 2021 with the social outbreak between them. As hypothesized, if a fundamental attitudinal change persisted over time, the non-traditional leftist candidates should have performed better (H3), especially in municipalities and polling stations that were more exposed to the social outbreak protests (H4). Figure 1.5 shows the spatial distribution of the protests across the country. This map illustrates that the social outbreak was a national-scale phenomenon. However, there

was a concentration of protests in the country's most central areas, particularly in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago, where its capital is, and its adjacent regions, such as Valparaíso, O'Higgins, Maule, and Biobío.

Figure 1.5: The Spatial Distribution of 2019 Social Outbreak Protests



Note: Each dot represents a protest that occurred during Chile's social outbreak (October 18, 2019-March 14, 2020)

Before conducting the analysis, checking the main assumption under the DID—that there is no change in the trends of the outcomes before the treatment—is substantial. The common way to test this assumption is by plotting the trends of the outcomes across time, considering several points in time, and assessing whether there are statistically significant differences among the trends before the treatment.

In the case of the Chilean presidential election, it is not possible to fully undertake this analysis because the political situation was diametrically different in the elections prior to 2017. From the return to democracy in 1990, the Chilean political system was dominated by two main coalitions, the center-left Concertation of Political Parties for Democracy and the center-right Alliance for Chile, renamed Let's Go Chile in the decade of the 2010s. These two coalitions also monopolized the Deputies' Chamber and the Senate because the electoral system, known as "binomial," was a corrected proportional representation system that benefited these two larger coalitions: all the districts had two seats of magnitude, which generated a situation where a coalition could only achieve the two seats when its list had double the votes of the second most voted list.

In 2015, electoral reform changed the system. Law 20,840 reformed the binomial system and established a traditional proportional representation system under D'hondt's rule with plurinominal districts. This institutional change opened the system, and new parties entered legislative power, reconfiguring the political party system and the capacity of the new parties to dispute the political elections. Thus, the Broad Front emerged as a response from the left to the Concertation, and the far-right of Jose Antonio Kast arose as an alternative to Let's Go Chile's traditional right, converting themselves into new political referents able to compete with the traditional coalitions.

Notwithstanding these challenges, we can test the no-changing trend in our outcome before treatment by checking the effect of protests on parties' share of votes in the 2017 election. If the analysis shows a significant treatment effect on the lag of each outcome, this will imply that the 2021 electoral results are not entirely shaped by the 2019 protests but by pre-existing trends among the candidacies or the different ideological blocs. As we show in the Appendix (Section A.2.4), there are no statistically significant treatment effects on the 2017 share of the votes, which strengthens the credibility of the DID design.

Although the absence of pre-treatment differences in trends between groups is the key identifying assumption of a difference-in-differences (DID) design, it is important to acknowledge a potential issue of reverse causality when using protests as the treatment. It is possible that municipalities with stronger electoral support for the left, higher levels of inequality, or greater political distrust were also more likely to experience protests. To explore this possibility, we used CASEN data to estimate a series of simple linear probability and OLS models to predict both the DID estimator and the number of protests at the municipal level. We estimated one model per outcome and explanatory variable, focusing on factors potentially related to protest: two binary indicators identifying municipalities where the non-Concertation left received more than 8.6% and 10.5% of the

vote in a first-round presidential election, respectively²⁴; the percentage of people living in poverty and in multidimensional poverty, used as proxies for inequality—considering that income inequality in Chile is also territorially stratified, and municipalities tend to be internally homogeneous; and the percentage of residents affiliated with political parties in each municipality, used as a proxy for political trust.

The results show that strong electoral performance by the left is positively associated with the number of protests, while political party membership has a negative effect—but only in predicting the DID estimator. In the case of poverty, its effects are not significant for any of the protest-related outcomes²⁵. The association between left-leaning areas and protests is not unexpected, as the main grievances driving the social outbreak have historically resonated with the left.

Regarding the main analysis, we first estimate several regression linear models using the share of the votes (%) of the candidates from the far-left, Progressive Party, Broad Front, Ex-Concertation, Let's Go Chile, and far-right in the 2021 first-round presidential election at the municipal level.

Figure 1.6 shows the results. Models indicate a positive effect on the share of the votes for the center-right (Let's Go Chile) and for far-left candidates. We observe that, on the right of the ideological spectrum, the vote share of the candidates of Let's Go Chile was three p.p. higher in places with protests. In contrast, far right candidates lost support (around 2.5 p.p.). On the left of the spectrum, the far-left gained support in municipalities that witnessed protests (0.24 p.p.). The effect for the other candidates is not statistically significant.

In substantive terms, the results indicate two different dynamics. On the right of the political spectrum, we observe a centripetal tendency. The center-right performed better than the far-right in places where protests occurred. On the left, the far left, represented by the candidate Eduardo Artés, performed better and, hence, was more likely to capitalize on the consequences of the social outbreak. Thus, the social outbreak had a centrifugal effect on the left side of the spectrum, albeit the effect, as we pointed out, is rather small. All in all, the results provide partial evidence for H3.²⁶


We also estimate the protests' effect on the vote's share at the polling station level, taking advantage of the spatial granularity of the data. It allows us to capture the exposure to social protests by the protests' location and the polling station's

²⁴We used these benchmarks because they correspond to the average and third quartile, respectively, of the left's vote share in first-round presidential elections between 1989 and 2013.

²⁵See Figure A.17 of the Appendix

²⁶It is important to mention that the COVID-19 pandemic might have blurred—or increased—the effect of the social outbreak, affecting some parties more than others. Therefore, these results should be interpreted as the effect of social unrest with the potential intervening factor of the pandemic.

Figure 1.6: The Effect of Protests on Election Results



Note: Coefficients are extracted from different models, shown in Table A.20 of the Appendix. Lines represent 95% CI.

coordinates.²⁷


Figure 1.7 shows the effect of the (log) distance between the protest and the polling station on election returns for both elections. These results largely confirm previous findings. The far left performed marginally better close to social protests. The effect of protest distance is also statistically significant on the Progressive Party's vote share, strengthening the findings from the *comuna*-level models, where the only significant effect was observed at the far end of the political spectrum. However, it is worth noting that the slope is much steeper for the center-right coalition Let's Go Chile. Overall, results confirm that the social outbreak triggered both a centripetal effect on the right side of the ideological spectrum and a centrifugal one on the left.

To strengthen the robustness of the findings, we replicated the estimations at the polling station level, including all stations, regardless of whether they were present in both elections or not.²⁸ The results indicate the same pattern as our main analysis: the shorter the distance to the protests, the better the electoral

²⁷The main caveat of the analysis is that it is not possible to include control variables at the polling station level. Yet, fixed effects models at different levels and controls at the *Comuna* level provide the same results.

²⁸For more details, see Figure A.18 in the Appendix.

Figure 1.7: The Effect of Distance Between the Polling Station and the Closest Protest on Election Results



Note: Coefficients are extracted from different models, shown in Table A.21 of the Appendix. Lines represent 95% CI.

performance of the far-left Progressive Party and Let's Go Chile, albeit the effect being clearer in the case of the center-right. Results show again that the social outbreak had a centrifugal effect on the left and a centripetal effect on the right, providing partial support for H4.

Lastly, we explore the voting flows from the 2017 to the 2021 election to check where the origin and destination of voters who changed parties. We found no clear pattern using the ELSOC-COES panel data, with one important exception. The Broad Front and the Far-right attracted more people in 2021 who did not vote in 2017. Therefore, this provides suggestive evidence that the new political party Broad Front and the Far-right, besides attracting voters from other formations, were able to mobilize previous abstainers.²⁹

1.7 Conclusions

This article examines the effect of the Chilean *Estallido Social* on public opinion and political behavior. By doing so, it contributes to our understanding of whether

²⁹Recall vote and intention to vote are affected by many different biases, but it is still reassuring that, despite this, the overall pattern aligns with the findings. For more details, see Figure A.19 of the Appendix.

and how protests can generate immediate and medium-term impacts on political outcomes (Bosi et al., 2016; Bosi and Uba, 2021; Amenta et al., 2018; Giugni, 2008). Our three-pronged empirical strategy, based on a combination of research designs and data, provides different conclusions. First, the analysis shows that the exposure to the protests of the 2019 social outbreak affected public opinion, specifically around pensions, education, and inequality over public security issues (H1). As a result of the social outbreak, people's priorities changed toward welfare state issues, those issues that were at the core of the protesters' demands. Second, the results reveal no effect of the intensity of the exposure to the protests, nor the moderation by the number of protests (H2.2) or the time elapsed since the protests began (H2.1). Third, we see that the effect of the social outbreak was relatively short-lived (panel data analysis). Finally, we find that the social outbreak had a centrifugal electoral effect on the left and a centripetal effect on the right, providing partial support for H3 and H4. In other words, on the right of the ideological spectrum, places exposed to protests gave higher support to the mainstream right, while support for the far-right was lower. On the left, the non-traditional left performed better where protests took place. In this manner, we find a short-term and rather modest effect of the social outbreak on politics, which aligns with comparative research that gives evidence on the difficulties that social movements, protests, and activists challenge to achieve their objectives (Amenta et al., 2018; Dahlum, 2019; McAdam and Tarrow, 2010).

At the same time, these findings contribute to our understanding of the political outcomes of protests, particularly of a type of protest wave that is unstructured, multi-issue, and disruptive, which the specialized literature has labeled as social outbreaks (Bringel et al., 2021; Joignant et al., 2024). The protests' effect on public opinion found in the analysis can be seen in some political episodes after the beginning of the social outbreak. Between October 2019 and March 2020, the executive's projects, the discussion in parliament, and the bills passed turned into progressive rhetoric, being particularly clear in the case of pensions and salaries (Tromben, 2024). During the first weeks of the social outbreak, Piñera's government had to give in to its pro-market agenda, diminishing the benefits for large companies through tax reform and presenting a bill to increase the minimum wage (Tromben and Schiappacasse, 2022). At the same time, the government suffered a defeat in a legislative dispute for reducing working hours: a project to reduce working hours from 45 a week to 40, presented by the Communist Party, was passed to discuss in the Lower Chamber after being out of the legislative agenda for almost two years (Tromben and Schiappacasse, 2022). In the same vein, in the last part of its administration, the rightist government passed a law that gave an almost universalist state contribution to the pensions. Future studies can explore these processes further. Still, our interpretation is that the social outbreak, as an unexpected and high-magnitude political event, generated a public opinion re-

alignment, putting pressure on the political system and pushing actors, especially conservatives, to adjust their positions around welfare-state issues.

The results show that the social outbreak had a less relevant impact on voting behavior than public opinion. We expect that due to the intermediation crisis that crossed the political institutions and social organizations in Chile (Rozas-Bugueño, 2024), the social outbreak protests opened an opportunity for the non-traditional left to capitalize on the discontent, considering the salience of welfare state issues in public opinion right after the emergence of the revolt, and the political detachment of traditional political parties. However, we find only relevant, but lower in magnitude, effects for the far left and Progressive Party, but not for other non-traditional left parties, such as the Broad Front or the Progressive Party's share of votes. These results could mean that the timing of protests is crucial, considering that the presidential election following the social outbreak was two years later. In addition, during these two years, the alternative left-wing parties, such as the Broad Front, may no longer have been considered anti-establishment parties by the citizens.

In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic may have blurred the impact of the protests. We are unable to examine the effect of the pandemic on our estimates in this paper, as it falls outside the scope of this thesis, and we do not have the appropriate data to address this issue. This is a limitation of our research. However, we believe future studies could approach this question using two strategies: (i) by analyzing ELSOC panel data to examine whether people's grievances changed after the onset of the health crisis in Chile, and whether post-pandemic grievances aligned with those mobilized during the 2019 social outbreak; and (ii) by replicating the analysis of protest effects on electoral outcomes while incorporating data on COVID-19-related deaths and infections at a more granular territorial level—such as municipalities or neighborhoods. These strategies would allow researchers to assess both the direct impact of the pandemic on the 2021 presidential election and any potential moderating effects of COVID-19 on the relationship between protests and electoral outcomes.

The protests positively impacted center-right voting but harmed far-right voting. This result aligns with the public opinion realignment argument, considering that the welfare state issues on the right of the ideological spectrum have been more prevalent on the center-right than on the far-right.

Besides, it is important to note that the analysis presented in this chapter does not focus on Boric's electoral victory, as the 2021 second-round presidential election is beyond the scope of this study. Although the findings suggest that the 2019 protests did not have a statistically significant effect on the Broad Front's vote share in the first-round election, and that proximity to protest sites is associated with a modest increase in support for Boric, further analysis is required to assess the potential impact of the social uprising on the runoff election.

In this regard, we propose future research that replicates the protest effect analysis using data from the second-round election, while incorporating the first-round electoral performance of all candidates. This approach would allow for a more precise estimation of the impact of protest exposure, controlling for the transfer of votes from losing candidates to the two runoff contenders: Gabriel Boric (Broad Front) and José Antonio Kast (Republican Party).

Additionally, it is plausible that the 2019 social uprising had a positive effect on Gabriel Boric's electoral performance beyond the localized impact of protest proximity at the municipal and polling-station levels—an effect that is difficult to capture using quantitative data due to limitations in statistical power, especially given that only two presidential elections are comparable, as the Broad Front did not exist prior to 2017. As Tironi (2023) suggests, Boric's prominent role in the National Agreement of November 2019—which enabled the launch of the constitution-making process (2020–2022)—granted him national visibility and the image of a politician capable of making difficult decisions, even at the cost of short-term unpopularity. This may have constituted a key attribute that contributed to his eventual election as President of the Republic.³⁰ A broader analysis that integrates multiple sources of data could offer valuable insights into the overall impact of the social uprising on Boric's electoral victory in 2021.

Finally, this article contributes to the debate on the political implications of the 2019 Chilean social outbreak. Most of the research has focused on the description of the revolt or the causes of it (Somma et al., 2021; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020; Joignant et al., 2024), but fewer works have addressed the political impacts of the social outbreak (Castro and Retamal, 2024), despite the effects of protests on public opinion and elections remained a contested topic in political circles during a long time.

³⁰Gabriel Boric signed the National Agreement of November 2019 without the support of his political party, Social Convergence. The Communist Party also criticized his decision, describing the agreement as a “life vest” for President Piñera's administration. Boric was also harshly criticized by more radical sectors of the 2019 protests, including a public scolding during a demonstration in downtown Santiago.

Chapter 2

BETWEEN HOPE AND DISAFFECTION: THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE INTERMEDIATION CRISIS

Chapter 2 is based on the paper “*Between Hope and Disaffection: The Chilean Constitution-Making Process and the Intermediation Crisis*” published in *PS: Political Science & Politics* (publication details available in the box below). Due to the journal’s formatting restrictions, I expanded the published article version in this thesis by incorporating details from the article’s supplementary material, providing additional background on the case, and further developing the introduction and conclusions.

Rozas-Bugueño, J. (2024). [Between Hope and Disaffection: The Chilean Constitution-Making Process and the Intermediation Crisis](#). *PS: Political Science & Politics* 57 (2), 274–281.

Abstract

This article explores which social activists have more chances to politically take advantage of the intermediation crisis, analyzing the case of Chile's 2021–2022 Constitutional Convention. Following the 2019 social uprising, the Convention's composition reflected a breakdown in traditional mediation between political parties and civil society. Using a mixed-methods approach, the study uses an original dataset on Convention delegates, survey data from the Social Longitudinal Study of Chile (ELSOC–COES), and 24 in-depth interviews with delegates and candidates to study the profile of the social activists who won a seat in the Convention. The findings reveal that many elected representatives had no party affiliation and instead emerged from relatively new feminist, environmental, territorial, and Indigenous organizations, underscoring a shift toward movement-based representation. The analysis also shows that support for environmental, feminist, and No+AFP movements has remained steady, despite a broader decline in support for social movements. The study contributes to understanding how social movements engage with formal institutions in a scenario of intermediation crisis and raises questions about the sustainability of movement-driven representation in democratic processes.

Keywords: Intermediation Crisis, Social Movements, Constitution-Making Process, Mixed Methods, Chile

2.1 Introduction

Contemporary liberal democracies are facing a crisis. In various regions, democratic regimes are experiencing growing levels of mistrust toward their institutions, which is particularly important regarding political parties and their capacity to represent and integrate the preferences and demands of the society (Castells, 2020; Urbinati, 2023; Luna, 2024). As Urbinati (2023) explains, one of the main drivers of the representation failure of current democracies is the detachment of the political elites from society, which encourages political disengagement. In this context, citizens have opted to vote for new political actors and outsiders. The electoral debacle of traditional leftist and rightist parties in France that allowed Emmanuel Macron to take power in 2017, and the rise of Donald Trump at the expense of the Republican Party's elites in the United States are examples of this phenomenon (Castells, 2020). Latin America follows a similar trend, where outsiders have had a vertiginous growth and have won national elections, such as the cases of Javier Milei in Argentina and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, but also the consolidation of new political parties with more stable structures, such as MORENA in Mexico (Luna, 2024).

Some political parties emerging from social movements have also capitalized on public mistrust and disengagement from traditional political actors. Notable European examples include the Spanish *Podemos*, Greek *Syriza*, and France Unbowed. In Latin America, similar cases include the Bolivian Movement for Socialism (MAS), Chilean Broad Front, and Colombian Historic Pact, led by Gustavo Petro. Additionally, parties with longer-standing traditions, such as Brazilian Workers' Party and Uruguayan Broad Front, also have deep historical roots in social mobilization. The social activists' incorporation into politics is one of the political outcomes at the individual level that the collective action literature has highlighted (Bosi et al., 2016; Bosi and Uba, 2021; Giugni, 2008). However, many parties and organizations are in constant creation, many of them from social activism, and only a few survive and maintain a sustainable electoral basis and connection with society (Luna, 2024). Thus, what explains that some political actors exploit the political representation problem? In the case of actors who come from social movements, what factors explain that they can be more competitive than political party members and enter into politics?

In this article, I sustain that the answer to these questions relates to the capacity of the actors to face and adapt to the intermediation crisis. Sánchez-Cuenca (2022) proposes the concept of intermediation crisis, and it appeals to the idea that the representation problem of the liberal democracy is part of a major crisis, the main characteristic of which is the failure of different intermediate actors to connect and coordinate people's preferences or expectations with results or services. According to the author, intermediation incapacity can be observed in many different spheres of society, such as the financial market, cultural consumption, or the housing market, where traditional actors lose ground against new ones or simply disappear. This process is accelerated by technological change and innovation, which have enabled the emergence of the crypto market, digital platforms of cultural critics (e.g., Rotten Tomatoes in the film landscape), and real estate platforms on the internet. These innovations have left the traditional intermediaries weakened in their different fields (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). That said, the new actors, those who are better able to differentiate themselves from those perceived as traditional or as part of the elite, and who are more deeply rooted in their base, should be better equipped to take advantage of the current political landscape.

To empirically test this expectation, I use the experience of the Chilean Constitutional Convention (2021-2022), which was a democratically-elected constitution-making body created by the political system to manage the 2019 social outbreak; the most important protest cycle that Chile experienced since the return to democracy in 1990 (Somma et al., 2021; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020). This body introduced three institutional innovations for the constitutional delegates' election: gender parity, reserving 17 seats for indigenous individuals, and allowing non-party candidates to run in independent lists (Heiss, 2021; Suárez-Cao, 2021). In

this manner, the electoral rules and the scenario marked by a protest cycle that impugned the whole political system opened a political opportunity for actors who had not been the traditional faces of politics in the country. The Constitutional Convention was composed of more than 60% of members who did not come from political parties and many of them with backgrounds in social activism (Rozas-Bugueño et al., 2022).

This article examines the distance between society, political parties, and social movements by analyzing the composition of the 2021–2022 Constitutional Convention. The analysis incorporates an original dataset containing the Convention delegates' background (Rozas-Bugueño, 2023), the Social Longitudinal Study of Chile (ELSOC) from the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion–COES (2023), and 24 in-depth interviews conducted with Convention delegates and candidates. The results indicate that the social activists who entered the Convention tended to come from regionalist, environmental, and feminist organizations instead of more classical collective organizations such as workers' unions and students' organizations. Also, they were from territories different to the Metropolitan Region of Santiago, and were neither party members nor close to political organizations. These findings suggest a novel and politically detached profile of the social activist delegates. Furthermore, the results show that the social activists' organizations were relatively young, and the movements they were part of have maintained or increased public support despite the generally low levels of support toward social movements. Qualitative evidence indicates that delegates and non-elected candidates believed this was due to the fact that Chileans have come to view the activists of the students' and workers' organizations as part of the political elites. Thus, the Convention composition reflected an intermediation crisis exacerbated by society's distrust of political parties and their detachment from social movements.

This research contributes, first, to the study on political outcomes of collective action, bridging two debates, the intermediation crisis discussion with the political consequences of collective actors. Second, this article contributes to knowledge generation on the contemporary political processes in Latin America, particularly through the examination of the constitution-making process in Chile (2021–2022).

2.2 Political Outcomes of Collective Action in a Context of Intermediation Crisis

The study of collective action outcomes has attracted the attention of scholars since the end of the 1990s (Giugni et al., 1999). Collective action can trigger different types of outcomes, and the specialized literature analytically divided it into

three: (i) political-institutional, associated with changes in political institutions and policy change; (ii) cultural, with regards to social change in terms of values and salience of ideas within society; and (iii) biographical, related to change in the trajectories and life-cycle of individuals (Bosi et al., 2016; Giugni, 2008). This research focuses on biographical changes, exploring how individual processes are modified after the participation in or exposure to collective action-related phenomena (Passy and Monsch, 2018; Vestergren et al., 2017).

There are many manifestations of the biographical outcomes of collective action. Among them are psychological changes (emotion-driven processes) (Vestergren et al., 2017; Passy and Monsch, 2018), social participation (whether people continued their involvement in the social militancy or withdrew from social movements and organizations) (Beckwith, 2016; McAdam, 1989), lifestyle changes (life-course pattern focused on marital-status, education, and occupation) (McAdam, 1989; Giugni, 2008), and political trajectories (detachment from political institutions or increment in the political involvement in the political-institutional arena) (Fendrich and Lovoy, 1988; Passy and Monsch, 2018; McAdam, 1989). The interest here is to address political trajectories after collective action.

Collective action participation could awaken interest in politics and public discussion and help people gain skills that are useful for entering politics (Passy and Monsch, 2018; Giugni, 2008). As Verba et al. (1995) show for the context of the United States, people involved in civil volunteer organizations tend to be more involved in politics than people who do not have experience in social organizations, as they develop civic skills, such as practical knowledge on how to coordinate people, organize meetings, and oral expression, which can facilitate the political engagement (Verba et al., 1995; Passy and Monsch, 2018). Similarly, classical works of McAdam (1989) and Fendrich and Lovoy (1988) show that activists of the civil rights movement have tended to be more active in politics, in addition to continuing to participate in different social organizations.

Another driver of the political engagement leverage of collective action is political socialization (Passy and Monsch, 2018; Vestergren et al., 2017). Protests, or the exposure to them, can serve as a shortcut to political information, or simply increase the political interest of people directly involved in collective action or exposed to it, serving as a critical event in the formation of political attitudes and preferences (Galais et al., 2024; Passy and Monsch, 2018; Grasso et al., 2019). Studying the cases of Spain, Chile, and China, authors such as Galais et al. (2024), Castro and Retamal (2024), and Desposato et al. (2024) show how political socialization derived from collective action encourages political engagement. Furthermore, Desposato et al. (2024) shows that, although the demonstration in Tiananmen Square was dramatically repressed in China, the cohort directly exposed to this event has important levels of political engagement, albeit a lower level of trust in political institutions.

Likewise, collective action can create or consolidate networks between organizations and individuals, which is another important resource for political involvement (Galais et al., 2024; Passy and Monsch, 2018). There are many recent examples of how collective action participation is an antecedent of emergence of new political parties and political actors, with moderate to high electoral success, such as the Five-Stars Movement in Italy, *Podemos* in Spain, *Syriza* in Greece, Unsubmissive France, the MAS in Bolivia, Broad Front in Chile, and MORENA in Mexico (Castells, 2020; Luna, 2024; Hochstetler and Friedman, 2008).

At the same time, it is important to introduce in this discussion the growing distrust in political institutions, which has been particularly strong toward political parties (Castells, 2020; Luna, 2024; Urbinati, 2023). This gap between political parties and society has been profusely studied by political science (Castells, 2020; Urbinati, 2023). Scholars studying the Chilean case have called this phenomenon the “political autonomization of social movements” (Parra-Coray, 2021; Somma and Bargsted, 2015; Somma and Medel, 2017). It involves a two-way process in which political parties no longer rely on social movements for political sustainability and movements no longer require party resources to implement their strategies (Somma and Bargsted, 2015, p. 228-229).

However, the distancing between society and political parties is not the sole pivotal aspect of the contemporary crisis in democracy (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). Recent worldwide protest movements are marked by spontaneous and leaderless social uprisings in which individuals express discontent without intermediaries and join for various reasons (Urbinati, 2023; Guzmán-Concha, 2024; Bringel et al., 2021). Furthermore, these uprisings challenge social organizations characterized by traditional structures and relationships with the establishment. Thus, the current crisis is more an intermediation than only a political–institutional one, where the disconnection between expectations or preferences and results or services is in the core of the problem (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). This problem is translated into a mistrust toward intermediation organizations perceived as traditional actors or part of the mainstream supply in their different spheres, which, in addition to the accelerated technological change, have allowed the emergence of new organizations that try to fill the intermediation gap (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). Thus, collective actors–social movements, social movement organizations, and activists–also suffer the implications of the intermediation crisis.

The emergence of inorganic, massive protest cycles in the last decade, the so-called social uprising across the world, characterized by the rejection of the entire political institutions due to their failure to address citizens’ political demands (Bringel et al., 2021; Guzmán-Concha, 2024), reflects the intermediation crisis in the collective action sphere. In this context, it is necessary to analyze what collective actions are more likely to capitalize on the intermediation crisis.

First, as the intermediation crisis is synthesized in the mistrust and criticism to-

ward actors perceived as traditional (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022), the collective actors who are perceived as novel should be more successful than traditional collective actors. For example, unionism and workers' movement in Western countries have less mobilization capacity now than in the past. The same occurs with students' movements, which remain more active than unions, but their focus of action is changing. They have begun to mobilize around issues that are not part of the education agenda, e.g., environmental issues with Friday for Future, feminist demands, or anti-war demonstrations on the campuses related to the Israel-Palestina conflict. Second, in the same line of the novelty of collective action actors, the new actors, in terms of longevity in the social activist field, should be in a better position to take advantage of the intermediation crisis. Third, considering that the current problem is one of intermediation, collective actors with greater capacity to maintain regular contact with their base, and with tools to address grassroots needs, should be better equipped to engage in politics.

2.3 Collective Action and Constitution-Making Process in Chile

Chilean politics since the return to democracy in 1990 has been characterized by a gap between political parties and social movements (Garretón, 2016; Tricot, 2021; Somma and Bargsted, 2015). As explained in the previous section, this process was defined as "autonomization of social movements" (Somma and Bargsted, 2015; Somma and Medel, 2017; Bidegain, 2017). In the 1990s, the center-left governments of the Concertation of Parties for Democracy embraced a governance strategy founded in demobilizing social sectors and promoting economic growth to prevent an authoritarian reversal (Parra-Coray, 2021; Tricot, 2021). According to the literature, most movements have followed an autonomization pattern during the past two decades (Parra-Coray, 2021; Somma and Medel, 2017). Although autonomization is a general trend in Chile, there have been nuances in the process.

The workers' and human-rights' movements have historical ties with leftist parties, dating back to before the 1973 coup and during Pinochet's dictatorship. The Chilean workers' movement maintains connections with the Christian Democratic, Socialist, and Communist parties (CP), which have persisted since the return of democracy. The Unitary Workers' Center (CUT in Spanish), which is the primary labor organization, has been led by representatives from these parties since 1990. Nonetheless, discontent within the movement has led to the emergence of new workers' centers, including the National Workers' Union and the Autonomous Workers' Center (López Moreno, 2023). The human-rights movement emerged as a response to human-rights abuses during the dictatorship, pri-

marily against left-wing party members. However, it has moved increasingly toward autonomy, maintaining ties mainly with the CP (Parra-Coray, 2021).

The autonomization trend has been more evident in various other movements. In the 1990s, the Indigenous Mapuche movement began distancing itself from political parties when the Frei government in 1997 proceeded with a hydroelectric project in the Biobio River, despite opposition from the indigenous group (Somma and Bargsted, 2015; Bidegain, 2017). Another crucial step in the autonomization occurred during the 2006 high school student mobilizations, called the “Penguin Revolution.” The Bachelet government responded with the General Education Law in 2009. However, the student movement viewed this reform as a political betrayal because it believed that the law did not substantially change the framework inherited from the Pinochet dictatorship (Von Bülow and Bidegain Ponte, 2015). Following this episode, the CP was the only party with a significant presence in the student movement, but even it began to lose influence after the 2011 student-protest cycle.

With the return to democracy, the feminist movement was divided into two factions: institutional feminists, who engaged in politics, and autonomous feminists, who avoided political ties (Palacios-Valladares, 2022). This movement was pivotal in pushing for the emergency contraceptive pill (2007) and abortion rights (2013, 2016–2017). In 2018, the movement gained significant momentum in tackling sexual abuse and harassment in universities. Miranda and Roque (2019) highlighted the emergence of performative feminists during the 2018 protests alongside the other two groups. This faction emphasized personal reflection and protests. Regarding the LGBTIQ+ movement, its leading organizations have maintained autonomy from political parties and have fostered strategic relationships with legislators (López Moreno, 2023).

Other movements emerged in the 2010s, including environmental and regional movements that were successful in garnering support from international organizations to develop their tactics and protest campaigns. These included the Movement for the Defense of Access to Water, Land, and Environmental Protection (MODATIMA) and Patagonia without Dams (Madariaga et al., 2021; Schiapacasse et al., 2024). This support enabled them to operate independently of political party resources (López Moreno, 2023; Parra-Coray, 2021). Similarly, the No+AFP movement—a coordinating committee of trade unions and citizens opposed to the individual capitalization pension system—developed its tactics with political autonomy (Rozas-Bugueño and Maillet, 2019).

On October 18, 2019, a social uprising began in Chile. It was triggered by the collapse of public transport in Santiago, caused by the shutdown of the entire subway system. The closure came in response to mass fare evasions, which themselves were a reaction to a recent increase of EUR 0.030 in the subway fare. This event scaled quickly from Santiago to the other regions of the country af-

ter a violent first day of protests, marked by the burning of twenty subway stations, looting of pharmacies and retail chains, and clashes between police and protesters (Somma et al., 2021; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020). The demands of the protests encompassed different issues, from income inequality to Indigenous recognition, lower pensions, problems in the health system, and claims against the patriarchy, with the demands around inequality being the most salient (Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020). Besides the multi-issue component of the protests, the social outbreak lacked clear leadership from social organizations. The common element across the participants was a general rejection of current politics (Somma et al., 2021).

The government of Sebastián Piñera declared the “state of constitutional exception,” which allows the government to decree curfews and deploy the army as part of the public order forces. The state harshly repressed the demonstrations; in less than one month of mobilizations, more than twenty people died in the protests (Deutsche Welle, 2019).

After a national strike on November 12, which was one of the most violent days of protest, Piñera’s government called on all political parties to find a solution to address the social discontent. Thus, on November 15, 2019, most political parties agreed to initiate a process to draft a new constitution, which started with a referendum to approve the beginning of the process and the creation of a democratically elected constitutional body. To respond to the political criticism, the political system introduced institutional innovations for the Constitutional Convention elections, including gender parity, reserving 17 seats for indigenous individuals, and allowing nonparty candidates to run in independent lists (Heiss, 2021; Suárez-Cao, 2021).

2.4 Data and Methods

This research employs a mixed-method empirical approach. First, I use an original dataset of the Convention delegates’ trajectories to analyze the composition of the Constitutional Convention (Rozas-Bugueño, 2023). I built this dataset using data from the Chilean National Congress Library, a delegates’ trajectories dataset of the study of Rozas-Bugueño et al. (2022), and delegates’ social media (Facebook, X-former Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and LinkedIn).¹ To analyze the delegates’ political profiles, I used their partisan affiliations, following the conceptualization and operationalization of Rozas-Bugueño et al. (2022) that goes beyond the binary consideration of the political party membership based on the legal party registration. Thus, I grouped delegates in a typology of three categories: (1) parti-

¹See Section A.1.4 in the Appendix for more information.

san militants, formal party members; (2) partisan independents, independents with historical political ties; and (3) nonpartisan independents, those without party affiliations or prior political connections.

Regarding the social activism of the delegates, I focus on their participation in civil volunteer organizations, mainly because it is difficult to establish a clear distinction between a social movement organization and a social organization. I operationalize the civil volunteer organization membership as a binary variable (membership= 1). In addition, I operationalize the delegates' type of civic volunteer organization based on the organization's main focus, using the social movements' demands categorization of the COES (2020). The categories of this variable are regionalist-local, environmental, feminist, Indigenous people, culture, human rights, labor, health, education, religion, LGTBIQ+. ² Likewise, I calculated the distance between the creation of the delegates' civil volunteer organization and the year of the delegates' election (2021) to approach the longevity of the social organizations. This indicator is useful for operationalizing the novelty of the delegate in the social activism landscape.

I also use the delegates' electoral districts as a binary variable distinguishing between the Metropolitan Region of Santiago's districts and those from other regions, a continuous variable of the delegates' age, the delegates' gender (female= 1), the education level (postgraduate= 1), ³ and the marital status (not married= 1).

Second, I use the Social Study of Chile Survey (2016-2022) of the COES (2023). This survey is a longitudinal panel study with six waves (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021, and 2022) and a total of 18,035 responses and 10,912 without attrition. The survey target population is men and women between eighteen and seventy-five years, who live in private residences in urban zones in Chile. The survey has a probabilistic stratified clustered multi-stage sampling design. ⁴

Regarding the survey variables, to gauge support for social movements, I use the following survey question: "Which social movement do you value most?" The responses encompassed various movements; I focused on those related to student, labor, environmental, Indigenous, LGTBIQ+, feminist, and pension demands because they aligned with the Convention's dataset domains. These responses appear in all survey waves except for the feminist and No+AFP movements, which have been included only since 2018 wave. Unfortunately, the list excludes the regionalist-local demands movement. I use seven binary variables, one for each movement. To assess the support of different social movements, I use the waves of the survey as a categorical variable (category of reference = 2016). I employ

²It is worth noting that the organizations related to disability rights (2) and sports (1) were codified as health and culture organizations, respectively, for reasons of comparative analysis.

³I made this decision because the delegates' education level do not have almost variance.

