

Criminal Social Orders in Chile:
A Social-Spatial Theory of Criminal Governance in Low-
Intensity Violence Societies

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Thesis submitted to the Instituto de Ciencia Política Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile for the degree of Doctor in Political Science.

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July 2024

Santiago de Chile, Chile



**PONTIFICIA
UNIVERSIDAD
CATÓLICA
DE CHILE**

Para Ingrid y Gonzalo.

“Construiremos un reloj para cuidar nuestro tiempo.

Yo construiré tu futuro y tú el mío irás construyendo”

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Acknowledgments

When I decided, at the end of 2018, to start my PhD studies, I never imagined everything that would follow. Today, at the end of this stage and with the perspective of time, I am able to understand how wonderful it has been to walk this path. In these almost six years, I got married, became a father, I have seen my son grow up, wonderful people come into my life, visited places I never thought I would know, and received the support of many who trusted me and my work. I thank each of them for their support, encouraging me to continue with this research, and teaching me to be a better researcher. As I look back on this journey, I realize the profound transformations my life has undergone and the importance of those people who have always encouraged me to keep forward, always forward.

First, I would like to thank my family, Ingrid, and Gonzalo, for their unconditional support, infinite love, and emotional support during all this time. This would not have been possible without their love and endurance. To both of them, I promise to repay the time and attention that, at times, I could not give them. Furthermore, I thank you for having walked together on this journey of our lives. Thank you for being the engines of my life and of this project. This result is yours.

To my wife, Ingrid, I thank you for believing in me and pushing me to follow this path, one that I have always sought but, for various reasons, had not had the courage to start. Today, I can tell you that with pride, we made it. I also thank him for the time, the unconditional company, and the endurance he put in during this whole period. I thank you for the long days you accompanied me, listening with love to some details of my research, and for the affection you gave me when I needed it or when I saw the end of this path from a distance. I thank him for his courage and unconditional support, which, among other things, led us to stay in Chicago with a child a little over a year old, with nothing more than a couple of loose ideas about this project. I thank Gonzalo, my son, for the energy, light, happiness, and colors he brought into my life. The opportunity to be a father and to accompany you in your development has made me a better person, has confronted my

deepest fears, and has allowed me to grow and move forward with this project. I have always thought that this is for you, and I believe so, and I will continue to do so.

Second, I would like to thank those who offered me their academic and human guidance during these years. I thank Juan Pablo Luna, my tutor, for allowing me to learn and work with him. His accompaniment as an advisor was crucial for maturing the initial ideas of this project, giving shape to this study, and successfully completing it. In addition, I thank him for his generosity, which was not only reflected in his time but also in the many opportunities and paths that he has opened for me and that have allowed me to continue my career as a researcher. I would also like to thank Andreas Feldmann for his affection and trust in me and this project. In every interaction we had, he was enthusiastic about the quality of my work, always offered his help unconditionally, and encouraged me to continue. In addition, I thank him, Helena, and Martín for their deep human warmth, who opened the doors of their home to us and provided us with everything during our stay in Chicago. Finally, I would like to thank Juan Albarracín, who was always available to read different versions of this work, offering me his theoretical and human advice in developing this project.

Third, I would like to thank my classmates in the PhD program, the "geniuses" Nerea Palma and Diego Telias. Each one, in their way, was a fundamental piece in the journey through the doctorate. I would also like to give special thanks to Nerea Palma for her company, unconditional support, and friendship. During this period, I have had the opportunity to learn from her work and her tremendous abilities as a researcher. In addition, I thank her for reading, commenting on, and editing different versions of this work. In each version, she always offered invaluable advice that improved the quality and clarity of the arguments. I also thank her for accompanying me in the multiple presentations where I presented advances in this work.

I would also like to thank each of the people who were part of this research and who trusted me to narrate their daily experiences with drug trafficking organizations, their life stories, their families, and the formation of their *poblaciones*. Many of them opened the doors and intimacy of their homes, invited me to a cup of tea, and fed me during my

fieldwork. At times, many shared sensitive personal experiences that helped me understand and challenge the moral codes that I brought with me as an observer into the fieldwork. I hope to capture their daily and life experiences as faithfully as possible. In other words, this work would not have been possible without their trust and the time they took to allow me to enter and understand their daily lives and neighborhoods.

Finally, I thank the Institute of Political Science of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile for allowing me to pursue my doctoral studies in a stimulating, challenging, and diverse environment for research. My gratitude goes to each professor at the Institute who contributed decisively to my formation as a researcher and gave me fundamental tools and knowledge to understand our discipline. I would especially like to thank Carla Alberti for her valuable comments during the defense of this thesis. I would also like to thank Francisco Urdinez for his generosity and knowledge. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Millennium Institute for Research on Violence and Democracy - Viodemos, who supported me as a doctoral researcher and allowed me to be part of an extensive and valuable network of researchers dedicated to studying the everyday and exceptional forms of violence that affect democratic citizenship in Chile. In addition, they allowed me to present initial versions of this work in spaces of academic reflection, where I received valuable comments from Catalina Droppelmann, Pilar Larroulet, Alejandra Luneke, Eduardo Valenzuela, Carla Alberti, and Benjamin Lessing. I would also like to thank the Latin American and Latino Studies Program and Department of Political Science of the University of Illinois at Chicago, its researchers, and doctoral students for the significant contributions and comments that allowed me to improve this work.

Chapter I

Introduction

1. The puzzle of forms of criminal governance and social orders

On November 6, 2020, at 4:00 am, the "Padre Nuestro" operation was launched in two *poblaciones*¹ [shantytowns], located in the periphery of the Metropolitan Region of Chile. The police intervention had been planned months in advance in the Regional Prosecutor's Office, and its objective was to infiltrate a "Task Force" in Padre Hurtado and Padre Demetrio, county of Melipilla², where a drug trafficking gang called "Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación"³ was operating - and still does. The operation resulted in the raid of 40 homes, arresting 25 members of the organization, and confiscating weapons, cocaine, cocaine base paste, marijuana, synthetic drugs, and money⁴.

A few days after the "Padre Hurtado" operation, government authorities, the police, and the Public Prosecutor's Office stated that the gang had been dismantled and would no longer be able to maintain illicit operations in the area. Moreover, the Minister of the Interior and Public Security claimed that the success of the police action would bring order and peace to neighborhoods that had been under the control of a dangerous and violent criminal gang (Biobio Chile 2020). However, this was not the case. Contrary to the authorities' expectations,

¹ *Población* is the Chilean name for popular neighborhoods.

² Strictly speaking, the denomination is *comuna* [county]. Which corresponds to the smallest administrative political unit in Chile. The county of Melipilla is located in the southwestern part of the Santiago Metropolitan Region, and because of its strategic location near the port of San Antonio, it is a storage and transit point for drugs entering from that port to the western part of the Metropolitan Region.

³ The group has no ties to the Mexican organization.

⁴ For further information see

http://www.fiscalia.dechile.cl/Fiscalia/sala_prensa/noticias_regional_det.do?id=18877

the organization still maintains operational arms in Padre Hurtado and Padre Demetrio neighborhoods. Above all, they were never empty spaces of governance and social order.

A closer look at life in these economically marginalized areas reveals that the governmental perspective of "bringing order" is inadequate and that it is sustained by a long-standing tradition of state abandonment and lack of services. This narrative obscures the multiple ways in which the state remains present and how the reality of the residents of these *poblaciones* is much more complex. Its inhabitants' daily lives occur in gray zones, where the boundaries between legality and illegality are blurred, and survival practices are often more relevant than some moral codes that are valid for the rest of society. Evidently, people resent the abuses and violence carried out by drug trafficking gangs. Still, they also represent a solution to the isolation of local markets and an effective way to resolve their demands for protection and order.

Therefore, the problem with this approach is that it cannot adequately account for variation among criminal actors and the different types of relationships they maintain with social actors. This incomplete image tends to obscure the profound variation in governance arrangements that emerge in neighborhoods under the control of drug trafficking organizations (hereafter DTO). The cases of the Padre Demetrio and Padre Hurtado *poblaciones* are clear examples of this, even if both neighborhoods are separated by a street only a few meters wide. This street acts as an invisible border that its inhabitants recognize; depending on which side they are located on, the form of social order differs profoundly.

In the Padre Demetrio, residents and DTO leaders repeatedly interact through a dense network of structured connections and internal codes that allow them to jointly regulate their behavior, build lasting agreements on the attributions of their authority, mutually recognize the areas in which they can exercise their authority, and the application of sanctions for deviant behavior by any of their members. This result is governance arrangements that assume the form of a *co-constructed order* between civilians and members of the drug trafficking organization.

In contrast, a governance structure characterized by disorder and indiscriminate violence emerges in the *población* Padre Hurtado. Residents frequently adjust their behavior

to avoid physical sanctions and damage to the individual or collective property by a drug gang. Moreover, in this *población*, the DTO controls the precarious community infrastructure—since 2019, the *Sede Social* [neighborhood infrastructure] was seized by gang members who use it for parties, stockpiling stolen objects and drug distribution—, and its leaders must request authorization from members of the criminal organization to use it. The ability to regulate the gang's conduct is restricted to fulfilling personal favors for members of the "Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación" and sporadic relations with the neighborhood's social leaders.

These neighborhoods are not the only places where divergent social orders and criminal governance arrangements emerge. In the county of El Bosque, in the southern area of the Metropolitan Region, a similar situation arises. The *poblaciones* Santa Elena and Los Almendros I are separated by an avenue that demarcates the spatial edges of the alternative social order. In Santa Elena, one characterized by overlapping and competing forms of governance between criminal and social actors predominates. While in Los Almendros I, the social order assumes a hybrid form characterized by the selective distribution of benefits and coercion to neighborhood residents. Here, the norms and practices to regulate behavior result from an unfinished integration of the DTO into the community structure and the gang's success in co-opting social leaders.