⁴See Section A.1.2 in the Appendix for more information.

an index of trust in political institutions, based on the question “Can you tell me how much confidence you have in each of the following institutions?” The items that I consider for the index are government, parliament, president, and political parties. The index is the average of a five-point scale (1 = not at all to 5 = a lot) of four items related to parliament, national government, president, and political parties.⁵

I use the demographic variables of the respondents’ regions of residence (Metropolitan Region of Santiago = 1), gender (female = 1), age (continuous variable), political ideology (left, center, right, and independent), and education level (less than primary education, primary education, secondary education, and tertiary education).

Finally, I conducted twenty-four in-depth interviews with Convention delegates and non-elected candidates to explore their campaign experiences, perceptions of political detachment, and reasons they believe they won a seat in the Convention. The interviews were conducted between December 2022 and June 2023, with 5 held in person and 19 conducted remotely. All interviews were carried out in accordance with ethical standards for qualitative research, as outlined in the informed consent forms.⁶ These documents specified that the data would be used confidentially, under pseudo-anonymization, and strictly for academic purposes. Table 2.1 presents the profiles of the interviewees.

Table 2.1: Interviewees’ Profiles

Districts’ geographical zone	Elected delegates (non-elected)	Female (Male)	Political party membership (Independents)	Civic volunteer membership (no membership)	Total
North	2 (2)	4 (0)	1 (3)	4 (0)	4
Center	6 (1)	5 (2)	2 (5)	6 (1)	7
Metropolitan Region	6 (3)	3 (6)	4 (5)	8 (1)	9
South	4 (0)	3 (1)	1 (3)	3 (1)	4
Total	24				

⁵The index has a standard Alpha of Cronbach of 0.80, which indicates that it has a strong internal cohesion.

⁶This ethical clearance was granted by the Institutional Committee for Ethical Review of Projects of Pompeu Fabra University (Application 279), and informed consent was obtained from all participants accordingly. See Section A.1.7 for more information.

2.5 The Constitutional Convention's Composition: An Intermediation-Crisis Expression

This section is divided into two parts. The first part uses the original dataset of the Constitutional Convention delegates, including their political affiliations and participation in civic volunteer organizations, to analyze the profile of the social activists who entered the Convention (Rozas-Bugueño, 2023). The second part includes an exploratory analysis using data from the survey of COES (2023) to delve into understanding the Convention's composition. Qualitative data from twenty-four in-depth interviews with Convention delegates and non-elected candidates also complement the analysis.

The Constitutional Convention featured diverse delegate trajectories. Moving beyond the simplistic classification of party members and independents, I grouped delegates into three categories based on Rozas-Bugueño et al. (2022) typology: (1) partisan militants (33.6%), formal party members; (2) partisan independents (31.6%), independents with historical political ties; and (3) nonpartisan independents (34.8%), those without party affiliations or prior political connections. This typology provides a rigorous framework for analyzing evidence related to the autonomization theory.


Furthermore, it is necessary to investigate the Convention delegates' participation in civic volunteer organizations to ascertain their association with their political affiliations. I used a dichotomous indicator denoting whether a delegate was a civic volunteer organization member, a proxy for social movement involvement. Yet, there is a limitation of this approach: Not all civic volunteer organizations are necessarily associated with social movements. Nevertheless, using this criterion as an objective measure became more feasible when comprehensive secondary data on social trajectories were not readily accessible.

Consequently, 73 delegates (47.1%) originated from civic volunteer organizations. It is important to note that these civic volunteer organizations encompass various types. Figure 2.1 illustrates that more than half of these organizations fall under the categories of regionalist (14), environmental (13), and feminist (11).

Next, I analyzed the factors influencing Convention delegates' membership in civic volunteer organizations as well as the age of these organizations. I used linear-probability models to predict membership (figure 2.2).⁷ The base model includes independent variables such as political affiliations (with partisan militants as the reference category) and district type (with metropolitan-region districts as

⁷I use this type of regression models to predict a binary variable because there are evidence of that the estimations of linear probability models arrive to the same results as logit or probit models, in addition to the interpretation of linear probability models is simpler than the logit or probit models (Wooldridge, 2012).

Figure 2.1: Delegates' Civic Volunteer Organization Types




the reference category). The complete model adds demographic controls including age, gender, education level, and marital status to the base model. The final model incorporates robust standard errors clustered by electoral districts.

The results indicate that Convention delegates from districts outside Santiago's Metropolitan Region and with a non-partisan, independent profile were more likely to be members of civic volunteer organizations. Although some coefficients are not statistically significant, they align with theoretical expectations. It is important to note that the number of observations is relatively low ($N = 155$), which partly explains the lack of statistical significance in some estimates. Overall, the findings underscore the relevance of territorial concerns and political detachment in the composition of the Constitutional Convention, consistent with the theoretical framework.

Another expectation was that the Convention delegates presented a detachment not only from political parties but also classical social movements. Therefore, the delegates who were members of organizations likely belonged to newer organizations associated with significant protest cycles around 2019. To investigate this, I constructed linear regression models to predict the age of civic volunteer organizations. Organization age was computed as the difference between its establishment year and the delegates' election year (2021), with the organization type as the independent variable. I used religious organizations as the reference because this category has the oldest age average. The models in figure 2.3 replicate previous models: the base model includes the independent variable; the complete model adds demographic controls (matching those in figure 2.2) along

Figure 2.2: Probability Linear Models to Predict Delegates' Civic Volunteer Organizations Membership




Note: Coefficients are extracted from different models, shown in Table A.25 of the Appendix. Lines represent 95% CI.

with political affiliations and district type; and the final model incorporates robust standard errors clustered by a delegate's district type.

The results show that, on average, all organizations are newer than the religious organizations, except the indigenous, cultural, and labor organizations. The effect size highlights more substantial differences in health, regionalist-local, human rights, environmental, and feminist organizations. These findings support the expectation that the composition of the Constitutional Convention reflects an intermediation crisis, emphasizing the importance of newer territorial, environmental, and feminist organizations and delegates with limited or weak political affiliations.

The interviews also support these findings. When asked about the reasons behind the Convention's particular political and social composition, a delegate who was a member of an environmental-territorial organization highlighted the importance that people attributed to having "new faces" in the constitutional body. This view aligns with the expectation that novelty would be a salient factor in the election of delegates.

Figure 2.3: Linear Regression Models to Predict the Age of Delegates' Civic Volunteer Organizations



Note: Coefficients are extracted from different models, shown in Table A.26 of the Appendix. Lines represent 95% CI.

I think there is a mix of several things, one of which has to do with a more social perspective, with that attempt to look for new faces, which was a reality. (...) So I believe there is a very relevant social aspect here that we should not forget: all those familiar faces were not what people were looking for at that moment [the constitutional delegate elections]. (Interview 57, 08/04/2023)

Likewise, the following testimony from a female delegate elected from an independent list and feminist organization emphasized the opportunity that criticism of the traditional political parties created for non-party members and feminist activists.

There was disillusionment with the political system, stemming from its perceived inefficiency over the past 30 years in Chile... There was a window for those not affiliated with political parties. Each list member was charged with carrying out a very active citizen campaign in their respective territories. Furthermore, I

think what contributed [to the electoral result] was the fact that we are amid the feminist movement's peak, which undoubtedly holds significant political capital. (Interview 55, 06/04/2023)

In addition, another former delegate who is part of a territorial-environmental social organization, when asked why he was elected, responded as follows, highlighting the relevance of grassroots connections with their district:

The territorial work [was fundamental]. I swept in three out of the four municipalities in the district (. . .) where we had been working with social organizations. Those were the municipalities most connected to issues of the environment, social welfare, and corruption. (Interview 58, 10/04/2023)


However, it is notable that the analysis must be approached cautiously due to the limited number of observations and the uneven distribution across the organizations (see figure 2.1).

I conducted a complementary analysis using the ELSOC–COES survey (longitudinal panel data), which spans six waves from 2016 to 2022, to assess individual support for various social movements. Fieldwork for the 2019, 2021, and 2022 waves coincided with critical events in the constitutional process: the 2019 fieldwork began during the social upheaval; the 2021 fieldwork took place from January to July, aligning with the Constitutional Convention elections and its subsequent commencement; and the 2022 fieldwork coincided with the referendum on the constitutional proposal. This context allows us to view the survey as representing citizen sentiment. As figure 2.4 indicates, nonsupport consistently ranged from 35% to 40% over time, except between 2019 and 2021. Within this context, support for student, labor, and No+AFP movements remained relatively high, with occasional variations.

To expand the analysis, I used individual fixed-effect linear-probability models with robust clustered standard errors by region of residence to predict support for social movements over time. The models included three independent variables: (1) survey waves (the 2016 wave as the reference category, except for No+AFP and feminist movements, which have the 2018 wave as the reference category); (2) a trust index in political institutions; and (3) a binary variable distinguishing respondents outside of the metropolitan region. Control variables in the models encompassed gender, age, political ideology, and education level.

Figure 2.5 shows mostly negative wave effects, reinforcing the previous analysis. Notably, the No+AFP movement had no significant effect in 2019, whereas support for the environmental movement increased after 2019. These findings highlight the importance of the “territorial” dimension in the post-uprising political process because environmental issues are closely tied to territorial conflicts

Figure 2.4: Individual Support for Social Movements over the Survey's Waves



Note: Full details are available in Table A.24 in the Appendix.


such as extractive and energy disputes (López Moreno, 2023; Somma and Medel, 2017). The uprising boosted local political engagement (Tricot, 2021), potentially influencing the constitutional process amid detachment from parties.

The interviews highlight that elected Constitutional Convention delegates perceived the territorial aspect as more crucial to their campaign than their association with the primary protest cycles of the 2010s. For instance, a delegate from an environmental organization noted:

“I’m not sure if people saw me as part of the protest decade [the 2010s], but I had done significant territorial work that allowed me [to secure a seat in the Convention]... I have a lot of confidence in my territorial work.” (Interview 63, 12/04/2023)

On the contrary, the 2022 wave reduced support for most social movements, consistent with expectations of assimilation between social movements and institutional politics. Notably, “traditional” movements active since early democracy (i.e., students, workers, LGBTIQ+, and indigenous groups) generally experienced declining support. In contrast, movements closer to the social uprising displayed more resilience: the 2021 and 2022 waves had a positive impact on environmental-

Figure 2.5: Individual Fixed Effect Linear Probability Models to Predict Support for Social Movements



Note: Models were built using weights that considered the sample without attrition; the weights were constructed by the ELSOC-COES' research team. Coefficients are extracted from different models, shown in Table A.27 of the Appendix. Lines represent 95% CI.

movement support; No+AFP support remained unaffected by time; and although the 2022 wave negatively affected feminist movement support, the decline was less pronounced.

The following quote, from an activist for a workers' movement who did not win election to the Constitutional Convention, illustrates this from his campaign experience:

We also had to acknowledge that actors who had played a significant role in shaping public policy were also subject to these critical perspectives... so it wasn't surprising that if there was criticism about how institutions were addressing future challenges, this criticism also extended to figures within the realm of labor. (Interview 61, 11/04/2023)

Regarding trust in political institutions, the models show a positive impact on support for student, environmental, and feminist movements, but no effect on other outcomes. This suggests that trust in political institutions does not play a relevant role in supporting social movements, except in the cases mentioned above. Additionally, I estimated the effect of the trust in politics index on the no support for social movements variable, finding that the coefficient is negative and statistically significant.⁸ This indicates that mistrust in political institutions is positively associated with lack of support for social movements, which aligns with the theoretical expectation, as both mistrust and lack of support are proxies for disaffection. Nevertheless, it is necessary to continue exploring the relationship between trust in political institutions and support for social movements.

Finally, predictors linked to respondents' regions significantly affect support only for the indigenous movement, contrary to expectations. The territorial aspect of the demands apparently had a more crucial role in garnering support for the social movements. The findings concerning the environmental movement underscore the relevance of the territorial component, emphasizing the significance of the territorial dimension within the movement context beyond only physical location.

2.6 Conclusions

This study sheds light on which collective actors take advantage of the intermediation crisis, assessing the case of the Chilean constitution-making process. The article provides evidence that the composition of the Constitutional Convention and the process that began with the social uprising reflected an intermediation crisis. The results suggest that the absence of connections to political parties and membership in relatively new organizations—particularly those linked to territorial, environmental, indigenous, and feminist sectors—were the most prominent characteristics among the social activists' delegates.

The second part of the analysis highlights that the Constitutional Convention evolved against a backdrop of political disaffection and waning support for social movements. However, the environmental and, to a lesser extent, the feminist and the No+AFP movements exhibited greater resilience. This aligns with the areas of focus on delegates' civic volunteer organizations that held more influence in shaping the Convention.

These findings show how social movements, in an intermediation-crisis context, can be assimilated as political institutions in terms of mistrust regardless of a historical opportunity. This is exemplified by the experience of the Chilean Con-

⁸See Figure A.20 of the appendix.

stitutional Convention, in which delegates from social movements held a pivotal position. This article opens future research around exploring the role of social movements within democratic institutions, and the implications of the intermediation crisis in political phenomena.

This article contributes, first, to the study of what type of social activists tend to politically exploit the context of political crisis, bridging two previously disconnected pieces of literature, namely the intermediation crisis (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022) discussion and the political outcomes of collective action research (Bosi and Uba, 2021; Bosi et al., 2016; Giugni, 2008). Second, this study contributes to understanding the crisis faced by contemporary democracies in different regions, involving different actors—traditional political actors, social movements, and non-organized actors (Urbinati, 2023; Castells, 2020; Luna, 2024). Third, this research adds new antecedents and evidence of the latest political events in Chile, the 2019 social uprising and the constitution-making process (2021-2022) from a mixed-method empirical strategy. In this line, this article provides opportunities for future lines of research on the role of social movements within the Convention, the analysis of the potential impact of the proposed Constitution's rejection in the referendum of September 2022 on social activists' involvement in politics, and the implications of the intermediation crisis in different political phenomena.

Chapter 3

LIFE AFTER FAILURE? POLITICAL TRAJECTORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATES AFTER THE REJECTION OF THE 2022 PROPOSAL

Abstract

What explains sustained individual engagement in politics, and how do social activists and party members differ in their long-term political trajectories? This article addresses these questions by examining the Chilean Constitutional Convention (2021–2022), a failed constitution-making body elected after the 2019 social outbreak. The research employs a quasi-experimental design comparing the political trajectories of former delegates (treatment group) and near-winner candidates (control group) before and after the Convention (treatment period). The control group was constructed by simulating a scenario in which district magnitudes were doubled; under the same electoral rules used in the original election, the additional seats were assigned to near-winner candidates. A difference-in-differences analysis of an original dataset tracking individual political trajectories reveals that former delegates are more likely to remain politically active than the control group. However, the results diverge by delegate profile: party members often advance within political hierarchies or become advisors, whereas social activists face barriers to sustained engagement. To explore the mechanisms behind these patterns, I analyze qualitative data from 22 in-depth interviews with former delegates and a systematic press review, focusing on three potential drivers: political socialization, civic skills, and political networking. The findings contribute to the study of political trajectories by bridging research on political elites and the biographical consequences of collective action. Moreover, this article demonstrates how participation in high-stakes institutional processes shapes individual trajectories while revealing differentiated pathways for party-affiliated and activist delegates.

Keywords: Biographical Consequences, Social Movements Outcomes, Political Trajectories, Constitution-making Process, Chile

3.1 Introduction

What explains sustained individual engagement in politics, and how do social activists and party members differ in their political trajectories over time? Political science has approached this question from two distinct but largely disconnected angles. On the one hand, the study of political elites emphasizes political ambition and resource mobilization as key factors that facilitate political careers (Alcántara Sáez, 2017; Fox and Lawless, 2005; Schlesinger, 1966). On the other hand, research on collective action explores how participation in social movements can shape individual life paths, particularly by producing what are known

as the biographical outcomes of activism (Bosi and Uba, 2021; Bosi et al., 2016; Giugni, 2008; Passy and Monsch, 2018; Fillieule and Neveu, 2019a). While both bodies of work are well developed, the causal mechanisms explaining why some individuals remain politically engaged over time are still not fully understood.

Two main limitations are worth highlighting. First, both fields are dominated by observational and qualitative research designs, particularly in the study of biographical outcomes of collective action, which limits causal inference and comparative generalization (Alcántara Sáez, 2017; Joignant, 2019; Passy and Monsch, 2018; Vestergren et al., 2017; Fillieule and Neveu, 2019a). Second, even though political trajectories are a shared concern across both literatures, they have evolved in relative isolation. Yet, these fields converge analytically on several fronts: political socialization (Galais et al., 2024; Desposato et al., 2024; Alcántara Sáez, 2017; Grasso et al., 2019), networks and relational embeddedness (Joignant, 2019; McAdam, 1989), and the acquisition of political skills and resources (Schlozman et al., 2012; Verba et al., 1995; Passy and Monsch, 2018). These overlapping analytical foci suggest that a unified framework could yield new insights into the causes and conditions of long-term political engagement.

Analyzing why people remain in politics is even more necessary in the context of an extended representation crisis in liberal democracies, which is characterized by the political actors' incapacity to process the society's necessities and demands (Castells, 2020; Mainwaring, 2016; Urbinati, 2023). Furthermore, Sánchez-Cuenca (2022) sustained that the representation crisis is an expression of a major issue, where all intermediate institutions fail to interpret society's inputs. In many regions, independents and social activists have taken advantage of this intermediation gap, entering representative political institutions (Brancati, 2008; Bolleyer and Weeks, 2009).

In this scenario, the case of the Chilean Constitutional Convention (2021-2022) provides a unique opportunity to advance methodologically and theoretically in studying actors' political engagement. The Convention was a democratically elected constitution-making body created as an institutional response to a massive and disruptive protest wave, the so-called social outbreak of October 2019 (Somma et al., 2021; Tricot, 2021). The 2021 election of the 155 Convention delegates incorporated three electoral innovations: (i) gender parity in the seat assignment, (ii) list of independents (disputing elections on practically the same foot as political parties), and (iii) seventeen reserved seats for Indigenous peoples (Heiss, 2021; Suárez-Cao, 2021). These innovations allowed various non-party members to reach a seat, generating a particular composition of the Convention: more than 60% of the members did not belong to a political party; many were social activists (Rozas-Bugueño, 2024). After one year of work, almost 62% of Chileans rejected the constitution proposal of the Convention in a referendum (September 4, 2022). This case thus offers a chance to examine how activists and party members navi-

gate formal politics together, and to identify the factors that shape their continued engagement (or not) after the breakdown of the institutional project that brought them into power.

This article posits that former delegates are likely to remain active in politics, as the Convention provided a space for political socialization, learning, and the development of new networks. However, I expect the Convention experience had negatively impacted the activists' likelihood to remain in politics, while it would have had the opposite effect for political party members. The above would have happened because the economic elite, traditional press, and political parties from the right to the center-left of the political landscape blamed the social activists for the failure of the constitution-making process (Sazo, 2023; Delucchi, 2024; Larraín et al., 2023). It is also expected that the proximity to the government moderated the effect of the Convention experience on delegates' political engagement, considering that being close to the incumbents is a political opportunity for remaining in politics, regardless of whether the delegate is a party member or social activist (Schlesinger, 1966; Fox and Lawless, 2005; Tarrow, 2011).

This research employs a quasi-experimental design based on a difference-in-differences analysis of an original political trajectories dataset, which simulates an experimental scenario. The study focuses on the trajectories of former Convention delegates, considered the treatment group, and individuals who ran in the election but narrowly missed securing a seat, designated as the control group. The control group selection was based on a simulation of an electoral situation in which the district magnitude was doubled, assigning the hypothetical extra 155 seats to the control group. In addition, I employ qualitative analysis based on 22 in-depth interviews with former delegates and secondary documents to complement the analysis, evaluating qualitative evidence of political socialization, development of civil skills, and construction of political and social network mechanisms that can connect participation in the Convention with political engagement.

3.2 Interrelated Outcomes of Social Mobilization and Political Trajectories

The political engagement of social activists has been less prominent in the literature on the consequences of social mobilization (Passy and Monsch, 2018; Giugni, 2008; Fillieule and Neveu, 2019a). The subfield has focused on how social organizations influence the trajectories of their members or protesters more broadly, while paying less attention to the individual-level processes involved in the biographical consequences of participating in collective action (Fillieule and Neveu, 2019b). To strengthen the theoretical discussion on when and why indi-

viduals, but particularly activists, remain in politics, it is necessary to bridge the debates on the outcomes of social mobilization and the political trajectories of elites. Thus, this section is divided into two: (i) a review of the outcomes of social mobilization literature and (ii) a discussion on the factors that explain how actors maintain themselves in politics, linking theories of mobilization effects and political trajectories.

3.2.1 Interrelation between political and biographical outcomes

Collective action literature has categorized the consequences of social mobilization into three groups (Bosi and Uba, 2021; Bosi et al., 2016; Giugni, 2008): (i) political, those that affect political institutions and public policies (external sphere from social movements and activists), (ii) cultural, regarding value changes and modification of practices at society level; and (iii) biographical, which is related to impacts on the own life-cycle, involvement in social organizations, and political engagement of social movements activists and people exposed to waves of protest.

The literature has treated the outcomes separately for analytical reasons; however, social movements and protests have different types of consequences simultaneously and in interrelation. Bosi (2016) proposes a procedural approach to evaluate the consequences of social mobilization, where the focus is on the concatenation of outcomes over time. The author applied this approach to the case of the biographical consequences of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) volunteers of Northern Ireland, showing that the PIRA mobilization produced policies for the inclusion of the Catholic community by the British government, and these policies generated an impact on the PIRA volunteers' life-courses. After the conflict, they worked in places aligned with the values constructed during the mobilization, such as catholic neighborhood centers. In this manner, the PIRA mobilization is a case in which an initial political outcome leads to a biographical outcome.

Other examples of the interrelated political-biographical consequences are the 15-M movement in Spain at the beginning of the 2010s, anti-school closure protests in Sweden in the 1990s, and the institutionalization of the Czech Civic Forum and the Brazilian Workers' Party. The 15-M movement preceded the creation and the entrance of new parties into the political system, in addition to generating a change in the attitudes and values of the people exposed to the 15-M protest wave. This change of attitudes would have allowed the electoral effect of the mobilization via new parties (Revilla-Blanco and Molina-Sánchez, 2021). Similarly, Helander (2016) showed that the protest against the closure of schools in Sweden impacted the political engagement of the demonstrators ten years after the mobilization. Still, involvement in politics depended on the mobilization results

(whether schools were kept open); thus, the biographical change was preceded by a policy outcome. In the same vein, the Civic Forum in Czech Republic and Workers' Party in Brazil are other examples of how social mobilization can facilitate the creation of new political referents, and how the emergence of these new parties can impact the trajectories of former activists. As noted by Dorronsoro (2019), the formation of new political parties often leads to the professionalization of their cadres, as the organization requires individuals to fill institutional roles.

This article follows the interrelated consequences approach of Bosi et al. (2016), framing the Convention as a political outcome of the 2019 social outbreak, which in turn generated an effect on the delegates' biographies after they participated in this constitution-making body. I focus on the impact of the political change on the delegates' political trajectories, as the nexus between the social outbreak and the constitution-making process has already been widely studied from different angles (Escudero and Olivares, 2021; Heiss, 2021; Suárez-Cao, 2021; Rozas-Bugueño, 2024). At the same time, the effect of the Convention's experience on the trajectories of its delegates has not yet been addressed.

3.2.2 Explaining political trajectories

Two distinct bodies of literature have examined political trajectories from different perspectives: the literature on social mobilization, which focuses on the biographical consequences of protest, and the literature on political elites, which centers on ambition and political capital. This article seeks to bridge both approaches to better understand political trajectories.

Although biographical outcomes have received comparatively less attention than other consequences of social mobilization (Passy and Monsch, 2018; Vestergren et al., 2017), the literature has identified multiple ways in which individual-level change may crystallize following participation in movements or exposure to protest waves. These include changes in their life course (such as marital status, career trajectories, and parenthood), psychological shifts (including identity, self-esteem, empowerment, general well-being, and radicalization), social involvement (such as increased engagement in other causes or sustained commitment to the original movement), and political engagement (including conventional political participation and involvement in electoral politics or political institutions) (Passy and Monsch, 2018; Vestergren et al., 2017; Giugni, 2008; McAdam, 1999, 1989; Giugni and Grasso, 2015). These outcomes may also vary in temporal scope, leading to short-, medium-, or long-term changes (Passy and Monsch, 2018; Vestergren et al., 2017). This paper focuses on short-term political engagement, particularly on political trajectories, understood as individual-level consequences that link protest experiences with access to formal politics.

Biographical consequences of collective action inherently operate at the individual level, but they are shaped by interactions between micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors (Fillieule and Neveu, 2019b). According to Fillieule and Neveu (2019b), activist trajectories emerge at the intersection of primary socialization and personal histories (micro-level), secondary socialization facilitated by organizational involvement (meso-level), and the broader political opportunity structure (macro-level). I adopt this multi-level framework as a central analytical tool. Accordingly, I engage these levels in dialogue to better understand how and why activists enter and remain in politics.

Different studies of the civil rights movement in the United States and feminist student activism have shown that the former demonstrators have participated more in politics (entering political parties and working in political institutions) than people who have not participated in these protest waves (McAdam, 1989, 1999; Fendrich and Lovoy, 1988; Cole et al., 1998). For the case of the May 1968 protests in France, Pagis (2019) found similar results regarding former demonstrators' higher levels of political engagement compared to non-participants after the mobilization. Pagis explains this finding by arguing that the participants in May 1968 developed an activist disposition, which facilitated their subsequent engagement in politics.

The main mechanisms behind these outcomes are that social mobilization increases political efficacy, fosters the development of civic skills relevant to political engagement, and enhances interest in a variety of public issues. These mechanisms align with what Fillieule and Neveu (2019b) identify as exposure to political events and organizational modeling. Political events can prompt a reorientation of beliefs and values among those involved or exposed, while participation in protest-related organizations plays a socializing role by transmitting the "rules of the game" and the practical know-how of mobilization and political action. The systematic literature review on the biographical consequences of the social movement of Passy and Monsch (2018) and Vestergren et al. (2017) ratified the salience of this explanation. Likewise, Galais et al. (2024) expose that former demonstrators of 15-M protests in Spain in 2011 have better indicators of political self-efficacy and political participation because the protests were for them a socialization space where they increased their interest in politics.

It is worth noting that the case of this article represents a failed political experience derived from social mobilization, the effects of which could be different. However, evidence shows that even negative outcomes can positively affect political engagement. Beckwith (2016) shows that the women involved in failed strikes against coal-pit closures in the UK did not affect their compromise with the movement, and they mobilized again ten years later against the closure of other coal-pits. Similarly, Desposato et al. (2024) show that the student cohort exposed to the Tiananmen Square repression nowadays participates more in elections than

the subsequent cohort.

While the biographical outcomes literature provides insights into how protest participation may lead to political engagement, elite studies offer complementary perspectives by examining how political ambition (Allen and Cutts, 2018; Lawless, 2012; Fox and Lawless, 2005; Schlesinger, 1966) and various forms of capital (Joignant, 2019, 2012; Alcántara Sáez, 2017) shape political careers. The book *Politics as a Vocation* of Weber (1946) opened the modern study of political trajectories. In his work, the author presents an agential argument: politicians seek to take control, and maintain it, of the state, and this vocation requires passion and responsibility ethics (awareness that the decisions generate consequences for people). More narrowly, the study of Schlesinger (1966) about the political careers in the United States is the cornerstone of the political ambition discussion. As per Weber (1946), the argument of Schlesinger (1966) is also agential but incorporates the rational choice approach. He argues that political trajectories are explained by political ambition, which is the function of the perceived political opportunities of the system. This calculus results in three types of ambition: (i) static ambition (remaining in the same position), (ii) progressive ambition (running for a higher office), and (iii) discrete ambition (exiting from politics instead of seeking re-election or scaling into a higher office). Based on Schlesinger (1966), Lawless differentiates political ambition based on two moments of the political career: the nascent political ambition, the ambition to run for the first time to the office, and the expressive ambition related to the development of the political career (static, discrete or progressive ambition) (Lawless, 2012; Fox and Lawless, 2005).

For its part, these studies focus on the capital that individuals hold as explanations of political careers and have distinguished between different types of capital. In their seminal work on the inequality of political voice, Verba et al. (1995) sustain that the socioeconomic background is central to predicting political engagement because it gives civic skills; thus, the more educated and the higher the income, the greater the likelihood of participating and remaining in politics. At the same time, the authors argue that participation in voluntary social organizations is also a source of civic skills that can be used to support political engagement (Schlozman et al., 2012). In a similar vein, but from a Bourdieuan starting point,¹ Joignant (2019, 2012) shows that the political system is a field where the actors are suited to different positions of importance depending on the amounts of the distinct capital they have and how valued they are in the field. Among the different capitals are those that come from political institutions (political parties or representative institutions), education (technical knowledge and its value in poli-

¹This approach builds on Bourdieu's notion of the political field. For Bourdieu, the political system is a space of struggle in which actors compete to improve their positions and increase their political influence. Individuals' positions within the field depend on the forms of capital they possess—social, cultural, symbolic, and political (Joignant, 2019).

tics), and personal characteristics such as public visibility and charisma (Joignant, 2019, 2012; Alcántara Sáez, 2017).

Regarding the capital derived from political institutions, Alcántara Sáez (2017) argues that political institutions (delegated political capital), such as political parties, play a socialization role that allows the actors to gain an important know-how of how to move in the political field. The works of Olivares and collaborators on Chile and Uruguay have shown that individuals' capital is important. Still, external variables such as economic shocks, protest waves, and the type of political office are also relevant to understanding political trajectories, particularly of higher-rank executive positions (ministers, undersecretaries, and other important offices) (Olivares, 2022; González-Bustamante and Olivares, 2016, 2015; Dávila et al., 2013).

The above highlights the main explanations of political engagement from the collective action and political elites discussions and shows the importance of connecting the two bodies of literature based on their similarities around mechanisms regarding political socialization, civil skills, and mobilization of different types of resources or capitals. This said, I propose a general hypothesis to test whether participation in the constitutional body had a leverage effect on the delegates' political engagement. I expect that the Convention played a socialization and civil skills generator function in this regard.

Hypothesis 1: Former delegates of the Constitutional Convention are more likely to remain in politics than individuals who were not part of the Convention.

I also expect a different effect of the Convention on the political trajectories of former delegates because, firstly, in theory, political party members have more political resources (delegated political capital) than non-party members (Joignant, 2019, 2012; Alcántara Sáez, 2017). Secondly, changes in the political scenario—such as divisions among political elites or shifts in government priorities—can result in the closure of political opportunities for activists (Fillieule and Neveu, 2019b). In the Chilean case, the political landscape shifted significantly following the rejection of the Constitutional Convention's proposal. President Boric's administration was forced to adapt its political agenda and reform priorities, while economic elites, political actors, and the media blamed the failure of the process primarily on the social activist delegates (Delucchi, 2024; Sazo, 2023). Hence, they would have fewer opportunities than the other delegates to engage in politics.

Hypothesis 2: Social activists who participated in the Constitutional Convention are less likely to remain in politics than those former delegates who were not.

Hypothesis 3: Party members who participated in the Constitutional Conven-

tion are more likely to remain in politics than those former delegates who were not party members.

Finally, I expect to find differences in the political trajectories between delegates depending on their proximity to the political incumbent (political parties in government). As the literature points out, the political structure can generate opportunities for the actors; and one of the central dimensions of the structure is having influential allies (Tarrow, 2011). At the same time, proximity to the government could also increase political ambition (Schlesinger, 1966; Fox and Lawless, 2005). It can also be considered as individual capital that allows them to improve their positions in the political field (Joignant, 2019). Hence, I propose that

Hypothesis 4: Former delegates close to the incumbents are more likely to remain in politics than those delegates distant from the incumbents.

3.3 A Tale of a Failure: The Case of the Constitutional Convention (2021-2022)

Since the return to democracy in 1990, Chile has experienced robust economic growth, reaching the highest GDP per capita growth in Latin America from 1990 to 2018 (Edwards, 2023). Poverty dropped significantly, from nearly 52% in 1987 to around 7% in 2017 (Edwards, 2023). Despite economic growth, the country experienced social tensions. The restoration of democracy was based on the rules of Pinochet's dictatorship: the dictator passed a Constitution in 1980 that produced an important reconfiguration of the Chilean institutions, favoring market actors in the provision of social goods and services and constraining the political representation toward the center. Inequality remained high, with a Gini coefficient between 0.56 and 0.44 from 1985-2017 (Edwards, 2023). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Chile warned of a growing discontent around inequality in the late 1990s, pointing out distrust in institutions such as education, pensions, and healthcare (UNDP-Chile, 1998).

During the 1990s, protests were relatively subdued, though tensions arose between the Indigenous Mapuche people and the government over a dam built on Mapuche land (Tricot, 2021). In 2006, student protests demanded an educational reform, but the resulting law was seen as a political betrayal, which disappointed the movement (Donoso, 2017). The 2010s, however, saw a resurgence of large-scale mobilizations: students protested for free, quality education in 2011, environmental groups opposed extractive projects, significant movement emerged

in 2016 against the privatized pension system, and feminist movements led mass protests against patriarchal structures in the Chilean society (Rozas-Bugueño and Maillet, 2019; Delamaza et al., 2017; Guzman-Concha, 2012; Palacios-Valladares, 2022; Tricot, 2021). All these mobilizations shared the detachment from the political parties and a tendency to assign the blame for inequality and low performance of the public system to the political system (Roberts, 2016).


The 2019 social uprising erupted from a seemingly minor event: a EUR 0.030 subway fare increase in Santiago. High school students initiated protests, leading to a massive disruption in Santiago's public transportation system. On October 18, 2019, the unrest escalated dramatically as the subway system was shut down, sparking protests across the city. These protests quickly turned violent, with clashes between police and protesters, looting, and the burning of twenty subway stations (Somma et al., 2021; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020; Guzmán-Concha, 2023). The government of Sebastián Piñera declared a state of emergency, deploying military forces and imposing curfews. This period saw the harshest state repression since the return to democracy, with thirty-four deaths, 347 eye injuries from police actions, and over 1,500 reported human rights violations (Heiss, 2021; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020).