These experiences show us the profound variation in the forms that social order can take. Building on Lessing (2021, p. 854), Feltran (2020, p. 19), and Arjona (2016, p. 21). I assume that social order is a kind of normative regime at the local level. In particular, I understand that every form of order is built on a set of institutions—that is, formal or informal rules, social codes, and a set of guidelines at the neighborhood level that regulate the empirical actions of subjects, their behaviors, and the interactions between its inhabitants and criminal gang members—allowing people have expectations about what might happen. I refer to the existence of this predictability as social order (Arjona 2016). This approach provides us with a more complete picture of criminal governance by incorporating the variation among criminal actors and the different types of relationships they maintain with social actors. Additionally, it enables researchers to pay attention not only to normative aspects of the social

order construct but in the multiple ways in which social leaders at the neighborhood level can enforce the rules and apply sanctions in the face of deviations by criminal actors.

The varied forms of local social orders constitute a central puzzle: Why in some communities, do drug trafficking organizations interact with residents to produce one type of social order, while in others, they do not? Or, more broadly, under what conditions does criminal social order emerge and assume different forms? Building on recent insights on civil war literature, criminal governance, and ethnographic data collected during my fieldwork, I argue that to explain this variation it is necessary to unpack the social structure of the communities within which criminal organizations operate: density of social organization and the embeddedness of criminal gangs into the community. By conditioning the social order on the structure of the community, social and criminal actors can interact in multiple ways, more or less ritualized, to collaborate in pursuing mutual or interdependent goals.

This raises a second aspect of this central puzzle: if community structure shapes different forms of social order, what influences community structure? Based on a comparative historical analysis, I argue that housing policies are crucial in this process. I identified three housing policies between 1965 and 1990 that acted as critical junctures. Each of these public policies triggers a series of events with long-term consequences crucial to understanding the variation in the dimensions of the social structure and, indirectly, the types of criminal social orders. First, the recognition and opportunities for *pobladores* [dwellers] to constitute themselves as a pervasive social actor over time are enhanced or eliminated. Secondly, the morphology of poor neighborhoods creates incentives for criminal actors to decide to operate in those places. Third, the social connectedness of the inhabitants and their ability to create a collective identity among all its members. This connection endures across generations and allows criminal gang members to identify themselves as a member of the community.

Although previous studies help us understand variation in criminal governance from the different relationships with the state (E. D. Arias, 2017; Auyero, 2007; Auyero & Sobering, 2019; Barnes, 2017; Durán-Martínez, 2018; G. de S. Feltran, 2012; Koivu, 2018; Lessing, 2018, 2021; Lessing & Willis, 2019; Snyder & Duran-Martinez, 2009; Willis, 2015),

how crime is organized (Adorno & Alvarado, 2022; Moncada, 2017, 2021a; Motta et al., 2022), and the structures of criminal groups (Bonilla-Calle et al., 2022; Durán-Martínez, 2018), fails to account for the profound linkages between the structure of communities and the emergence of criminal social orders. This void remains puzzling in at least two ways.

First, the existing research has omitted both the juxtaposition with other authorities and social structures that are present in the territories where the criminal groups operate and the agency and resources that communities have to resist or negotiate some norms in local order-building processes. Second, studies have privileged scenarios of acute violence, such as in Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil, as violence is assumed to be a natural by-product of drug trafficking and territorial control by criminal organizations. But most of the experiences with crime do not occur through lethal acts or scenarios of intense violence but rather through everyday actions such as extortion and coercion (Magaloni, Franco-Vivanco, et al., 2020; Magaloni, Robles, et al., 2020; Moncada, 2021a). Therefore, unlike many studies of criminal governance, my dissertation seeks to provide a more complete picture of some fundamental questions of this research agenda: Who governs, how do they do it, and how do they exercise their authority? To this purpose, I focus on community structure as the critical factor that determines how social and criminal actors are embedded or not and maintain different types of relationships, more or less structured, with divergent outcomes for social orders at the neighborhood level.

2. The Arguments

Conditionality the plural social order on the structure of the community

Criminal groups never establish absolute territorial control without some form of interaction with the communities where they are located. The reason is threefold. First, drug trafficking organizations require a degree of commitment from the inhabitants in order to ensure an adequate functioning of their operations –usually in the form of silence. Second, they need to acquire some form of legitimacy to maintain their territorial presence and

eliminate potential challengers. Third, and most importantly, communities are not neutral actors. They have agency and may possess valuable resources that may affect such territorial control.

The structure of communities can alter the preferences and capabilities of criminal actors with respect to social order. On the one hand, communities may possess associative capacities that are stable and widely recognized by all their members, which are a significant resource for advancing or resisting territorial control. On the other hand, traffickers may be insider or outsider groups depending on the origin of their leaders and whether the DTO is perceived as a community member, independent of its illicit role in the drug market. I call these dimensions of community structure: organizational density and embeddedness, and they constitute the explanatory variables of my argument.

As with criminal actors, the structure of communities affects the preferences of residents and the way in which they may interact with drug trafficking gangs. On the one hand, if the organizational density of communities is low or unstable, social leaders may be restricted in their ability to cultivate symmetrical relationships with gangs or be unprotected in their interactions. On the other hand, the level of embeddedness of criminal actors in each neighborhood may offer more or less effective day-to-day connections to transmit residents' norms and preferences about DTOs' behavior.

The logic of the conditionality of the plural social order on community structure is that regardless of the organizational density of the communities, its effect is mediated by the level of embeddedness of criminal gangs in them. In this sense, the Padre Demetrio and Santa Elena neighborhoods have long and historic organizational traditions that allow them to have solid and similar associative structures. However, the social order that emerges in each differs substantially because of the level of embeddedness of the criminal actors. In the first, the DTO is highly embedded in the community structure insofar as they are native neighbors of the *poblaciones* –mainly children or grandchildren of the founding generations of the neighborhood—who recognize and act within the institutions and social codes that the residents themselves have imposed on themselves to resolve their disputes or social needs. Additionally, social leaders and criminal actors share socialization processes –school,

upbringing within the neighborhood, friendship, kinship ties, etc.— that favor the construction of more flexible connections for the mutual transmission of norms, values, and preferences about the social order based on the codes of conduct transmitted between generations of residents. In contrast, in Santa Elena, the drug trafficking gang is an outsider group - regardless of whether some of its members were recruited from among the residents - that carries its own codes of conduct. The lack of pre-established social networks makes it difficult for criminal and social actors to maintain collaborative connections or work together to achieve mutual or interdependent goals. Finally, it may be more costly for social leaders to build or maintain relationships with these groups, given the nature of their activities.

Analytically, based on the interaction between organizational density and the level of embeddedness of criminal actors in the communities, as two dimensions of social structure, four ideal types of social orders are produced at the neighborhood level. Figure 1.1 shows the social orders based on this interaction.

Table 1. Type of order at the neighborhood level

		Density of social organization	
		Low	High
Embeddedness of DTOs	High	Co-opted Order	Co-constructed Order
	Low	Violent Order	Competitive Order

Source: Own elaboration

First, a Violent and disorganized Order is produced in areas with criminal gangs that are not integrated into the community and are perceived as threats to their members and where the social organization is absent or weakened. In this type of order, the DTOs are actors that do not have any link with the inhabitants of the *poblaciones*, and the members of the

criminal organization are alien to the community. The DTOs' behavior is oriented towards maximization of the resources they can extract from their market share. The only tool that DTOs have to regulate the behavior of community members is massive and indiscriminate violence.

Second, a Co-opted Social Order emerges in some neighborhoods where gangs are integrated into the community insofar as they are recognized as a stable member of it, and inhabitants do not have a solid organization. In this type of neighborhood, drug trafficking gangs often recruit local residents to become part of their organization or to collect valuable information that will allow them to ensure the success of their illicit operations. To this end, they can selectively distribute benefits to those who collaborate and punish deviations in the conduct of the community's inhabitants. In addition, the absence of strong and permanent associative dynamics over time encourages DTOs to form their own community organizations or co-opt existing ones without major difficulties. The objective is to make the production and maintenance of social order more efficient while reducing the use of violence as a mechanism for social regulation of the territories.

Third, in some neighborhoods, a *Competitive Order* emerges. In these places, the social order results from the interaction between a strong community with an active and recognized role by the residents of the *población*, and a low embeddedness of DTOs. The Competitive Order is characterized by the overlapping of governance regimes and the instability of the rules used to govern territories. Criminal and social actors dispute the establishment of norms and inhabitants' groups over which they can exercise their authority. Social leaders have sufficient resources to regulate some aspects of neighborhood social life in those groups of residents unattractive to criminal actors: children and the elderly. The traffickers, on the other hand, control the behavior of adults and youth and have the capacity to extend it to the rest of the residents through the use of selective violence. The outsider characteristic of the DTO is a disincentive for the creation of structured negotiation channels by increasing the costs for social leaders to cooperate with criminal gangs that are perceived as invaders of the territory and the pre-existing social order.

Finally, the co-production of social order is characterized by collaboration and mutual regulation of the behaviors of both actors. In this type of order, criminal gangs are fully embedded into the community, their members belong to the neighborhood, and their leaders maintain regular channels of communication and negotiation with social leaders. The internal or insider origin of the criminal gangs helps reduce the costs in the processes of daily interaction with residents in the social leaders who have no major restrictions to expose the ties they maintain with DTO members to the rest of the neighborhood inhabitants. At the same time, both actors have been socialized based on the value of the social organization as an inherent element of the neighborhood and its formation. The intergenerational legitimacy of the popular organization allows its current leadership to have a certain degree of autonomy to negotiate aspects of the local social order and to be connected to drug traffickers mostly through horizontal ties.

The long-term effect of housing policy on the structure community

State policies on the issue of housing for the poorest are a persistent factor in Chile's social history and one that has enduring legacies on the community structures adopted by popular neighborhoods. Building on Lessing (2021), I assume that criminal governance is "shaped by" state power insofar as it produces substantive effects on criminal groups' incentives and their capacities to govern. However, I extend this argument to social actors and the way in which *poblaciones* acquire durable characteristics, both in their organizational dynamics and in the embeddedness of various groups more or less recognized by the inhabitants of each popular neighborhood.

The way in which the Chilean state has responded to the demands of the "homeless", from the last third of the 20th century to date, has been marked by three critical moments in the development of housing policy: the '*Operación Sitio*' of 1965, the '*Política de Erradicación de Campamentos*' during the military dictatorship, and the '*Policy of subsidizing demand*' in the first years of the democratic transition.

Each of these public policies has resulted in the emergence of 'new popular neighborhoods' that completely modify the dynamics of popular organization and pressure (Garcés, 2013). Strictly speaking, I argue that two differentiated phenomena occur depending on the policy adopted. First, the opportunities for settlers to constitute themselves as a permanent social actor over time are enhanced or eliminated. Secondly, the morphology of poor neighborhoods creates incentives for criminal actors to decide to operate in those places.

The first phase of the housing policy was “*Operación Sitio*”. This was the state's articulated response, during the administration of President Frei Montalva (1964-1970), to the emergency of the “*tomas de terreno*” that had begun towards the end of the 1950s. This housing solution was characterized by the recognition and regulation of “occupied” land together with a basic urbanization for poor families, which gave shape to a new type of popular neighborhood. The “Toma de La Victoria” is considered the first organized land occupation and marked the beginning of this type of informal settlement as a repertoire of collective action by the *pobladores*.

Analyzed from a historical perspective, the land seizure assumes that if the state did not meet the housing demands of the settlers, they themselves could respond to their situation by taking over organized sites. This type of settlement arose from the autonomous organization of the settlers and allowed them to resolve their housing demands through negotiations with the state, and to emerge as a political actor in society. The interaction of the settlers' organizations with the state was mediated by political parties -mainly the Communist Party and the Socialist Party- and other organizations linked to the Catholic Church, who supported the occupations and interceded in favor of their demands (Cortés Morales, 2013; Dubet, 2016; Espinoza, 1988b; Garcés, 2002).

The state response of “Operación Sitio” inaugurated a new public policy of housing and “Popular Promotion” that advanced in the promotion of the participation of the residents' organizations in the articulation and mediation between the communities and the political life of the country. The demands for the allocation of the “*tomas de terrenos*” were followed by a series of demands for infrastructure and public services (electricity, water, transportation, and services), which forced the residents to keep their organizations vibrant and to seek new

forms of mobilization and pressure on the state. In this sense, the popular neighborhoods that emerged due to this first moment of housing policy are characterized by long and historical organizational traditions that profoundly impact the action of 'inhabiting' the territories. According to Gárce (2013, p. 84) the popular organization of these settlements has two dimensions that extend to this day in the memory of the settlers: an "instrument of struggle" that materialized their demands for housing and urban improvements and a space for participation, decision making and the construction of local community power.

A second phase of housing policy has been implemented at different times: during the Alessandri Rodríguez administration (1958-1964) and during the authoritarian Pinochet regime (1973 – 1990). In this phase, housing policy took a new turn with profound consequences for community structures. During the Alessandri administration, the policy of camp eradication was aimed at disabling irregular settlements as a mechanism for "sanitizing" the city. However, the government was not politically motivated to displace the homeless, as it was during the military dictatorship. After the coup d'état, the regime no longer conceived of housing as a social right that could be politically demanded. The camps were prohibited as a strategy for access to housing because of an active policy of intervention and repression against their leaders (Abufhele, 2019, p. 58; Skewes, 2002). These actions were part of a broader policy of repression and discipline in the most relevant symbolic spaces for developing the urban popular movement in Chile: the "factories" and the "*poblaciones*".

The repression in the camps resulted in the disarticulation of political and social organizations and of the inhabitants while at the same time preventing the "*tomas de terrenos*" as a collective strategy for access to housing. As an alternative, the regime's authorities promoted a housing policy based on two innovations. On the one hand, a plan of forced relocation of residents from the city's central areas to the peripheries between 1975 and 1985. In this government policy, more than 30,000 families –or more than 150,000 people– were moved to settlements located mostly in three counties of the south-western part of the city: El Bosque, La Pintana, and Puente Alto (Morales et al. 1990; Morales and Rojas 1986). On the other hand, a new conception of housing as a right that can be obtained through the market (Valdés 1986) and based on the recognition of savings. Pinochet declared in his

last message that: "The housing policy that we have carried out is based on the full valuation of the individual and on trust in his or her capacity to save [...] Ownership of real estate is the result of the effort of each Chilean and a serious housing policy [...]" (Pinochet, 1989, p. XV).

The policy of camp eradication had a substantive and lasting impact on the community structure of the new settlements: the destruction of the accumulated social networks and the disintegration of the settlers' organizations. This result is consistent with the heterogeneous allocation of *poblaciones* with respect to the places of origin of the *pobladores*. According to Morales et al. (1990, pp. 101–104) the heterogeneity of origin proved to be successful in the increase of conflictive coexistence among the residents, and new practices of a "misguided youth" that gave rise to drug use, vagrancy, violence and alcoholism.

The third phase occurred during the return to democracy, particularly in the administrations of Aylwin (1990-1994) and Frei (1994-2000). The new authorities deepened the process of depoliticization of residents' organizations through a housing policy that favored a "contained social demand" (Minvu 2004, 231), as opposed to that of politically articulated organizations oriented towards negotiation with the state (Minvu 2004, 231) (Abufhele, 2019, pp. 62–65).

This new approach to housing policy is based on the idea that access to housing is a regular demand that can be solved through institutional channels where people can apply according to a predefined timetable - windows - set by the political authorities (Abufhele 2019; Ducci 1997; Hidalgo 2004; Rojas 1999). In this new model, collective organizations, the political demand for housing, and the mediation of political agents become unnecessary elements. On the contrary, the participation of the inhabitants is restricted to individual applications to government programs that decide, according to the availability of budgets and constructed housing, where they will be located. Thus, these new settlements were characterized by a fragmented community structure, lacking internal conflict resolution mechanisms and normative governance regimes. Table 1.2 summarizes the characteristics and results of community structures at each critical juncture of housing policy in Chile.

Table 1.2 Housing policies, characteristics, and effect on community structure.

Housing policy	Political orientation	Device	Actor	Mediation	Organizational density	Embeddness DTO
Operación Sitio	State recognition of housing demand	Delivery of land to organizations and subsidies for self-construction	Housing committees	Political parties and the Catholic Church	High and with intergenerational transmission mechanisms	High and with early integration into community dynamics
Plan de Erradicación de Campamentos	Disintegration of social organization	Relocation of settlements in peripheral areas	Family units	Army	Low or High depending on the delivery of subsidies or self-construction programs.	Low or High
Housing subsidy	Contained demand	Housing Subsidy	Family units or individual persons	Unmediated	Low and late articulation via state interventions	Low and with attempts to co-opt community dynamics.

Source: Own elaboration

3. Research design and case selection

My dissertation deepens the understanding of the different processes and mechanisms that lead to plural forms of social order at the neighborhood level in settings of low-intensity violence. To this end, I introduce a novel theory of conditionality of social orders on community structure and provide empirical evidence from four cases from the urban peripheries of Santiago, Chile. For this purpose, it uses a multi-method research design (Goertz 2017) that combines in-depth subnational comparative case studies and comparative historical analysis for theory development (George & Bennett, 2005; Mahoney & Terrie, 2010), with process tracing for testing some of the implications derived from my theory (Goertz and Mahoney 2012).

An initial aspect in developing a theory about the emergence of plural social orders is, on the one hand, the assumption that the topic is, by nature, difficult to study and, on the other hand, the absence of adequate data for a large-N cross-case study. As an alternative, I assume an "analytic iteration" approach (Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015; Bril-Mascarenhas, Maillet, and Mayoux 2017), which enables me to move between inductive and deductive approaches to develop hypotheses, collect data, and other aspects of research design both within and outside the field. This method is better equipped to deal with the complexities of the study and allows me to revisit cases for theory development.

For case selection, I use multiple strategies that help me represent variation along with dependent and independent variables. First, I use news archives and official documents from the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of the Interior to identify neighborhoods in the Metropolitan Region where drug gangs operate. Second, since I seek to trace and analyze the long-term effect of housing policies, this information was triangulated with housing policy files from the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism, and historical archive to locate neighborhoods that originated from the three critical moments previously mentioned. This initial selection allowed me to locate six *poblaciones* in which I conducted preliminary fieldwork to identify the type of social order operating in each locality. Finally, I combined semi-structured interviews with ethnographic fieldwork to selected four *poblaciones* of the peripheries of Santiago of Chile, known as: Padre Demetrio, Padre Hurtado, Los Almendros I, and Santa Elena.

A substantive aspect of selecting these four cases was to take advantage of specific characteristics that allow for creating a unique natural experiment. By design, I selected two pairs of *poblaciones* that were located in the same “Unidad Vecinal” (minimal territorial unit in Chile), that were contiguous neighborhoods or separated by a street a few meters wide, that the same DTO maintained active operations in both neighborhoods. Still, the resulting social order was divergent in each case. I exploit these similarities to assess whether variation in organizational density and level of embeddedness significantly impacts the emergence and shape of the criminal social order.

Table 3. Case selected and attributes

Cases	Density of social organization	Embeddedness of DTO	Social Order
Padre Demetrio – Melipilla (Western RM)	High	High	Co-constructed Order
Santa Elena – El Bosque (Southern RM)	High	Low	Competitive Order
Los Almendros I – El Bosque (Southern RM)	Low	High	Criminal Order
Padre Hurtado – Melipilla (Western RM)	Low	Low	Violent Order

The unit of analysis is the social order within a *población* with the presence of gangs dedicated to drug trafficking. I use a subnational comparative approach that combines the logic of different analytic strategies. Following the logic of a most-similar analysis (Landman 2011; Gerring 2006; Lijphart 1971), I analyze several *poblaciones* in the same county that have the presence of the same criminal gang, but where the resulting social order is different. This enables me to control the criminal gang structure as an alternative explanation. Second, building on the logic of most-different analysis (Przeworski & Teune, 1970), I trace how a variation in the insertion of criminal actors into the structure of communities can lead to

different social orders. More specifically, some communities have similar levels of associativity and density of their organizations, but not the level of embeddedness of criminal actors in their community dynamics. The lack of such ties may condition the ability of residents and their social leaders to shape a more favorable social order for the community. In other words, these systematic comparisons allow me to highlight the conditionality of the social structure on the resulting social order, and how a high organizational density is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to give rise to a co-produced social order between social and criminal actors.

The data was collected during fourteen months of fieldwork in those four localities. I conducted over 42 semi-structured interviews involving social leaders, residents, local authorities, and some criminal gang members. Due to security and ethical considerations, all participants have been anonymized. In addition, I collected evidence from judicial archives, official reports from the Ministries of Interior and Housing and Urbanism in Chile, the Public Prosecutor's Office, and the press on gang activities in the selected localities. The information was analyzed through process-tracing in order to illustrate the different mechanisms and causal processes that lead to plural forms of social orders at the neighborhood level.