On November 15, 2019, most political parties (except the Communist Party and Social Convergence) agreed to start a new constitutional process. A 2020 referendum showed strong public support, with over 78% voting for a fully elected convention to draft a new constitution. The constitutional delegates election in May 2021 included important innovations: gender parity, independent candidates, and 17 seats reserved for Indigenous people reserved seats (Heiss, 2021; Suárez-Cao, 2021). Independents won over 60% of seats (Rozas-Bugueño et al., 2022). The Convention began its work on June 4, 2021, and completed a draft constitution by June 4, 2022. The process was tense from the outset due to internal fragmentation within the Convention. Tensions were further exacerbated by the inclusion of controversial provisions in the constitutional proposal, such as *plurinationality*, the right to free abortion, and the elimination of the Senate. Additionally, a political scandal involving a delegate who lied about having cancer—a central element of his electoral campaign—fueled public distrust (Sazo, 2023; Larraín et al., 2023). The media amplified these tensions, especially during the electoral campaign for the constitutional referendum (Sazo, 2023). However, in the referendum on September 4, 2022, the proposed Constitution was rejected by more than 60% of voters.

Following the defeat, political parties agreed on a new constitutional process with stricter guidelines: fifty members, selected based on Senate rules, with reduced independent and Indigenous representation. A council of legal experts was also added. In the election for this new body on May 7, 2023, right-wing parties gained thirty-four out of the fifty seats, including twenty-three held by the

far-right Republican Party. This conservative proposal was rejected in another referendum on December 17, 2023. This research does not address the second constitution-making body, as it is difficult to compare it with the Convention. First, the Constitutional Council operated under different rules, including fewer seats, the absence of independent lists, and restricted representation of indigenous peoples. Consequently, the presence of social activists within the Council was practically null. Second, the Council's process was influenced by the outcomes of the first constitution-making process, which impacted the election of Council delegates. Lastly, as the second process was a response to the failure of the Convention, the contexts of the two processes were fundamentally different, altering the incentives to participate as a candidate in the Council election. Figure 3.1 summarizes the stages of this constitution-making process.

Figure 3.1: Chile's Constitution-Making Process Timeline (2019-2023)



3.4 Design and Data

This article has a quasi-experimental strategy. This study uses a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to address political engagement before and after the Constitutional Convention. To carry out this analysis, I constructed an original dataset of political trajectories for former Convention delegates and 155 other individuals who participated in the Convention members' election and almost won a seat in the constitutional body. For selecting the other individuals, I simulated an electoral scenario where the district magnitude of the 28 electoral districts in Chile would have been doubled. Thus, I replicated the delegate election rules for the new seats: I applied the D'Hondt rule, and then I corrected the seat assignment based on the gender parity rule. For the dataset construction, I used information from the Chilean Electoral Service (SERVEL), the Chilean Transparency Council, the Chamber of Deputies of Chile, the Congress National Library, the individuals' social media, and systematic press review of three newspapers with different editorials.²

²For more details on the dataset construction and the assignment of extra seats, see Section A.1.5 in the Appendix.

The sample is compounded by 310 individuals—155 Convention members and 155 simulated seats—measured in six points of time: (i) 2017, (ii) 2018, (iii) 2019, (iv) 2020-May 2021 (Convention members’ elections), (v) September 2022 (referendum of the Convention’s proposal)-December 2023, and (vi) 2024. I chose this time range for three reasons. First, having six time points allows the test of the parallel trends assumption—no statistically significant differences between the groups before the treatment assignment—, which is fundamental to conducting a DID. The more periods are considered in the analysis, the more reliable the assessment of the parallel trends assumption. Second, this period allows me to address the 2019 social uprising, which marked the delegate election and the whole process of the Convention. Third, I opted for aggregating the data at the year level because, considering that changes in political engagement take time, it allows for addressing differences in individual trajectories over time adequately; it would be unlikely to find differences a few months after the Convention’s end.

The 155 former delegates correspond to the treatment group, where the treatment is to have participated in the constitutional body. The 155 simulated Convention extra-seats correspond to the control group—individuals who, on average, share similar characteristics with former delegates but did not participate in the constitutional body. Thus, the dataset contains 1,860 observations (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Total Observations of the Political Trajectories Dataset

Time	Control group	Treatment group	Total
2017	155	155	310
2018	155	155	310
2019	155	155	310
2020-May 2021	155	155	310
Sept. 2022-2023	155	155	310
2024	155	155	310
Total	930	930	1,860

The DID estimator is defined as the interaction between the post-treatment period (September 2022–2024) and the condition of serving as a constitutional delegate. This straightforward specification of the DID variable was chosen because the treatment is discrete: only one type of treatment was applied (having served as a Convention delegate).

Regarding outcomes, the paper considers three political engagement indicators: (i) a binary variable of being in a political position at the national or subnational level (= 1), which also includes advisory roles in public institutions;³ (ii)

³It is worth noting that the deputies and senators were excluded from the analysis because Law

a continuous variable related to the intensity of the party militancy, which goes from 0 to 5; where 0 corresponds to no party membership, 1 to party membership without any leadership position within the party, 2 to a local or provincial leadership position, 3 to holding a regional position, 4 to political commission members, Council positions in the party or as part of the board of the party's youth group, and 5 as part of the party national board; and (iii) a binary variable that distinguishes between those that have advising roles in political parties that are not positions of the national directive (= 1), such as negotiating positions to discuss a political agreement between government party and opposition, electoral campaign managers, and rapporteurs of political training of party cadres.

To address the moderation hypotheses, I first considered a binary variable related to social activism (H1). The variable describes whether the individual is a member of a civil volunteer organization (= 1), which aligns with the operationalization of Convention delegates' social activism used by Rozas-Bugueño (2024) and Rozas-Bugueño et al. (2022). Second, I employed a binary political party militancy (= 1) variable to address H2. It is worth noting that the dichotomous variables of social activism and party membership are not mutually exclusive; one individual could be a party member and simultaneously be a member of a social organization. Third, I use a binary variable indicating whether the individuals are close to the incumbent (= 1) for analyzing H.3. I used the political party membership and the political list where individuals compete in the election as a proxy of proximity to the incumbent. Individuals who were part of the electoral list of Go Chile (center-right coalition) and the center-left Democratic Socialism and leftist Approval Dignity were considered close to the incumbent.⁴

As for the covariates, I considered gender (female = 1), the individual's age, educational level (higher education = 1), ideology, scholar position (= 1), holding of a law degree, being a business organization member (= 1), political experience before the 2017-2024 period, and the candidate's share of votes (percentage of the total district votes).⁵ I introduced these variables because the literature has shown that life-course patterns' effects on political engagement can affect contentious political participation and political engagement for biographical availability (Passy and Monsch, 2018; Verba et al., 1995; McAdam, 1989). Likewise, different research has highlighted that people with more resources (income and education) and political background tend to participate more in politics, and these resources are also helpful capital to engage in politics (Joignant, 2019; Schlozman

21,200 prohibited former delegates from participating in elections until one year after the end of their mandate.

⁴Center-right Sebastián Piñera (Let's Go Chile) was in power during the pre-treatment time (2019-May 2021), while Gabriel Boric (Democratic Socialism and Approval Dignity) was in office during the post-treatment period (September 2022-2024).

⁵For more details on the operationalization, see Section A.4.1 in the Appendix.

et al., 2012; Verba et al., 1995). Specifically, there is evidence in the Chilean case that the political elite is composed of people with a strong academic background, often with a legal background, and who have economic power (Olivares, 2022; González-Bustamante and Olivares, 2015, 2016; Dávila et al., 2013). It is worth noting that the covariates of the groups were balanced before the treatment, except for ideology, scholar position, legal background, political experience before the 2017-2024 period, and the candidate's share of votes (%)⁶.

Regarding the analysis, I conducted linear probability models to predict the political position and party advising outcomes, and OLS models to estimate the party membership intensity outcome. Considering the geographical differences of the country, the centralized administration of the state, and the historical exclusion that the indigenous people have suffered in Chile since the conquest (Tricot et al., 2022; Disi-Pavlic, 2024), I used robust standard errors clustered by geographical zones of the electoral districts plus whether the seat corresponded a seat reserved for an indigenous representative. I included in the models the covariates mentioned above, except for gender, age, educational level, and business organization membership, as there are no statistically significant differences between the groups⁷.

In addition, I complement the DID approach with a qualitative analysis based on 22 in-depth interviews with former Convention delegates and the press review conducted to construct the political trajectories' dataset⁸ to trace the mechanisms of political socialization, civic skills development, and political and social networking behind the relationship between being part of the Convention and political engagement. The interview fieldwork was reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee of Pompeu Fabra University (Application 279). The interviews were conducted remotely, except for two that were carried out in person, between April 2023 and May 2024. I coded the qualitative data using MaxQDA software: I identified interviewees' reflections on increased political interest after participating in the Convention and their understanding of how political institutions work as indicators of political socialization. Regarding civic skills, I coded data related to learning how to coordinate people, work in teams, and effectively present ideas in writing and orally. Lastly, I coded qualitative evidence of meeting new individuals and collaborating with actors with whom former delegates had not interacted before as political and social networking indicators. Regarding the press review, I used an analysis matrix to synthesize the information of 2,178 press articles from three newspapers, the same corpus of data I employed to construct the political trajectories dataset.

⁶See Section A.4.2 in the Appendix.

⁷See Section A.4.2 in the Appendix.

⁸For more details, please see Section A.1.7 of the Appendix.

3.5 Results and Discussion


This section is divided into two parts. First, I show the difference-in-differences analysis to systematically evaluate the effect of participating in the Convention and how this interacts with the different profiles of the former delegates. Second, I present the qualitative analysis based on in-depth interviews with former delegates and the press to trace how the mechanisms of political socialization, civil skills, and networking can facilitate remaining in politics.

3.5.1 Difference-in-differences

To begin the analysis, it is necessary to assess one of the key assumptions of the DID strategy: parallel trends. As shown in Figure 3.2, the groups exhibit similar trajectories before the Convention and different trends after the Convention, with the differences being more pronounced after the Convention in the intensity of political party membership and political party advising compared to political positions. These trends suggest that, on average, the political trajectories of the two groups diverged after the treatment assignment, with political engagement increasing among the former delegates and decreasing in the latter group. To assess whether the assumption of parallel trends holds, I conducted the Callaway and Sant'Anna pre-treatment parallel trends test. In all three cases, the tests indicate that pre-treatment trends were not statistically different between treated and control groups (see p-values in Figure 3.2).


Now, I examine whether the difference in political engagement between the two groups after the Convention is statistically significant. The first test analyzes whether the former delegates have tended to remain in politics more than the control group (H1). In this regard, Figure 3.3 presents the results of the robust linear probability models to predict having a political position ($= 1$) and a party advising position ($= 1$), and the robust OLS model to estimate the party membership intensity. The models also include the control variables described in the previous section, but I only graph the DID term to clarify the analysis. In general terms, the models show that the former delegates are more likely to be involved in party advising ($p < 0.01$) and increasing their intensity of party membership ($p < 0.01$) compared to the control group. However, there are no significant differences between delegates and non-delegates in terms of political position. Nevertheless, the direction of the DID estimate is positive, which aligns with the expectation outlined in H1. At the same time, it is interesting that the DID has a greater magnitude of effect on party membership intensity (almost 0.18 pp). In other words, the Convention's experience seems to incentivize partisan politics. Considering the above, there is partial evidence in favor of H1 but only for the outcomes directly linked to the political party arena.

Figure 3.2: Parallel Trends of Political Engagement Outcomes (2017-2024)



Note: P-value: Political charges = 0.60, party advising = 0.38, party membership intensity = 0.22.

Figure 3.3: DID Robust Linear Probability and OLS Models to Predict Political Engagement




Note: Coefficients are extracted from different models, shown in Table A.30 of the Appendix. Lines represent 95% CI.

Regarding the hypotheses involving heterogeneous effects, the results vary across outcomes and interactions. Figure 3.4 presents eight models that estimate the outcomes through three three-way interactions between the DID term and specific individual characteristics (social activism, party membership, and proximity to the incumbent). It is worth noting that I did not include a model that estimates the effect of DID-party member interaction on the party membership intensity because the association is endogenous; the party membership intensity is constructed based on the party membership.

None of the delegates' characteristics have a statistically significant effect on predicting political positions after the Convention. These results are counterintuitive for two reasons. First, party members should theoretically be better positioned to remain in or enter political office, as political parties provide access to political capital and know-how, which should amplify the effect of the Convention (Alcántara Sáez, 2017; Joignant, 2019). A similar pattern emerges in the case of the incumbent-related interaction. Second, I expected to find a positive effect of the interaction between proximity to the incumbent and Convention participation, as the literature suggests that when political and social actors have influential allies in positions of power and perceive the political system as open, their politi-

Figure 3.4: DID Robust Linear Probability and OLS Models to Predict Political Engagement: Heterogeneous Effects



Note: Coefficients are extracted from different models, shown in Table A.31 of the Appendix. Lines represent 95% CI.

cal ambition and chances of attaining office increase (Schlesinger, 1966; Tarrow, 2011).

In contrast, the models to predict party advising show an interesting finding: Former delegates who are members of political parties are more likely to be involved in party advising than delegates who are not party militants. The situation is the opposite in the case of social activists: Delegates who are part of social organizations are less likely to work in party advising after the Convention than delegates who are not social activists. It suggests that the party members and social activists followed different political paths after the Convention. In the case of the DID-incumbent interaction, the effect is not statistically significant, although the coefficient goes in the expected orientation.

For its part, the models that predict party membership indicate no significant effect. However, the findings related to social activist involvement are substantively interesting. Even though the interaction coefficient is not significant, the direction of the effect is positive, which contrasts the results found in the model predicting party advising outcomes. It suggests that the political engagement of former delegates who are social activists varies depending on the type of political position. As for the impact of Convention participation on the proximity to the incumbent, it is also not statistically significant.


One possible explanation is that the political opportunity structure (Tarrow, 2011) would have closed for social activists but remained open for party members. After rejecting the Convention's proposal in the 2022 referendum, the elite blamed social activism for the failure of the constitution-making process, advocating that these actors did not work seriously, generating fragmentation within the constitutional body, and polarizing the public with maximalist positions (Sazo, 2023; Delucchi, 2024; Larraín et al., 2023). Hence, it makes sense that the trajectories of former delegates with a partisan profile differ from those of the social activists.

The results give mixed evidence for hypotheses 2 (social activists) and 3 (party members), while the evidence goes against Hypothesis 4 (incumbent). The findings align with the initial results, which indicate a null effect of the treatment on having political positions but a significant impact on involvement in party advising and increasing the intensity of party membership. Likewise, the models that include heterogeneous effects expose a pattern: party members and social activists tend to have different trajectories. The results suggest that party members are more politically consistent, particularly in the partisan space (positions within parties and political advising).

Building on this, I explore whether the effect of participating in the Convention remains constant over time, is concentrated in the first year after the constitutional body was dissolved, or increases in the second year after the Convention. To conduct that, I estimated the predicted values of the three outcomes based on

group differences over time. Figure 3.5 shows that the predicted values coincide with the results of the models. First, it shows no relevant difference between the groups after the Convention, represented by the year 2020, in the case of political positions. However, there is a growing trend of increased party advising and membership intensity among former delegates after the Convention. It is worth noting that the predicted values of party advising are greater in 2023, while the predicted values of party membership intensity are practically the same in 2023 and 2024.

Figure 3.5: Predicted Values of Political Engagement Outcomes: Groups' Differences over Time




Note: Coefficients are extracted from different models, shown in Table A.32 of the Appendix. Lines represent 95% CI.

These findings are understandable given that, in 2023, a new constitution-making process began with the election of a second constitutional body—the Constitutional Council. Many former delegates were involved in this new process by supporting Council candidates during their campaigns, training new representatives, and providing technical and political assistance to various parties. It is the case for many right-wing former delegates, such as Ruth Hurtado (Republican

Party), Constanza Hube (Independent Democratic Union), and Marcela Cubillos (independent), who participated in several instances of advocacy and training of new delegates, in addition to defining political strategies during the Council. Another interesting case was the former Communist delegates Marcos Barraza and Bárbara Sepúlveda, who negotiated on behalf of their party in the political agreement that defined the rules and the institutional framework of the new constitution-making process.

At the same time, I estimated the predicted values of the three political engagement outcomes, considering the different profiles of the individuals, based on whether they are social activists, party members, or close to the incumbent. As Figure 3.6 illustrates, the predicted values show similar patterns over time, which the previous analysis did not account for in terms of individuals' profiles. However, there are interesting differences across the profiles. First, the predicted values of the political position outcome are generally not statistically relevant, except for the individuals close to the incumbent. However, the differences between the groups are not relevant. Likewise, the predicted values of having a political position are particularly low among non-party members. In the case of party membership intensity, the predicted values increase over time; being particularly high for former delegates close to the incumbent. The predicted values of party advising positions follow the same trend as estimated by the groups' differences (see Figure 3.5): the bigger differences are in 2023. Across all profiles, the delegates tend to have higher predicted values after the Convention than the non-delegates. These results delve into and support the analysis reported by the regression models, showing partial evidence in favor of the hypotheses based on heterogeneous effects (H2, H3, and H4).


Figure 3.6: Predicted Values of Political Engagement Outcomes: Group and Profiles Differences over Time



Note: Coefficients are extracted from different models, shown in Table A.33 of the Appendix. Lines represent 95% CI.

To close this section, I conducted several robustness checks to assess the internal validity of the results and the consistency of the treatment.⁹ Since the control group was constructed based on increases in district magnitude, there are differences between groups regarding the percentage of votes they received. This could be problematic, particularly for individuals with lower vote shares. The average vote share for former delegates is 5.36%, while the control group averages 3.05%. Therefore, assessing whether the results are sensitive to the percentage of votes individuals received in the Convention election is necessary. To do so, I re-estimate the same regression models predicting the three political engagement outcomes using three different subsets of the data: one including only individuals who received between 3.5% and 6.5% of the vote, another including those with 2.5% to 7.5%, and a third with individuals who received between 1.5% and 8.5%. I use these vote ranges because they are close to the vote share averages of both groups and the overall sample (4.21%).

Figure 3.7: Sensitivity Analysis: Robust Linear Probability and OLS Models to Predict Political Engagement



Note: Coefficients are extracted from different models, shown in Table A.34 of the Appendix. Lines represent 95% CI.

⁹Full details of the robustness tests are available in Sections A.4.3 and A.4.4 of the Appendix.

Figure 3.7 shows the results of the models that estimate the DID effect on political engagement outcomes. The results align with the main estimations (Figure 3.3) in terms of the magnitude and direction of the effects on the different outcomes. However, there is only one difference regarding the main models: the DID effect is not statistically significant on party membership intensity. As shown in Figure 3.7, the confidence intervals are wider than in the other estimations. This is directly related to the smaller number of observations used in these models, which results from using datasets limited to specific ranges of individuals' vote shares.

For its part, Figure 3.8 presents the replication of models employed in the three different datasets but now to estimate the effects of the interactions between DID and the individuals' profile (social activist, party member, and proximity to the incumbent) on the outcomes. Again, the effects' magnitude and direction are consistent with the main estimations (Figure 3.4). However, there are some differences in terms of statistical significance. In the case of the political position outcome, the interactions of the DID with profiles of party members, social activists, and being close to the incumbent (3.5-6.5% voting range dataset) are statistically significant, while there are no significant effects in the main estimations (Figure 3.4). Something similar happens in the party membership intensity estimations, where interaction between DID and the incumbent's profile is statistically significant (2.5-7.5% and 1.5-8.5% voting range datasets), which differs from the main estimations that do not report any significant effect. As mentioned earlier, the differences in statistical significance are likely due to the reduced number of observations used to estimate the models, rather than to substantive differences in voting shares. This is supported by the fact that both the magnitude and direction of the effects remain consistent with the main estimations. Accordingly, these additional estimations (Figures 3.7 and 3.8) confirm the robustness of the main findings.

Moreover, I checked the reliability and precision of the treatment. Using the treatment, I regressed the political trajectory before 2017 (prior to the political trajectory covariate). If the treatment is reliable, there should be no statistically relevant effect on the earlier political trajectory. This is confirmed by a linear probability model, with the same specification as the main models. The estimation shows a non-statistically significant impact of the DID on the prior political trajectory variable.¹⁰


Additionally, I estimated two extra probability linear models to predict two non-theoretically related outcomes through the treatment: being a scholar (= 1) and business organization membership (= 1). If the treatment is reliable, it should not have a relevant effect on the two outcomes. The results indicate that the treatment does not predict the two outcomes, which is evidence of its reliability.¹¹

¹⁰See Figure A.21 of the Appendix.

¹¹See Figure A.22 of the Appendix.

Finally, regarding the precision of the treatment, I tested the sensitivity of the results by replicating the main models but without clustered standard errors, and the results remained consistent with the main models.¹²

Figure 3.8: Sensitivity Analysis: Robust Linear Probability and OLS Models to Estimate Interactions' Effect on Political Engagement



Note: Coefficients are extracted from different models, shown in Tables A.35, A.36, and A.37 of the Appendix. Lines represent 95% CI.

3.5.2 Exploring mechanisms: qualitative data analysis

The difference-in-differences analysis shows that the former delegates tended to achieve party advising positions and increased their party membership intensity after the Convention. Likewise, the analysis indicates that former delegates who are party members are more likely to have party advising positions than those who

¹²See Figure A.23 of the Appendix.

are not party members. In the same vein, the results show that the former delegates who are social activists are less likely to have party advising positions than those who are not members of social organizations. Despite the consistency of these results and their insights into delegates' political trajectories after the Convention, it is impossible to examine the mechanisms that enable delegates to stay active in politics following their participation in the constitutional body. For this reason, it is necessary to explore the mechanisms of political socialization, civil skills, and political networking that the literature has pointed out as relevant to explain political engagement (see Section 3.2).

There is consensus among the interviewees that the Convention experience allows them to understand better how institutional politics work and that their participation in the constitutional body generated more interest in politics. In this regard, one of the main agreements between the interviewees is learning how to negotiate in a context with diverse actors, ranging from traditional politicians to independents, without any political or social experience. The following quote about the constitution-making work of a former delegate and social activist (Interview 59, 10/04/2023) reflects this point:

“The proposals had to be negotiated with other sectors, and none of us [social activists] knew how to negotiate because none of us had ever been part of a political representative body. I think that’s the first thing to note: there wasn’t a direct translation from aspiration to norm, but rather a process of mediation between the two, shaped by a series of political actions for which none of us were truly prepared. I believe we learned quickly, but it was still difficult.”

Similarly, one of the seventeen former Indigenous delegates pointed out that *“we must be able to engage in dialogue despite all these problems [Indigenous recognition and politics]—with all the movements”* (Interview 74, 05/04/2024). This quote indicates the perceived importance to strengthen the dialogue to have more political influence capacity in the decision-making.

Likewise, another relevant aspect of political socialization is the generation or strengthening of political interest. Despite the failure of the constitutional proposal of the Convention, many former delegates have remained active in politics or demonstrated their interest in assuming a political position. There are cases of former delegates who have moved into national politics, such as Ricardo Montero (Socialist Party), the current Undersecretary of Defense; Beatriz Sánchez (Independent, aligned with the Broad Front), Chile’s ambassador to Mexico; and Ignacio Achurra (Broad Front), Director of the Division of Social Organizations, which depends on the Ministry General Secretariat of Government, one of the most important state offices in the country. Other former delegates achieved important subnational positions after the Convention, such as Helmuth Martínez

(independent), who was elected as the mayor of Carahue Municipality, Javier Fuchslocher (Socialist Party), who was named as Presidential Delegate of Biobío Province, and Ericka Portilla (Communist Party), the current director of the Youth Institute of the Atacama Region.

Beyond the political positions, being a candidate is another indicator of political interest. As I mentioned before, former delegates were legally unable to compete in the legislative election of 2021. The first elections in which they could be a candidate were the subnational elections in 2024. Running in subnational elections demonstrates political ambition (Schlesinger, 1966; Fox and Lawless, 2005), as was the case with twenty-three former delegates in 2024, who competed for subnational positions despite the Convention's failure. Aligned with the findings of the DID analysis, the interviews show that the former delegates are interested in remaining in politics and think the learning they gained during the Convention will be helpful in future political challenges. The following quote from a former delegate and social activist exemplifies this:

"We returned to our territories (...), and we went back to the kind of activism we were probably doing before. But that doesn't mean we've given up on the process or on our aspirations to have some degree of influence in national politics." (Interview 67, 14/05/2023).

Regarding civic skills, the interviews show that participation in the Convention was marked by many learnings, such as teamwork, coordination of people, or developing legal work. Still, according to the interviews, the most important one was learning to dialogue with people from different backgrounds and across political positions. Literature has highlighted civic skills as relevant shortcuts that facilitate remaining in, and incorporation into politics because they are skills required for the political work (Verba et al., 1995). The following quotes, first from a former delegate close to the Broad Front and second from a former delegate who was part of a political party, illustrate very well the learning process of how to engage in effective dialogue and collectively build knowledge to improve deliberation.

"That required learning how to have conversations—everyone had to learn how to engage politically in a different way. Because, of course, traditional politics has certain codes, certain logics, a certain structure. And with a Convention so different, with such open and plural representation, where new voices emerged, and new positions of enunciation were asserted, we all had to learn to engage in political dialogue differently." (Interview 72, 07/09/2023)

What I think is positive—and it really saddens me that it hasn't been highlighted—

is that the depth of the political, technical, programmatic, and strategic work was enormous. I mean, the number of books that were written to generate proposals for the new constitution, the opening up of debates, but at the same time the specification of certain demands or general concepts that people used to talk about or march for, which then began to be translated—all of that is extremely valuable. And this was work that different organizations and social movements had been pushing forward, many of them obviously with the support of NGOs and so on, but which is also part of the movements themselves. And I think that was incredibly valuable. (Interview 70, 16/06/2023)

Finally, expanding political and social networks is also a useful resource for politics. After the Convention, several former delegates created new political organizations or joined existing political parties; some of them were legalized and others were in the process of legalization. Interestingly, former delegates who created new organizations or joined parties did this with people they met in the constitutional body. An example is the case of the new political organization, Solidarity for Chile, which was in the process of legalization and was formed by former delegates of Constituent Social Movements, a political caucus that grouped social activists mainly from feminist, territorial, and environmental movements. A former delegate from the Constituent Social Movement sustained, before the confirmation of Solidarity of Chile, that,

“Many of us [social activists], because of all these experiences, see the need to move toward more formal spaces. But why isn’t that done within the existing parties? It has to do with a need and a desire to build something of our own—something that is true to the principles that guide and inspire us.” (Interview 55, 06/04/2023).

In the same vein, a former delegate from a territorial organization mentioned that, after the rejection of the Convention’s constitutional proposal, many former independent and social activist delegates continue to hold meetings and coordinate to face the current political scenario and to contest political institutions. The following quote illustrates how the networks built during the Convention led to new political and social ties.

Constituent Social Movements [a caucus of independent delegates who were members of social movements that operated during the Convention] are still organized. The former delegates from Constituent People [another caucus of independent delegates that worked during the Convention] have also joined this space of coordination, because many of them belong to territorial organizations that are also part of it. And there are two currents among the social movements: there

are those who believe that the struggle should take place outside institutions, and there are those who believe it should happen both inside and outside institutions, which includes my movement. Each of them has different strategies depending on the scenario that emerges after the constitutional process. (...) There are regular meetings in both spaces, and I think how this will unfold will partly depend on what happens this year. (Interview 69, 05/06/2023)

There are other interesting cases of delegates' consolidation of networks. Former delegates Manuel Woldarsky, Alejandra Pérez, and Eric Chinga, the first two delegates from the People's List and the latter Indigenous delegate of the Diaguita people, entered Transform Chile, the leftist political organization of the mayor of Valparaíso, Jorge Sharp (2016-2024). They joined the political organization through Tania Madriaga, a former delegate from People's List and a member of Transform Chile. When the Convention ended, Woldarsky, Pérez, Chinga, and Madriaga assumed political positions in the Municipality of Valparaíso. Another good example of constructing political networks is the case of Giovanna Grandón, one of the most iconic delegates of the Convention. She became publicly known for attending the 2019 social uprising protests dressed as Pikachu, the popular character from the anime Pokémon. After the Convention, the former independent delegate from the People's List joined the Popular Party, a new political party formed by former militants of different leftist organizations, becoming vice-president of the new organization. Thus, the Solidarity for Chile, Transform Chile, and the Popular Party cases show how the construction of networks can help remain in politics.

3.6 Conclusions

This article approaches the question on the biographical consequences of social mobilization from an interrelated outcomes approach (Bosi, 2016), bridging the discussion on political elites' trajectories (Alcántara Sáez, 2017; Schlesinger, 1966; Fox and Lawless, 2005; Lawless, 2012) and consequences of contentious politics (Bosi et al., 2016; McAdam, 1989; Passy and Monsch, 2018; Fillieule and Neveu, 2019a). Addressing the case of the Chilean Constitutional Convention, this research shows that former delegates tended to remain in politics more than individuals with similar characteristics who came close to winning a seat in the constitutional body. However, the findings show that the results are significant only for party advising and the increment in party membership intensity. Another interesting result is that the delegates have a different likelihood of staying in politics depending on their profiles—party members or social activists. Additionally, the results indicate that the proximity to the incumbent does not moderate the

effect of being part of the Convention on political engagement.

The findings show that participating in a political representative space gives helpful resources to remain in politics. Even more, the results suggest that life exists after a political failure, indicating that the Convention was a space for political socialization, learning of civil skills, widening ties, and gaining political capital, aligning with literature (Beckwith, 2016; Bosi, 2016; Passy and Monsch, 2018; Schlozman et al., 2012; Fillieule and Neveu, 2019a). Still, this political survival seems to be within the realm of party politics, and, at least in the short-term, it would be more favorable for those who have more delegated political capital; namely, the party members (Alcántara Sáez, 2017; Joignant, 2019). This characterization of this political trajectory coincides with what Joignant (2012) called “Party politician (*hombre de partido* in Spanish).”

These findings could be related to two elements. On the one hand, rejecting the Convention’s proposal represents a closure of the political system and the end of a political opportunity, which was particularly costly for social activists (Sazo, 2023; Delucchi, 2024; Larraín et al., 2023). This same post-proposal rejecting scenario could complicate the chances of the former delegates entering into political positions after finishing their participation in the constitution-making process. The fact that the process was considered a failure would have reduced the possibility of entering a leading position, although there are important exceptions, as I mentioned in the past section.

Also, it is important to highlight the context after the Convention. In 2023, the political system opened a new constitution-making process in which the former delegates could not participate again as representatives. Even though the process closed a door, it opened a window of opportunity. The political parties began to seek people with direct experience in constitution-making, the former delegates, to train their candidates, advise the parties on the rules of the new body, and bring support for the process itself.

Taking a step back from the Chilean case, this article contributes to the literature by analyzing the interrelation between institutional and biographical outcomes of collective action. Specifically, it examines a complex sequence in which an institutional outcome is followed by biographical consequences at the individual level (Bosi, 2016). In doing so, it engages in dialogue with other cases where failed political change and social mobilization have left long-term effects on political engagement. These include the coal miners’ strikes in the UK (Beckwith, 2016), the trajectories of former PIRA members in Northern Ireland (Bosi, 2016), and the failed constitution-making process in Iceland (2010–2013). Likewise, the findings of this research can also be applied to mini-public cases, such as participatory budgets or randomly selected citizen councils, in which non-professional politicians participate in the decision-making process and acquire political experience and civic skills (Vandamme, 2024; Cervellini et al., 2024; Smith, 2012).

This article also contributes to the study of political trajectories by bridging the literature on political elites (Joignant, 2019; Alcántara Sáez, 2017; Schlesinger, 1966; Fox and Lawless, 2005) and the biographical outcomes of collective action (Passy and Monsch, 2018; Vestergren et al., 2017; Giugni, 2008; McAdam, 1989). It does so through an innovative design that combines a quasi-experimental approach with qualitative analysis. Building on the seminal study by McAdam (1989), it examines contentious political consequences at the individual level while addressing the methodological gap regarding causality identified in this sub-field (Bosi et al., 2016; Passy and Monsch, 2018).

Finally, it is important to discuss the limitations of the study. This article addresses the short-term impact of the Convention on political engagement. Hence, it is necessary to have a greater scope of time to determine if the effect lasts and how political engagement evolves over time. Regarding the latter, Law 12,200 prohibited the delegates' participation in the election right after the Convention, so it is difficult to anticipate whether the former delegates will participate in national elections and how their electoral performance will be. Future research will be able to investigate the former delegates' incursions in different political positions at various levels with a more extended temporal scope.

Chapter 4

THE EFFECTS OF THE INTERMEDIATION CRISIS: DEMOBILIZATION OF THE STUDENT AND NO+AFP MOVEMENTS

Chapter 4 is based on the book chapter “*Efectos de la crisis de intermediación en los movimientos sociales: desmovilización de los movimientos estudiantil y No+AFP en Chile*” published in the book “*Encrucijadas de la Resistencia en América Latina. Movimientos Sociales en Época de Crisis y Polarización*” (publication details available in the box below).

Rozas-Bugueño, J. (2024). [Efectos de la crisis de intermediación en los movimientos sociales: desmovilización de los movimientos estudiantil y No+AFP en Chile](#). En *Encrucijadas de la Resistencia en América Latina. Movimientos Sociales en Época de Crisis y Polarización*, eds. Camila Ponce, Natalia Miranda, Benjamín Tejerina and Camilo Tamayo Gómez, 33–53. Ariadna Ediciones-Universidad del País Vasco: Santiago de Chile.

Abstract

This paper examines the demobilization of social movements, approaching the phenomenon through a medium-level analysis, focusing on how the intermediation crisis affects social movement organizations. While the literature has extensively analyzed mobilization processes, the factors leading to demobilization remain understudied, particularly in Latin America. This research employs a most different systems comparative design to study two distinct social movement organizations (SMOs) that played a key role in Chile's mobilization during the 2010s, but are currently demobilized. Based on 31 in-depth interviews with activists, protest event data, and secondary sources, the analysis argues that the demobilization of these movements is primarily driven by an intermediation crisis, understood as the weakening of intermediary organizations' capacity to connect societal demands and preferences with tangible outcomes. This crisis resulted in organizational failure and a decline in activist commitment, ultimately undermining the mobilization and political influence of both SMOs. While external factors such as the 2019 social uprising, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the rejection of the 2022 constitutional proposal have exacerbated this process, they do not replace the underlying explanatory mechanism. This study contributes to the literature in two key ways: first, by advancing a research agenda that integrates intermediation crisis theory into social movement studies; and second, by deepening the comparative analysis of social movements and protests, particularly regarding the underexplored dynamics of demobilization.

Keywords: Demobilization, Intermediation crisis, social movements, Chile

4.1 Introduction

The literature on collective action has been prolific in studying social movements and protest cycles, especially on large-scale movements that have generated tangible political outcomes, such as political regime changes, creation of political parties, or policy changes (Amenta et al., 2018; Tarrow, 2011; Giugni, 2008). However, it has paid less attention to demobilization processes (Zeller, 2020; Davenport, 2015; Tarrow, 2011). The specialized literature has tended to focus on external factors of social movements, particularly on the repression capacity of the state, but also another type of opponents, such as business actors (Zeller, 2020; Davenport, 2015; Tarrow, 2011). However, other external factors such as the society's trust in social movements are directly associated with the intermediation crisis (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). Intermediation is understood as the process by which diverse organizations and actors match individual or collective expectations with outcomes or services (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022).