For the operationalization of the dependent variable, I combine data from ethnographic vignettes applied to residents and social leaders of the *poblaciones*, interviews, and direct observation during field work. The vignettes were constructed based on the theoretical expectations of the different types of social orders and describe different ways in which the actors could interact to regulate the behavior and sanction deviant behaviors of the inhabitants and traffickers within the neighborhood. Interviews and direct observation allowed me to triangulate the information gathered through the vignettes, in particular, to assess mechanisms of cooperation, competition, co-optation, and violence as vehicles for forcing desired behaviors. The basic question guiding the interviews and observations was Who is in charge?

The operationalization of the independent variables followed a similar strategy. To evaluate organizational density, I combined official information on the registration of social organizations in the selected territories with fieldwork, interviews, and historical archives.

The registry of social organizations allowed me to identify the number of registered community organizations and their spheres of action (territorial, functional, sports and/or cultural, among others). However, to mitigate a bias in the records, the information was triangulated with interviews with leaders and direct observation of the activities of these organizations. The historical archives, some compiled by the residents themselves to which they gave me access, others by historians, and official documents of governmental intervention in the neighborhoods, allowed me to identify the dynamics of associativity of the residents during the origin and trajectory of each of the neighborhoods. To evaluate the level of incrustation of criminal actors in community dynamics, I used ethnographic data collected during my fieldwork, interviews with social leaders and some members of drug trafficking gangs. In particular, I observed the type and depth of the ties in which social and criminal actors interacted based on whether they were more or less stable, whether they were based on the exchange of personal favors, whether gang members were perceived as a member of the community -neighbors- or outsiders, and the attendance and participation in community activities of each *población*.

Chapter II

A social-spatial theory of criminal governance in low-intensity societies

The literature on criminal governance has grown considerably in recent years. These studies helped us understand variations in criminal governance from the different relationships with the state, how crime is organized, and the structure of criminal groups. Despite this, there is still a need for a comprehensive social-spatial theory that can explain the nuances of criminal governance in low-intensity societies. In this chapter, I develop my argument to explain the emergence of divergent forms of social order. While the preferences of criminal groups are essential to shaping the social order in the areas they control, my theory holds that space and the inhabitants are not neutral according to how they interact with traffickers to regulate each other's behaviors, as well as the form in which social order emerges and unfolds. The theory draws our attention to two variables: the social density of communities and the embeddedness of drug trafficking organizations. Different combinations of these variables make it more likely for inhabitants to deploy or not their authority as much as possible and be capable of regulating each other's behaviors and establishing sanctions. On the other hand, the theory illustrates the different long-term processes and mechanisms by which housing policies led communities to build or undermine their capacities to shape and govern their territories.

The first section of this chapter lays out the core concepts that underpin the variations in social order. The second section elucidates the logical framework of the argument, demonstrating how the interplay between the social density of communities and

the embeddedness of drug trafficking organizations gives rise to different orders. The third section outlines the specific conditions under which the argument is expected to hold.

1. Key variables

The Social density of communities

The emerging literature on criminal governance has begun to pay attention to how the inhabitants of territories under criminal control can affect the governance schemes deployed by these groups (E. D. Arias, 2017, 2019; E. D. Arias & Barnes, 2016; Magaloni, Franco-Vivanco, et al., 2020; Moncada, 2020, 2021b). Building on insights from the civil war literature (Arjona, 2016; Arjona et al., 2015; Kaplan, 2017), these studies have shed light on the essential role of communities in securing or challenging the territorial control achieved by criminal organizations. However, the capacity of civilians will depend on the characteristics of community organizations and their ability to mobilize resources that put the sustainability of criminal groups' operations at risk.

Communities are not necessarily passive or powerless. They are actors with agency with their interests and resources to influence the social order that emerges. The critical element is that their resources derive from what I call the social density of communities. Social density refers to situations in which a community is cohesive and maintains significant interactions through its members, authorities, and self-assigned local institutions. In addition, there are procedures for aggregating preferences and incorporating new information and collective strategies for their organizations to maintain democratic decision-making power over the day-to-day affairs of the community and, especially, can survive over time.


Traditionally, the role of communities has been extensively explored through social capital (Buonanno et al., 2009; Putnam, 1993). Social capital refers to “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1993). Alternatively, some works have used the

systemic model of community social organization. It conceptualizes the local community as a complex system of friendship, kinship networks, and formal and informal associational ties rooted in family life and ongoing socialization processes (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Kornhauser, 1969; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2001). However, despite their wide use, both approaches have been unable to offer a clear differentiation on how many levels of social capital are required for communities to be equipped to cope with situations that undermine the well-being of their members. My definition of social density adheres to this tradition. However, it pushes the model one step further by incorporating some characteristics that allow us to observe when we are in the presence of a community with high or low levels of social density. It highlights an essential aspect of communities' vitality and ability to endow themselves with local structures and institutions, mechanisms for aggregating preferences, and clearly defined authority roles. In other words, without these characteristics, we cannot capture the enormous variation among communities, limiting our understanding of their role in shaping criminal governance schemes.

Social density can vary depending on how strengthened the community's characteristics are. A community has a high social density when four elements are observed together. First, the community has endowed itself with its own effective organizations that all its members widely recognize. Thus, an organization is effective when it retains sufficient power to enable it to implement its own decisions and enforce its obligations to its constituents.⁵ Second, there are clear lines of authority and decision-making bodies for community affairs. Third, the community is cohesive and maintains a significant number of daily interactions. These interactions give its members a sense of certainty that they can count on their neighbors to act collectively. Fourth, its organizations and leaders are recognized as the figureheads of the community to external actors. Figure 2.1 summarizes the variation in the social density of communities.

⁵ This idea is similar to the notion of community autonomy developed by Kaplan (2017).

Figure 2.1 Characteristics of community social density.



In turn, variation in the social density of communities results from state-driven housing policies. As I will show in the next section, the decisions of the political authorities and the nature of housing policies produce long-term effects on the socio-spatial configurations of *poblaciones* (Section 2. The arguments)

The embeddedness of drug trafficking organizations

The level of embeddedness of drug trafficking organizations in the territories where they operate is the second key variable in the theoretical argument. It refers to how the inhabitants of a *población* identify themselves as community members, criminal or not, which is usually marked by having been born and raised in the community. Additionally, it refers to the sense of belonging possessed by its members, the possibility of rooting their identities in the territory, its shared experiences, histories, and collective memories, and the predisposition of individuals to invest in their communities. Therefore, embeddedness acts as a kind of status marker, a kind of citizenship of the *población*, a category of belonging deeply connected to the place and to the dense network of social relations, identity, and normative structures of the territory⁶.

Other studies have explored the importance of place of residence as a key factor influencing individuals' attitudes and behavior toward crime (Hawley, 1950; Hunter, 1974; Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Sampson et al., 1997; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2001). These studies are based on the basic ideas of the ecological paradigm of criminology, which assumes that the environment in which social subjects are inserted influences their predisposition to crime and, particularly, the capacity of communities to reduce this behavior among their members. In a more recent version of this approach, Stuart and Taylor (2021) refer to the concept of social connectedness to differentiate the peer effect from the shared root linked to the place of origin. According to these authors, social connectedness could directly reduce crime by increasing the probability that a criminal is identified and punished, helping individuals find jobs, increasing the stock of cognitive and non-cognitive

⁶ De Souza (2021) explores this idea based on the concept of Cria Pride in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

skills that boost earnings in the non-crime labor market, or promoting anti-crime norms is analogous to social cohesion among older individuals that stems from a shared birth town (Stuart and Taylor 2019, 9). While significant progress has been made, this research has underestimated the effect that shared social roots have on the behavior of criminal organizations already established in the territories. The reason is quite simple: it is assumed that the probability of criminal behavior is reduced in the presence of a high level of social connectedness or long residence in the territories.

In this sense, the proposed definition of embeddedness of drug trafficking organizations seeks to fill this gap. In doing so, it recognizes the broad tradition initiated by the work of Janowitz (1974) and Sampson (1988). However, it expands on the effect that socialization and territorial rooting processes have on attitudes and associational ties in criminal organizations. The primary hypothesis derived from this conceptualization is that embeddedness is an essential factor that (de)activates the adherence of criminal groups to the identities, habitual forms of relationships, and normative structures in the territory where they carry out their illegal activities. Thus, the embeddedness of criminal groups allows us to explore how criminal and civilian inhabitants can produce a kind of common knowledge. The creation of this common knowledge facilitates intra-community social relations and fosters commitment and reciprocity among its members. It provides a deep connection to the place and to stay in it.


The condition of having been born and/or raised in a territory is a particular characteristic of the idea of embeddedness. It assumes that inhabitants acquire a special status of "insiders" that would promote adherence to the system of norms and codes of the place through shared socialization processes. In contrast, those new residents or "outsiders" would lack such processes that shape the deeply territorialized shared identities and relationships of friendship, kinship, and experience that connect older residents. Therefore, this characteristic establishes a first condition for observing the variation in the embeddedness of criminal organizations in communities. Thus, a high level of embeddedness of drug traffickers is marked by four characteristics. First, a deep sense of belonging to the neighborhood, its shared experiences, values, and social codes. Second, a strong identity is rooted in the place that is not disruptive to the identity shared by the rest

of the inhabitants. Thirdly, mutual recognition of the neighborhood's inhabitants as residents of the place. Fourth, being local or insider based on birth or raised in the neighborhood.

The long-term effect of housing policies also determines the variation in the embeddedness of criminal organizations. As I will show in the next section and in Chapters III and IV, the type of production of space, social or market-based, profoundly influences how settlers arrive in the territories and decide to anchor their life projects there.

Finally, through the interaction between different levels of social density of communities and the embedding of drug trafficking organizations, it is possible to observe the formation of criminal social orders. The joint presence of the two dimensions of community structures seeks to reinforce the idea of the conditionality of social order. In other words, without considering the variation in the levels of embeddedness of criminal groups in communities, we would not be able to understand why two *poblaciones* with similar levels of social density have divergent social orders.

Figure 2.2 Characteristics of embeddedness of drug trafficking organization.