The lack of demobilization studies in the collective action literature is even more evident in Latin America, where the demobilization has been less studied, although with relevant exceptions such as the research of Kowalchuk (2005) and Lapegna (2013) on the demobilization of peasants in El Salvador and Argentina, respectively.

The Chilean case offers a valuable lens through which to examine contemporary experiences of demobilized social movements, bridging the literature on collective action with the emerging framework of the intermediation crisis. As Sánchez-Cuenca (2022) argues, this crisis stems from the widespread inability of organizations to effectively connect people's preferences with concrete political outcomes. On one hand, the decade of the 2010s in Chile has been particularly mobilized, producing different protest cycles; including student (Donoso, 2017; Bidegain and Maillet, 2021), environmental (Schaeffer, 2017; Schiappacasse et al., 2024), territorial (Delamaza et al., 2017), feminist (Palacios-Valladares, 2022), and the anti-private pension system (Rozas-Bugueño and Maillet, 2019). This period of mobilization culminated in the 2019 social uprising (Somma et al., 2021; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020). However, not all organizations participating in these cycles are equally active, and many have experienced demobilization processes. It happened with two social movement organizations (SMOs) that were protagonists of the 2010s decade but are currently facing processes of demobilization: the Students' Confederation of Chile (CONFECH), which led the 2011 student mobilization for free and quality higher education (Donoso, 2017; Von Bülow and Bidegain Ponte, 2015), and the National Workers' Coordinator No+AFP.¹, that emerged in 2016, mobilizing against the private pension system (Rozas-Bugueño and Maillet, 2019)

On the other hand, similar to the comparative collective action research in Western countries and Latin America, little research is done on this subject in Chile. Some studies address the demobilization of social actors in the 1990s as the prelude to the emergence of different protest waves during the mobilizations of the 2010s (Garretón, 2016; Donoso and von Bülow, 2017; Somma and Bargsted, 2015). To my knowledge, only one research has explained the demobilization of social movements in Chile as its main objective: Koppelman (2017) analyzes the setbacks of the urban popular movement since the return to democracy (1990). Thus, little is known about the factors that explain demobilization.

This article tries to answer the following questions: What explains the social movements' demobilization? What factors explain the demobilization of the CONFECH and No+AFP in Chile? This article presents a comparative analysis of the student and No+AFP movements at medium-level, employing a comparative design of most different systems, with the CONFECH and No+AFP as very differ-

¹From now on, No+AFP.

ent cases. Both SMOs differ in their sectoral demands (strengthening of the public education vs. change of the individual capitalization pension system), the degree of political impact, the political coalition that was in government during the most relevant protest cycle part of each SMO, and in their organizational structure. Yet, they both demobilized.

The analysis is based on thirty-one in-depth interviews with activists from the CONFECH and No+AFP, conducted face-to-face and online between December 2022 and February 2023, secondary documents that address both cases, protest event data from the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES), and previous works of the author (Rozas-Bugueño, 2024; Rozas-Bugueño et al., 2022; Rozas-Bugueño and Maillet, 2019). The analysis sustains that the intermediation crisis explains the demobilization of both SMOs. Thus, the intermediation crisis refers to the weakening of the mediating function of intermediary organizations from different spheres of society, in this case, SMOs (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022; Rozas-Bugueño, 2024). In this case, the intermediation crisis generated an organizational failure of the CONFECH and No+AFP and a decline in supporters' commitment to these SMOs and their political impact. Thus, this article contributes to the study of demobilization, with an innovative theoretical approach, which integrates the debate on the impacts of the intermediation crisis and demobilization of collective actors.

This article is structured as follows: First, I discuss the explanatory factors of demobilization and how the intermediation crisis concept contributes to this debate. Second, I describe the cases to compare. Third, I present the research design and methods employed in the study. Fourth, I expose the results of the comparative analysis. Finally, I close the article with reflections on how this study contributes to the demobilization literature.

4.2 Demobilization and Intermediation Crisis

Tarrow (2011), in his book *Power in Movement*, sustains that protest cycles are compounded by at least three phases: emergence, peak, and demobilization. Hence, demobilization is a natural part of the mobilization process, in which different actors, such as social movements and SMOs, political-institutional actors, and private sector actors involved in mobilization start to suffer the costs of maintaining collective action over time and the protest cycle begins to decline (Tarrow, 2011; Zeller, 2020). In fact, as Piven and Cloward (1978) argue, it is most common for social movements to fail in achieving their goals and disappearing or being co-opted. Despite being an intrinsic part of mobilization, the literature has paid less attention to demobilization, while focusing more on the origins and development of the mobilization (Zeller, 2020; Davenport, 2015; Demirel-Pegg, 2017). For its

part, Davenport (2015, p. 21) defines demobilization as a broad concept, referring to four possible crystallizations of the phenomenon:

(1) official termination and/or significant alteration of the formal institution engaged in challenging authorities; (2) departure of individuals (members) from relevant organizations—especially the founding and/or core members that participate most frequently; (3) termination of or significant reduction in dissident interventions (behaviors); and (4) a fundamental shift in the ideas of the challenger (particularities of the claim) away from what was earlier established. Although any of these on its own signals demobilization, normally several are present at the same time.

This article is centered on the third point of Davenport (2015), considering the CONFECH and No+AFP do not disappear, but their contentious actions have diminished. In a similar vein, Karmel and Kuburic (2021) argue, in their study on the demobilization of protesters of the Arab Spring in Jordan, that the demobilization is related to a process where the collective action decreases rather than seeing the disappearance of the movement. Besides, I consider it necessary to add the loss of the social movements' and SMOs' political impact as another expression of demobilization, taking into account that most of the movements were born with a clear vision of political change, which materializes in social demands that are mobilized through a collective action repertoire. The political impact of social movements is a substantial element in understanding their mobilization and objective achievement capacity. The lack of political influence would also be an expression of demobilization.

The scholars of demobilization have divided the explanatory factors into internal and external (Zeller, 2020; Davenport, 2015). The internal factors are those that take place within the social movement, while the external factors are linked to the political context and actors outside. The literature has identified multiple elements at the internal level. Tarrow (2011) explains that radicalization and institutionalization are processes that social movements often experience during the demobilization phases. After the peak of the mobilization, the movement tends to divide between those who seek the institutionalization of their demands to reach part of their objectives and those who seek to radicalize until they fully achieve their demands. At the same time, the movements can demobilize depending on the extent of demands accomplished; if the objectives were achieved, the movement loses its purpose, while if it fails to reach its aims, the movement can be affected by the discouragement of the supporters (Zeller, 2020).

Davenport (2015) presents five internal elements that impact demobilization, and Zeller (2020) groups them into two categories: (i) the loss of participation within the social movements, due to burnout and decline of commitment, when

activists and supporters stop participating in the mobilization for an extended period of time; and (ii) the organizational failure, that contains the loss of supporters, the factionalization (internal division of the SMOs into different groups with distinct ideologies and strategies), and the organizational rigidity (organizations' incapacity to change their objectives and strategies to adapt to new scenarios).

The literature on social mobilization has identified as external factors those elements associated with the political and macroeconomic context (Tarrow, 2011; McAdam and Tarrow, 2018; Giugni and Grasso, 2016). The co-optation of the movement, or part of it, stands out among these factors (Piven and Cloward, 1978). It is a phenomenon of particular interest in the Chilean case. Different authors have argued that the center-left governments of the Concertation of Parties for Democracy (*Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* in Spanish) neutralized social movements to reduce conflict and avoid an authoritarian backlash (Garretón, 2016; Bidegain, 2017; Somma and Bargsted, 2015). The perception of threat has also been highlighted as a demobilization trigger. This element relates to a change in the political context and how the movement perceived it. In this process of appropriation of engaging with the political context, if the movement perceives that the mobilization costs outweigh the possible benefits, the movement demobilizes (Heaney and Rojas, 2011). The participation of political parties in social movements is also a relevant element. The proximity of certain political actors, who were allies at the peak of the protests, can also generate demobilization. For example, the research of Heaney and Rojas (2011) shows that Democrats who left the anti-war movement in the 2000s to focus on Obama's election, leaving the movement weakened and giving more protagonism of radical SMOs.

In addition, Grasso and Giugni (2016) show that the interaction between the political and macroeconomic context—particularly the level of public investment and social spending—conditions the likelihood of protest. The mere presence of economic grievances is not sufficient to trigger mobilization. Rather, grievances are more likely to translate into protest when embedded in a favorable political context that offers perceived opportunities for action. In contrast, when individuals experience deprivation but perceive the political context as unresponsive or hostile, this may discourage collective action.

Research that has focused on external factors has paid more attention to repression. Davenport (2015) centers a good part of his analysis of the New Africa Republic in the United States on repression, understanding it as the actions made by the state, violent or not, to dismantle an organization. Additionally, Zeller (2020) addresses the demobilization of For Fair Elections in Russia, which is characterized by a distinction between open repression (public) or closed, and it points out that both state actors and private actors can deploy repressive actions.

This article focuses on the internal elements of demobilization, particularly the organizational failure and the loss of commitment, dialoguing with a struc-


tural element that has not been part of this literature, partly because of its novelty: the intermediation crisis. Sánchez-Cuenca (2022) introduces the concept of intermediation crisis, arguing that the contemporary society crisis stems from the organizations' incapacity to understand societal input and to provide services and outcomes aligned with this input. What is in crisis, Sánchez-Cuenca (2022) sustains, is the organizations' mediation function that matches preferences or necessities with outcomes or goods in the society.

The representation crisis that political parties face in most Western democracies is part of the intermediation problem. The intermediation crisis also affects organizations that are part of the other social spheres, such as the banks in the market and institutions specialized in arts and culture (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). In politics, the market, and the culture, new actors have emerged that seek to replace the traditional intermediaries, such as the non-traditional political movements from the left and the right, organizations that mediate the new virtual cryptocurrency markets and online film criticism where common people upload their opinions (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). What these organizations have in common is the intention to facilitate more direct and instantaneous mediation between individual expectations and the outcome. This crisis has a dual component: on the one hand, the mismatch on the organization side and, on the other hand, a structural process of distrust of the individuals toward the intermediate organization (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022).

However, Sánchez-Cuenca (2022) does not examine the role of social movements within the spheres he analyzes. The intermediation crisis has also affected Social movements and SMOs; and the Constitutional Convention of Chile (2021-2022) is a good example of this (Rozas-Bugueño, 2024). More than 60% of the constitutional body did not have party membership, and many representatives came from social organizations (Rozas-Bugueño et al., 2022). Notwithstanding, most social organizations that were relatively new and came from mobilization sectors that were not part of the most prominent protest cycles of the 2010s (Rozas-Bugueño, 2024). A process occurred in which citizens were integrated into the social movements that highly criticized traditional intermediary organizations in politics (i.e., political parties) (Rozas-Bugueño, 2024).

All in all, I propose an explanation in which the intermediation crisis demobilized the SMOs, as it caused organizational failure and loss of supporters' commitment (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: Explaining Demobilization: Intermediation Crisis



4.3 The Cases: CONFECH and National Workers' Coordinator No+AFP

The SMOs to analyze are part of the students and No+AFP movements. Both have experienced different mobilization processes since the return to democracy (1990). During the 1990s, the center-left governments of the Concertation opted for the demobilization of the social movement and co-optation of social activists to avoid an authoritarian backlash (Garretón, 2016; Somma and Medel, 2017; Tricot, 2021). In this period, the student movement put their efforts into the organic reconstruction of the students' federations and the Students' Confederation of Chile–CONFECH (Donoso, 2017), while it took a few decades for the formation of No+AFP (Rozas-Bugueño and Maillet, 2019).

The first mobilization waves of the student movement appeared at the beginning of the 2000s, led by high-school students. In 2001, high-school students protested in Santiago against the delay of student transportation cards and an increase in the public transport student fares. The students achieved a reduction of the transport fare and the management of the student transport card passed from a private transport business council to the Education Ministry (Donoso, 2017).

In 2006 emerged the most relevant mobilization of the post-dictatorship until this moment, the so-called *Penguin Revolution* (Von Bülow and Bidegain Ponte, 2015; Donoso, 2013). This protest wave, led also by high-school students, had nationwide reach, with school occupations and massive demonstrations. The government of the Socialist Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) responded to the protests with the creation of a Presidential Advocacy Council that gave her an education reform proposal to replace the Education Constitutional Organic Law (LOCE in Spanish) inherited from Pinochet's dictatorship. Following a broad agreement

across the political landscape with representation in Congress, the General Law of Education replaced the LOCE, without altering the pillars of the education model. The student movement understood this event as a betrayal of the political system (Von Bülow and Bidegain Ponte, 2015; Donoso, 2017).

With the arrival of the rightist government of Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014), and its pro-market agenda in educational matters, college students passed to the front in a new mobilization cycle. In 2011, the university students organized under the CONFECH began a mobilization demanding free higher education, the strengthening of public education, and the end of profit in education. The mobilization expanded for almost one year and maintained important levels of protest until the final year of Piñera's government, although it was weakened compared to 2011 (Donoso, 2017; Guzman-Concha, 2012).

Student leaders such as Camila Vallejo (Communist Party), Giorgio Jackson (New University Action, a center-leftist political movement from the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile), Gabriel Boric (Autonomous Left, leftist political movement), and Karol Cariola (Communist Party) won a seat in the Chamber of Deputies in 2013 national election.² For her part, the Socialist Michelle Bachelet won the presidency for the second time (2014-2018) and included education reform as a political priority in her political program. This reform introduced free higher education for 60% of the population and eliminated the selection and co-payment in secondary education (Bidegain and Maillet, 2021). These two policy changes resulting from the educational reform highlight the strong political impact of the student movement.

The second SMO to be analyzed, No+AFP, was formed in 2013 by several trade unions from different economic sectors, with the Confederation of Bank Workers as the spearhead of the Coordinator. However, the first antecedent of No+AFP was when the Confederation of Bank Workers mobilized for the first time in 2008 to demand the end of the individual capitalization pension system.³

²Vallejo, Boric, and Jackson were in the Congress until 2021 when Boric won the presidency of Chile as the candidate of the Broad Front (2022-2026), a political conglomerate formed from the leftist political collective of the student movement that did not feel represented neither by the former Concertation nor the Communist Party. Karol Cariola continued as Deputy, and she was appointed as president of the Chamber of Deputies in 2024.

³The capitalization pension system is another heritage of Pinochet's dictatorship. At the beginning of the 1980s, the dictatorship, with the help of civil technocrats, created the private pension system known as the AFP system for the Spanish acronym Pension Fund Administrators. The AFPs monopolize the management of workers' contributions and invest funds in different markets and financial products. This system allowed the dictatorship and its collaborators to transform the country's financial system, increasing the amount of money circulating in the system (Tromben and Schiappacasse, 2022; Edwards, 2023; Bril-Mascarenhas and Maillet, 2019). Until 2008, the system had not had any reform. At this moment, the first government of Michelle Bachelet passed a reform that integrated a non-contributory pillar focusing on the most vulnerable part of the pop-

When the No+AFP Coordinator was created in 2013, it only grouped national trade unions. After a few years, No+AFP expanded toward (Rozas-Bugueño and Maillet, 2019). In 2016, No+AFP led a protest wave against the AFPs that mobilized thousands of people in Chile (Rozas-Bugueño and Maillet, 2019).

The government of Bachelet (2014-2018) presented a reform to the Parliament, which in turn proposed to transfer part of the contributions toward a solidarity scheme, structuring a mixed pension system. However, the reform was not approved. The second government of Piñera also presented a pension reform to the Parliament, focusing on increasing the individual contribution and incentives for competence within the system. The reform was not approved either. Even though No+AFP did not generate a policy change, it produced a turn in the political discussion and introduced issues, such as solidarity, that had been out of the debate since the policy introduction (Olivares and Carrasco-Hidalgo, 2020).

4.4 Research Design and Methods

This article is based on a comparative design of the most different systems, where the explanation of the common outcome presented in very different cases is the only, or one of the few, common factors shared by both cases (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). As I described in the previous section, the CONFECH and No+AFP differ in many aspects, starting with their mobilization sector; student, and anti-private pension system. Likewise, the target audience is also different: students, workers, and retirees. At the same time, the target of the critics and the demands of the movements are different. The student movement appeals to the state, while No+AFP questions the industry of AFPs in addition to the state. As mentioned before, the political outcome of the movements also differed. The student movement had relevant political outcomes regarding education reforms, while the No+AFP has not transformed the pension system but has impacted public opinion and political debate. Furthermore, the opponents the movements faced in their most important protest cycles also differed. The student movement had the first center-right Piñera's government in 2011 as its political opponent, while No+AFP had to confront the second center-left government of Michelle Bachelet in 2016. Lastly, it is worth noting that the organizational structure of the SMOs is different. No+AFP has a more classical organizational structure—centralized and hierarchical, based on the traditional format of trade unions—while CONFECH has a less rigid one.

That said, the cases share contextual factors, such as the political-institutional design of Chile, the economic situation, and the health crisis derived from the

ulation (Bril-Mascarenhas and Maillet, 2019). After the 2019 social uprising, Piñera transformed the non-contributory pillar into one that expanded the benefits to 90% of the population (Tromben and Schiappacasse, 2022).

Table 4.1: Most Different Systems Design: Comparing CONFECH and No+AFP

SMOs	CONFECH	No+AFP
Mobilization sector	Student	Anti-private pension system
Target audience	University students	Workers and retirees
Target of actions	The State	The State and the AFP's industry
Political outcomes	Education reform (2015)	Public opinion and political debate
Opponents	Rightist Piñera's government (2010-2014)	Center-leftist Bachelet's government (2014-2018)
Organizational structures	Centralized-hierarchical (trade union-based organic)	Flexible and more horizontal structure
Common factor	Intermediation crisis	Intermediation crisis
Outcome	Demobilization	Demobilization

COVID-19 pandemic, which could have interfered with the most different systems comparative design. However, when considering other important cases of SMOs mobilized during the 2010s in the country—e.g., the Movement for the Access to Water, Land, and Environmental Protection (MODATIMA in Spanish), the Movement for Water and Territories (MAT), or the March 8 Feminist Coordinator—it is possible to observe that some organizations remain mobilized and continue to have political influence. These three SMOs had an important participation in the constitution-making process, reaching political representation in the Constitutional Convention (2021-2022) (Rozas-Bugueño et al., 2022). For its part, the March 8 Feminist Coordinator has maintained its ability to mobilize supporters, especially during International Women's Day. Likewise, MODATIMA won the regional government of the Region of Valparaíso in 2021, led by Rodrigo Mundaca, the historical leader of the movement. Meanwhile, the MAT carried out the “citizen assemblies for water” (*cabildos por el agua* in Spanish) between October 2019 and March 2020, which was an autonomous participatory experience for discussing water management and water scarcity (Larocque et al., 2021). All the abovementioned suggest that the contextual factors do not explain the demobilization because other SMOs that share the same context with the CONFECH and No+AFP have remained mobilized. In this manner, the only common factor

between the SMOs that I consider in the analysis as a potential explanation is the intermediation crisis. As outlined above, when I refer to the intermediation crisis as an explanation for the demobilization, I refer to the organizations' capacity to intermediate between preferences of the society and outcomes. Table 4.1 summarizes the most different system design to compare the CONFECH and No+AFP cases.

Regarding methods, the comparative analysis is based on qualitative data that stem from thirty-one in-depth interviews with students and No+AFP movements' social activists (see Table 4.2),⁴ secondary documents that address the cases, previous research of the author (Rozas-Bugueño, 2024; Rozas-Bugueño et al., 2022; Rozas-Bugueño and Maillet, 2019), and protest event data from the COES' Observatory of Conflicts. The in-depth interviews have a central role in the analysis because they allow me to access primary sources of information on organizational problems and the demobilization of the SMOs. The other data sources complement the analysis structured on the interviews and are helpful in describing the outcome of both SMOs, showing the decrease in the mobilization trends and distrust toward both organizations. I conducted the interviews analysis using the IA software of qualitative analysis Wovi.ai.⁵ This process consisted of systematically asking the software for information and evidence on intermediation crisis, demobilization, loss of supporters' commitment, and organizational failure (see Figure 4.1).

Table 4.2: Interviewees' Profiles

Movement	Student Movement		No+AFP		Total
Gender	Face-to-face	Online	Face-to-face	Online	
Male	7	2	5	1	15
Female	9	3	2	2	16
Total	16	5	7	3	31

4.5 Analysis

This section presents the analysis of the CONFECH and No+AFP's demobilization based on the theoretical explanation introduced in Section 4.2. This section is analytically divided into three parts: (i) a description of the demobilization of the SMOs, (ii) an analysis of the intermediation crisis within the SMOs, and (iii)

⁴The interview fieldwork received approval from the Ethics Committee of Pompeu Fabra University (Application 279). See Section A.1.7 in the Appendix for more information.

⁵Software website: <https://wovi.ai/>

an analysis focused on organizational failure and the loss of commitment among SMO supporters.

4.5.1 Demobilization of the CONFECH and No+AFP


I use two indicators to address the overview of demobilization of the CONFECH and No+AFP rooted in the literature (Tarrow, 2011; Davenport, 2015): the decrease of protest actions, and the weakening of the political impact of the social movements. First, a proxy to analyze the decrease in protest actions is reviewing their trajectory. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of the student and anti-private pension system protests (2008-2020). The trajectories of protests expose that there is a higher number of students than pension protests, and it also shows that the peaks of the protests were in 2011 in the case of the student movement, and 2016 in the case of pension protests, which aligns with the mobilization processes described in Section 4.3. However, Figure 4.2 shows a slight increment in protests. In October 2019, the social outbreak was the country's largest and most relevant protest cycle since the return to democracy (1990) (Somma et al., 2021; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020). This protest wave did not center on a particular mobilization field but called for a broad challenge of the political and economic system (Somma et al., 2021; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020). One of the main characteristics of the social uprising was the lack of central organization. Any SMO was able to lead the mobilization, compared with the protest cycles of the last Century and the beginning of 2000s that had recognizable leaders and organizations (Somma et al., 2021; Bringel et al., 2021). Hence, it makes sense that the student and pension protests did not have salience during the 2019 social uprising.

It is worth noting that protests are not the only action that is part of the collective action repertoires of the social movements and SMOs (Tilly, 2010; Rossi, 2016). Both the CONFECH and the No+AFP have deployed different strategies and actions over time, such as employing legal actions, occupation of public buildings, media campaigns, artistic performances, participating in parliamentary discussions, self-organized referendums, and elaborating popular law proposals (Ponce, 2024; Rozas-Bugueño and Maillet, 2019; Guzman-Concha, 2012). However, according to the interviews, protest actions by CONFECH and No+AFP have declined, a trend further intensified by the 2019 social uprising, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the failure of the 2021-2022 constitution-making process. A student leader exemplifies the above,

“I think the entire social movement is left in a bad place, in the sense that so many years of mobilizations, raising demands, organizing calls, and drafting petitions feel like they were thrown away (...) [at the university] the atmosphere is very depoliticized. I don't know if it's exhaustion from the uprising, fatigue from

COVID, but people either don't want to be informed or just didn't keep up with what's happening. And I don't know if [the students] just want to go out partying and have no interest in organizing an assembly” (Interview 5, 12/12/2022).

Figure 4.2: Protest Events: Student and No+AFP Movements



Note: The protest event data come from the Observatory of Conflicts at COES (2020).

Second, it is worth examining the political impacts of the SMOs. As mentioned in Section 4.3, students' movement triggered the education reform of the socialist Michelle Bachelet's second government (2014-2018), while No+AFP movement did not contribute to a policy change, it brought the pension issue onto the political agenda of the center-left government of Bachelet (2014-2018) and center-right government of Piñera (2018-2022). Yet, activists of both SMOs agree that the political impact of the CONFECH and No+AFP has diminished recently. In the same vein as those above, there is a perception that the rejection of the constitutional proposal of the Constitutional Convention (2021-2022) in the referendum of September 2022 was a heavy blow that affected the political influence of the SMOs. A spokesman of the No+AFP explained that,

“Chile perhaps suffers from a much deeper problem than the rest of Latin America—that the experience of the ’73 [coup d’état of 1973] and the dominance of political parties within social spaces have prevented any real possibility [of change] from emerging (. . .) also due to the excessive fragmentation in this country and the prevailing distrust” (Interview 3, 06/12/2022).

However, the main argument of this article is that the decline of the political influence occurred before the conclusion of the constitution-making process (2021-2022), and the composition of the Constitutional Convention is an indicator of that. The 2021 election of constitutional delegates was a historic opportunity for activists and individuals without party affiliation to enter institutional politics, thanks to electoral innovations that allowed the creation of fully independent electoral lists, enabling non-party members to compete on a level playing field with party members. Under these rules, many social activists won a seat in the Constitutional Convention. Notwithstanding, this was not the case for the social activists of No+AFP or the CONFECH. No+AFP competed in almost all the districts but obtained only two seats through two candidates who were not part of the main leaderships of the SMO (Fossa et al., 2021).

For its part, the CONFECH did not take an organizational position on the constitution-making process, and the candidacies of college social activists depended on individual interests and political party memberships, such as the case of the former president of the Students’ Federation of the University of Chile Emilia Schneider.⁶ No college activist was elected.

Thus, the main winners of social activism in the 2021 constitutional delegates election came from environmental and territorial young organizations and feminist organizations with more trajectory (Rozas-Bugueño, 2024). I will analyze the factors that explain the demobilization of these SMOs in the following subsections.

4.5.2 Intermediation crisis

This study identifies the intermediation crisis as the main trigger of the demobilization of the CONFECH and No+AFP. As mentioned before, the crisis of intermediation refers to the inability of intermediate actors, in this case the SMOs, to connect preferences or expectations of people with results. A main indicator of this intermediation problem is the distrust toward organizations. According to data from the COES Longitudinal Social Study (2016-2022), there has been a decline in Chileans’ support for the student and No+AFP movements (see Figure 2.4

⁶She is Deputy of the Broad Front since 2022.

in Chapter 2 of this thesis).⁷ Likewise, there is a consensus among respondents that their organizations are experiencing a crisis of distrust. This is illustrated by the testimonies of a student activist and a No+AFP leader:

“The idea is very much ingrained at the university that all spaces of representation are just political stepping stones—that no one acts out of genuine conviction in politics, that we are all there because we want to pursue higher positions each time, that we want to become members of parliament (...)” (Interview 4 with student leader, 08/12/2022).

“Distrust is a key issue within the No+AFP movement. Many people have lost trust in political institutions and leaders, as they feel that their demands and the needs of citizens have not been met. This has led to disillusionment and fatigue when it comes to participation and social mobilization. Moreover, the lack of concrete results in the fight for better pensions and public policies has generated frustration and distrust within the movement” (Interview 10 with No+AFP leader, 16/12/2022).

Another relevant indicator of the intermediation crisis is assessing whether the collective demands of SMOs resonate with their target audiences and the population in general. In this regard, interviews reveal a saturation of information indicating that the demands of CONFECH and No+AFP have lost their grounding in society. The following quotes from a student leader of a university student federation in southern Chile and a No+AFP activist illustrate the view that CONFECH’s demands have lost connection with students and the historical agenda of the student movement and that No+AFP has faced difficulties in making its pension system proposal resonate with society.

“Lately, CONFECH has been very focused on the constitutional process and the progress toward a new constitution, but they have completely set aside the programmatic agenda of student struggles that have been historically significant and ongoing for a long time. Now, CONFECH holds press conferences and occasionally marches for a new constitution, but they no longer fight for the student agenda. Personally, for example, in our federation, we don’t care whether free education is achieved through a new constitution, through a law, or any other means—we are fighting for free education, not for a new constitution as such. So, that demand has been set aside” (Interview 27, 10/01/2023).

⁷Also this evidence is presented in the published paper based on the Chapter 2 of this thesis (Rozas-Bugueño, 2024)

From the No+AFP movement, using the proposal developed by the SOL Foundation,⁸ we can demonstrate that a solidarity-based pension system would at least double current pensions (...). We can show that the Austrian system, for example, operates entirely on a pay-as-you-go solidarity model and guarantees pensions equivalent to 80% of active workers' salaries. Here [in Chile], we are nowhere near that 80% (...) we will never reach 80%, never. And yet, people here keep saying, 'No, don't touch my money [my pension savings]' (Interview 18, 27/12/2022).

4.5.3 Organizational failure and loss in supporters' commitment

In this section, I analyze the qualitative evidence on how demobilization has materialized in organizational failure and the loss of supporters' commitment, in line with the theoretical explanation presented in Section 4.2 of this dissertation. On the one hand, organizational failure can be linked to organizational and leadership-related problems. The interviews highlight the consensus around the organizational problems that the SMOs face, making a link between distrust toward the SMOs (one of the indicators of the intermediation crisis) and the organizational problems. The following quote from a student activist from Santiago shows the linkage between these elements and points out that it is a common problem in the FECH—the student organization of the University of Chile and the oldest such organization in the country—and No+AFP.

"I think it is very difficult to organize today; any organization is viewed with a lot of distrust. Not only political parties, but also others like No+AFP, FECH... All students say, 'this is just a political stepping stone' (...). Since there is distrust toward organizations, people don't spend their time attending assemblies or engaging with their representatives because it hasn't been proven to them, through actions, that it is worth it. As a result, there has been a disarticulation or a significant lack of organization, which prevents these debates—where diverse positions could come together to find agreements—from taking place" (Interview 17, 26/12/2022).

It is worth noting that the FECH ceased to operate between 2020 and 2022, as it failed to meet the minimum electoral quorum required to constitute the fed-

⁸SOL Foundation is a Chilean leftist center of studies on labor and unionism that is close to No+AFP. The Foundation and other leftist and center-leftist scholars advised No+AFP in its technical proposal of pay-as-you-go pension system (Rozas-Bugueño and Maillet, 2019).

eration. However, its organizational crisis had begun earlier. Since 2011, student turnout at the University of Chile has remained consistently low, ultimately leading to the federation's temporary suspension (2020–2022) (Pinto, 2019). It was only in mid-2023 that students were able to form a federation again, following a refoundation process carried out through a student congress held throughout 2022 and 2023. However, in the 2024 federation elections, only 9% of students participated, making it once again impossible to formally constitute the federation (Universidad de Chile, 2024). This phenomenon is not unique to the University of Chile, but reflects a broader trend among student federations across the country, many of which have disappeared or now function as interim boards. This situation worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the case of No+AFP, a similar process of organizational weakening has taken place, as evidenced by the withdrawal of key member organizations such as the Teachers' Union.

At the level of leadership, the evidence varies in each SMO. Although important organizations have left the organization, the interviews did not show that No+AFP has weakened its leadership. In the case of the student movement, there is evidence of weakened leadership. An important point in this regard was highlighted by a student activist from a university of the Valparaíso Region, who explained that the student movement, and its organizations, have suffered challenges in knowledge transmission and absence of training of new activists.

“The transfer of knowledge [has been] incomplete (...) it has been a significant weakness in the organizational structure of the student movement. During this period of reconstruction and reorganization, we have experienced a lack of quorum, low participation, and difficulty in mobilizing. This is due to various factors, such as the disinterest and lack of awareness among younger students, the lack of experience, and the crisis of expectations. (...) All of this has affected the organizational stability and continuity of the student movement” (Interview 12, 17/12/2022).

Finally, regarding the loss of supporters' commitment, both SMOs have presented a decrease in their base participation. According to the evidence from the interviews, this phenomenon contributes to the organization's failure and accentuates the internal problems of the SMOs. The following two quotes from the activists of the CONFECH and No+AFP exemplify this issue.

CONFECH has been dead for a long time, it's been dead for a long time, and we're kind of trying to give it electroshock, but it's been dead for a long time. And it's been dead for a long time because it doesn't make sense (...) students are not drawn to attend the calls for action, they're not interested in the discussions we're promoting (Interview 7, 13/12/2022).

“There was a time when many young people participated in the [No+AFP] Coordinadora; those young people are now workers, some are union leaders, but this current generation is almost completely absent. The young people who are still studying are very disconnected from this reality (...)” (Interview 21, 29/12/2022).

4.6 Final Considerations

This article shows how the intermediation crisis, understood as the disconnection between people’s preferences or expectations with results (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022), can explain the demobilization of social movements. This research employs a medium-level analysis comparing two very different SMOs, the CONFECH and No+AFP (most different systems comparative design). The results, based on in-depth interviews, secondary documents, and protest event data, show that the intermediation crisis can be observed in the distrust toward the SMOs and the loss of their capacity to connect with society. This crisis has impacted the organizational structure and caused the loss of supporters’ commitment. This interactive process has resulted in the demobilization of the CONFECH and No+AFP.

However, an emerging element of the analysis, on which the interviewees agree, is that the 2019 social uprising, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the failure of the Constitutional Convention’s proposal in the 2022 referendum have deepened the demobilization of the CONFECH and No+AFP. In this regard, the context does not replace the intermediation crisis-driven explanation but amplifies its effect on the SMOs’ demobilization.

This research is part of a research agenda on the consequences of the intermediation crisis in the field of collective action, seeking to contribute to the literature from integrating this concept into the study of social movements and SMOs. At the same time, this article contributes to the research of social movements demobilization, a topic less studied by the collective action literature (Zeller, 2020; Davenport, 2015; Tarrow, 2011). The specific contribution to the demobilization subfield is presenting a mechanism that can explain the phenomenon at a medium level, linking the intermediation crisis with internal elements of the SMOs. Finally, it is worth noting that the results of this analysis do not indicate that students and the No+AFP movement have disappeared, but they are passing through a demobilization phase. As Tarrow (2011) argues, the mobilization is a cyclical process, that has phases of peak and decline, hence it is necessary to continue analyzing the collective actions of these two movements.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS

This doctoral research addresses different political outcomes in an intermediation crisis context from a procedural and interrelated collective action outcomes perspective (Bosi and Uba, 2021; Bosi, 2016). It uses the 2019 Chilean social outbreak and the constitution-making process (2021-2022), which was initiated in response to the protests. The research conducts an exhaustive analysis of the most critical and contingent events in Chile since the return to democracy in 1990 (Somma et al., 2021; Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020; Canales, 2022; Tromben, 2024; Rozas-Bugueño et al., 2022; Heiss, 2021; Suárez-Cao, 2021), based on a rigorous and innovative methodological approach. Thus, this dissertation offers valuable insights that enhance our understanding of collective action political outcomes, which are synthesized in the following findings.

The first article shows that the social outbreak had a short-term effect on political attitudes toward the welfare state and a moderate impact on electoral behavior. The results indicate that the protests immediately affected political preferences regarding the salience of welfare state issues. However, the impact on attitudes tended to dilute the following year, returning to a similar rate as before the social outbreak. Also, the findings show that protest exposure produced a centrifugal effect on the left and a centripetal one on the right in the 2021 first-round presidential election.

The second paper finds evidence that social activists who took advantage of the political opportunity that opened after the social outbreak, the unprecedented constitution-making process (2021-2022), tended to be those who were members of new and small social organizations from territorial, environmental, and feminist mobilization sectors. In this manner, the composition of the Convention was marked by the presence of social actors who did not come from the main organizations that led the long decade of social mobilization, such as student organizations or unions that are part of the No+AFP movement.

The third paper focuses on the political trajectories after the Convention, with particular attention on the social activists' involvement in politics, understanding the participation in the Convention as an interrelated outcome derived from the social outbreak. The findings of this study indicate that, on average, the former delegates were more likely to remain in politics than those who were not part of the Convention. Political trajectories after the Convention were marked by involvement in party politics, getting leading positions within the party structure, or playing an advocacy role. Likewise, the trajectories after the Convention vary depending on the delegates' profiles: the impact on the political trajectories is more significant among party member delegates, while activist delegates faced difficulties in remaining in politics.

The fourth paper deepens the discussion on the political impacts of collective action by offering a comparative analysis of two negative cases: the students' movement and the No+AFP movement, two collective action actors that have seen

their political influence diminish. This article examines how the intermediation crisis has affected these social movements in Chile. After important mobilization processes, the main organizations of these movements have entered into a long demobilization phase because of an extended distrust (the principal indicator of an intermediation crisis), which has provoked an organizational failure and a decline in the adherents' commitment.

Although the collective actions analyzed in this dissertation saw political outcomes at different levels, some were moderate or did not perdure over time. It coincides with the comparative literature on collective action outcomes, which describes many cases where social movements and protests have short-term, moderate outcomes, or impacts mediated by other actors, such as political parties and the media (Dahlum, 2019; Amenta et al., 2018; McAdam and Tarrow, 2010). However, the findings contain many theoretical novelties. The results show that the distrust and discontent marked the political events studied in this thesis, which suggests that the collective action outcomes studied here must be understood as the results of the interaction between a phenomenon with a vast capacity to mobilize people, yet lacking cohesion, and a structural crisis centered around the incapacity to connect expectations with results. In other words, the results of this thesis reflect the intersection between a “social overflow”—a concept used by Bringel et al. (2021) to analyze the social uprisings in Latin America (2019–2021)—and the intermediation crisis (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). As Luna (2024) explains for the Latin American context, contemporary politics are marked by a strong *destituent* energy. It develops a circular dynamic where the incumbents are replaced by the current opponents, who present themselves as non-traditional actors promising to cleanse the institutions of the “same old politicians.” When challengers gain political power, they become a target of criticism, thus restarting the cycle.

The process that Luna (2024) discusses is extrapolated to collective action dynamics. On the side of collective actions, broadened and disorganized discontent triggered the mobilization processes during the Chilean social outbreak. The generalized discontent, although without structure, allows the mobilization to bring a large number of people out onto the streets with a dual problem: political power struggles to effectively address the discontent from the streets because it has lost its capacity to understand the society through its institutional channels (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022; Luna, 2024). Traditional power is also ineffective because the mobilization reflects widespread discontent, lacks structured demands, and does not have a leading organization to negotiate with. Simultaneously, the traditional collective actors—social movement organizations and leaders of social movements—are also incapable of channeling massive discontent because they are also questioned by the public (see Chapters 2 and 4 for evidence of distrust and skepticism toward unions, students' organizations and organizations against the private pension system in Chile). Hence, the organized collective actors can nei-

ther connect society's expectations, expressed through organized demands, with tangible outcomes, because they are not perceived as legitimate bargaining actors. In the words of one of the interviewees for Chapter 2 of this dissertation, the activists who led mobilizations in Chile after the return to democracy are viewed as "part of the same [problem]," being assimilated into the questioned and powerless political institutions.

However, this research also highlights potential opportunities for the collective actors in this intermediation crisis context. As Chapters 2 and 3 illustrate, some activists were able to capitalize on the political opportunity created by the constitution-making process. As the analysis shows, on average, the Convention delegates from social organizations were members of young and local organizations focused on territorial, environmental, and feminist issues. I understand this finding as evidence of their proximity to local and grassroots networks. Beyond the fact that these organizations tended to be young, indicating that novelty plays an important role in the capacity of their members to win a seat in the Convention, it is worth noting that the local link of these organizations allows them to have deeper roots in the community, connecting better with the expectations of the people they represent. Despite establishing a limited range of action, the localist approach can potentially overcome the intermediation problem. In a global context where the advances of technology made social interactions more immediate and instantaneous, allowing people to access different contents but increasing the distance between the same people and incentivizing the increasing individualism (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022; Castells, 2020), the proximity of the local ties could help fix the intermediation gap.

In addition to the territorial component, organizations that focus on certain issues seem more capable of maintaining people's support than others. As Chapter 2 shows, after the social outbreak and the failure of the constitution-making process, the only movement that could keep practically the same level of support was the environmental movement. In Chile, many environmental social movement organizations operate, in general, in a particular territory, facing problems regarding extractivism, water scarcity, and environmental conservation (Schiapacasse et al., 2024; Schaeffer, 2017; Cortez and Maillet, 2018; Bustos-Gallardo et al., 2021; Delamaza et al., 2017). Here again, the territorial component features strongly. Thus, the characteristic that potentially explains the ability of environmental organizations to keep their support is that the demands and their areas of action resonate with the people because they live in the space where the organization is based. In addition, the way these organizations frame the problem aligns with people's everyday lives—especially in a context where the development model is strongly tied to extractive industries.

The findings of this thesis are not only anchored in the Chilean case or the Latin American context; they are expressions of the political dynamics of our

contemporary society, profoundly marked by distrust, individualism, and technological acceleration (Castells, 2020; Urbinati, 2023; Luna, 2024); all synthesized in the intermediation crisis (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). However, this dissertation shows that, despite the deep-rooted nature of this crisis, collective action maintains its capacity to trigger political changes, although in a more limited space.

5.1 Contributions

This thesis contributes to political and social sciences, and especially to research on the outcomes of collective action (Almeida, 2023; Bosi and Uba, 2021; Amenta et al., 2018; Bosi et al., 2016; Giugni, 2008), in four main aspects: (i) bridging the literature on the political outcomes of collective action with the debate on the crisis of intermediation; (ii) studying a contingent case—the Chilean 2019 social outbreak—which is representative of other inorganic, massive, and disruptive social mobilizations; (iii) contributing to the scholarly debate on Chilean politics after the democratic transition; and (iv) presenting a complex mixed-methods design that combines causal inference strategies, observational data, and qualitative techniques.

The first contribution of this thesis, as mentioned above, is the merging of the collective action outcomes literature with discussions of the intermediation crisis (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022), thereby opening a novel research agenda to expand to other cases in Latin America and Western countries.

The evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates the value of incorporating the intermediation crisis approach into discussions of collective action outcomes. Actors engaged in collective action face similar challenges to those encountered by political parties, financial organizations, cultural agencies, and other intermediary organizations across diverse spheres of contemporary societies (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). What the literature on liberal democracy has termed the representation crisis (Mainwaring, 2016; Bolleyer and Weeks, 2009) can thus be extrapolated to the collective action landscape. However, this is not primarily due to representation per se, but rather because what underlies both the crisis in politics and the challenges in collective action is the incapacity to mediate between preferences or expectations and concrete results or services.

The notion of a crisis of intermediation more effectively captures the phenomena described above as a framework for analyzing collective action outcomes than other concepts that refer to crises in liberal democracies but focus predominantly on democratic backlash or autocratization, such as de-democratization (Mudde and Rovira, 2012), democratic backsliding (Andersen, 2019), or democratic recession (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). This is true for two reasons. One, although these concepts are useful theoretical tools for examining the deterioration

of democratic institutions, they focus on the role of political elites in protecting democracy—such as legislators, party leaders, or heads of the executive branch—and do not consider the role of social mobilization (Guzmán-Concha, 2024). As a result, they are less suited to bridging debates on the crisis of democracy or, more broadly, on contemporary society with the literature on the outcomes of collective action.

Two, as mentioned earlier, these concepts tend to associate discontent with democratic institutions necessarily with processes of autocratization. This is evident in cases such as the United States under Trump (and arguably even more so in his current administration), Argentina under Milei, Russia under Putin, and Bolivia during Morales's last government (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2019; Luna, 2024). However, there are cases where trust in political institutions has declined and the political system has undergone a profound transformation without experiencing authoritarian backsliding. France and Spain are good examples: both countries have witnessed significant transformations in their party systems and a decline in trust in political parties and parliament, but these processes have not resulted in an authoritarian turn (Castells, 2020). Based on the aspects mentioned above, Chile shares important similarities with France and Spain: trust in democratic institutions has eroded over time, albeit at a faster pace, and the party system has undergone profound changes in the last decade, with the emergence of new competitive actors on both the left and the right (Luna, 2021). Yet, as in France and Spain, these dynamics have not led to autocratization.

For this reason, it is difficult to argue that the mobilization process examined in this dissertation—the 2019 social outbreak in Chile—was part of a phenomenon of authoritarian reversal. When comparing other contemporary cases of social outbreaks in Latin America (2019–2021), the trajectories vary significantly. In Chile and Colombia, despite episodes of police repression, democratic institutions remained functional and addressed the conflicts through public policy and electoral mechanisms (Bringel et al., 2021; Guzmán-Concha, 2024). By contrast, the situations in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador were different, as democracy was either faltering or profoundly affected (Bringel et al., 2021). Hence, if social outbreaks do not necessarily lead to an authoritarian turn, the factors driving autocratization must be sought elsewhere.

In the broader debate on the crisis of liberal democracy, the intermediation crisis approach is conceptually closer to the idea of democratic malaise. From the perspective of the intermediation crisis, the core problem is the incapacity of intermediary organizations to connect citizens' expectations with the outcomes these organizations can deliver (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022). For its part, the concept of democratic malaise highlights widespread discontent and the decline in public support for the institutions of liberal democracy (Bienstman et al., 2024). Between the two concepts, there are at least two connections: (i) both focus on

the functioning of institutions and organizations, suggesting that unfulfilled expectations are at the core of democratic malaise; and (ii) democratic malaise is associated with income inequality, which sheds light on the types of issues that are especially relevant in the context of the intermediation crisis.

Second, this dissertation exhaustively analyzes a contingent case as the political consequences of social movements in Chile, which is representative of a series of unstructured, violent, and massive protest cycles in Latin America, the so-called social outbreaks (Bringel et al., 2021; Guzmán-Concha, 2024). Yet, this case is comparable to the antiausterity mobilizations in Western Europe during the 2010s (Della Porta, 2015), the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States (Calhoun, 2013), and the 2019 mobilization in Hong Kong (Holbig, 2020). All the above-mentioned cases share attributes with the 2019 Chilean social outbreak. They were mobilizations with a broad pool of demands, which literature has called multi-issue mobilizations, but with inequality and welfare at the core of their demands. The last is clearer in the Occupy Wall Street movement and the antiausterity mobilizations in Europe, which were a social reaction to the policies of public spending cuts to mitigate the effects of the worldwide financial crisis of 2008 (Della Porta, 2015; Calhoun, 2013).

In addition to the multi-issue component of these mobilizations, they are also similar in the massiveness of their protest calls and the disruption of their mobilizations. Demonstrations in Hong Kong in 2019 and the social outbreaks in Latin America mobilized huge numbers of people for months, despite the repressive response of the authorities, which is another common characteristic among these cases (Bringel et al., 2021; Guzmán-Concha, 2024; Holbig, 2020). At the same time, the protest tactics were disruptive, considering the occupation of public spaces, such as the case of Occupy Wall Street in the United States, or the daily concentration in different places of cities simultaneously, which disrupts everyday life (Calhoun, 2013). Latin American social outbreaks are a good example of the latter (Guzmán-Concha, 2024).

Likewise, these cases share the commonality of lacking an organization that led the calls to protests and negotiations. The Latin American social outbreaks began as a response to specific government policies or decisions, and people mobilized for varied reasons without the intermediation of a centralized, national social movement organization, as seen in the protest cycles of the 20th century (Guzmán-Concha, 2024; Bringel et al., 2021). Moreover, these mobilizations provided a space for the creation of new political referents or for opening a space for previously powerless actors—e.g., the emergence of *Podemos* in Spain and the political positioning of Gustavo Petro to contest the presidency in Colombia.

Third, this thesis is also part of a broader debate on Chilean politics after the return to democracy. From my perspective, the 2019 social outbreak and its subsequent political consequences cannot be fully understood without consider-

ing the processes rooted in the politics of the transition and the governments that followed. The remnants of the dictatorship—whether described as authoritarian locks (Garretón et al., 1997) or constitutional traps (Atria et al., 2013)—have had profound implications for democratization and subsequent political events. These include widespread discontent and mistrust toward political institutions, as well as the predominance of the market as the primary mechanism for providing public goods and services (Huneus, 2014; Garretón, 2016; Moulian, 1997; Mayol, 2012).

As Canales (2022) explains, the social outbreak was a reaction by people disillusioned with the political and economic system because they felt that the promise of progress had not been fulfilled. As Moulian (1997) argues, the transition model was built on the legitimacy of social mobility and integration through mass consumption. According to Canales (2022), this promise ultimately broke down during the 2010s. This failed promise is evident in the field of education. The expansion of higher education coverage, achieved through the growth of private supply and the financing of demand with private debt, created a popular segment that gained access to higher education but could not secure adequate positions in the job market. The new educational institutions have not been able to compete with traditional universities in terms of quality, producing thousands of qualified individuals who are burdened with debt and face limited opportunities (Canales, 2022). It is in this context that the malaise toward the political, social, and economic model took shape. Thus, the social outbreak can be understood as an unorganized expression of discontent with a clear class component.

However, the eruption of the 2019 social outbreak did not lead to the collapse of the model, nor did it result in its replacement by an alternative centered on a public regime, as Mayol (2012) and Atria et al. (2013) suggested might occur after the various mobilizations between 2010 and 2011. The constitution-making process led by the Constitutional Convention (2020–2021) could have represented a model shift, but in light of the evidence, it is difficult to argue that there was a complete replacement of one model by another. Hence, it may be more appropriate to understand the transformations in Chile's political, social, and economic structures as sectoral changes (Maillet, 2015a). These changes combine different roles for the state and markets, which vary from one policy area to another, resulting in a hybridization of policies rather than a fully coherent model (Maillet, 2015a,b).

The cases of reform in higher education and electricity policy illustrate how the state and the market can assume different roles and degrees of prominence without one completely replacing the other (Maillet and Rozas Bugueño, 2019; Rios-Jara, 2023). During Bachelet's second government (2014–2018), a higher education reform was implemented in which the state assumed a more prominent role. As part of the education agenda, the government passed a bill establishing

free higher education for 70% of the population. In addition, the higher education quality assurance system was strengthened. However, private universities continued to participate in the system of free education, receiving public funding without any reduction in their role in the overall provision of higher education (Rios-Jara, 2023).

Bachelet's second administration also undertook a reform of electricity policy aimed at stimulating market competition among existing system operators in order to lower electricity prices, while simultaneously incorporating the state as a provider of electricity generation. In this case, the state helped promote market competition, playing an active role while remaining aligned with the principles of free competition (Maillet and Rozas Bugueño, 2019).

This thesis contributes to the debate on Chilean politics and how the democratic transition has shaped the political events of the last decades by disentangling the outcomes of the 2019 social outbreak in terms of public opinion, electoral behavior, and the political trajectories of the members of the Constitutional Convention (2021–2022). Furthermore, the research examines the demobilization processes of two relevant movements in Chile—the student movement and the No+AFP movement—as negative cases that have been unable to overcome the intermediation crisis. This analysis also contributes to the literature, as the sub-field of demobilization within collective action studies has attracted less scholarly attention in recent years (Zeller, 2020; Davenport, 2015; Tarrow, 2011).

Fourth, this research contributes to the discipline with a mixed methodological approach that combines quasi-experimental, observational, and qualitative strategies to address different political outcomes of a diverse set of collective action phenomena. It provides input on integrating different approaches for the empirical assessment of collective action outcomes, considering that qualitative designs have dominated this field and that observational and causal research in the literature do not engage with in-depth qualitative approaches (Almeida, 2023; Amenta et al., 2018). This process of profound methodological construction produced three original datasets, two of them related to social and political trajectories of former Constitutional Convention delegates, another of georeferenced data from the 2019 social outbreak process and polling stations of the 2017 and 2021 presidential elections, and seventy-four in-depth interviews with social activists, former Convention delegates (2021–2022), government authorities, congresspeople, and political party leaders between December 2022 and June 2023. The datasets will be made available to scholars and the public in an open-access format.

As with all research, this thesis has limitations. The analysis was empirically focused on only one case, Chile. Although the thesis design has a longitudinal perspective and integrates different political outcomes in the same analysis, bringing strong internal validity to the results, the generalizability of the findings is only theoretical. At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out amid the 2019

social outbreak and interfered with the mobilization outcomes. Although exploring the pandemic's implications on the study objects is not part of the research objectives of this dissertation, it is important to acknowledge that it was a significant change in the environment in which the mobilization took place. These limitations, among others, will be discussed in the next section, which will also present future lines of research to address them and to expand the contributions of this dissertation.

5.2 Future Research Lines

This dissertation paves the way for future research by engaging with its results, contributions, and limitations. First, it reflects on the links between intermediation problems, collective action, and political change. In this regard, the theorization presented in this research must be consolidated through a systematic discussion of how these components interconnect and how this could constitute an invitation to the field of collective action and politics to participate in an innovative research agenda.

Second, this dissertation provides an in-depth analysis of the political outcomes of collective action in the Chilean case. A key direction for future research is to expand the external validity of the findings by incorporating cases from different regions. This would enrich the discussion by revealing both similarities and differences across contexts. Phenomena such as the rise of non-traditional political leaders (e.g., Trump in the United States, Milei in Argentina, Bolsonaro in Brazil, MORENA in Mexico, or Petro in Colombia) (Castells, 2020; Luna, 2024; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2022; Urbinati, 2023), alongside the eruption of massive and inorganic protest cycles in Latin America, Asia, and Europe (Bringel et al., 2021; Almeida, 2023), point to broader dynamics of social unrest. Expanding the research agenda in this direction would contribute to a deeper and more comparative understanding of the insights developed in this dissertation.

Third, in the context of this dissertation, I conducted seventy-four in-depth interviews with relevant actors involved in the political process that began with the 2019 social outbreak. This qualitative material still has much to contribute to the study of the political consequences of collective action, particularly for understanding the political changes that occurred in Chile after the social outbreak. What reasons do different actors identify for the failure of the Convention's constitutional proposal in the September 2022 referendum? How did the social outbreak and the constitution-making process impact the political project of Boric's government? How do activists and political actors perceive the capacity of social movements to influence politics over time, especially in the wake of the social outbreak and the constitution-making process? Future research will address these

three questions through the systematic qualitative analysis of the in-depth interviews collected during this dissertation.

Fourth, as mentioned earlier, this dissertation does not address the irruption of COVID-19. However, it is necessary to assess the pandemic's potential effects on the outcomes analyzed in this research. COVID-19 may have had a direct impact on electoral results, but it could also have played a moderating role in the relationship between the social outbreak and electoral behavior. To explore this, future research could draw on ELSOC's panel data to examine whether people's grievances after the onset of the pandemic differed from those associated with the 2019 social outbreak. Additionally, it would be possible to incorporate data on COVID-19-related deaths and infections into the original dataset of georeferenced protests and electoral results (used in Chapter 1) in order to analyze both the direct and moderating effects of the pandemic on the 2021 first-round presidential elections.

Fifth, this dissertation does not examine the effect of the 2019 social outbreak on Gabriel Boric's electoral victory in the second round of the 2021 presidential election. Rather, it focuses on analyzing the impact of protest occurrence—both in general terms and in relation to their spatial proximity to voters—on the results of the first-round presidential election, using data aggregated at the municipal and polling station levels. The analytical choice is justified by the broader electoral supply available to voters in the first round, as opposed to the second round, in which electoral preferences are limited to two alternatives. The findings indicate that the protests did not produce statistically significant differences in support for Gabriel Boric, the Broad Front candidate. Nonetheless, a weakly significant association suggests that polling stations located closer to protest sites in 2019 registered slightly higher support for Boric. While this could point toward a potential relationship between protest proximity and electoral support, the evidence presented in this dissertation is insufficient to account for Boric's ultimate electoral success in the runoff.

Furthermore, the second-round election entailed distinct political dynamics that fall beyond the scope of this study. Notably, political parties and voters from the center to the left largely converged in support of Boric—not necessarily out of ideological conviction, but rather as a strategic response to the perceived threat posed by the far-right candidate, José Antonio Kast. This context may help explain, at least partially, the rapid decline in Boric's approval ratings following his inauguration in March 2022 (Luna, 2024). To adequately address the second-round electoral process, future research should explicitly focus on that stage of the election. A potential extension could involve a comparative analysis of the electoral performance of Gabriel Boric and José Antonio Kast, replicating the protest-related models developed in Chapter 1 while controlling for first-round voting patterns. Such an approach would allow for a more systematic assessment

of the role played by strategic, “the lesser of two evils” voting in shaping the outcome of the runoff.

Sixth, this thesis does not address political events that occurred after the rejection of the Constitutional Convention’s proposal in the referendum of September 4th, 2022. Notwithstanding, many relevant political events continued to emerge in Chile. After the failure of the Constitution Convention, whose aim was to create a new constitution that could address the generalized discontent with the institutions and the economic model that was expressed by the Chileans, the political system generated a second agreement to conduct a new constitution-making process, but this time with a lower number of delegates, emulating the rules and composition of the Senate. In this second, democratically elected, constitutional body, the Constitutional Council (2023), the far-right Republican Party of Jose Antonio Kast emerged as the strongest party. This process was the opposite of the Convention: it designed a conservative proposal to deepen the institutional framework established in the constitution inherited from Pinochet’s dictatorship. The Council’s constitutional proposal was rejected in a new referendum on December 17th, 2023.

Considering the above, there is an opportunity to review the role of collective action and actors during the Constitutional Council’s tenure, focusing on whether they participated in any instances of mobilizing themselves for the campaign to reject the Council’s proposal.

Conversely, the leftist Broad Front came to power with Gabriel Boric’s victory in the 2021 presidential election. The government of Boric has faced various challenges, one of which, and perhaps the most relevant, is the rejection of the Convention’s proposal. The rightist parties, the press, and business organizations blamed Boric’s government and social activists for the failure of the process (Desposato et al., 2024; Sazo, 2023; Larraín et al., 2023). Even though Boric’s government had problems implementing a good part of its political program after the failure of the Constitutional Convention process, it succeeded in passing important reforms: the elimination of vouchers (*co-pago* in Spanish) in the public health system; the historic raise of the minimum wage (it passed from US\$ 368 in 2022 to US\$526 in 2024); and the pension reform, increasing employer contributions and incorporating a new solidarity component in the system. It would be interesting to study the evolving relationship between Boric’s government and collective actors, taking into account the context of reforms in welfare policy sectors, particularly with the Broad Front, a party with origins in the 2011 student movement (Ponce, 2024; Orrego, 2024).

At the same time, elections will be held at the end of 2025, marking the first national election in which former Convention delegates can run for a seat in Parliament. This will provide a good opportunity to expand the scope of the analysis of the delegates’ political trajectories after the Convention. In the same vein, it will

be necessary to explore other changes in the trajectories of the former delegates as a political outcome of collective action, such as social trajectories. I will carry out a study on whether the former delegates participated more in social organizations after the Convention, focusing on the number of social organizations that they are members and whether the social organizations are part of different sectors (e.g., labor, education, health, pensions, housing, feminist, environmentalist, or territorial). Additionally, I will incorporate the exploration of heterogeneous effects related to gender into the analysis of the political and social trajectories of the former Convention delegates.

Finally, over the last few years, some social movements and organizations have entered political institutions. For example, the Movement for the Defense of Access to Water, Land, and Environmental Protection (MODATIMA in Spanish), with its leader Rodrigo Mundaca, won the regional government of Valparaíso, one of the most important regions of the country, because it is Chile's principal port. The environmental movement approached the regional government with the support of the Broad Front, but it has maintained its political independence throughout its mandate. Another interesting experience is the election of Matías Toledo, the leader of Shishigang Coordinator, a grassroots social organization, who was elected mayor of Puente Alto, one of the municipalities with the largest population in the country. He ran in the 2022 subnational election as an independent candidate, and he defeated the rightist candidate and former minister of Pinera's government, Karla Rubilar. These two experiences demonstrate that, despite the intermediation crisis, collective actors have triggered political changes as they enter the political sphere. Hence, another future line of research will be to study social movements that have achieved important political positions in Chile.

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Appendix

A.1 Data Sources

This section of the Appendix describes the secondary sources, the construction of the original datasets, and the in-depth interviews used throughout the different parts of the thesis.

A.1.1 Pulso Ciudadano Survey

For Chapter 1, the data used for the UESD-related analysis come from the October 2019 *Pulso Ciudadano* Survey by Activa Research.¹ Activa Research is a Chilean private survey company specializing in public opinion, marketing, and customer experience studies. We chose to use this survey because, to our knowledge, it was the only one in Chile conducted during the outbreak of the social uprising. We obtained access to the data by submitting an information request to the executive board of Activa Research. We thank the company for providing us with the dataset.

A.1.2 Panel Data - ELSOC-COES Survey

I used data from the Chilean Longitudinal Social Survey of the COES (ELSOC-COES) for the analyses conducted in Chapters 1 and 2. ELSOC-COES is a six-wave panel survey, with a multistage probabilistic sample stratified by clusters, and is representative of the Chilean population.² COES had to cancel the wave initially planned for 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The dataset is publicly available on the [Harvard Dataverse](#). The data collection periods were as follows:

- **2016:** August 8th, 2016 - December 12th, 2016

¹For more information on the survey, please visit the Activa Research website: <https://chile.activasite.com/>

²For more information, visit the [official webpage](#) of the survey.

- **2017:** July 24th, 2017 - October 10th, 2017
- **2018:** August 27th, 2018 - December 10th, 2018
- **2019:** November 21th, 2019 - March 23rd, 2020 **This wave was conducted after the social uprising.*
- **2021:** January 30th, 2021 - July 12th, 2021
- **2022:** July 20th, 2022 - December 1st, 2022

A.1.3 Georeferenced Electoral Results Dataset (2017-2021)

Together with Toni Rodon, I constructed an original dataset of georeferenced electoral results in Chile for the analysis conducted in Chapter 1. We combined data from three different sources.

First, we used data on the 2019 social uprising protests from the protest events dataset of the COES' Observatory of Conflicts, considering protests between October 18, 2019, and March 14, 2020. On the latter date, Chile's health system registered the first case of COVID-19, marking the end of the protest wave due to the mobility restrictions imposed by the pandemic.

We considered 4,369 protest events. We relied on variable "P9", which indicates where each protest took place. We manually coded the latitude and longitude of protest locations using Google Maps. From the 4,369 protest events, we successfully geolocated 3,912. In the remaining cases, the location information was either missing or too vague to identify the specific site. In such instances, we assigned the coordinates of the city's main square as the location of the protest. We coded 902 events using this approximation. This decision does not affect the robustness of our results.

Second, we used voting data from the first-round presidential elections of 2017 and 2021, provided by the Electoral Service ([SERVEL](#)). In the DiD analysis, we first used data at the commune level and later aggregated it at the polling station level. In both cases, we captured the percentage of votes received by each candidate in both elections.

Finally, we incorporated demographic data at the commune level from the National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey ([CASEN](#)). This survey, conducted by the Ministry of Social Development and Family, is one of the Chilean state's main tools for designing social policy. The survey sample is probabilistic and consisted of 216,439 observations in 2017 and 202,231 in 2022. As control variables, we included average years of schooling, the percentage of foreign-born individuals, indigenous individuals, people living in overcrowded conditions, and the

(log of the) total population. We relied on the aggregation at the municipal level provided by the Ministry of Social Development and Family.

A.1.4 Cross-sectional Chilean Constitutional Delegates' Political Trajectories (2021) Dataset

For Chapter 2, I constructed an original dataset on the political trajectories of Chilean constitutional delegates at the time of the 2021 election of the Constitutional Convention. The construction of this cross-sectional dataset was based on Rozas-Bugueño et al. (2022). I complemented the information provided by Rozas-Bugueño et al. (2022) with data obtained from the National Congress Library and the delegates' social media profiles (Facebook, X—formerly Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube).

A.1.5 Longitudinal Chilean Constitutional Delegates' Political Trajectories (2017-2024) Dataset

For Chapter 3, I constructed an original dataset on the political trajectories of Chilean constitutional delegates between 2017 and 2024. This dataset builds upon the Convention delegates' trajectory data developed for Chapter 2 (Rozas-Bugueño, 2024), as well as the work of Rozas-Bugueño et al. (2022) on the political profiles of Convention members.³

I added 155 individuals who came close to securing a seat in the Convention but ultimately were not elected. These individuals form the control group for the analysis. I selected the control group by simulating a scenario in which the 28 electoral districts had double their actual district magnitudes.⁴ For example, District 3 had an actual magnitude of three seats, whereas in the simulation, it had six.

To allocate seats, I used the electoral simulator developed by the Catalan consultancy Icon⁵ and official data from the Chilean Electoral Service (SERVEL, see footnote 2). I applied the same rules used in the actual Convention election: the D'Hondt proportional representation system to assign 138 seats across 28 multi-member districts, with district magnitudes proportional to population size. These rules are the same as those used in elections for the Chamber of Deputies,⁶ but the

³This dataset is publicly available on the Harvard Dataverse: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/FA6E1V>

⁴Information on district magnitudes and detailed electoral results for the Convention election is available at: <https://www.servel.cl/centro-de-datos/resultados-electorales-historicos-gw3/>

⁵Electoral simulator available at: <https://icon.cat/util/elecciones#>

⁶However, the Chamber of Deputies allocates 155 seats.

Convention election included three electoral innovations (Heiss, 2021; Suárez-Cao, 2021):

(i) Gender parity in seat allocation, ensuring that neither gender could outnumber the other by more than one seat per district. The parity correction was applied after votes were counted and seats assigned via the D'Hondt method. If parity was not achieved, the seat of the overrepresented gender on the least-voted list was reassigned to the highest-voted unelected candidate of the underrepresented gender on the same list or sub-list.

(ii) Electoral lists for independents, which allowed non-party candidates to organize electoral lists and compete on equal terms with political parties.

(iii) The reservation of 17 seats for Chile's ten constitutionally recognized Indigenous peoples: Mapuche (7), Aymara (2), Chango (1), Colla (1), Diaguita (1), Kawésqar (1), Lican Antay/Atacameño (1), Quechua (1), Rapa Nui (1), and Yagán/Yamana (1). These seats were elected simultaneously with the ordinary Convention delegates and through a separate electoral roll. A candidate-pair system was used to ensure gender parity in the allocation of reserved seats: voters chose between pairs of candidates, and in the event of a gender imbalance, the least-voted pair that secured a seat underwent a gender-based replacement.

Thus, I replicated the Convention election rules by doubling the number of ordinary seats per district and selecting the unelected candidate from each Indigenous pair as part of the control group.

The dataset was complemented with indicators of political involvement, membership in social organizations, ideology, and demographic variables. Many of these indicators were drawn from Rozas-Bugueño (2024) and Rozas-Bugueño et al. (2022), but were extended in both temporal scope (2017–2024) and number of observations (control group).

The data collection strategy was as follows: I conducted a systematic data collection for each individual using official sources, including electoral data from SERVEL,⁷ political biographies from the National Congress Library,⁸ the Transparency Portal,⁹ and the Chamber of Deputies of Chile.¹⁰ These sources were particularly useful for tracing individuals' political and professional trajectories. SERVEL provided not only electoral results and candidate lists but also, in many cases, the political programs of candidates, which contained biographical information. The National Congress Library hosts a repository of biographies of individuals who have held parliamentary or constitutional delegate positions in Chilean

⁷Available at: <https://www.servel.cl/centro-de-datos/resultados-electorales-historicos-gw3/>

⁸Available at: https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/convencionales_constituyentes/index.html

⁹Available at: <https://www.portaltransparencia.cl/PortalPdT/>

¹⁰Available at: <https://www.camara.cl/>

history.

The Transparency Portal contains official information on all individuals who have held public contracts with the Chilean state, including public employees, high-level officials (e.g., ministers, undersecretaries), and officials at local and regional levels. It also systematizes information on all individuals holding positions within legally recognized political parties between 2016 and 2024, from local leadership to the national executive (e.g., president, vice president, general secretary). This was especially useful for constructing the party membership intensity indicator.

The Chamber of Deputies provides detailed information on individuals who have served as parliamentary advisors. I submitted a formal information request for the list of all advisors during the period of interest. The dataset includes full names, advisor roles, contract periods, and monthly salaries.

Additionally, I collected data through individuals' social media accounts (Facebook, X—formerly Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube) and systematic press review. Social media was especially useful for identifying information related to activism and professional history, particularly for lesser-known individuals. LinkedIn was especially valuable for triangulating professional background data.

For the press analysis, I searched for news articles using the keywords *Convención*, *convencional*, and *constituyente*, covering the period from September 5, 2019, to December 31, 2024. I used advanced Google search tools to search day by day and reduced potential editorial bias by collecting articles from three outlets:¹¹ (i) 1,394 articles from the traditional right-leaning newspaper *La Tercera*,¹² (ii) 336 from the left-leaning outlet *El Desconcierto*, focused on social movements,¹³ (iii) and 477 from the newer right-leaning newspaper *El Líbero*.¹⁴

All articles were compiled into a dataset, systematized qualitatively, and coded for analysis (see A.1). Press analysis was particularly useful in identifying individuals with party advisory roles.

Complementary to the systematic review of the three newspapers, I conducted an open-ended Google search for each individual included in the dataset. I followed a similar strategy to that used in the press analysis: I fixed the search period and entered each individual's full name into Google.¹⁵

¹¹Articles were collected using Google's advanced search tools with the command `site:[newspaper website] ``Convención`` OR ``convencional`` OR ``constituyente``` day by day between September 5, 2022, and December 31, 2024.