2. The arguments

In this section, I develop my argument to explain when and why divergent forms of criminal social orders are more likely to emerge. Although criminal groups have a solid incentive to shape the social order unilaterally in their areas of operation, my theory argues that they are, in fact, unable to do so without considering the socio-spatial configuration of the territory and its communities. To theorize how residents and drug trafficking organizations interact, shaping each other's behavior as well as the form of social order in which they live, it is necessary to consider how the intersection between social density and the level of embeddedness of criminal groups in communities modifies the preferences and strategies that each actor pursues for their optimal governance scheme. The logic of the argument shows that housing policies for the popular sectors have long-term effects on the socio-spatial characteristics of the territories, mainly by initiating a series of causal events that lead to the bifurcation of the two critical dimensions of the community structure that explain the different social orders. Figure 2.3 summarizes the pathways and the mechanisms of the argument.

Conditionality the plural social order on the structure of the community

I start by assuming that criminal groups and residents are equally interested in establishing their rule over the *población* where they have a presence. However, their ability to shape the type of social order that will emerge is a function of two factors: the social density of communities and the embeddedness of drug trafficking organizations. First, in communities with high social density, residents have the resources to resist or threaten criminal groups in the face of governance arrangements that threaten their well-being, their own institutions, and the pre-existing normative regime. In these cases, residents have bargaining powers recognized by criminal organizations, and a co-produced social order is more likely to be established if criminal members are embedded in the *población*. However, in areas where criminal groups do not have a sense of belonging to the neighborhood and do not identify themselves as members of the *población*, given their status as born or raised in the neighborhood, drug trafficking organizations will prefer to

establish their own dominance and, for their part, residents will be willing to defend their position and local institutions. The result is a competitive social order.

Second, in neighborhoods where local institutions are weakened or non-existent, and their organizations and leaders are not recognized as the community's figureheads in the eyes of external agents, criminal groups will prefer to shape the social order unilaterally. However, the social contract that emerges will depend on the level of rootedness that criminal groups have with the community. On the one hand, if the traffickers are inhabitants of the community and have an identity rooted in the territory, it is more likely that a criminal social order will emerge. In these cases, criminal groups will decide to invest resources and co-opt or establish community organizations under their control in order to legitimize their presence in the territory in the long term. On the other hand, if the members of the criminal organization are external to the community and, therefore, do not share common experiences and socialization codes with its inhabitants, it is to be expected that traffickers will decide to use physical violence or the threat of it as the primary means to shape daily interactions. The result is a violent social order. In these cases, the criminal groups know that the inhabitants do not have the resources to modify the criminal organization's behavior, and the latter has no incentive to negotiate the criminal governance scheme with the inhabitants.

The logic of the conditionality of the plural social order on community structure is that regardless of the organizational density of the communities, its effect is mediated by the level of embeddedness of criminal gangs in them. In this sense, the Padre Demetrio and Santa Elena neighborhoods have long and historic organizational traditions that allow them to have solid and similar associative structures. However, the social order that emerges in each differs substantially because of the level of embeddedness of the criminal actors. First, the DTO is highly embedded in the community structure insofar as they are native neighbors of the *poblaciones* –mainly children or grandchildren of the founding generations of the neighborhood– who recognize and act within the institutions and social codes that the residents themselves have imposed on themselves to resolve their disputes or social needs. Additionally, social leaders and criminal actors share socialization processes –school, upbringing within the neighborhood, friendship, kinship ties, etc.– that favor the

construction of more flexible connections for the mutual transmission of norms, values, and preferences about the social order based on the codes of conduct transmitted between generations of residents. In contrast, in Santa Elena, the drug trafficking gang is an outsider group –regardless of whether some of its members were recruited from among the residents– that carries its own codes of conduct. The lack of pre-established social networks makes it difficult for criminal and social actors to maintain collaborative connections or work together to achieve mutual or interdependent goals. Finally, it may be more costly for social leaders to build or maintain relationships with these groups, given the nature of their activities.

Analytically, based on the interaction between organizational density and the level of embeddedness of criminal actors in the communities, as two dimensions of social structure, four ideal types of social orders are produced at the neighborhood level. Table 2.1 summarizes the argument, and Figure 2.3 shows the causal paths and the long-term effects of housing policy on social order.

Table 4. Type of order at the neighborhood level

		Density of social organization	
		Low	High
Embeddedness of DTOs	High	Co-opted Order	Co-constructed Order
	Low	Violent Order	Competitive Order

Source: Own elaboration

First, a *Violent and disorganized Order* is produced in areas with criminal gangs that are not integrated into the community and are perceived as threats to their members and where the social organization is absent or weakened. In this type of order, the DTOs are actors that do not have any link with the inhabitants of the *poblaciones*, and the members of the criminal organization are alien to the community. The DTOs' behavior is oriented towards maximization of the resources they can extract from their market share. The preferred tool that DTOs have to regulate the behavior of community members is selective and indiscriminate violence. In these cases, the use or threat of physical violence is a strategic response by criminal groups in at least three ways. First, traffickers and residents recognize criminals' powerful position in the *población* and their ability to shape the social order. Thus, drug trafficking organizations are not willing to share their rule. Second, if the *pobladores* prefer to restrain the arrangement of criminal governance, they still lack the capacity to do so. Thirdly, the criminal organization is oriented to use its coercive power, whereas not using it may provide *pobladores* organizations with considerable signs to seek to improve conditions and redress grievances generated by persistent territorial control and illicit operations under their neighborhood. Therefore, the criminal organization opts for the use of violence, as its ongoing and open use prevents the emergence of alternative modes of social control, inhibits the formation of civic groups and vigilantism, and is more cost-effective due to the high turnover of neighborhood residents that discourages the investment of resources in a more legitimate governance structure.

Second, a *Co-opted Social Order* emerges in some neighborhoods where gangs are integrated into the community insofar as they are recognized as a stable member of it, and inhabitants do not have a solid organization. In this type of neighborhood, drug trafficking gangs often recruit local residents to become part of their organization or to collect valuable information that will allow them to ensure the success of their illicit operations. To this end, they can selectively distribute benefits to those who collaborate and punish deviations in the conduct of the community's inhabitants. In addition, the absence of solid and permanent associative dynamics over time encourages DTOs to form their own community organizations or co-opt existing ones without significant difficulties. The objective is to make the production and maintenance of social order more efficient while reducing the use of violence as a mechanism for social regulation of the territories. The basic hypothesis

derived from this order is that the neighborhood status of the members of the criminal organization influences their preference for social order in two ways. First, by altering attitudes and behavior towards the community (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Sampson 1988), particularly by constraining the use of violence as the principal means of securing territorial control. Second, it redirects the interest in long-term territorial control toward seeking civil obedience, cooperation, and spontaneous support. All mechanisms that allow it to acquire greater legitimacy and encourage stable adherence to its authority.

Third, in some neighborhoods, a *Competitive Order* emerges. In these places, the social order results from the interaction between a strong community with an active and recognized role by the residents and a low embeddedness of DTOs. The Competitive Order is characterized by the overlapping of governance regimes and the instability of the rules used to govern territories. Criminal and social actors dispute the establishment of norms and inhabitants' groups over which they can exercise their authority. Social leaders have sufficient resources to regulate some aspects of neighborhood social life in those groups of residents unattractive to criminal actors: children and the elderly. The traffickers, on the other hand, control the behavior of adults and youth and have the capacity to extend it to the rest of the residents through the use of selective violence. The outsider characteristic of the DTO is a disincentive for creating structured negotiation channels by increasing the costs for social leaders to cooperate with criminal gangs that are perceived as invaders of the territory and the pre-existing social order. In these cases, the community has the capacity to resist and threaten the control that the criminal organization seeks to exert over the territory. The social leaders are supported by the community, which tries to safeguard its pre-existing normative order. In turn, the criminal groups recognize this capacity on the part of the community but are willing to confront their residents through massive acts of intimidation and predatory attitudes towards their victims in terms not only of using violence but also as a strategy of selective domination that weakens the community authorities in their efforts to resist them. In short, this social order is characterized by the competition of two normative and authority regimes in a dispute over regulating social life within a territory.

Finally, the *Co-production of Social Order* is characterized by collaboration and mutual regulation of the behaviors of both actors. In this type of order, criminal gangs are fully embedded into the community, their members belong to the neighborhood, and their leaders maintain regular channels of communication and negotiation with social leaders. The internal or insider origin of the criminal gangs helps reduce the costs in the processes of daily interaction with residents, especially social leaders who have no major restrictions to expose the ties they maintain with DTO members to the rest of the neighborhood inhabitants. At the same time, both actors have been socialized based on the value of the social organization as an inherent element of the neighborhood and its formation and recognized the normative pre-established. The intergenerational legitimacy of the popular organization allows its current leadership to have a certain degree of autonomy to negotiate aspects of the local social order and to be connected to drug traffickers mostly through horizontal ties. Therefore, I argue that criminal groups and residents have incentives to establish a co-produced social order to any other order because they have strategically aligned themselves to achieve mutual objectives and guarantee obedience, voluntary cooperation, and spontaneous support in the long run.

The key dimension of the argument is how divergences in community structures produce different social orders. Differences in the social density and embeddedness of drug trafficking organizations alter both the preferences that criminal actors and residents have over the governance scheme, as well as their ability to shape and sustain it over time. In this sense, if communities possess associative capacities, local organizations, and institutions, it is expected that they will be motivated to protect their governance structures from disruptive actors. However, this capacity will depend on whether or not the traffickers are inhabitants of the territory and share strong socialization ties with the rest of the residents. In the former cases, it is more likely that both groups will make an effort to agree on a mutually beneficial social contract in which the pre-existing governance structure acts as the legitimate framework within which the actors interact and negotiate new aspects of the social order. In the latter case, where criminal groups are not rooted in the community structure, it is likely that each group prefers its own governance scheme and is unwilling to collaborate in establishing common norms that allow them to regulate their interactions and

behavior. The dispute over the dominant social contract results in a juxtaposed social order depending on who exercises authority in each dimension of social life in the territory.