¹²<https://www.latercera.com/>

¹³<https://eldesconcierto.cl/>

¹⁴<https://ellibero.cl/>

¹⁵This involved entering the individual's full name in quotation marks and conducting two separate searches using Google's advanced search tools: one for the period between January 1, 2017,

Table A.1: Distribution of Articles by Relevance for the Dataset and Newspaper

Newspaper	Articles with relevant information	Articles without relevant information	Total
<i>La Tercera</i>	196	1198	1394
<i>El Desconcierto</i>	51	285	336
<i>El Líbero</i>	107	340	447

A.1.6 COES' Observatory of Conflicts - Cumulative Dataset of Protest Events in Chile

I used the protest event data from the COES Observatory of Conflicts¹⁶ for the analyses conducted in Chapters 1 and 4. This dataset contains information on protest events that took place in Chile between 2008 and 2020. It covers the 2019 social uprising as well as other key moments of protest in the country's recent history, such as the 2011 student movement and the emergence of the No+AFP demonstrations in 2016. The data collection by the Observatory of Conflicts is based on the coding of protest characteristics extracted from press articles, including coverage from both national and regional newspapers.

For Chapter 1, I used only the protest events that occurred between October 10 and October 30, 2019, corresponding to the survey's fieldwork period for conducting the UESD analysis. For Chapter 4, I used data on student and No+AFP protests between 2008 and 2020.

A.1.7 In-depth Interviews with Key Actors

For this thesis, I conducted seventy-four in-depth interviews with key actors—social activists, constitutional delegates, political authorities, and political party leaders. I submitted the interview fieldwork plan to the Institutional Committee for Ethical Review of Projects at Pompeu Fabra University for ethical evaluation (Application 279). The Committee approved the plan, and informed consent was obtained from all participants accordingly. In line with the informed consent protocol, I shared the results of academic publications and dissemination materials with the interviewees.

However, I used fifty-four interviews to develop Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Since those chapters focused on the constitution-making process (2021–2022) and so-

and December 31, 2021; and another for the period between September 5, 2022, and December 31, 2024.

¹⁶<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/OC>

cial activism, I did not include the twenty interviews conducted with political authorities and party leaders. Table A.2 presents the profile of the interviewees used in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.

Table A.2: Interviewees' Description

Type of actor	Face-to-face		Remote		Total
	Female	Male	Female	Male	
Activist	12	11	6	3	32
Constitutional delegate	1	1	11	9	22
Total	13	12	17	12	54

A.2 Chapter 1

A.2.1 Operationalization and Summary Statistics

UESD

Figure A.1 shows the distribution of survey respondents during the *Pulso Ciudadano* Survey fieldwork, carried out between October 09, 2019, and October 30, 2019.

Figure A.1: Distribution of Respondents Throughout the *Pulso Ciudadano* Survey Fieldwork




Table A.3 presents the number of observations across the different issues employed as outcomes in the UESD analysis.

Table A.3: Which Are the Three Main Problems of Chile at This Moment? (Number of Observations)

	Pensions	Health	Education	Housing	Inequality	Crime
N	602	514	311	86	397	362
	Environment	Indigenous People	Human Rights	Insecurity	Immigration	
N	69	22	40	104	118	

Table A.4 contains the operationalization of the covariates employed in the UESD. It is worth noting that the last row of Table A.4 presents the operational-

ization of the geographical zone of respondents' residence, which was used as a fixed effect across models.

Table A.4: Operationalization of the UESD Covariates

Covariate	Operationalization
Woman	Women (= 1) and other genders (= 0)
Age	- Younger than 30 y/o; - 31-40 y/o; - 41-50 y/o; Older than 50 y/o
Education	- Primary education: uncompleted primary education or less; completed basic education - Secondary education: uncompleted high school level; completed high school level - Higher education: uncompleted university degree; completed university degree; at least one of postgraduate degree
Type of occupation	- Occasional worker; Unskilled worker; Skilled worker; Middle-level employee; Middle-level manager; Upper-level manager
Nationality	Chilean nationality (= 1) and others (= 0)
Ideology	- Right: Center-right (4) and Right (5); Center (3); Left: Center-left (2) and Left (1) Don't know/no answer: no political position and don't know
Ident. government coalition	Respondents identified with the government coalition (right-wing Piñera's government) (= 1) and people identified with other political coalitions (= 0) - Gov coalition (= 1): Let's Go Chile (Independent Democratic Union, National Renovation, Political Evolution, and Independent Regionalist Party) - Other political coalitions and responses (= 0): Republican Action; New Majority (Socialist Party, Party for Democracy, Social Democratic Radical Party, and Communist Party); Christian Democratic Party; Broad Front; Independent; Anyone; DK/NA
Country geographical zone	- Northern zone: Regions of Arica and Parinacota; Tarapacá; Antofagasta; Atacama; and Coquimbo - Center zone: Regions of Valparaíso; Libertador Bernardo O'Higgins; and Maule - Southern zone: Regions of Ñuble; Biobío; Araucanía; Los Ríos; Los Lagos; Aysén; and Magallanes y la Antártica Chilena - Metropolitan Region: Metropolitan Region of Santiago

Panel analysis

Table A.5 describes the operationalization of the covariates used in the panel data analysis.

Table A.5: Operationalization of the Panel Data Covariates

Covariate	Operationalization
Sex	Women (= 1) and men (= 0)
Age	Younger than 30 y/o; 31-40 y/o; 41-50 y/o; Older than 50 y/o
Education	- Primary education or less: no studies, incomplete primary education, completed primary education, and incomplete secondary education - Secondary education: complete secondary education, incomplete technical education, and incomplete university education - Higher education: complete technical education, complete university education, and postgraduate studies (master o doctorate)
Ideology	Right: 6-10; Center: 5 point; Left: 0-4 points; Independent; DK or NA
Country geo- graphical zone	- Northern zone: Regions of Arica and Parinacota, Tarapacá, Antofagasta, Atacama, and Coquimbo - Center zone: Regions of Valparaíso, Libertador Bernardo O'Higgins, and Maule - Southern zone: Regions of Ñuble, Biobío, Araucanía, Los Ríos, Los Lagos, and Aysén - Metropolitan Region: Metropolitan Region of Santiago

Table A.6 shows the distribution of observations over the waves of ELSOC-COES survey, showing the differences between the dataframes with and without attrition.

Table A.6: Distribution of Observations over Survey Waves

Dataframe	2016	2017	2018	2019	2021	2022
With attrition	2927	2473	3748	3417	2740	2730
Without attrition	1304	1304	2076	2076	2076	2076

Table A.7 describes the presence of welfare state-related questions over survey waves.

Table A.7: Presence of Welfare State Preferences Questions over Survey Waves

Questions	2016	2017	2018	2019	2021	2022	N
Pensions	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	5166
Health	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	8821
Education	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	3901
Housing	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	8704
Inequality	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	10870

Tables A.8 and A.9 summarize the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the panel data analysis.

Table A.8: Descriptive Statistics: Welfare State Preferences


Variable	Min	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max	NA
Pensions	1.00	2.00	3.00	2.94	4.00	5.00	5746.00
Health	1.00	4.00	4.00	4.17	5.00	5.00	2091.00
Education	1.00	4.00	4.00	4.22	5.00	5.00	7011.00
Housing	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.24	2.00	5.00	2204.00
Inequality	1.00	4.00	4.00	4.31	5.00	5.00	42.00

Table A.9: Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables

Variable	N
Sex	
Man	3728
Woman	7184
Age	
Younger than 30 y/o	1503
31-40 y/o	1944
41-50 y/o	2110
Older than 50 y/o	5355
Education	
Primary educ.	3737
Secondary educ.	4369
Higher educ.	2802
NA	4
Ideology	
Right	1774
Center	2995
Left	2363
Independent	3615
Dk/Na	164
NA	1
Geograph. Zones	
North.	1410
Center	3265
South.	3182
Metrop.	3055

Figure A.2 presents the evolution of Chileans' welfare state preferences over time (2016-2022).

Figure A.2: Evolution of Agreement/Satisfaction with Welfare State Preferences (2016-2022)



DID

- **Far-left:** The far-left ran in the presidential elections of 2017 and 2021 under the candidature of Eduardo Artés from the Patriotic Union, a non-traditional left party. This party is the political platform of the organization Chilean Communist Party (Proletarian Action). The political party defines its political ideology as Marxist-Leninist, anti-imperialist, and with a proletarian-international approach.
- **Progressive Party:** This Party was created in 2010 by Marco Enríquez-Ominami. Enríquez-Ominami has run as the candidate of the Progressive Party in all of the presidential elections. We also consider the votes of Alejandro Navarro, an ex-militant, deputy, and senator of the Socialist Party. We grouped the voting of both candidates as representatives of a non-traditional left because the parties have very close political ideologies, both share similar political trajectories and origins, and because the Country Party, after the 2017 elections, merged with the Progressive Party, supporting Enríquez-Ominami's candidature in 2021.
- **Broad Front:** It is a political coalition created in 2017 and composed of new and old leftist political parties that have criticized politics since the restoration of democracy. Almost all parties that composed the Broad Front have their roots in the student mobilizations of 2011, whose main leaders were Gabriel Boric and Giorgio Jackson. The Uruguayan Broad Front and the experiences of the new left in Europe inspired the coalition, which had democratic socialism, feminism, and ecology as its cornerstones. The Broad Front, ideologically speaking, represented a new progressive left between the former Concertation and the Progressive Party. In 2017, the coalition named Beatriz Sánchez, a leftist-independent journalist, as presidential candidate. Sánchez almost passed to the second round of the election. In the 2021 presidential elections, the Broad Front allied with the Communist Party under the political coalition Approve Dignity. The new political coalition won the elections, and Gabriel Boric became the country's president when he defeated the far-right candidate José Antonio Kast.
- **Ex-Concertation:** The Concertation of Political Parties for Democracy was a coalition that governed during the first twenty years since the return of democracy (1990). The coalition had internal divisions on how to implement the political reforms, going to the 2017 presidential divided: the Christian Democratic Party presented Senator Carolina Goic as its presidential candidate, and the other coalition parties named Senator Alejandro Guillier as its candidate. We grouped them because they share a similar political history, have shared 24 years of government since the return of democracy in 1990, and have similar political programs.

- **Let's Go Chile:** It is a right-wing coalition composed of the National Renovation Party, the Independent Democratic Union, Political Evolution, and the Independent Democratic Regionalist Party. The first two are the traditional parties of the right, which mostly campaigned for Pinochet in the plebiscite of 1988 and defended the reforms of Pinochet's dictatorship. In 2017, Let's Go Chile supported former president Sebastián Piñera as its presidential candidate. He won the presidency of Chile in the second-round against Alejandro Guillier, the Ex-Concertation's candidate. In 2021, the right-wing coalition supported the independent Sebastián Sichel. Sichel lost the 2021 presidential election in the first-round.
- **Far-right:** In 2017, the far-right was represented by José Antonio Kast, a former militant of the Independent Democratic Union. He received support from the evangelicals, conservative factions of traditional right parties, and far-right radicalized political groups without political representation in Congress. Kast defended many aspects of Pinochet's dictatorship and its institutional heritage. In 2021, Kast passed to the second-round, obtaining the first position in the first round. In addition to Kast, the far-right was also represented by Franco Parisi in the 2021 presidential election, an independent with a pro-market program and liberal position.

The number of polling stations in 2017 was 2,138, and 2,800 in 2021. We carried out our main analysis considering only the consistent polling stations in both elections—a total of 3,830 polling stations (1,915 per year).


For its part, Table A.10 shows the descriptive statistics of the number of protests at the municipality level.

Table A.10: Descriptive Statistics of the Number of the 2019 Social Outbreak Protests at *Comuna* Level

Statistic	Value
Min.	0.00
1st Qu.	0.00
Median	1.50
Mean	11.17
3rd Qu.	6.00
Max.	237.00

Figure A.3 summarizes the distribution of the logarithmic distance from each polling station of the 2021 election to the closest protest related to the social uprising.

Figure A.3: Distribution of the Minimum Logarithmic Distance Between Polling Stations and Social Uprising Protests (2021 Election)



A.2.2 UESD

Full estimates

Tables A.11 and A.12 show the full estimates of the Linear Probability Models (LPM) presented in Chapter 1.

Table A.11: The Effect of Protests Exposure on Issue Priorities

	Crime	Drug Trafficking	Immigration	Insecurity	Environment	Indigenous people	Housing	Human Rights	Health	Education	Pensions	Inequality
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Exposure to protest	-0.1330*** (0.0326)	-0.0626*** (0.0222)	-0.0490** (0.0216)	-0.0422** (0.0208)	-0.0356** (0.0180)	-0.0206* (0.0120)	-0.0036 (0.0212)	0.0077 (0.0165)	0.0423 (0.0375)	0.0708** (0.0308)	0.1247*** (0.0376)	0.1543*** (0.0324)
Woman(=1)	0.0060 (0.0338)	0.0344 (0.0222)	0.0176 (0.0226)	-0.0173 (0.0203)	0.0251 (0.0176)	0.0068 (0.0123)	0.0031 (0.0211)	-0.0158 (0.0155)	0.0918** (0.0390)	-0.0080 (0.0323)	0.0305 (0.0387)	-0.0445 (0.0340)
31-40y/o	0.0932* (0.0484)	0.1048*** (0.0376)	0.0153 (0.0311)	0.0049 (0.0265)	-0.0315 (0.0233)	-0.0096 (0.0165)	0.0103 (0.0317)	-0.0700*** (0.0202)	-0.0335 (0.0542)	-0.0084 (0.0476)	-0.0050 (0.0528)	0.1673*** (0.0482)
41-50y/o	0.1712*** (0.0471)	0.0284 (0.0242)	-0.0130 (0.0238)	0.0386 (0.0282)	-0.0399* (0.0236)	-0.0086 (0.0162)	-0.0121 (0.0267)	-0.0626*** (0.0191)	0.0748 (0.0511)	0.0111 (0.0445)	0.1140** (0.0521)	0.0450 (0.0432)
Older than 50	0.1885*** (0.0466)	0.1170*** (0.0350)	0.0320 (0.0320)	0.0725** (0.0305)	-0.0702*** (0.0228)	-0.0188 (0.0139)	-0.0317 (0.0269)	-0.0646*** (0.0179)	-0.0302 (0.0493)	-0.1095*** (0.0382)	0.1131** (0.0517)	0.0747 (0.0472)
Secondary educ.	0.0561 (0.0637)	-0.0231 (0.0414)	0.0401 (0.0450)	-0.0373 (0.0454)	-0.0562 (0.0436)	-0.0339 (0.0316)	-0.0712 (0.0511)	-0.0165 (0.0307)	-0.1089 (0.0736)	-0.0883 (0.0644)	0.1190* (0.0707)	0.1433*** (0.0534)
Higher educ.	-0.0076 (0.0703)	-0.0820* (0.0454)	0.0189 (0.0530)	-0.0093 (0.0459)	0.0009 (0.0428)	-0.0287 (0.0316)	-0.0817 (0.0562)	-0.0180 (0.0312)	-0.1430* (0.0801)	0.0464 (0.0702)	0.0770 (0.0777)	0.1396** (0.0634)
Unskilled worker	-0.0312 (0.0744)	0.0511 (0.0524)	-0.0001 (0.0533)	0.0703 (0.0428)	0.0196 (0.0465)	0.0192 (0.0138)	0.0396 (0.0529)	0.0022 (0.0409)	0.0906 (0.0866)	-0.1742** (0.0705)	0.0115 (0.0886)	9.69×10^{-5} (0.0722)
Skilled worker	-0.0120 (0.0768)	-0.0129 (0.0417)	-0.0583 (0.0473)	0.0717 (0.0471)	0.0381 (0.0473)	0.0512 (0.0341)	0.0055 (0.0431)	-0.0131 (0.0320)	0.0691 (0.0822)	-0.0354 (0.0765)	-0.0313 (0.0814)	7.74×10^{-5} (0.0650)
Middle-level employee	0.0044 (0.0730)	0.0479 (0.0419)	-0.0160 (0.0555)	0.0620 (0.0388)	-0.0038 (0.0369)	0.0333 (0.0220)	0.0304 (0.0468)	0.0070 (0.0326)	0.1044 (0.0787)	-0.1068 (0.0695)	-0.0162 (0.0801)	-0.0370 (0.0645)
Middle-level manager	-0.0010 (0.0794)	0.0307 (0.0460)	-0.0398 (0.0561)	0.0544 (0.0459)	0.0112 (0.0423)	0.0385 (0.0242)	-0.0352 (0.0454)	0.0105 (0.0398)	0.1972** (0.0898)	-0.1073 (0.0768)	0.0163 (0.0919)	0.0046 (0.0804)
Upper-level manager	-0.0495 (0.1183)	0.0184 (0.0794)	0.0154 (0.0879)	0.0366 (0.0715)	0.0469 (0.0857)	0.0020 (0.0226)	-0.0398 (0.0461)	-0.0093 (0.0335)	0.1707 (0.1437)	-0.0010 (0.1655)	-0.0308 (0.1607)	0.0710 (0.1575)
Chilean nat.(=1)	0.1285* (0.0678)	0.0259 (0.0412)	0.0481 (0.0624)	-0.0262 (0.0688)	0.0319 (0.0364)	0.0132* (0.0078)	-0.2286** (0.0966)	-0.0773 (0.0768)	0.0417 (0.0910)	0.0961* (0.0571)	-0.0536 (0.0996)	-0.1016 (0.0888)
Centre	-0.0602 (0.0815)	-0.1457*** (0.0474)	-0.1310*** (0.0404)	0.0126 (0.0515)	0.0969** (0.0491)	0.0197 (0.0176)	0.0591 (0.0593)	0.0194 (0.0394)	0.0965 (0.0808)	0.0096 (0.0607)	-0.0335 (0.0769)	0.0770 (0.0652)
Left	-0.1985*** (0.0646)	-0.1128** (0.0480)	-0.1495*** (0.0367)	-0.0469 (0.0345)	0.0445 (0.0307)	0.0367* (0.0207)	0.0100 (0.0409)	0.0102 (0.0376)	0.0120 (0.0658)	0.0196 (0.0521)	0.1438** (0.0701)	0.1978*** (0.0639)
Dk/Na	-0.1062* (0.0583)	-0.1212*** (0.0415)	-0.0815** (0.0392)	-0.0134 (0.0318)	0.0096 (0.0161)	0.0152** (0.0072)	-0.0025 (0.0389)	0.0172 (0.0372)	0.0989* (0.0552)	0.0218 (0.0395)	0.0534 (0.0557)	0.0517 (0.0471)
Officialism(=1)	0.0593 (0.0677)	0.0110 (0.0502)	-0.0583 (0.0441)	0.0390 (0.0445)	0.0171 (0.0249)	-0.0101** (0.0050)	0.0361 (0.0565)	0.0415 (0.0513)	0.0268 (0.0680)	-0.0643 (0.0454)	0.0386 (0.0686)	-0.0492 (0.0556)
Observations	990	990	990	990	990	990	990	990	990	990	990	990
R ²	0.08809	0.08650	0.04910	0.03776	0.04883	0.03446	0.09308	0.05152	0.04290	0.05673	0.04419	0.09740
Within R ²	0.08722	0.08033	0.04149	0.03646	0.04527	0.02811	0.05896	0.04704	0.03383	0.05420	0.04378	0.08265
Geo. Zone fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓


Table A.12: The Effect of Protests Exposure on Issue Priorities: Interactions

	Inequality	Housing	Pensions	Education	Health	Housing	Inequality	Education	Health	Pensions
Treated	0.1859*** (0.0374)	0.0022 (0.0249)	0.1083** (0.0440)	0.0729* (0.0382)	0.0182 (0.0453)	-0.0179 (0.0426)	-0.0143 (0.0608)	0.0506 (0.0609)	0.0018 (0.0723)	0.0857 (0.0688)
Protests	-0.0004 (0.0041)	-0.0005 (0.0016)	0.0024 (0.0048)	-0.0022 (0.0035)	-0.0122*** (0.0031)					
Surv. Day						0.0016 (0.0069)	0.0155 (0.0102)	-0.0011 (0.0097)	0.0006 (0.0121)	-0.0093 (0.0118)
Woman(=1)	-0.0438 (0.0336)	0.0035 (0.0210)	0.0288 (0.0387)	-0.0067 (0.0321)	0.0985** (0.0386)	0.0030 (0.0214)	-0.0453 (0.0342)	-0.0075 (0.0323)	0.0923** (0.0390)	0.0330 (0.0386)
31-40y/o	0.1611*** (0.0483)	0.0088 (0.0316)	0.0004 (0.0528)	-0.0109 (0.0473)	-0.0412 (0.0542)	0.0093 (0.0321)	0.1533*** (0.0481)	-0.0115 (0.0482)	-0.0384 (0.0548)	-0.0146 (0.0529)
41-50y/o	0.0453 (0.0428)	-0.0123 (0.0267)	0.1151** (0.0521)	0.0099 (0.0446)	0.0677 (0.0512)	-0.0122 (0.0267)	0.0413 (0.0429)	0.0082 (0.0452)	0.0714 (0.0519)	0.1024* (0.0525)
Older than 50	0.0694 (0.0474)	-0.0332 (0.0270)	0.1183** (0.0517)	-0.1123*** (0.0382)	-0.0403 (0.0490)	-0.0320 (0.0270)	0.0674 (0.0463)	-0.1141*** (0.0390)	-0.0358 (0.0503)	0.0951* (0.0523)
Secondary educ.	0.1412*** (0.0530)	-0.0716 (0.0511)	0.1205* (0.0708)	-0.0889 (0.0645)	-0.1099 (0.0731)	-0.0712 (0.0510)	0.1407*** (0.0533)	-0.0911 (0.0651)	-0.1120 (0.0733)	0.1078 (0.0719)
Higher educ.	0.1342** (0.0621)	-0.0828 (0.0563)	0.0809 (0.0771)	0.0449 (0.0706)	-0.1456* (0.0800)	-0.0810 (0.0557)	0.1440** (0.0625)	0.0440 (0.0715)	-0.1449* (0.0802)	0.0657 (0.0793)
Unskilled worker	-0.0028 (0.0726)	0.0394 (0.0529)	0.0114 (0.0887)	-0.1728** (0.0708)	0.1020 (0.0868)	0.0397 (0.0527)	0.0029 (0.0722)	-0.1720** (0.0712)	0.0932 (0.0866)	0.0204 (0.0882)
Skilled worker	0.0006 (0.0652)	0.0062 (0.0427)	-0.0345 (0.0817)	-0.0325 (0.0765)	0.0856 (0.0822)	0.0062 (0.0423)	0.0116 (0.0647)	-0.0312 (0.0770)	0.0748 (0.0823)	-0.0161 (0.0811)
Middle-level employee	-0.0377 (0.0641)	0.0305 (0.0468)	-0.0168 (0.0800)	-0.1058 (0.0698)	0.1108 (0.0788)	0.0316 (0.0455)	-0.0195 (0.0648)	-0.1014 (0.0700)	0.1120 (0.0790)	0.0021 (0.0805)
Middle-level manager	0.0138 (0.0788)	-0.0334 (0.0457)	0.0111 (0.0904)	-0.1063 (0.0768)	0.1925** (0.0901)	-0.0329 (0.0450)	0.0339 (0.0801)	-0.1018 (0.0766)	0.2063** (0.0897)	0.0319 (0.0929)
Upper-level manager	0.1079 (0.1370)	-0.0320 (0.0445)	-0.0556 (0.1461)	0.0069 (0.1680)	0.1742 (0.1553)	-0.0361 (0.0451)	0.1203 (0.1438)	0.0095 (0.1672)	0.1873 (0.1469)	0.0007 (0.1674)
Chilean nat.(=1)	-0.0946 (0.0904)	-0.2266** (0.0967)	-0.0609 (0.1001)	0.1002* (0.0575)	0.0571 (0.0917)	-0.2302** (0.0970)	-0.1205 (0.0877)	0.0941* (0.0568)	0.0374 (0.0941)	-0.0569 (0.1011)
Centre	0.0703 (0.0654)	0.0575 (0.0593)	-0.0280 (0.0764)	0.0072 (0.0608)	0.0903 (0.0795)	0.0576 (0.0585)	0.0581 (0.0661)	0.0059 (0.0614)	0.0905 (0.0804)	-0.0441 (0.0768)
Left	0.2014*** (0.0634)	0.0105 (0.0411)	0.1426** (0.0705)	0.0193 (0.0526)	0.0061 (0.0655)	0.0099 (0.0413)	0.1958*** (0.0627)	0.0178 (0.0526)	0.0099 (0.0659)	0.1367** (0.0694)
Dk/Na	0.0476 (0.0471)	-0.0034 (0.0391)	0.0566 (0.0558)	0.0205 (0.0395)	0.0960* (0.0546)	-0.0036 (0.0396)	0.0364 (0.0473)	0.0184 (0.0394)	0.0936* (0.0555)	0.0430 (0.0555)
Officialism(=1)	-0.0497 (0.0552)	0.0363 (0.0566)	0.0371 (0.0687)	-0.0626 (0.0459)	0.0373 (0.0672)	0.0365 (0.0563)	-0.0430 (0.0537)	-0.0629 (0.0457)	0.0290 (0.0676)	0.0428 (0.0683)
Treated × Protests	-0.0037 (0.0041)	-0.0005 (0.0018)	0.0007 (0.0050)	0.0009 (0.0039)	0.0096** (0.0038)					
Treated × Surv. Day						-2.87×10^{-5} (0.0076)	0.0048 (0.0121)	0.0055 (0.0113)	0.0062 (0.0141)	0.0224 (0.0140)
Observations	990	990	990	990	990	990	990	990	990	990
R ²	0.10244	0.09387	0.04685	0.05764	0.05382	0.07578	0.09931	0.05580	0.04669	0.04031
Within R ²	0.08778	0.05978	0.04643	0.05512	0.04485	0.04769	0.08736	0.05575	0.03768	0.03968
Geog. Zones fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Moderation by ideology

Figure A.4 shows the effect of the social uprising moderated by a R's ideological self-placement. The survey only allowed respondents to choose three categories (Left, Center, and Right). The results suggest no statistically significant differences, with two exceptions: while the left was more concerned about inequality and education after the social uprising, the right was more likely to mention the issues of terrorism and insecurity.


Figure A.4: The Effect of the Protests on Issue Priorities by Respondents' Position on the Left-Right Scale



Placebo test

A reliability test consists of checking if the treatment predicts outcomes that should not be theoretically associated. We use a battery of questions on personal health included in the *Pulso Ciudadano* Survey: Healthy nutrition: How would you evaluate the quality of your daily diet? (rather good = 1); Dairy consumption: Regarding the consumption of certain foods, how often do you consume dairy products? (at least two or three times a week = 1); Physical activity: Currently, how often do you engage in physical activity? (at least two or three times a week = 1). There are no theoretical reasons to justify a link between the social uprising and a change in nutrition, dairy consumption or physical activity. The results indicate that the treatment is not statistically associated with the three outcomes (Figure A.5).


Figure A.5: Effect of the Social Outbreak on Personal Health



Ignorability assumption

Figure A.6 shows the Google searches regarding social uprising-related keywords (police, turmoil, and protests). If individuals had been aware that the social uprising would occur on October 18, the distribution of the search hits would have been homogenous during the period. As we can see, Chileans ignored the fact that the event would happen and that it would become one of the most important protest events in the country's history.

Figure A.6: Google Search Hits for Chilean Social Outbreak-related Keywords (10-30 October 2019)



Balance test and matching

Tables A.13 and A.14 show the balance across UESD-related covariates in different scenarios—without propensity score matching, post-propensity score matching, and post-propensity score matching and weighting.

Table A.13: Covariates Balance Before Matching

Covariates	Control (N=495)	Treated (N=809)	Total (N=1304)	P-value*
Sex				0.044
Man (= 0)	205 (41.4%)	290 (35.8%)	495 (38.0%)	
Woman (= 1)	290 (58.6%)	519 (64.2%)	809 (62.0%)	
Age				<0.001
Younger than 30 y/o	139 (28.1%)	252 (31.1%)	391 (30.0%)	
31-40 y/o	105 (21.2%)	233 (28.8%)	338 (25.9%)	
41-50 y/o	113 (22.8%)	178 (22.0%)	291 (22.3%)	
Older than 50 y/o	138 (27.9%)	146 (18.0%)	284 (21.8%)	
Education				0.002
Primary educ.	30 (6.1%)	51 (6.3%)	81 (6.2%)	
Secondary educ.	161 (32.5%)	340 (42.0%)	501 (38.4%)	
Higher educ.	304 (61.4%)	418 (51.7%)	722 (55.4%)	
Occupation				<0.001
Occasional workers	34 (6.9%)	70 (8.7%)	104 (8.0%)	
Unskilled workers	47 (9.5%)	104 (12.9%)	151 (11.6%)	
Skilled workers	65 (13.1%)	153 (18.9%)	218 (16.7%)	
Middle-level workers	210 (42.4%)	356 (44.0%)	566 (43.4%)	
Middle-level managers	130 (26.3%)	119 (14.7%)	249 (19.1%)	
High managers	9 (1.8%)	7 (0.9%)	16 (1.2%)	
Chilean nat. (= 1)				0.046
Other (= 0)	21 (4.2%)	56 (6.9%)	77 (5.9%)	
Chilean nat. (= 1)	474 (95.8%)	753 (93.1%)	1227 (94.1%)	
Geo. zone				0.010
North. zone	70 (14.1%)	106 (13.1%)	176 (13.5%)	
Center zone	117 (23.6%)	172 (21.3%)	289 (22.2%)	
South. zone	132 (26.7%)	170 (21.0%)	302 (23.2%)	
Metrop. zone	176 (35.6%)	361 (44.6%)	537 (41.2%)	
Ideology				<0.001
Right	105 (21.2%)	123 (15.2%)	228 (17.5%)	
Centre	44 (8.9%)	35 (4.3%)	79 (6.1%)	
Left	73 (14.7%)	104 (12.9%)	177 (13.6%)	
Dk/Na	273 (55.2%)	547 (67.6%)	820 (62.9%)	
Gov. coal. identif.				0.071
Other (= 0)	437 (88.3%)	739 (91.3%)	1176 (90.2%)	
Officialism (= 1)	58 (11.7%)	70 (8.7%)	128 (9.8%)	

*Pearson's Chi-squared test

Table A.14: Covariates Balance After Propensity Score Optimal Matching

Covariates	Control (N=495)	Treated (N=495)	Total (N=990)	P-value*
Sex				0.437
Man(= 0)	205 (41.4%)	193 (39.0%)	398 (40.2%)	
Woman(= 1)	290 (58.6%)	302 (61.0%)	592 (59.8%)	
Age				0.770
Younger than 30 y/o	139 (28.1%)	146 (29.5%)	285 (28.8%)	
31-40 y/o	105 (21.2%)	105 (21.2%)	210 (21.2%)	
41-50 y/o	113 (22.8%)	120 (24.2%)	233 (23.5%)	
Older than 50 y/o	138 (27.9%)	124 (25.1%)	262 (26.5%)	
Education				0.602
Primary educ.	30 (6.1%)	29 (5.9%)	59 (6.0%)	
Secondary educ.	161 (32.5%)	176 (35.6%)	337 (34.0%)	
Higher educ.	304 (61.4%)	290 (58.6%)	594 (60.0%)	
Occupation				0.706
Occasional workers	34 (6.9%)	33 (6.7%)	67 (6.8%)	
Unskilled workers	47 (9.5%)	46 (9.3%)	93 (9.4%)	
Skilled workers	65 (13.1%)	72 (14.5%)	137 (13.8%)	
Middle-level workers	210 (42.4%)	227 (45.9%)	437 (44.1%)	
Middle-level managers	130 (26.3%)	110 (22.2%)	240 (24.2%)	
High managers	9 (1.8%)	7 (1.4%)	16 (1.6%)	
Chilean nat.				0.873
Other (= 0)	21 (4.2%)	20 (4.0%)	41 (4.1%)	
Chilean nat. (= 1)	474 (95.8%)	475 (96.0%)	949 (95.9%)	
Geo. zone				0.980
North. zone	70 (14.1%)	66 (13.3%)	136 (13.7%)	
Center zone	117 (23.6%)	116 (23.4%)	233 (23.5%)	
South. zone	132 (26.7%)	136 (27.5%)	268 (27.1%)	
Metrop. zone	176 (35.6%)	177 (35.7%)	353 (35.7%)	
Ideology				0.403
Right	105 (21.2%)	105 (21.1%)	210 (21.2%)	
Centre	44 (8.9%)	30 (6.1%)	74 (7.5%)	
Left	73 (14.7%)	76 (15.8%)	149 (15.1%)	
Dk/Na	273 (55.2%)	284 (57.4%)	557 (56.3%)	
Gov. coalition identif.				0.842
Other (= 0)	437 (88.3%)	439 (88.7%)	876 (88.5%)	
Officialism (= 1)	58 (11.7%)	56 (11.3%)	114 (11.5%)	

*Pearson's Chi-squared test

Alternative models

Figures A.7 and A.8 present the replication of the main models using a dataframe without matching and weighting and another equivalent to the first but with individuals surveyed between October 10 and 25—on 25 of October is the day that the “larger demonstration of Chile” took place. The general results are coherent with the main models’ coefficient direction and statistical significance.

For its part, figure A.9 shows the replication analysis of the main models but for predicting the outcomes using three variables which codified the issues in the function of the types of issues: (i) health, education, pensions, housing, and inequality as welfare state issues; (ii) public security, drug trafficking, and crime as public security issues; and (iii) environment, indigenous people, human rights, and immigration as post-material issues. The results expose similar trends to the main analysis, but the treatment’s effect on welfare state issues is not statistically significant. However, the low number of observations can explain this result. Since the issues collapsed into one sole variable, the number of respondents that consider at least one of the welfare state-related issues as one of the main three problems of the country increased in the treatment and control groups in such a manner that the treatment group has only thirty-seven more observation that considers welfare state issues as one of the main problems of the country than the control group.

Figure A.7: Main Models Replication of the UESD Analysis with Different Dataframes




Figure A.8: Main Models Replication of the UESD Analysis with Different Dataframes: Interactions





Figure A.9: Main Models Replication of the UESD Analysis to Predict Grouped Outcomes



Finally, we explored the effect of time. To do so, first, we estimated the predicted values of the outcomes for each day of the survey fieldwork. Second, we aggregated the surveyed days in different bandwidths and explored the predicted values: day by day, every two days, every three days, and every four days. The analysis shows no relevant differences in the temporal exposure.

Figure A.10: Predicted Values of the Welfare State-related Across Fieldwork Days





Figure A.11: Predicted Values of Different Bandwidths to Test the Temporal Effect on Welfare State-related Outcomes



A.2.3 Panel Analysis

Assumption analysis

As table A.6 shows, the ELSOC survey has attrition and it could be problematic for the analysis in the case of systematic differences between the people who dropped out from the panel and people who remain in the survey. Figure A.12 describes a probability linear model to predict the individuals' dropping out using all the variables introduced in the main models.