Additionally, the social order that emerges is reinforced by a situation of equilibrium between the capacities and interactions that actors perform according to their level of social density and the embeddedness of the drug trafficking organization. The idea of balance is like the one used by Bergman (2018, p. 17), where it is highlighted that the strategic actions pursued by one or more actors who interact frequently, it leaves as a result, a scenario that reflects the best strategy for each of them depending on the decisions made by the others. The key to equilibrium is that it creates the expectation that there is no better social order given the resources available to them. It, therefore, creates incentives for actors to continue to interact in the same way they have in previous iterations.

Thus, in the co-produced social order, criminals and residents prefer to continue interacting based on the mutually agreed scheme. The residents, although they may prefer to keep their position intact, given the strength of their organizations, manage to recognize that cooperation with the criminal group brings them benefits and improvements to their collective well-being, particularly policing. Additionally, they are aware that the local criminal group recognizes the social codes and authority system of the *población* and that they will maintain adherence to these norms and, therefore, are preferable to any other criminal organization that may settle in the territory. In turn, criminals are aware that altering the pre-existing normative regime would generate resistance from the inhabitants and weaken their position as legitimate members of the *población*. In addition, they would not be able to benefit from the dense community network that allows them to exercise informal control over the territory and obtain valuable information for their operations.

The equilibrium in the case of the competitive social order differs completely. The strategic actions pursued by each actor do not seek to maximize their profits but rather to keep costs and risks as low as possible. Both *pobladores* and the drug trafficking organization are aware that the other has resources that threaten their survival and authority in the territory. Thus, each is limited in the actions it can take based on the decisions of the other. On the one hand, the villagers may be oriented to develop mechanisms of peaceful

coexistence with the traffickers that allow them to maintain some levels of autonomy in community affairs and the relevance of their institutions. However, they know that any such approach may be seen as a sign of weakness on the part of *pobladores* and members of the criminal organization. On the other hand, traffickers could reduce the use of coercive means and develop capital-intensive control actions. However, they recognize that these could provide residents with debilitating signals that drive organized residents to seek to improve conditions and redress grievances generated by the persistence of territorial control and illicit operations in their *población*. In other words, neither of the two actors is willing to seek alternatives that would reduce the confrontation over the normative and authoritative control of the *población*.

In the co-opted social order, equilibrium is produced by the expectations that the actors have about the future returns of maintaining interactions in the same way. Residents are aware of the fragmentation of the social fabric of their community and the high costs of attempting to build an autonomous social organization. In addition, they identify that the criminal group has become an influential actor in community affairs by co-opting weakened local organizations and, above all, by distributing access to jobs, goods, and services that are mediated by the drug trafficking organization. Opposition carries material penalties and even selective coercion. For their part, members of the criminal organization choose to capture community associations as it allows them to shape efficient control of the *población* through the influence of the discourses and expectations of future benefits that residents can derive from the gang's sustained presence in the community. A positive reputation can foster spontaneous cooperation, emotional responses aligned to their objectives, and, above all, commitment in the form of silence.

Finally, in the violent social order, equilibrium is produced by the search for reduction of resources used to shape the social order that both parties develop. Residents avoid being objects of reprisals and coercive actions by the gang, so they are willing to look the other way and remain silent about illicit activities on a permanent basis. For their part, traffickers want to reduce the investment of resources needed to secure control over the territory and, therefore, operate as efficiently as possible. To this end, they are willing to selectively employ violence so as not to capture the attention of the state. In addition, given

the characteristics of the *población* where this type of order is most likely to emerge - low social density, trafficking organizations not rooted in the neighborhood, and high turnover of residents, traffickers have strong incentives to continue exercising their control through the use of violent means. Particularly, given that temporary mobility operates as a barrier to developing kinship ties and widespread local associative ties, the criminal group has no incentive to form community organizations that would allow it to shape a legitimate social contract without the use or threat of violence. Thus, the selective use of violence is a more efficient way to structure order in the *población*.

The long-term consequences of housing policy on social orders: socio-spatial conditions of criminal governance

State policies on the issue of housing for the poorest are a persistent factor in the Global South and have enduring legacies on the community structures adopted by popular neighborhoods. Building on Lessing (2021), I assume that criminal governance is "shaped by" state power as it substantially affects criminal groups' incentives and capacities to govern. However, I extend this argument to social actors and the way in which *poblaciones* acquire durable characteristics, both in their organizational dynamics and in the embeddedness of various groups more or less recognized by the inhabitants of each popular neighborhood.

I start by assuming that space is not an empty and neutral entity. It is a product of the social relations of each time and, in turn, a generator of new social conditions (Lefebvre 1974). In this sense, space acquires a pervasive physical and social configuration according to the nature of the housing policy of each historical moment. At times, housing policy encourages insurgent forms of urbanization of the periphery (Caldeira, 2017), while at others, it discourages the protagonism of the *pobladores*. In the former, a mode of production of space predominates in which its residents build their homes and neighborhoods and become citizens and political agents during this process. In the latter, housing policy is dominated by market logics that profoundly affect how residents inhabit

space. In them, residents are conceived as secondary actors without agency in the planning and organization of homes, neighborhoods, and space.

I argue that housing policies play a crucial role in varying the dimensions of the social structure of communities. I identify three housing policies between 1965 and 1990 in Chile that acted as critical junctures: the '*Operación Sitio*' of 1965, the '*Política de Erradicación de Campamentos*' during the Alessandri Rodríguez and military dictatorship, and the '*Policy of subsidizing demand*' in the first years of the democratic transition. Each of these public policies triggers a series of events with long-term consequences crucial to understanding the variation in the social density and embeddedness of drug trafficking organizations and, indirectly, the types of criminal social orders. First, the recognition and opportunities for *pobladores* to constitute themselves as a pervasive social actor over time are enhanced or eliminated. Secondly, poor neighborhoods' morphology incentivizes criminal actors to decide to operate in those places. Third, the social connectedness of the inhabitants and their ability to create a collective identity among all its members rooted in the neighborhoods. This connection endures across generations and allows criminal gang members to identify as community members. Fourth, it encourages informal social control practices among their inhabitants and their neighborhoods.

The provision of affordable housing is a pervasive concern in the Global South (Gil 2019, Caldeira 2000, 2017; Castells 1983; Pérez 2022). Chile has been no exception. The explosive urban growth experienced by Chilean society in the first half of the twentieth century led the low-income neighborhood to demand responses from the State to ensure living conditions and access to housing. In this process, the settlers shaped a novel social movement with which they became key political actors. However, the way in which governments responded to their demands reinforced, in some cases, their capacity for collective action and for governing the territories where they built their homes and neighborhoods. In other cases, housing policy was aimed at limiting or preventing the politicization of the inhabitants and their protagonism as producers of urban space. In its most extreme form, housing policy during Pinochet's authoritarian regime ceased to conceive of housing as a social right that could be politically demanded, and informal settlements were redefined based on the concept of poverty and housing marginality

(Abufhele, 2019). In this sense, I argue that the different representations of housing policies reflect the conflictive processes whereby the State seeks to establish governmental control mechanisms and prevent an overflow of its institutions in the face of the demand for the right to housing of the urban poor.

These experiences allow us to understand the nature and representation of the political actions promoted by different governments in Chile since the second half of the twentieth century regarding the demands for housing solutions for low-income sectors. Initially, during the Frei (1964 - 1970) and Allende (1970 - 1973) governments, the massive land seizures, the self-construction of informal settlements, and the collective mobilization of the settlers led the governments to recognize this practice of urbanization of the periphery. The result was a housing policy called “Operación Sitio”, which gave new impetus to the collective action of the *pobladores* and forced the state to design housing policies that formalized the self-construction of housing and neighborhoods. This policy encouraged the urban poor to identify themselves as part of a social movement and to endow themselves with a collective subjectivity as inhabitants, referred to as producers of space, with deeply shared beliefs, values, and memories of the struggle for their space in the construction of the city. Thus, this housing policy encouraged popular associativity as a valid alternative for access to housing and homeownership. Its long-term consequence is the creation of a social musculature and a complex system of autonomous community institutions that are key to how residents can react to the irruption of criminal groups in their territory. A kind of "adverse possession" (Murphy, 2021) that encouraged the emergence of alternative forms of territorial power or popular governance and allowed residents to develop their own legitimate mechanisms to resolve internal disputes within the *población*.

In contrast, in a second moment, during the government of Alessandri Rodríguez (1858 - 1864) and the authoritarian regime of Pinochet (1973 - 1989), housing policy for low-income sectors was characterized by three central issues that undermined the ability of the *pobladores* to maintain themselves as a political actor and empowered to govern their neighborhoods. First, during the early years of the dictatorship, encampments and land takeovers as strategies to access housing were prohibited. These actions were accompanied

by military interventions in politically active encampments, arrests of their leaders, and plans to dismantle settler organizations (Garcés, 2002, 2013; Gil, 2019; Pérez, 2022). Secondly, a neoliberal principle was imposed aimed at reducing fiscal spending and focusing it on those groups that, given their low income levels, could not participate in the market by their own means (Minvu 2004). This redirection of social spending forced the authoritarian regime to identify the most "needy" families through the application of new instruments designed to meet this objective, such as the Extreme Poverty Map and the Social Stratification Cards or CAS Cards (Ramos 2016; Valdés 1986). Finally, the settlers were relocated from the central areas to the peripheries of the city through a program called "eradication", which, between 1979 and 1985, displaced more than 30,000 families living in camps (Hidalgo, 2002).

Although the repression of the encampments was aimed at dismantling the political and social organizations already existing among the settlers, and the settlers were forced to move to the peripheries of the city, the results of this policy were dissimilar. In most cases, relocation achieved its objectives. However, some of these settlements were able to maintain a communitarian logic, mainly motivated by the preservation of their identities as members of excluded urban communities. Thus, although the relocated settlers were unable to preserve identities and political projects, they managed to retain adequate levels to manage their territories, particularly those of low interest to the market, and to deploy collective actions during the waves of protest in 1983 and after the return to democracy. In addition, relocation sometimes took place within the same commune of the *pobladores* or they were settled on the same land through the provision of sanitary infrastructure (Minvu 2004, 2013).

In the third moment, during the first governments of the Concertación Aylwin (1990 – 1994) and Frei (1994 – 2000), housing policy deepened the process of depoliticization of residents' organizations and gave structure to a "contained social demand" (Minvu 2004, 231), understood as a policy as opposed to that of politically articulated organizations oriented towards negotiation with the state (Minvu 2004, 23). The housing subsidy policy was oriented towards disarticulating the inhabitants as a social subject through a new government technology that allowed the allocation of a direct monetary transfer to each

family group and handed over to the private sector the primary responsibility for the construction of social housing and residential space. In this way, the new settlements were no longer politically articulated collective actions, and the requirements of the inhabitants for housing solutions were described as a “passive demand” that could be met through institutional channels and mechanisms.

This type of policy has multiple effects on the capacity of residents to regulate their territories and community social life. In the first place, it displaces the inhabitants as active subjects in the process of building their neighborhoods. Secondly, by inhibiting and discouraging collective dynamics for access to housing, a new locus of assistance and profoundly individual in the way in which the new residents conceive life in their neighborhoods is configured. Cooperation and active involvement are no longer necessary to satisfy social assistance requirements, much less to solve common problems. Third, delivering housing subsidies without a territorial logic to their beneficiaries gave rise to new neighborhoods for low-income sectors of the alluvial type. This type of housing solution is characterized by a fragmented composition, an unresolved identity uprooted from the territory, and permanent renewal of its residents after short periods of stay of its inhabitants. Finally, the process of disarticulation of the social fabric that the inhabitants had managed to accumulate is consolidated. All these characteristics prevent the new inhabitants from developing a vigorous musculature with their own organizations capable of asserting their conditions at the moment of shaping the social order in their neighborhoods.

In addition, housing policies influence the socio-spatial configuration that neighborhoods adopt. I call this the effect of social or market production of space. And I argue that it produces two long-term consequences for residents interacting with and in physical space. First, it affects the preferences that social and criminal actors have about the development of illicit operations in a given territory. Second, it impacts the emergence and quality of informal social control mechanisms that its inhabitants can deploy.

Regarding preferences for the development of illicit activities. I argue that the physical or morphological characteristics adopted by the neighborhoods alter the social

hierarchies and the use of certain community spaces, thus establishing prohibited spaces for drug trafficking and consumption or others that are optimal for developing such activities. In the case of the self-construction housing programs, a spatial arrangement called 9x18 was favored. This typology of peripheral urbanization is characteristic of the emblematic neighborhood built in Chile since the 1960s. According to urban planners and historians, this way of configuring space favors a more fluid daily interaction among residents by blurring the boundaries between the private, the communal, and the public domains, which juxtapose and reciprocally reinforce each other (Holston 2013; Murphy AA; Schalack 2019; Skewes 2001). In its physical form, such *poblaciones* are characterized by an organization of streets in regular grids, primarily open and homogeneous. This configuration of the physical form promotes that the roads have different speeds and enables areas suitable for pedestrians and others for vehicles. Also, the functional configuration of 9x18 neighborhoods contemplates a network of public spaces of different scales with non-residential destinations. The green areas, community equipment, and commercial areas are structured from the lot and other elements of the urban form of the space.

The key to this physical form or morphology of the neighborhood is that it materializes the functional aspects and the predominant social relations of community life and how its inhabitants appropriate this space (Conzen 1960). Thus, in them, the inhabitants are able to prioritize in which places they can tolerate the emergence of practices far from the social codes of the community and, in case of deviations, establish sanctions.

In turn, the market-driven spatial production process opted for a location of social housing and a physical configuration that will maximize the profitability of private builders responsible for housing projects. The increase in the value of land and the reduced availability of land have encouraged the real estate and construction industry in charge of social housing projects to produce housing solutions in degraded areas of the urban periphery where people do not want to stay. In practice, this housing policy has encouraged the expulsion of the urban poor from the city and the formation of segregated and highly fragmented neighborhoods. Therefore, a residential and socio-spatial design guided by profitability criteria for the construction companies was privileged.

The construction of the space based on the market left an extraordinarily rudimentary architecture: apartments of no more than 36 square meters that are organized linearly around parallel blocks that generate an interior space of no more than 4 meters wide. Each line of apartments is connected to each other by a central staircase that saves on vertical circulation but at the same time divides the space in between and reduces the possibilities for the inhabitants to use the space. Circulations are linear, with no containment spaces for community meetings or social interaction. The absence of architectural support elements or urban furniture makes the collective appropriation of the interior space even more difficult. Additionally, the physical configuration limits a continuous and natural flow of residents, both within the neighborhood and through the apartment blocks. This configuration often reduces the natural demarcations between public and semi-public spaces and their functions. It particularly reorients the transit and development of the daily activities of the residents towards other areas of the neighborhood, not integrated into their homes. On the other hand, the complex and narrow network of internal streets that connect the apartment blocks are ideal places for the transaction of drugs and other illicit activities.

The block design of the housing units of the subsidy programs based on demand encourages the fragmentation of the social fabric and hinders the homogeneous appropriation of all the territories of the neighborhood. Each block is constituted as a co-ownership with the capacity to decide, without consulting the rest of the neighborhood, on matters pertaining to its micro-space. On the one hand, this physical distribution of the blocks reproduces a sort of archipelago of residential units that makes it difficult to build reciprocal trust beyond each block. Regarding social control, some blocks manage to accumulate conditions that favor it. However, there is a spatial pattern in that the blocks located towards the outer edges of the *población* achieve this condition to a greater extent. On the other hand, the areas destined for community facilities are located on the periphery of the *población* and separated by roads. Informal social controls, such as self-regulation, mutual supervision, and other routine behaviors that shape the codes of coexistence, are related to the physical characteristics of the neighborhood, particularly by encouraging collective actions to maintain the social cohesion of the residents. Finally, in these housing projects, the space is standardized in size, use, and distribution, and, above all, its function

is exclusively residential. The implication of the latter is that the new residents must inhabit a space in which they have no influence over the type of spatial characteristics and use of the various spaces in the neighborhood.

In short, the main idea that housing policies have long-term effects on the structure of communities implies, then, that empirically, we must pay attention to the foundational moments of neighborhoods. These constitute milestones that give course to multiple routes on how residents acquire, reinforce, or atrophy collective capacities that allow them to shape autonomous governance and authority schemes that will be key to coexisting with criminal organizations.

3. Scope conditions

Criminal governance schemes often lead to the creation of criminal social order in virtually all contexts in which DTOs carry out their illicit activities. Such dynamic seems present in countries with diverse levels of participation in the drug business (production, transit, commercialization). The theory I propose applies to all societies that are facing the initial stages of consolidation of the local drug market motivated by changes in the international illicit narcotics industry. An important scope condition, therefore, is that countries are transitioning from drug transit points to other international markets to sustainable local consumption and production points.

According to Luna and Feldmann (2023), the expansion of the drug market has reached new settings not usually associated with the industry such as Chile, Uruguay, and Perú, among others. These countries served primarily as distribution routes to cocaine and marijuana shipments to Australia, Africa, and Europe. This does not exclude internal consumption. However, recent years have seen changes in local drug trafficking dynamics driven by better prices and growing local consumption. In the Chilean case, the discovery of clandestine laboratories destined for the bulking and production of cocaine and synthetic drugs has experienced a significant rise from 2014 to date (Observatorio del Narcotráfico

de Chile 2016). Additionally, these countries have seen increased homicides and other criminal acts associated with drug trafficking.

These conditions presume changes in the dynamics of drug trafficking at the national level and anticipate new dynamics in how the DTOs operate in the territories. On the one hand, criminal organizations are adapting to these changes by adjusting their internal structures and have begun to acquire greater complexity and growing membership. This transformation has led them to move from small family gangs restricted to their place of origin to more sophisticated criminal syndicates capable of operating in different territories through more extensive criminal networks. On the other hand, DTOs must be motivated to secure their territorial control. To do so, they can resort to multiple factors, such as collusion pacts between state agents and criminal organizations, the intensive use of their coercive capacity, and the diversification of forms of interaction with communities. However, a crucial condition scope is that territorial control is not facing threats from external competitors that put its presence at risk. This characteristic does not exclude that DTOs may face competition for territorial control in the future and could generate alterations in the type of social order. But it does allow us to observe the initial conditions or the embryonic moment that explains the emergence of a criminal social order.

In this sense, Chile as a case study is an extraordinary opportunity to analyze how drug trafficking organizations promote actions to shape social order during the initial stages of their consolidation process. Such conditions have not been analyzed by the criminal governance literature and restrict our understanding of how criminal social order emerges and takes different forms. In other words, despite the significant contributions of this literature, the excessive focus on typical Latin American cases such as Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, we may face two problems. First, our findings have biases derived from the selection of the cases. Second, by design, our understanding of how criminal social order emerges may have been truncated to scenarios with DTOs with extraordinary capacities, such as those present in the typical cases mentioned above.

4. Existing approaches to crime and social order

In recent years, a growing research agenda has turned its attention to how criminal gangs govern and has become a key aspect in the study of politics and society in Latin America (E. D. Arias, 2017; Auyero & Sobering, 2019; “Criminal Governance and the Crisis of Contemporary Latin American States,” 2022; Magaloni, Franco-Vivanco, et al., 2020). This concern is, in part, a reaction to the rapid expansion and consolidation of violence and organized crime in some Latin American countries and other regions of the world.

The academic response has led to the development of rich literature on criminal governance, which has sought to explain the emergence of social orders from three approaches. In general terms, these approaches share the view that the regulation of social and territorial space by criminal actors is a substantive concern to ensure the execution of their operations and that through the distribution of goods and the establishment of formal and informal rules, they can shape the behavior of communities, members of their own organization and other criminal actors (Lessing, 2021). This existing research has provided us with crucial insights into the way in which criminal actors govern and the multiple vehicles they have at their disposal to shape the various schemes of social order.

One of the most popular explanations for variation in the criminal social order is the political economy approach, which establishes that social order can take various forms depending on the opportunities to capture illicit rents and revenues from the areas where criminal groups operate. On the one hand, the lack of state regulation to regulate disputes promotes a social order characterized by violence as a vehicle for resolving contractual problems, disciplining behavior, and eliminating competitors (Reuter, 1983, 2009; Reuter & Haaga, 1989). On the other hand, the characteristics of illegal markets can produce different criminal governance schemes depending on the type of goods, and the volumes of transactions and profits to be made. In both approaches, the logic is that profitable markets create incentives for criminals to protect their turf violently.