Figure A.12: Linear Probability Models to Predict the Individual's Dropping Out from the ELSOC Survey




Table A.15: Hausman Test: Fixed vs. Random Effects

Outcome	Hausman statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P-Value
Pensions	35.80	16	0.00
Health	52.72	17	0.00
Education	20.87	15	0.14
Housing	105.98	17	0.00
Inequality	79.73	18	0.00

Table A.16: Breusch-Pagan Test of Homocedasticity

Outcome	Breusch-Pagan Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P-Value
Pensions	2.50	1.00	0.11
Health	169.25	1.00	0.00
Education	267.43	1.00	0.00
Housing	187.14	1.00	0.00
Inequality	247.74	1.00	0.00

Table A.17: Wooldridge Test of No-Errors Autocorrelation

Outcome	Wooldridge Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P-Value
Pensions	534.22	2	0.00
Health	934.47	2	0.00
Education	332.50	1	0.00
Housing	812.35	2	0.00
Inequality	1200.64	3	0.00

Table A.18 exposes the Variance Inflation Factor of the main panel regression models. The results show that there are no relevant collinearity between the variables in any of the models.

Table A.18: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of the Main Panel Regression Models (ELSOC Survey)

Variable	Pensions	Health	Education	Housing	Inequality
2018		1.39		1.38	1.47
2019	1.13	1.38	1.01	1.38	1.46
2021	1.14				1.49
2022		1.39		1.38	1.47
Woman(=1)	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02
31-40 y/o	2.25	1.88	2.20	1.88	1.90
41-50 y/o	2.37	1.97	2.32	1.97	1.98
Older than 50 y/o	3.16	2.52	3.08	2.52	2.55
Secondary education	1.42	1.46	1.42	1.45	1.46
Higher education	1.45	1.48	1.45	1.47	1.48
Center	2.02	1.93	1.99	1.93	1.97
Left	1.85	1.83	1.85	1.83	1.84
Independent	2.10	2.15	2.16	2.15	2.12
Dk/Na	1.09	1.08	1.07	1.08	1.08
Center Zone	2.30	2.33	2.30	2.33	2.33
Southern Zone	2.35	2.32	2.36	2.33	2.32
Metrop. Zone	2.31	2.32	2.33	2.33	2.31

Full estimates

Table A.19 contains the full estimation of the models included in the manuscript.


Table A.19: Linear Regression Models to Predict Welfare State Preferences

	Pensions	Housing	Inequality	Health	Education
2017		-0.1393*** (0.0299)	0.0075 (0.0351)	0.2206*** (0.0331)	
2018	0.0526 (0.0461)	-0.1096*** (0.0276)	0.1154*** (0.0317)	0.1252*** (0.0316)	0.1199*** (0.0331)
2019	0.0163 (0.0435)	-0.0970*** (0.0277)	0.2247*** (0.0312)	0.1373*** (0.0315)	0.2869*** (0.0296)
2021	-0.0113 (0.0420)		-0.1323*** (0.0337)		
2022		-0.1171*** (0.0301)	-0.0366 (0.0333)	-0.1942*** (0.0337)	
Woman(=1)	-0.2918 (0.5944)	0.0337 (0.1916)	-0.3116 (0.2085)	0.3569** (0.1660)	-0.0586 (0.2353)
31-40y/o	-0.0539 (0.1354)	-0.0085 (0.0673)	-0.0042 (0.0673)	0.0225 (0.0621)	0.0244 (0.1048)
41-50y/o	-0.0223 (0.1842)	-0.0362 (0.0894)	0.0580 (0.0908)	-0.0139 (0.0873)	0.0903 (0.1468)
Older than 50	0.0831 (0.2264)	-0.0389 (0.1035)	0.0779 (0.1084)	0.0309 (0.1074)	0.1022 (0.1788)
Secondary educ.	-0.0117 (0.0954)	-0.0075 (0.0438)	0.0643 (0.0470)	0.0049 (0.0492)	-0.0265 (0.0808)
Higher educ.	-0.0437 (0.1203)	0.0158 (0.0570)	0.0921 (0.0571)	-0.0118 (0.0632)	0.0238 (0.0993)
Centre	0.0812 (0.0651)	0.0309 (0.0345)	0.0360 (0.0360)	0.0772* (0.0399)	0.1298** (0.0649)
Left	0.1599** (0.0795)	0.0260 (0.0405)	0.0317 (0.0407)	0.1099** (0.0454)	0.1404* (0.0740)
Independent	0.0952 (0.0706)	0.0017 (0.0340)	0.0577 (0.0365)	0.0533 (0.0409)	0.0517 (0.0659)
Dk/Na	-0.0032 (0.1500)	0.0385 (0.0888)	-0.3551*** (0.0966)	-0.0429 (0.0910)	-0.1182 (0.1221)
Centre zone	0.0453 (0.4330)	0.5331** (0.2498)	-0.5421** (0.2445)	0.4288** (0.1790)	0.0003 (0.3754)
South. zone	0.0237 (0.4809)	-0.1552 (0.2640)	-0.2286 (0.2590)	0.4165** (0.1946)	0.1688 (0.3932)
Metrop. zone	0.1011 (0.4803)	0.1205 (0.2741)	-0.3799 (0.2433)	0.2924 (0.2018)	-0.0190 (0.3991)
Observations	5,163	8,704	10,865	8,817	3,898
R ²	0.40895	0.55047	0.29183	0.39103	0.45575
Within R ²	0.00215	0.01178	0.02963	0.04372	0.04162
Fixed effects: individuals	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Moderation by ideology

Figure A.13 presents the predicted values of the effect of the 2019 social uprising on welfare state preferences across the respondents' positions on the left-right scale. The results show no moderation effects of the ideology.

Figure A.13: The Effect of the Social Outbreak on Welfare State Preferences by Respondent's Position on the Left-Right Scale



Alternative models

We carried out two robustness checks. Firstly, we checked the attrition of the EL-SOC survey by analyzing the differences between observations kept in the survey and those that dropped out of the study. We replicated the main models through linear probability models to predict welfare state preferences using the complete panel data, considering observation with and without attrition (18,035 observations). Figure A.14 shows the results of the models, and they are practically the same in terms of statistical significance and coefficient estimations.

Secondly, we replicated the main models using within-between models for panel data. Figure A.15 shows that the within-between models estimate the effect of the years similarly to the main models of the analysis.

Figure A.14: Main Models Replication of the Panel Analysis Using Full Panel Data






Figure A.15: Main Models Replication of the Panel Analysis Using Within-Between Models



A.2.4 DID


Assumption analysis

Figure A.16: Effect of Protests on the 2017 First-round Presidential Election



Note: Lines represent 95% CI.

Figure A.17: Reverse Causality Analysis: Robust Linear Probability and OLS Models to Predict Treatment Assignment and Number of 2019 Social Outbreak Protests



Note: Lines represent 95% CI.

Full estimates

Tables A.20 and A.21 present the full results of the DID estimates, both in terms of DID (commune level) and distances regarding protests (polling station level).

Table A.20: The Effect of Protests on Election Results

	Far-left	Progressive	Broad Front	Ex-Concert	Let's go Chile	Far-right
Presence of protests	0.2432*** (0.0432)	0.3022 (0.1932)	-0.2469 (0.4732)	-0.8036 (0.6218)	3.049*** (0.8557)	-2.553*** (0.9553)
Average school years	-0.0472 (0.0304)	-0.1565 (0.1211)	-0.2454 (0.4136)	0.2747 (0.4398)	-0.3455 (0.4905)	0.5421 (0.5974)
Perc foreign population (log)	0.0717** (0.0327)	0.3176** (0.1470)	0.3064 (0.3340)	-0.1859 (0.3972)	1.526*** (0.5300)	-2.102*** (0.6226)
Perc original people	-0.0013 (0.0021)	-0.0073 (0.0174)	0.0281 (0.0315)	0.0050 (0.0270)	-0.0423 (0.0490)	0.0209 (0.0753)
Perc living in overcrowding contitions (log)	0.0447 (0.0335)	0.2814 (0.1767)	0.7824* (0.4148)	-0.2432 (0.4154)	1.246* (0.7505)	-2.081** (0.9624)
Population (log)	1.889*** (0.5054)	4.636* (2.463)	4.613 (6.800)	-8.775* (5.041)	14.84** (7.466)	-17.36 (11.27)
Observations	656	656	656	656	656	656
R ²	0.84558	0.84549	0.91087	0.93398	0.95250	0.96202
Within R ²	0.16554	0.06143	0.02929	0.01719	0.10779	0.10077
Fixed effects: <i>Comunas</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fixed effects: Years	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table A.21: The Effect of Protests on Election Results

	Far-left (1)	Progressive (2)	Broad Front (3)	Ex-Concert (4)	Let's go Chile (5)	Far-right (6)
Log(Distance)	34.15*** (6.954)	51.06** (21.68)	-17.46 (65.19)	-73.41 (49.40)	479.8*** (75.36)	-498.4*** (99.72)
Log(Distance) × year	-0.0169*** (0.0034)	-0.0253** (0.0107)	0.0086 (0.0323)	0.0363 (0.0245)	-0.2377*** (0.0373)	0.2469*** (0.0494)
Observations	3,828	3,828	3,828	3,828	3,828	3,828
R ²	0.66972	0.71094	0.66755	0.82881	0.88529	0.92906
Within R ²	0.03532	0.00556	0.00018	0.00260	0.04154	0.04266
Fixed effects: <i>Comunas</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fixed effects: Years	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Alternative models

Excluding polling stations that are not consistent in 2017 and 2021 can bias our estimates. Polling stations that changed could have been located in places substantially different from those that remained stable. If this was the case, our estimates could be affected. To rule this out, we ran the models again, including all polling stations. Figure A.18 summarizes the DID distance estimates with all polling stations. The figure shows that the findings are practically the same as those in our main models, which only consider the observations consistent at both points in time in the estimates.

Figure A.18: Effect of Protests on 2021 First-round Presidential Election (All Polling Stations)





Figure A.19 shows a flow diagram visually illustrating the aggregate transfer of votes between the 2017 and the 2021 first-round presidential elections. To create it, we have used the questions intended to vote in 2017 and the recall vote in 2021 (ELSOC Survey). These questions are not comparable, but unfortunately, the survey did not ask for an individual's recall vote in 2017. The Sankey diagram largely confirms the centripetal pull on the right of the ideological spectrum and the centrifugal force on the left.

Figure A.19: Voting Flow Between the 2017 and 2021 Presidential Elections



A.3 Chapter 2

A.3.1 Summary Statistics

Table A.22: Summary Statistics of Former Constitutional Delegates Data

Variables	Overall (N=155)
Civil Volunteer Org. Membership	
Mean(SD)	0.471 (0.501)
Range	0 - 1
Civil org. age	
NA	9
Mean(SD)	14.984 (20.390)
Range	0 - 96
Civil org. main demand	
Religion	2 (2.7%)
Indigenous people	9 (12.3%)
Environmental	13 (17.8%)
Culture	7 (9.6%)
Human Rights	6 (8.2%)
Education	2 (2.7%)
Feminist	11 (15.1%)
Labor	5 (6.8%)
LGTBIQ+	1 (1.4%)
Regionalist	14 (19.2%)
Health	3 (4.1%)
Political ties	
Partisan militant	52 (33.5%)
Partisan independent	49 (31.6%)
Non-partisan independent	54 (34.8%)
Region	
Metropolitan Region	41 (26.5%)
Other Regions	97 (62.6%)
Indigenous People	17 (11.0%)
Age	
Mean(SD)	44.974 (12.693)
Range	20 - 81
Gender	
Male	78 (50.3%)
Female	77 (49.7%)
Educ. level	
NA	2
Postgraduate	59 (38.6%)
Less than postgraduate	94 (61.4%)
Married	
NA	7
Married	67 (45.3%)
Not married	81 (54.7%)

Table A.23: Summary Statistics of ELSOC-COES Panel Data

Variables	Overall (N=10,912)
Support for Student Movement	
NA	120
Mean(SD)	0.111 (0.315)
Support for Workers' Movement	
NA	120
Mean(SD)	0.111 (0.314)
Support for Environmental Movement	
NA	120
Mean(SD)	0.050 (0.218)
Support for Indigenous Movement	
NA	120
Mean(SD)	0.028 (0.165)
Support for LGTBIQ+ Movement	
NA	120
Mean(SD)	0.020 (0.140)
Support for Feminist Movement	
NA	2700
Mean(SD)	0.037 (0.189)
Support for No+AFP Movement	
NA	2700
Mean(SD)	0.192 (0.394)
Survey Wave	
2016	1304 (12.0%)
2017	1304 (12.0%)
2018	2076 (19.0%)
2019	2076 (19.0%)
2021	2076 (19.0%)
2022	2076 (19.0%)
Gender	
Male	3728 (34.2%)
Female	7184 (65.8%)
Age	
Mean(SD)	49.180 (15.022)
Ideology	
Right	1774 (16.5%)
Center	2995 (27.9%)
Left	2363 (22.0%)
Independent	3615 (33.6%)
Educ. level	
Less than primary educ.	1309 (12.0%)
Primary educ.	2428 (22.3%)
Secondary educ.	4369 (40.1%)
Tertiary educ.	2802 (25.7%)
Trust in Political Institutions Index	
NA	942
Mean(SD)	1.781 (0.751)
Regions	
Metropolitan Region	3055 (28.0%)
Other Regions	7857 (72.0%)

Table A.24: Support for Social Movements (2016-2022)

Survey Wave	Social Movement	Support (%)
2016	Student Movement	0.16
2017	Student Movement	0.16
2018	Student Movement	0.08
2019	Student Movement	0.09
2021	Student Movement	0.13
2022	Student Movement	0.08
2016	Workers' Movement	0.12
2017	Workers' Movement	0.12
2018	Workers' Movement	0.07
2019	Workers' Movement	0.09
2021	Workers' Movement	0.16
2022	Workers' Movement	0.10
2016	Environmental Movement	0.05
2017	Environmental Movement	0.06
2018	Environmental Movement	0.05
2019	Environmental Movement	0.03
2021	Environmental Movement	0.05
2022	Environmental Movement	0.06
2016	Indigenous Movement	0.03
2017	Indigenous Movement	0.03
2018	Indigenous Movement	0.03
2019	Indigenous Movement	0.02
2021	Indigenous Movement	0.04
2022	Indigenous Movement	0.01
2016	LGTBIQ+ Movement	0.03
2017	LGTBIQ+ Movement	0.03
2018	LGTBIQ+ Movement	0.02
2019	LGTBIQ+ Movement	0.01
2021	LGTBIQ+ Movement	0.01
2022	LGTBIQ+ Movement	0.02
2018	Feminist Movement	0.04
2019	Feminist Movement	0.02
2021	Feminist Movement	0.05
2022	Feminist Movement	0.04
2018	No+AFP Movement	0.20
2019	No+AFP Movement	0.23
2021	No+AFP Movement	0.22
2022	No+AFP Movement	0.11
2016	None	0.34
2017	None	0.40
2018	None	0.36
2019	None	0.22
2021	None	0.04
2022	None	0.36

A.3.2 Full Estimates

Table A.25: Linear Probability Models to Predict Delegates' Civic Volunteer Organizations Membership

Predictors	Base Model	Compl. Model	Compl. Model + RSE
Intercept	0.335 (0.098)***	0.233 (0.214)	0.233 (0.134)+
Part. independent	0.185 (0.100)+	0.194 (0.104)+	0.194 (0.164)
Non-partisan independent	0.190 (0.101)+	0.153 (0.103)	0.153 (0.073)*
Other regions	0.014 (0.093)	0.069 (0.095)	0.069 (0.014)***
Indigenous People	0.016 (0.148)	−0.002 (0.153)	−0.002 (0.046)
Age		−0.003 (0.004)	−0.003 (0.001)+
Female		0.104 (0.084)	0.104 (0.032)**
Less than postgraduate		0.167 (0.087)+	0.167 (0.002)***
Not married		0.086 (0.093)	0.086 (0.080)
Num.Obs.	155	147	147
R2	0.032	0.107	0.107
R2 Adj.	0.006	0.055	0.055
AIC	231.5	216.0	216.0
BIC	249.7	245.9	245.9
Log.Lik.	−109.734	−97.998	
F	1.230	2.057	
RMSE	0.49	0.47	0.47
Std.Errors	No	No	by: Metropolitan Region (=1)

Table A.26: Linear Regression Models to Predict the Age of Delegates' Civic Volunteer Organizations


Predictors	Base Model	Compl. Model	Compl. Model + RSE
Intercept	51.000 (12.322)***	58.295 (17.465)**	58.295 (7.932)***
Demands - Indigenous People	−32.600 (14.580)*	−22.978 (19.070)	−22.978 (16.392)
Demands - Environmental	−40.231 (13.236)**	−33.745 (14.219)*	−33.745 (11.907)**
Demands - Culture	−16.167 (14.228)	−6.152 (14.555)	−6.152 (5.856)
Demands - Human Rights	−43.833 (14.228)**	−35.547 (15.215)*	−35.547 (7.087)***
Demands - Education	−39.500 (17.426)*	−26.633 (19.317)	−26.633 (7.934)**
Demands - Feminist	−44.100 (13.498)**	−31.937 (15.240)*	−31.937 (8.738)***
Demands - Labor	−13.200 (14.580)	0.760 (15.331)	0.760 (10.042)
Demands - LGTBIQ+	−40.000 (21.342)+	−27.201 (21.810)	−27.201 (2.136)***
Demands - Regionalist	−45.077 (13.236)**	−39.356 (14.177)**	−39.356 (6.699)***
Demands - Health	−47.000 (21.342)*	−44.433 (21.972)*	−44.433 (7.805)***
Part. independent		12.822 (6.682)+	12.822 (0.662)***
Non-partisan independent		10.748 (6.410)	10.748 (0.962)***
Other regions		−0.938 (6.342)	−0.938 (0.778)
Indigenous People		−4.970 (14.636)	−4.970 (7.532)
Female		−8.471 (5.814)	−8.471 (8.079)
Age		−0.236 (0.239)	−0.236 (0.153)
Less than postgraduate		−3.843 (5.745)	−3.843 (3.404)
Not married		−7.531 (6.224)	−7.531 (2.584)**
Num.Obs.	64	60	60
R2	0.386	0.545	0.545
R2 Adj.	0.270	0.346	0.346
AIC	559.4	527.0	527.0
BIC	585.3	568.9	568.9
Log.Lik.	−267.687	−243.492	
F	3.326		
RMSE	15.86	14.00	14.00
Std.Errors	No	No	by: Metropolitan Region (=1)

Table A.27: Individual Fixed Effect Linear Probability Models to Predict Support for Social Movements

	Student Movement	Workers' Movement	Environmental Movement	Indigenous Movement	LGTBIQ+ Movement	Feminist Movement	No+AFP Movement
Wave 2017	0.034 (0.015)*	−0.013 (0.014)	0.007 (0.003)*	0.010 (0.014)	−0.005 (0.008)		
Wave 2018	−0.107 (0.021)***	−0.047 (0.003)***	−0.009 (0.004)*	−0.002 (0.009)	−0.036 (0.009)***		
Wave 2019	−0.098 (0.024)***	−0.056 (0.009)***	0.003 (0.003)	−0.022 (0.008)**	−0.052 (0.016)**	−0.013 (0.003)***	0.019 (0.015)
Wave 2021	−0.092 (0.025)***	−0.016 (0.013)	0.034 (0.011)**	0.003 (0.009)	−0.048 (0.011)***	−0.026 (0.018)	−0.050 (0.040)
Wave 2022	−0.135 (0.025)***	−0.043 (0.013)***	0.067 (0.021)**	−0.025 (0.005)***	−0.043 (0.014)**	−0.028 (0.011)**	−0.083 (0.060)
Female	0.052 (0.085)	−0.029 (0.017)+	−0.002 (0.030)	0.073 (0.009)***	0.030 (0.014)*	0.008 (0.010)	−0.359 (0.257)
Age	0.001 (0.000)	0.004 (0.000)***	−0.007 (0.001)***	0.001 (0.001)*	0.000 (0.000)	0.008 (0.004)*	−0.007 (0.016)
ideolCenter	0.020 (0.020)	0.009 (0.019)	−0.003 (0.003)	−0.022 (0.010)*	0.025 (0.003)***	0.015 (0.006)**	−0.027 (0.030)
Ideology: Left	0.016 (0.011)	0.015 (0.017)	−0.006 (0.007)	−0.012 (0.005)**	0.021 (0.003)***	−0.001 (0.006)	−0.031 (0.021)
Ideology: Independent	−0.047 (0.020)*	0.002 (0.011)	−0.015 (0.006)**	−0.017 (0.009)+	0.007 (0.005)	0.011 (0.006)+	−0.073 (0.013)***
Primary education	0.010 (0.044)	0.002 (0.022)	−0.013 (0.024)	0.018 (0.020)	−0.002 (0.003)	0.010 (0.017)	−0.097 (0.050)+
Secondary education	−0.014 (0.039)	0.009 (0.013)	0.007 (0.020)	0.019 (0.025)	0.009 (0.003)**	−0.015 (0.017)	−0.089 (0.074)
Tertiary education	−0.081 (0.035)*	0.021 (0.019)	−0.006 (0.021)	0.021 (0.029)	−0.014 (0.003)***	0.008 (0.015)	−0.122 (0.058)*
Trust in Political Institutions Index	0.026 (0.006)***	0.010 (0.008)	0.025 (0.006)***	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.016 (0.006)**	−0.009 (0.009)
Other regions	−0.015 (0.042)	−0.007 (0.016)	−0.067 (0.049)	0.040 (0.019)*	−0.026 (0.018)	−0.025 (0.028)	0.069 (0.041)+
Num.Obs.	9735	9735	9735	9735	9735	7244	7244
R2	0.373	0.359	0.393	0.344	0.426	0.566	0.405
R2 Adj.	0.202	0.183	0.228	0.165	0.269	0.391	0.165
AIC	17 660.6	14 961.9	10 715.0	4234.9	2424.6	4080.3	14 401.1
BIC	17 775.5	15 076.8	10 830.0	4349.8	2539.5	4176.8	14 497.6
RMSE	0.26	0.26	0.18	0.14	0.12	0.14	0.32
Std.Errors	by: Region	by: Region	by: Region	by: Region	by: Region	by: Region	by: Region
Fixed effects: individuals	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

A.3.3 Robustness Checks

Figure A.20: Individual Fixed Effect Linear Probability Model to Predict No Support for Social Movements



Note: Lines represent 95% CI.

A.4 Chapter 3

A.4.1 Operationalization

Table A.28 summarizes the operationalization of the covariates used in the estimations of regression models.

Table A.28: Operationalization of the Covariates and Cluster

Covariates	Operationalization
Woman	Dichotomous variable that distinguishes between women (= 1) and man (= 0)
Age	numerical variable that indicates the individuals' age. The age was calculated based on the distance between individuals' birth years and the corresponding time point.
Education	Binary variable that differentiates between individuals who have higher education or more (= 1) and those who have less than higher education (= 0).
Ideology	Categorical variable of individuals' ideological position constructed based on their electoral list and party affiliation. The variable includes the following categories: far-right (reference category), right, center-right, center, center-left, left, and far-left. To establish the ideological distribution of lists and parties, I followed the works of Rozas-Bugueño et al. (2022) and Fábrega (2022) on the Constitutional Convention. Accordingly, I constructed the categorization in two steps: (i) If the individual is a party member, I coded ideology based on the party's left–right position: far-right (Christian Social Party and Republican Party), right (National Renovation and Independent Democratic Union), center-right (Yellow for Chile, Political Evolution—Evópoli, and Common Sense), center (Community in Motion, Christian Democratic Party, and Democrats), center-left (Party for Democracy, Radical Party, and Socialist Party), left (Social Convergence, Regionalist Green Social Federation Party, Commons, Communist Party, Ecologist Green Party, Democratic Revolution, and Broad Front), and far-left (Popular Party, International Workers' Movement, Solidarity for Chile, and Transform Chile). (ii) If the individual is not a party member, I coded the left–right position of their electoral list as the individual's ideological position: right (Let's Go Chile), center-left (Approval List, Non-Neutral Independents), left (Approve Dignity, Other Independents, Green Ecologist Party List, and Indigenous Peoples), and far-left (People's List).
Scholar	Dichotomous variable that differentiates between whether the individual has a scholar position (= 1) in a university or not (= 0)
Lawyer	Binary variable that addresses if the individual holds a bachelor in law (= 1) or not (= 0)
Business org. membership	Dichotomous variable that distinguishes between individuals who are members of business organization (= 1) and those who are not (= 0)
Political positions before 2017	Binary variable distinguishes between individuals who had occupied political positions before 2017 and those who had not.
Voting in 2021 delegate elections (%)	Percentage of candidates voting in 2021 elections based on voting proportion regarding total district voting.
Geographical cluster	the article uses a geographical cluster to run robust standard errors in the models. The cluster was constructed on territorial differences (regions) and the belonging of indigenous people. In this venue, the clusterization considered seven clusters: (i) northern extreme zone (Arica y Parinacota, Taparacá, and Antofagasta Regions); (ii) northern zone (Atacama, and Coquimbo Regions); (iii) center zone (Valparaíso, Bernardo O'Higgins, Maule, and Ñuble Regions); (iv) southern zone (Biobío, La Araucanía, Los Ríos, and Los Lagos Regions); (v) southern extreme zone (Aysen, and Magallanes y la Antártica Chilena Regions); (vi) Metropolitan Region of Santiago; and (vii) indigenous reserved seats.

A.4.2 Balance

Table A.29 shows the covariates balance analysis between the groups at the pre-treatment moment (2019-2021).

Table A.29: Covariates Balance Pre-Treatment (2017-May 2021)

Covariates	Control Group (N=620)	Treatment Group (N=620)	Total (N=1240)	P-value
Gender				0.820
Male	308 (49.7%)	312 (50.3%)	620 (50.0%)	
Female	312 (50.3%)	308 (49.7%)	620 (50.0%)	
Age	43.576	43.474	43.523	0.891
Education				0.385
Less than Higher Educ.	107 (17.8%)	99 (16.0%)	206 (16.9%)	
Higher Educ. or More	493 (82.2%)	521 (84.0%)	1014 (83.1%)	
Ideology				<0.001
Far-right	4 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (0.3%)	
Right	96 (15.5%)	144 (23.2%)	240 (19.4%)	
Center-right	28 (4.5%)	8 (1.3%)	36 (2.9%)	
Center	28 (4.5%)	4 (0.6%)	32 (2.6%)	
Center-left	104 (16.8%)	140 (22.6%)	244 (19.7%)	
Left	280 (45.2%)	221 (35.6%)	501 (40.4%)	
Far-left	80 (12.9%)	103 (16.6%)	183 (14.8%)	
Scholar				0.001
No	536 (86.5%)	494 (79.7%)	1030 (83.1%)	
Yes	84 (13.5%)	126 (20.3%)	210 (16.9%)	
Lawyer				0.007
No	413 (66.6%)	367 (59.2%)	780 (62.9%)	
Yes	207 (33.4%)	253 (40.8%)	460 (37.1%)	
Business Org. Membership				0.069
No	612 (98.7%)	603 (97.3%)	1215 (98.0%)	
Yes	8 (1.3%)	17 (2.7%)	25 (2.0%)	
Political positions pre-2017				<0.001
No	468 (75.5%)	408 (65.8%)	876 (70.6%)	
Yes	152 (24.5%)	212 (34.2%)	364 (29.4%)	
Vote(%)	3.040	5.361	4.201	<0.001

A.4.3 Full Estimates

DID models

Table A.30: DID Robust Linear Probability and OLS Models to Predict Political Engagement

	Political Positions	Party Advising	Party Memb. Intensity
(Intercept)	0.027 (0.133)	0.226 (0.075)**	2.463 (0.647)***
DiD	0.008 (0.044)	0.110 (0.017)***	0.174 (0.048)***
Convention(=1)	0.014 (0.035)	−0.009 (0.005)	0.112 (0.120)
Time(=1)	0.046 (0.039)	0.005 (0.004)	0.176 (0.075)*
Right	0.092 (0.140)	−0.187 (0.071)**	−1.869 (0.613)**
Center-right	0.243 (0.150)	−0.161 (0.113)	−0.832 (0.765)
Center	0.173 (0.263)	−0.238 (0.055)***	−1.405 (0.776)+
Center-left	0.050 (0.101)	−0.245 (0.070)***	−2.456 (0.673)***
Left	0.055 (0.141)	−0.226 (0.088)*	−2.193 (0.805)**
Fart-left	−0.013 (0.132)	−0.247 (0.083)**	−2.458 (0.763)**
Scholar(=1)	−0.141 (0.034)***	0.017 (0.020)	−0.077 (0.170)
Lawyer(=1)	0.026 (0.019)	−0.007 (0.013)	0.193 (0.077)*
Pre-2019 political charges(=1)	0.241 (0.038)***	0.032 (0.024)	0.747 (0.118)***
Voting	0.003 (0.007)	0.000 (0.002)	−0.003 (0.039)
Num.Obs.	1860	1860	1860
AIC	5122.5	2221.1	9481.9
BIC	15 327.8	12 426.4	19 687.2

DID models: Heterogeneous effects

Table A.31: DID Robust Linear Probability and OLS Models to Predict Political Engagement: Heterogeneous Effects

	Political Positions	Party Advising	Party Memb. Intensity	Party Member	Party Advising	Political Positions	Party Advising	Party Memb. Intensity
(Intercept)	0.038 (0.136)	0.217 (0.072)**	2.493 (0.652)***	−0.128 (0.129)	0.185 (0.066)**	0.042 (0.128)	0.225 (0.074)**	2.512 (0.633)***
DiD	−0.014 (0.058)	0.145 (0.019)***	0.147 (0.027)***	0.001 (0.064)	0.043 (0.014)**	0.013 (0.061)	0.107 (0.028)***	0.158 (0.094)+
Convention(=1)	0.017 (0.035)	−0.008 (0.006)	0.122 (0.122)	0.005 (0.039)	−0.008 (0.005)	0.015 (0.037)	−0.009 (0.006)	0.115 (0.109)
Time(=1)	0.044 (0.039)	0.005 (0.004)	0.168 (0.073)*	0.035 (0.039)	0.005 (0.004)	0.034 (0.034)	0.007 (0.003)*	0.149 (0.081)+
Right	0.091 (0.144)	−0.180 (0.070)*	−1.861 (0.631)**	0.187 (0.149)	−0.144 (0.060)*	−0.018 (0.143)	−0.169 (0.070)*	−2.120 (0.600)***
Center-right	0.236 (0.155)	−0.153 (0.110)	−0.844 (0.775)	0.254 (0.162)	−0.121 (0.096)	0.140 (0.149)	−0.145 (0.110)	−1.071 (0.754)
Center	0.168 (0.272)	−0.229 (0.053)***	−1.410 (0.789)+	0.196 (0.270)	−0.196 (0.041)***	0.144 (0.253)	−0.234 (0.056)***	−1.480 (0.770)+
Center-left	0.053 (0.106)	−0.236 (0.070)***	−2.427 (0.689)***	0.173 (0.103)+	−0.197 (0.059)***	−0.010 (0.100)	−0.236 (0.069)***	−2.606 (0.655)***
Left	0.067 (0.151)	−0.218 (0.088)*	−2.133 (0.838)*	0.183 (0.141)	−0.180 (0.075)*	0.020 (0.136)	−0.221 (0.088)*	−2.286 (0.780)**
Fart-left	−0.006 (0.142)	−0.235 (0.084)**	−2.410 (0.785)**	0.138 (0.129)	−0.202 (0.072)**	−0.020 (0.127)	−0.246 (0.083)**	−2.482 (0.756)**
Scholar(=1)	−0.139 (0.035)***	0.018 (0.020)	−0.065 (0.169)	−0.128 (0.036)***	0.018 (0.019)	−0.137 (0.036)***	0.016 (0.019)	−0.068 (0.184)
Lawyer(=1)	0.023 (0.017)	−0.008 (0.013)	0.182 (0.078)*	0.011 (0.017)	−0.009 (0.015)	0.018 (0.017)	−0.005 (0.012)	0.174 (0.078)*
Pre-2019 political charges(=1)	0.242 (0.039)***	0.031 (0.024)	0.749 (0.115)***	0.190 (0.046)***	0.023 (0.022)	0.222 (0.037)***	0.035 (0.024)	0.703 (0.115)***
Voting	0.003 (0.008)	0.000 (0.002)	−0.004 (0.040)	0.003 (0.006)	0.000 (0.002)	0.003 (0.007)	0.000 (0.002)	−0.005 (0.037)
Social Activist(=1)	−0.044 (0.023)+	0.006 (0.006)	−0.157 (0.095)+					
DiD x Social Activist	0.056 (0.083)	−0.077 (0.012)***	0.092 (0.119)					
Party Member(=1)				0.178 (0.042)***	−0.001 (0.011)			
DiD x Party Member				0.012 (0.080)	0.151 (0.021)***			
Incumbent(=1)						0.221 (0.020)***	−0.037 (0.004)***	0.490 (0.116)***
DiD x Incumbent						−0.055 (0.087)	0.014 (0.042)	−0.042 (0.246)
Num.Obs.	1860	1860	1860	1860	1860	1860	1860	1860
AIC	5113.4	2202.5	9471.6	5037.3	2154.1	5020.1	2204.8	9428.6
BIC	15 307.6	12 396.8	19 665.8	15 231.5	12 348.3	15 214.4	12 399.1	19 622.8

Predicted values

Table A.32: Predicted Values of Political Engagement Outcomes: Group Differences over Time

Year	Predicted Value	Std. error	Conf. Low	Conf. High	Convention	Outcome
2017	-0.01	0.09	-0.19	0.17	No	Political Positions
2017	0.01	0.09	-0.17	0.19	Yes	Political Positions
2018	0.07	0.09	-0.10	0.25	No	Political Positions
2018	0.09	0.09	-0.09	0.27	Yes	Political Positions
2019	0.05	0.09	-0.13	0.22	No	Political Positions
2019	0.07	0.09	-0.11	0.24	Yes	Political Positions
2020	0.04	0.09	-0.13	0.22	No	Political Positions
2020	0.06	0.09	-0.12	0.23	Yes	Political Positions
2023	0.08	0.09	-0.09	0.25	No	Political Positions
2023	0.10	0.09	-0.08	0.27	Yes	Political Positions
2024	0.10	0.09	-0.08	0.27	No	Political Positions
2024	0.12	0.09	-0.06	0.29	Yes	Political Positions
2017	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	No	Party Advising
2017	0.28	0.04	0.19	0.36	Yes	Party Advising
2018	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.30	No	Party Advising
2018	0.25	0.04	0.16	0.33	Yes	Party Advising
2019	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.30	No	Party Advising
2019	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Yes	Party Advising
2020	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.30	No	Party Advising
2020	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Yes	Party Advising
2023	0.32	0.04	0.24	0.40	No	Party Advising
2023	0.35	0.04	0.26	0.43	Yes	Party Advising
2024	0.26	0.04	0.18	0.34	No	Party Advising
2024	0.28	0.04	0.20	0.36	Yes	Party Advising
2017	2.39	0.29	1.82	2.96	No	Party Memb. Intensity
2017	2.56	0.29	1.99	3.13	Yes	Party Memb. Intensity
2018	2.41	0.29	1.83	2.98	No	Party Memb. Intensity
2018	2.58	0.29	2.01	3.15	Yes	Party Memb. Intensity
2019	2.45	0.29	1.88	3.02	No	Party Memb. Intensity
2019	2.62	0.29	2.05	3.19	Yes	Party Memb. Intensity
2020	2.51	0.29	1.94	3.08	No	Party Memb. Intensity
2020	2.68	0.29	2.11	3.25	Yes	Party Memb. Intensity
2023	2.71	0.29	2.15	3.27	No	Party Memb. Intensity
2023	2.88	0.29	2.32	3.44	Yes	Party Memb. Intensity
2024	2.69	0.29	2.13	3.25	No	Party Memb. Intensity
2024	2.86	0.29	2.30	3.42	Yes	Party Memb. Intensity

Table A.33: Predicted Values of Political Engagement Outcomes: Group and Profiles Differences over Time

Year	Predicted Value	Std. error	Conf. Low	Conf. High	Profile	Outcome	Convention
2017	-0.01	0.09	-0.19	0.17	Non soc. org. member	Political Positions	No
2017	-0.04	0.09	-0.22	0.14	Soc. org. member	Political Positions	No
2017	0.01	0.09	-0.16	0.19	Non soc. org. member	Political Positions	Yes
2017	-0.02	0.09	-0.20	0.16	Soc. org. member	Political Positions	Yes
2018	0.08	0.09	-0.10	0.25	Non soc. org. member	Political Positions	No
2018	0.04	0.09	-0.14	0.22	Soc. org. member	Political Positions	No
2018	0.10	0.09	-0.08	0.27	Non soc. org. member	Political Positions	Yes
2018	0.06	0.09	-0.12	0.24	Soc. org. member	Political Positions	Yes
2019	0.05	0.09	-0.12	0.23	Non soc. org. member	Political Positions	No
2019	0.02	0.09	-0.16	0.19	Soc. org. member	Political Positions	No
2019	0.07	0.09	-0.10	0.25	Non soc. org. member	Political Positions	Yes
2019	0.04	0.09	-0.14	0.21	Soc. org. member	Political Positions	Yes
2020	0.05	0.09	-0.13	0.22	Non soc. org. member	Political Positions	No
2020	0.01	0.09	-0.17	0.19	Soc. org. member	Political Positions	No
2020	0.07	0.09	-0.11	0.24	Non soc. org. member	Political Positions	Yes
2020	0.03	0.09	-0.15	0.21	Soc. org. member	Political Positions	Yes
2023	0.08	0.09	-0.09	0.26	Non soc. org. member	Political Positions	No
2023	0.05	0.09	-0.13	0.22	Soc. org. member	Political Positions	No
2023	0.10	0.09	-0.07	0.28	Non soc. org. member	Political Positions	Yes
2023	0.07	0.09	-0.11	0.24	Soc. org. member	Political Positions	Yes
2024	0.10	0.09	-0.07	0.27	Non soc. org. member	Political Positions	No
2024	0.06	0.09	-0.11	0.24	Soc. org. member	Political Positions	No
2024	0.12	0.09	-0.05	0.29	Non soc. org. member	Political Positions	Yes
2024	0.08	0.09	-0.09	0.26	Soc. org. member	Political Positions	Yes
2017	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Non soc. org. member	Party Advising	No
2017	0.24	0.04	0.16	0.33	Soc. org. member	Party Advising	No
2017	0.28	0.04	0.19	0.36	Non soc. org. member	Party Advising	Yes
2017	0.27	0.04	0.19	0.36	Soc. org. member	Party Advising	Yes
2018	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.30	Non soc. org. member	Party Advising	No
2018	0.21	0.04	0.13	0.30	Soc. org. member	Party Advising	No
2018	0.25	0.04	0.16	0.33	Non soc. org. member	Party Advising	Yes
2018	0.24	0.04	0.16	0.33	Soc. org. member	Party Advising	Yes
2019	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.30	Non soc. org. member	Party Advising	No
2019	0.22	0.04	0.13	0.30	Soc. org. member	Party Advising	No
2019	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Non soc. org. member	Party Advising	Yes
2019	0.25	0.04	0.16	0.33	Soc. org. member	Party Advising	Yes
2020	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.30	Non soc. org. member	Party Advising	No
2020	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.30	Soc. org. member	Party Advising	No
2020	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Non soc. org. member	Party Advising	Yes
2020	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Soc. org. member	Party Advising	Yes
2023	0.32	0.04	0.24	0.40	Non soc. org. member	Party Advising	No
2023	0.31	0.04	0.23	0.40	Soc. org. member	Party Advising	No
2023	0.35	0.04	0.27	0.43	Non soc. org. member	Party Advising	Yes
2023	0.34	0.04	0.26	0.42	Soc. org. member	Party Advising	Yes
2024	0.26	0.04	0.18	0.34	Non soc. org. member	Party Advising	No
2024	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Soc. org. member	Party Advising	No
2024	0.28	0.04	0.20	0.36	Non soc. org. member	Party Advising	Yes
2024	0.28	0.04	0.20	0.36	Soc. org. member	Party Advising	Yes
2017	2.39	0.29	1.82	2.96	Non soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2017	2.25	0.30	1.66	2.83	Soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2017	2.58	0.29	2.00	3.15	Non soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2017	2.43	0.30	1.85	3.01	Soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2018	2.41	0.29	1.84	2.98	Non soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2018	2.27	0.30	1.69	2.85	Soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2018	2.60	0.29	2.03	3.17	Non soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2018	2.45	0.30	1.87	3.03	Soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes

Year	Predicted Value	Std. error	Conf. Low	Conf. High	Profile	Outcome	Convention
2019	2.46	0.29	1.89	3.03	Non soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2019	2.32	0.29	1.74	2.90	Soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2019	2.65	0.29	2.08	3.22	Non soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2019	2.50	0.29	1.93	3.08	Soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2020	2.52	0.29	1.95	3.09	Non soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2020	2.38	0.29	1.80	2.96	Soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2020	2.71	0.29	2.14	3.28	Non soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2020	2.56	0.29	1.99	3.14	Soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2023	2.72	0.29	2.16	3.28	Non soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2023	2.57	0.29	2.00	3.15	Soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2023	2.90	0.29	2.34	3.47	Non soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2023	2.76	0.29	2.19	3.33	Soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2024	2.70	0.29	2.14	3.26	Non soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2024	2.55	0.29	1.98	3.13	Soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2024	2.88	0.29	2.32	3.45	Non soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2024	2.74	0.29	2.17	3.31	Soc. org. member	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2017	-0.16	0.09	-0.34	0.02	Non party member	Political Positions	No
2017	0.02	0.09	-0.15	0.19	Party member	Political Positions	No
2017	-0.15	0.09	-0.33	0.02	Non party member	Political Positions	Yes
2017	0.03	0.09	-0.15	0.20	Party member	Political Positions	Yes
2018	-0.08	0.09	-0.25	0.10	Non party member	Political Positions	No
2018	0.10	0.09	-0.07	0.28	Party member	Political Positions	No
2018	-0.07	0.09	-0.25	0.11	Non party member	Political Positions	Yes
2018	0.11	0.09	-0.06	0.28	Party member	Political Positions	Yes
2019	-0.11	0.09	-0.28	0.07	Non party member	Political Positions	No
2019	0.07	0.09	-0.10	0.25	Party member	Political Positions	No
2019	-0.10	0.09	-0.28	0.08	Non party member	Political Positions	Yes
2019	0.08	0.09	-0.09	0.25	Party member	Political Positions	Yes
2020	-0.11	0.09	-0.29	0.06	Non party member	Political Positions	No
2020	0.07	0.09	-0.10	0.24	Party member	Political Positions	No
2020	-0.11	0.09	-0.28	0.07	Non party member	Political Positions	Yes
2020	0.07	0.09	-0.10	0.25	Party member	Political Positions	Yes
2023	-0.08	0.09	-0.26	0.09	Non party member	Political Positions	No
2023	0.10	0.09	-0.07	0.27	Party member	Political Positions	No
2023	-0.08	0.09	-0.25	0.10	Non party member	Political Positions	Yes
2023	0.10	0.09	-0.07	0.27	Party member	Political Positions	Yes
2024	-0.07	0.09	-0.24	0.11	Non party member	Political Positions	No
2024	0.11	0.09	-0.06	0.28	Party member	Political Positions	No
2024	-0.06	0.09	-0.24	0.11	Non party member	Political Positions	Yes
2024	0.12	0.09	-0.05	0.29	Party member	Political Positions	Yes
2017	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.31	Non party member	Party Advising	No
2017	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Party member	Party Advising	No
2017	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Non party member	Party Advising	Yes
2017	0.28	0.04	0.20	0.36	Party member	Party Advising	Yes
2018	0.19	0.04	0.11	0.28	Non party member	Party Advising	No
2018	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.30	Party member	Party Advising	No
2018	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.30	Non party member	Party Advising	Yes
2018	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Party member	Party Advising	Yes
2019	0.19	0.04	0.11	0.28	Non party member	Party Advising	No
2019	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.30	Party member	Party Advising	No
2019	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.30	Non party member	Party Advising	Yes
2019	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Party member	Party Advising	Yes
2020	0.20	0.04	0.12	0.28	Non party member	Party Advising	No
2020	0.23	0.04	0.15	0.31	Party member	Party Advising	No
2020	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.31	Non party member	Party Advising	Yes
2020	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Party member	Party Advising	Yes
2023	0.29	0.04	0.21	0.37	Non party member	Party Advising	No
2023	0.32	0.04	0.24	0.40	Party member	Party Advising	No
2023	0.32	0.04	0.24	0.40	Non party member	Party Advising	Yes
2023	0.35	0.04	0.27	0.43	Party member	Party Advising	Yes

Year	Predicted Value	Std. error	Conf. Low	Conf. High	Profile	Outcome	Convention
2024	0.23	0.04	0.15	0.31	Non party member	Party Advising	No
2024	0.26	0.04	0.18	0.34	Party member	Party Advising	No
2024	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.34	Non party member	Party Advising	Yes
2024	0.28	0.04	0.20	0.36	Party member	Party Advising	Yes
2017	0.02	0.09	-0.16	0.19	Non incumbent	Political Positions	No
2017	0.22	0.09	0.04	0.40	Incumbent	Political Positions	No
2017	0.03	0.09	-0.14	0.20	Non incumbent	Political Positions	Yes
2017	0.24	0.09	0.06	0.41	Incumbent	Political Positions	Yes
2018	0.09	0.09	-0.08	0.27	Non incumbent	Political Positions	No
2018	0.30	0.09	0.12	0.48	Incumbent	Political Positions	No
2018	0.11	0.09	-0.06	0.28	Non incumbent	Political Positions	Yes
2018	0.31	0.09	0.14	0.49	Incumbent	Political Positions	Yes
2019	0.07	0.09	-0.10	0.24	Non incumbent	Political Positions	No
2019	0.27	0.09	0.10	0.45	Incumbent	Political Positions	No
2019	0.08	0.09	-0.09	0.25	Non incumbent	Political Positions	Yes
2019	0.29	0.09	0.11	0.47	Incumbent	Political Positions	Yes
2020	0.06	0.09	-0.11	0.23	Non incumbent	Political Positions	No
2020	0.27	0.09	0.09	0.44	Incumbent	Political Positions	No
2020	0.08	0.09	-0.10	0.25	Non incumbent	Political Positions	Yes
2020	0.28	0.09	0.10	0.46	Incumbent	Political Positions	Yes
2023	0.08	0.09	-0.09	0.25	Non incumbent	Political Positions	No
2023	0.29	0.09	0.12	0.46	Incumbent	Political Positions	No
2023	0.10	0.09	-0.07	0.27	Non incumbent	Political Positions	Yes
2023	0.30	0.09	0.13	0.48	Incumbent	Political Positions	Yes
2024	0.10	0.09	-0.07	0.27	Non incumbent	Political Positions	No
2024	0.31	0.09	0.13	0.48	Incumbent	Political Positions	No
2024	0.12	0.09	-0.05	0.28	Non incumbent	Political Positions	Yes
2024	0.32	0.09	0.15	0.50	Incumbent	Political Positions	Yes
2017	0.24	0.04	0.16	0.33	Non incumbent	Party Advising	No
2017	0.21	0.04	0.13	0.30	Incumbent	Party Advising	No
2017	0.27	0.04	0.19	0.35	Non incumbent	Party Advising	Yes
2017	0.24	0.04	0.16	0.33	Incumbent	Party Advising	Yes
2018	0.21	0.04	0.13	0.30	Non incumbent	Party Advising	No
2018	0.18	0.04	0.10	0.27	Incumbent	Party Advising	No
2018	0.24	0.04	0.16	0.32	Non incumbent	Party Advising	Yes
2018	0.21	0.04	0.13	0.30	Incumbent	Party Advising	Yes
2019	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.30	Non incumbent	Party Advising	No
2019	0.19	0.04	0.10	0.27	Incumbent	Party Advising	No
2019	0.24	0.04	0.16	0.33	Non incumbent	Party Advising	Yes
2019	0.21	0.04	0.13	0.30	Incumbent	Party Advising	Yes
2020	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.30	Non incumbent	Party Advising	No
2020	0.19	0.04	0.11	0.27	Incumbent	Party Advising	No
2020	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Non incumbent	Party Advising	Yes
2020	0.22	0.04	0.13	0.30	Incumbent	Party Advising	Yes
2023	0.32	0.04	0.24	0.40	Non incumbent	Party Advising	No
2023	0.29	0.04	0.20	0.37	Incumbent	Party Advising	No
2023	0.35	0.04	0.27	0.43	Non incumbent	Party Advising	Yes
2023	0.31	0.04	0.23	0.40	Incumbent	Party Advising	Yes
2024	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Non incumbent	Party Advising	No
2024	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.31	Incumbent	Party Advising	No
2024	0.28	0.04	0.20	0.36	Non incumbent	Party Advising	Yes
2024	0.25	0.04	0.17	0.33	Incumbent	Party Advising	Yes
2017	2.45	0.29	1.88	3.01	Non incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2017	2.93	0.30	2.35	3.52	Incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2017	2.61	0.29	2.05	3.18	Non incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2017	3.10	0.30	2.51	3.68	Incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2018	2.45	0.29	1.89	3.02	Non incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2018	2.93	0.30	2.35	3.52	Incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2018	2.62	0.29	2.05	3.18	Non incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2018	3.10	0.30	2.52	3.68	Incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes

Year	Predicted Value	Std. error	Conf. Low	Conf. High	Profile	Outcome	Convention
2019	2.50	0.29	1.93	3.06	Non incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2019	2.98	0.30	2.40	3.56	Incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2019	2.66	0.29	2.10	3.22	Non incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2019	3.14	0.30	2.56	3.72	Incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2020	2.55	0.29	1.99	3.11	Non incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2020	3.03	0.30	2.45	3.62	Incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2020	2.72	0.29	2.15	3.28	Non incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2020	3.20	0.30	2.62	3.78	Incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2023	2.72	0.28	2.16	3.27	Non incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2023	3.20	0.29	2.63	3.77	Incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2023	2.88	0.28	2.33	3.44	Non incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2023	3.36	0.29	2.79	3.94	Incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2024	2.70	0.28	2.15	3.25	Non incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2024	3.18	0.29	2.61	3.75	Incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	No
2024	2.86	0.28	2.31	3.42	Non incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes
2024	3.35	0.29	2.78	3.92	Incumbent	Party Memb. Intensity	Yes

Voting bandwidth models

Table A.34: Robust Linear Probability and OLS Models to Predict Political Engagement

	Political Positions: 2.5–7.5% voting	Party Advising: 2.5–7.5% voting	Party Memb. Intensity: 2.5–7.5% voting	Political Positions: 3.5–6.5% voting	Party Advising: 3.5–6.5% voting	Party Memb. Intensity: 3.5–6.5% voting	Political Positions: 1.5–8.5% voting	Party Advising: 1.5–8.5% voting	Party Memb. Intensity: 1.5–8.5% voting
(Intercept)	−0.018 (0.047)	−0.005 (0.067)	2.204 (0.415)***	−0.205 (0.115)+	0.378 (0.359)	2.857 (0.368)***	0.092 (0.094)	0.117 (0.096)	2.351 (0.418)***
DiD	0.016 (0.047)	0.129 (0.027)***	0.161 (0.153)	0.104 (0.058)+	0.079 (0.030)**	0.210 (0.174)	0.024 (0.042)	0.137 (0.025)***	0.123 (0.138)
CC=1	−0.032 (0.026)	−0.012 (0.008)	0.076 (0.083)	−0.048 (0.034)	−0.008 (0.007)	−0.031 (0.102)	−0.014 (0.023)	−0.013 (0.007)+	0.076 (0.071)
time1	0.056 (0.033)+	0.008 (0.010)	0.130 (0.099)	0.003 (0.040)	0.015 (0.014)	0.024 (0.108)	0.048 (0.028)+	0.003 (0.009)	0.225 (0.088)*
Right	0.179 (0.044)***	0.030 (0.071)	−1.351 (0.406)***	0.492 (0.062)***	−0.322 (0.357)	−2.192 (0.211)***	0.068 (0.093)	−0.090 (0.097)	−1.705 (0.415)***
Center right	0.239 (0.074)**	0.073 (0.082)	−0.692 (0.447)	0.525 (0.101)***	−0.332 (0.359)	−1.808 (0.299)***	0.126 (0.111)	−0.040 (0.105)	−1.088 (0.458)*
Center	0.481 (0.111)***	−0.046 (0.070)	−1.163 (0.484)*	0.100 (0.043)*	−0.496 (0.354)	−3.150 (0.133)***	0.221 (0.122)+	−0.152 (0.095)	−1.518 (0.457)***
Center left	0.160 (0.042)***	−0.040 (0.069)	−2.011 (0.398)***	0.434 (0.057)***	−0.380 (0.356)	−2.774 (0.182)***	−0.012 (0.092)	−0.149 (0.095)	−2.349 (0.409)***
Left	0.166 (0.041)***	−0.031 (0.069)	−1.627 (0.400)***	0.525 (0.058)***	−0.376 (0.356)	−2.547 (0.194)***	0.008 (0.091)	−0.136 (0.095)	−2.043 (0.409)***
Far left	0.093 (0.040)*	−0.046 (0.068)	−1.946 (0.401)***	0.464 (0.061)***	−0.378 (0.356)	−2.669 (0.205)***	−0.059 (0.091)	−0.160 (0.095)+	−2.351 (0.411)***
Scholar(=1)	−0.148 (0.025)***	0.029 (0.016)+	−0.010 (0.090)	−0.099 (0.029)***	0.020 (0.017)	0.083 (0.102)	−0.144 (0.023)***	0.017 (0.014)	−0.133 (0.081)
Lawyer(=1)	0.046 (0.024)+	−0.014 (0.011)	0.186 (0.073)*	0.016 (0.030)	−0.023 (0.013)+	0.073 (0.089)	0.047 (0.022)*	−0.008 (0.009)	0.232 (0.066)***
Previous pol. position(=1)	0.271 (0.032)***	0.031 (0.014)*	0.789 (0.102)***	0.372 (0.041)***	0.051 (0.018)**	1.023 (0.134)***	0.204 (0.027)***	0.023 (0.012)+	0.789 (0.088)***
Vote(%)	−0.007 (0.009)	0.007 (0.006)	−0.053 (0.031)+	−0.040 (0.020)+	−0.003 (0.009)	−0.014 (0.056)	0.000 (0.007)	0.005 (0.004)	−0.002 (0.021)
Num.Obs.	1122	1122	1122	672	672	672	1452	1452	1452
AIC	3042.6	1345.4	5691.7	1754.8	604.4	3287.0	3943.2	1746.5	7346.2
BIC	8607.9	6910.7	11 257.0	4722.6	3572.1	6254.8	11 536.8	9340.2	14 939.9

Table A.35: Robust Linear Probability and OLS Models to Estimate Interactions' Effect on Political Engagement (3.5-6.5% bandwidth)

	Political Positions 3.5–6.5% voting	Party Advising 3.5–6.5% voting	Party Memb. Intensity 3.5–6.5% voting	Political Positions 3.5–6.5% voting	Party Advising 3.5–6.5% voting	Political Positions 3.5–6.5% voting	Party Advising 3.5–6.5% voting	Party Memb. Intensity 3.5–6.5% voting
(Intercept)	–0.057 (0.125)	0.355 (0.362)	2.797 (0.408)***	–0.388 (0.127)**	0.314 (0.360)	–0.182 (0.109)+	0.376 (0.359)	2.813 (0.395)***
DiD	0.013 (0.072)	0.100 (0.049)*	0.250 (0.238)	0.039 (0.056)	0.037 (0.028)	0.154 (0.059)*	0.068 (0.033)*	0.321 (0.192)+
CC=1	–0.038 (0.034)	–0.008 (0.008)	–0.035 (0.105)	–0.047 (0.034)	–0.006 (0.007)	–0.048 (0.032)	–0.008 (0.007)	–0.033 (0.101)
Time=1	–0.008 (0.040)	0.015 (0.014)	0.027 (0.107)	–0.004 (0.040)	0.015 (0.014)	–0.004 (0.037)	0.016 (0.014)	0.015 (0.103)
Right	0.409 (0.072)***	–0.304 (0.359)	–2.156 (0.259)***	0.651 (0.090)***	–0.253 (0.360)	0.340 (0.060)***	–0.295 (0.358)	–2.340 (0.243)***
Center right	0.423 (0.111)***	–0.311 (0.361)	–1.764 (0.341)***	0.624 (0.125)***	–0.253 (0.363)	0.380 (0.089)***	–0.307 (0.359)	–1.936 (0.324)***
Center	0.014 (0.091)	–0.463 (0.360)	–3.106 (0.275)***	0.110 (0.043)**	–0.495 (0.354)	0.109 (0.041)**	–0.498 (0.354)	–3.145 (0.137)***
Center left	0.363 (0.072)***	–0.361 (0.358)	–2.742 (0.231)***	0.608 (0.085)***	–0.306 (0.359)	0.380 (0.060)***	–0.372 (0.356)	–2.777 (0.217)***
Left	0.486 (0.074)***	–0.357 (0.358)	–2.525 (0.258)***	0.698 (0.084)***	–0.305 (0.359)	0.506 (0.061)***	–0.375 (0.356)	–2.513 (0.217)***
Far left	0.412 (0.077)***	–0.358 (0.358)	–2.642 (0.253)***	0.636 (0.085)***	–0.312 (0.359)	0.465 (0.063)***	–0.380 (0.356)	–2.622 (0.228)***
Scholar(=1)	–0.093 (0.028)**	0.021 (0.017)	0.081 (0.104)	–0.098 (0.028)***	0.021 (0.017)	–0.091 (0.027)***	0.018 (0.017)	0.097 (0.104)
Lawyer(=1)	0.015 (0.030)	–0.024 (0.013)+	0.073 (0.090)	0.004 (0.030)	–0.024 (0.013)+	0.001 (0.028)	–0.020 (0.012)	0.056 (0.089)
Previous pol. charge(=1)	0.371 (0.041)***	0.051 (0.018)**	1.023 (0.133)***	0.324 (0.044)***	0.047 (0.017)**	0.340 (0.039)***	0.057 (0.018)**	0.988 (0.135)***
Vote(%)	–0.050 (0.020)*	–0.002 (0.009)	–0.011 (0.057)	–0.039 (0.020)*	–0.003 (0.009)	–0.046 (0.019)*	–0.002 (0.009)	–0.018 (0.057)
Social activist(=1)	–0.117 (0.029)***	0.004 (0.009)	0.042 (0.094)					
DiD x social activist	0.200 (0.080)*	–0.038 (0.056)	–0.084 (0.258)					
Party member(=1)				0.103 (0.042)*	–0.012 (0.013)			
DiD x party member				0.197 (0.093)*	0.123 (0.065)+			
Incumbent(=1)						0.330 (0.048)***	–0.062 (0.017)***	0.415 (0.161)*
DiD x incumbent						–0.236 (0.097)*	0.049 (0.050)	–0.446 (0.288)
Num.Obs.	672	672	672	672	672	672	672	672
AIC	1734.8	598.7	3282.8	1723.5	584.1	1679.7	587.4	3272.5
BIC	4693.5	3557.5	6241.5	4682.2	3542.9	4638.4	3546.1	6231.2

Table A.36: Robust Linear Probability and OLS Models to Estimate Interactions' Effect on Political Engagement (2.5-7.5% bandwidth)

	Political Positions 2.5–7.5% voting	Party Advising 2.5–7.5% voting	Party Memb. Intensity 2.5–7.5% voting	Political Positions 2.5–7.5% voting	Party Advising 2.5–7.5% voting	Political Positions 2.5–7.5% voting	Party Advising 2.5–7.5% voting	Party Memb. Intensity 2.5–7.5% voting
(Intercept)	0.001 (0.047)	−0.026 (0.067)	2.203 (0.408)***	−0.164 (0.054)**	−0.030 (0.070)	−0.009 (0.045)	−0.006 (0.066)	2.152 (0.402)***
DiD	−0.006 (0.058)	0.194 (0.043)***	0.235 (0.197)	0.000 (0.046)	0.043 (0.024)+	0.023 (0.049)	0.124 (0.030)***	0.340 (0.168)*
CC=1	−0.026 (0.026)	−0.010 (0.008)	0.093 (0.085)	−0.032 (0.026)	−0.009 (0.008)	−0.033 (0.025)	−0.012 (0.008)	0.071 (0.082)
Time=1	0.051 (0.033)	0.008 (0.010)	0.119 (0.098)	0.049 (0.033)	0.009 (0.010)	0.050 (0.032)	0.010 (0.011)	0.114 (0.093)
Right	0.187 (0.042)***	0.050 (0.071)	−1.299 (0.401)**	0.262 (0.048)***	0.064 (0.072)	0.077 (0.043)+	0.062 (0.073)	−1.570 (0.398)***
Center right	0.239 (0.074)**	0.098 (0.081)	−0.646 (0.443)	0.260 (0.076)***	0.119 (0.081)	0.143 (0.072)*	0.102 (0.082)	−0.873 (0.435)*
Center	0.486 (0.111)***	−0.016 (0.070)	−1.098 (0.478)*	0.511 (0.111)***	0.001 (0.071)	0.453 (0.109)***	−0.038 (0.070)	−1.177 (0.479)*
Center left	0.173 (0.043)***	−0.018 (0.068)	−1.942 (0.393)***	0.276 (0.050)***	0.004 (0.071)	0.108 (0.042)**	−0.025 (0.068)	−2.042 (0.386)***
Left	0.204 (0.043)***	−0.003 (0.069)	−1.498 (0.399)***	0.276 (0.047)***	0.010 (0.071)	0.134 (0.040)***	−0.022 (0.068)	−1.628 (0.387)***
Far left	0.123 (0.041)**	−0.015 (0.069)	−1.829 (0.395)***	0.222 (0.047)***	−0.014 (0.071)	0.089 (0.039)*	−0.045 (0.068)	−1.922 (0.388)***
Scholar(=1)	−0.140 (0.025)***	0.031 (0.016)*	0.011 (0.090)	−0.137 (0.024)***	0.027 (0.015)+	−0.144 (0.024)***	0.027 (0.016)+	0.007 (0.090)
Lawyer(=1)	0.043 (0.025)+	−0.015 (0.011)	0.178 (0.073)*	0.027 (0.024)	−0.017 (0.010)+	0.034 (0.024)	−0.010 (0.010)	0.168 (0.072)*
Previous pol. charge(=1)	0.273 (0.032)***	0.027 (0.014)+	0.787 (0.102)***	0.225 (0.034)***	0.021 (0.014)	0.249 (0.031)***	0.037 (0.014)**	0.752 (0.102)***
Vote(%)	−0.011 (0.009)	0.005 (0.006)	−0.062 (0.032)+	−0.006 (0.009)	0.006 (0.006)	−0.008 (0.009)	0.007 (0.006)	−0.052 (0.031)+
Social activist(=1)	−0.076 (0.023)**	0.004 (0.007)	−0.146 (0.077)+					
DiD x social activist	0.067 (0.063)	−0.127 (0.049)*	−0.099 (0.219)					
Party member(=1)				0.146 (0.032)***	−0.017 (0.011)			
DiD x party member				0.036 (0.067)	0.207 (0.053)***			
Incumbent(=1)						0.214 (0.036)***	−0.068 (0.013)***	0.513 (0.118)***
DiD x incumbent						−0.044 (0.079)	0.023 (0.046)	−0.617 (0.245)*
Num.Obs.	1122	1122	1122	1122	1122	1122	1122	1122
AIC	3029.6	1315.9	5682.9	3002.1	1278.1	2976.8	1315.0	5660.7
BIC	8584.9	6871.1	11 238.2	8557.4	6833.4	8532.1	6870.3	11 216.0


Table A.37: Robust Linear Probability and OLS Models to Estimate Interactions' Effect on Political Engagement (1.5-8.5% bandwidth)

	Political Positions 1.5–8.5% voting	Party Advising 1.5–8.5% voting	Party Memb. Intensity 1.5–8.5% voting	Political Positions 1.5–8.5% voting	Party Advising 1.5–8.5% voting	Political Positions 1.5–8.5% voting	Party Advising 1.5–8.5% voting	Party Memb. Intensity 1.5–8.5% voting
(Intercept)	0.104 (0.094)	0.107 (0.101)	2.362 (0.423)***	−0.045 (0.095)	0.066 (0.092)	0.094 (0.092)	0.116 (0.096)	2.303 (0.407)***
DiD	−0.005 (0.053)	0.186 (0.040)***	0.159 (0.181)	0.000 (0.040)	0.045 (0.021)*	0.049 (0.043)	0.134 (0.028)***	0.282 (0.152)+
CC=1	−0.010 (0.023)	−0.012 (0.008)+	0.088 (0.073)	−0.017 (0.023)	−0.012 (0.007)+	−0.019 (0.022)	−0.012 (0.007)	0.065 (0.071)
Time=1	0.045 (0.028)	0.003 (0.009)	0.218 (0.087)*	0.038 (0.028)	0.003 (0.009)	0.034 (0.027)	0.006 (0.009)	0.196 (0.084)*
Right	0.067 (0.092)	−0.084 (0.101)	−1.692 (0.420)***	0.155 (0.092)+	−0.038 (0.092)	−0.034 (0.092)	−0.065 (0.098)	−1.897 (0.408)***
Center right	0.121 (0.111)	−0.030 (0.108)	−1.079 (0.464)*	0.153 (0.110)	0.016 (0.099)	0.031 (0.109)	−0.016 (0.105)	−1.252 (0.447)**
Center	0.216 (0.122)+	−0.139 (0.100)	−1.503 (0.462)**	0.258 (0.120)*	−0.090 (0.090)	0.199 (0.121)+	−0.145 (0.095)	−1.523 (0.449)***
Center left	−0.008 (0.092)	−0.141 (0.100)	−2.318 (0.415)***	0.106 (0.093)	−0.086 (0.091)	−0.059 (0.090)	−0.136 (0.095)	−2.385 (0.399)***
Left	0.023 (0.092)	−0.127 (0.100)	−1.975 (0.417)***	0.120 (0.091)	−0.078 (0.091)	−0.021 (0.089)	−0.127 (0.095)	−2.047 (0.398)***
Far left	−0.052 (0.092)	−0.147 (0.100)	−2.298 (0.417)***	0.072 (0.092)	−0.105 (0.091)	−0.061 (0.090)	−0.159 (0.095)+	−2.322 (0.400)***
Scholar(=1)	−0.141 (0.023)***	0.018 (0.014)	−0.120 (0.081)	−0.129 (0.022)***	0.017 (0.013)	−0.142 (0.022)***	0.017 (0.014)	−0.124 (0.081)
Lawyer(=1)	0.046 (0.022)*	−0.008 (0.009)	0.230 (0.065)***	0.029 (0.022)	−0.013 (0.009)	0.039 (0.021)+	−0.006 (0.009)	0.220 (0.065)***
Previous pol. charge(=1)	0.204 (0.027)***	0.021 (0.012)+	0.784 (0.088)***	0.159 (0.029)***	0.011 (0.012)	0.186 (0.027)***	0.027 (0.012)*	0.757 (0.088)***
Vote(%)	0.000 (0.006)	0.005 (0.004)	−0.005 (0.021)	0.001 (0.006)	0.006 (0.004)	0.001 (0.006)	0.005 (0.004)	0.000 (0.021)
Social activist(=1)	−0.044 (0.020)*	0.008 (0.007)	−0.113 (0.065)+					
DiD x social activist	0.068 (0.058)	−0.095 (0.047)*	−0.038 (0.199)					
Party member(=1)				0.137 (0.028)***	−0.004 (0.011)			
DiD x party member				0.054 (0.061)	0.215 (0.048)***			
Incumbent(=1)						0.215 (0.032)***	−0.052 (0.011)***	0.466 (0.103)***
DiD x incumbent						−0.088 (0.070)	0.014 (0.044)	−0.519 (0.216)*
Num.Obs.	1452	1452	1452	1452	1452	1452	1452	1452
AIC	3934.8	1726.6	7339.0	3896.2	1654.2	3864.4	1722.0	7312.3
BIC	11 517.9	9309.7	14 922.0	11 479.3	9237.3	11 447.4	9305.1	14 895.4

A.4.4 Robustness Checks


Placebo

Figure A.21: DID Robust Linear Probability to Predict Political Positions Before 2017



Note: Lines represent 95% CI.


Figure A.22: DID Robust Linear Probability to Scholar and Business Organization Membership



Note: Lines represent 95% CI.

Other checks

Figure A.23: DID Robust Linear Probability and OLS Models to Predict Political Engagement (Without Robust Standard Errors)



Note: Lines represent 95% CI.

A.5 Chapter 4

A.5.1 Protest Events Related to the Student and No+AFP Movements (2008-2020)

Table A.38: Protest Events: Student and No+AFP Movements (2008-2020)

Year	Student Protests	No+AFP Protests
2008	400.00	14.00
2009	99.00	24.00
2010	121.00	0.00
2011	1141.00	5.00
2012	364.00	9.00
2013	308.00	70.00
2014	144.00	11.00
2015	126.00	6.00
2016	222.00	135.00
2017	100.00	50.00
2018	137.00	24.00
2019	178.00	94.00
2020	115.00	35.00