A variant of the political economy approach argues that the type of social order that emerges is related to the ability of criminal groups to exercise monopolistic control or

whether they must fight with rivals for territory (E. D. Arias, 2017; Díaz Cayeros et al., 2016; Lawrence, 2017; Mampilly, 2012; Moncada, 2021a). These studies are not a homogeneous approach, and only share the expectations of territorial control derived from Olson's (1993) seminal work on the time horizons that criminal actors have for investing in governance schemes. The first group of studies argues that the way in which crime is concentrated or fragmented into multiple competing factions produces variations in violent or peaceful social orders. Lawrence (2017), claims that dualities in the exercise of territorial control resulting from the presence of more than one gang in the same territory often result in hybrid forms of social and political order. In such cases, governance structures often overlap with each other, sometimes giving rise to complementary and sometimes contradictory forms. Similarly, Arias (2017) stated that four micro-level political order regimes are produced depending on the armed groups' structure, the number within a specific territory, and the levels of coordination between these groups. The second group of studies argues that the ultimate motivations of criminal groups can produce differences in the form of governance they establish in the territories under their control. Briceño-León, Barreira y Diógenes de Aquino (2022), based on a comparison between “Los Colectivos de Caracas” and the “Facções” of Fortaleza shows how the former seek to translate their political links with local government actors into economic benefits, while the factions seek to transform their economic resources into political power. This difference is not neutral in that an economic motivation promotes a predatory social order oriented to obtain as many financial resources as possible in their activities.

Economic explanations are successful in analyzing how changes in drug production and marketing produce variations in levels of violence, but they are limited in understanding the type of social order that emerges in contexts where violence is not of epidemic proportions and where criminal actors can diversify their strategies to secure their contractual problems.

A second explanatory corpus starts from a widely accepted assumption in the criminal governance literature that criminal actors do not seek to replace the social order (Kalyvas, 2015), but through various forms of involvement with state agents, they promote the emergence of social orders that allow them to guarantee the success of their operations

(E. D. Arias & Barnes, 2016; Auyero & Sobering, 2019; Lessing, 2018; Lessing & Willis, 2019; Snyder & Duran-Martinez, 2009). In this approach, the type and stability of interactions result in different criminal governance schemes in collusion with the state.

These studies focus on how state agents, politicians, and criminal organizations establish dynamics of cooperation and informal transactions over law enforcement or the provision of certain public services in exchange for material resources, information or to ensure a given social order (Auyero, 2007; Auyero & Sobering, 2019; Dewey, 2015; Dewey et al., 2017; Snyder & Duran-Martinez, 2009). These works have shown that the stability of state-sponsored protection rackets is key to maintaining the functioning of illicit markets in a peaceful manner. Duran-Martínez (2018), in an attempt to develop a unified approach, argues that the social order will be more or less violent based on the ability of actors to perceive whether the state has the necessary resources to attack them, or whether they can form state-sponsored protection networks.

Additionally, these studies have shown that the emergence of this type of alliance brings benefits in at least two ways. On the one hand, the state can provide itself with effective means to achieve stability and social peace —perverse— and regulate spaces where it may be unable or unwilling to govern. On the other hand, criminal organizations can benefit from reduced state repression and access to information about their challengers.

By bringing in the state as a central piece of the forms of criminal governance, we have been able to understand that criminal actors do not seek to establish exclusive forms of territorial control but rather depend on it and require it to ensure their control. According to Lessing (2021), the criminal governance schemes are embedded with the state in that their forms are responses to its definitions of criminality (born of), to the incentives set by government policies (shaped by), and to choices of those elements of social life in which the state should maintain its authority and those in which it is not.

However, despite advances, studies of the politics of crime tend to assume that communities are a kind of neutral scenario where illegal activities occur and where their inhabitants adopt a passive and resigned attitude in the face of the coercive power of these

groups. In other words, this approach relegates the agency and resources communities have to resist or negotiate some norms in local order-building processes.

A third and more recent approach is filling this gap (E. Arias, 2006; E. D. Arias & Barnes, 2016; E. D. Arias & Rodrigues, 2006; Arjona et al., 2015; Arjona, 2016; Magaloni et al., 2020; Moncada, 2020, 2021a). Building on community-based analysis and some insights from the civil war literature, these works are opening new avenues of inquiry into how social orders differ according to the multiple relationships that criminal groups establish with local residents. Although it is always possible for DTOs to rely on their coercive capacity to exercise their authority, not everything is violence for two reasons. First, under certain circumstances, it is more cost-effective for these groups to invest time and resources to strengthen their legitimacy among the inhabitants of a given territory (Felbab-Brown et al., 2017). And second, residents have their own interests and resources to influence the type of social order that emerges (Arjona et al., 2015; Moncada, 2021a).


My dissertation responds to this trend and goes one step further. To explain why plural criminal social orders, emerge in the peripheries of some cities, it is necessary to consider how community structures influence the decisions of criminal actors. Specifically, I focus on two factors that have not received much attention in criminal governance studies: the density of social organizations and whether criminal groups are homegrown or outsiders to the community. Through this, it is possible to enhance our understanding of how some communities are better equipped to resist attempts by criminal actors to impose a unilateral social order and, therefore, to assume an advantageous position in the process of creating social order at the neighborhood level.

Table 5. Summarizes the consequences of each type of housing policy.

Housing policy	Political orientation	Device	Actor	Mediation	Organizational density	Embeddness DTO
Operación Sitio	State recognition of housing demand	Delivery of land to organizations and subsidies for self-construction	Housing committees	Political parties and the Catholic Church	High and with intergenerational transmission mechanisms	High and with early integration into community dynamics
Plan de Erradicación de Campamentos	Disintegration of social organization	Relocation of settlements in peripheral areas	Family units	Army	Low or High depending on the delivery of subsidies or self-construction programs.	Low or High
Housing subsidy	Contained demand	Housing Subsidy	Family units or individual persons	Unmediated	Low and late articulation via state interventions	Low and with attempts to co-opt community dynamics.

Source: Own elaboration

Figure 2.3 The arguments: Pathways of criminal social orders in low-intensity society violence



Chapter III

Co-produced and Violent Social Order

“The relationship with this gang, in general, is not bad. We know that this will never end [drug trafficking] and that the only way we could solve some problems is to talk directly to the gang leader. I don't do it because I'm brave, but because we all know each other, and we have friendships. We grew up in this población and went to school together. I tell them: 'Stop it, don't do this, stop stealing here, or you're giving me a hard time. He [gang leader] gathers his people, delivers our message, and things improve (...) We both govern this territory, and there is respect between us.”

Social leader of *población* Padre Demetrio – Melipilla, June 2022.

“A few months ago, the police raided several apartments in the población. A few days later, the girlfriend of one of the arrested [traffickers] came to see me. She needed a certificate of residence for a procedure with her lawyer. I was doing that, and she told me they knew who sapeo [gave information to the police]. He pulled a piece of paper from the prosecutor's office showing where the calls had gone. They know everything. The only way for us to be calm is to look the other way.”

Social leader of *población* Padre Hurtado – Melipilla, June 2022.

The statements above exemplify responses I received while asking people to describe who govern in their neighborhood. Surprisingly, although in both *poblaciones* the drug trafficking organization "Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación" maintains illicit activities and they are separated by a street only a few meters wide, how the social order emerges and the form it assumes differs substantially. In Padre Demetrio, an emblematic neighborhood that emerged as a result of a housing policy in the late 1960s and that promoted the agency of the *pobladores* and the recognition of their right to housing through the land seizures, residents identify that community and DTO leaders, together,

are able to exercise their authority, establish sanctions and regulate the behavior of residents and criminal members. The result is a co-constructed social order. By contrast, in Padre Hurtado, a working-class neighborhood that emerged because of a subsidy-based housing policy in the 1990s, which fragmented the *pobladores* movement, suppressed the agency of the settlers, and increased competition among its members for housing, its inhabitants identify that the members of the DTO are the lords of the territory and are able through intensive use of violence, intimidation, and coercion to modify the behavior of the community. The result is a violent social order.

What explains this sharp variation? Under what conditions does a co-produced and violent type of social order emerge? Why are some communities more capable of sustaining stable informal agreements and practices to regulate the criminal behavior of drug trafficking organizations, and others are not? Why would the same drug trafficking organization accept that residents modify their behavior in one neighborhood and not in another? According to the theoretical argument developed in Chapter 2, the structure of communities can alter the preferences and capabilities of criminal actors concerning social order. On the one hand, communities may possess associative capacities and social codes that are stable and widely recognized by all their members, which are a significant resource for advancing or resisting territorial control. On the other hand, traffickers may be insider or outsider groups depending on the origin of their leaders and whether the DTO is perceived as a community member, independent of its illicit role in the drug market. The main argument is how, as social order is conditioned by community structure, residents and criminal actors can interact in multiple ways, more or less ritualized, to collaborate or not in the pursuit of mutual or interdependent objectives.

In this chapter, I use an in-depth study of two peripheral *poblaciones* in Melipilla, a municipality located in the western part of the Metropolitan Region and that it has a strategic location for the development of the drug industry in Chile. These two adjoining urban settlements share important characteristics that allow me to hold constant some key variables previously identified by the literature, and to take full advantage of the differences that arise when considering the long-term effects of the housing policy that gave rise to them. Each housing policy initiated a series of events that explain the bifurcation of the two dimensions of community structure, and the type

of interaction that communities maintain with DTO members. This divergence offers a unique opportunity to trace the long-term effects of housing policies on the form of social order that emerged several decades later when the “Jalisco Nueva Melipilla” took over the *poblaciones* Padre Hurtado and Padre Demetrio. The study, therefore, invokes the logic of “process-driven natural experiments” (Arjona 2016), in that causal inference is based in terms of a random event that affects units independently of their attributes and compares processes between two cases.

Conducting this study on these two *poblaciones* has several advantages. First, as I have explained above, the characteristics of DTOs, their location, and their relevance to the functioning of the local drug market cannot explain the differences in the social orders observed in each of the two communities. Second, the type and nature of housing policy allow us to contrast the sequence of events leading to the differences in social density and degree of embeddedness of the same DTO. Third, paying attention to community structure allows us to highlight how criminal governance schemes do not emerge in a vacuum. Instead, they respond to the socio-spatial conditions in which they are established.

Throughout each section of this chapter, I explain how each housing policy impacts the critical variables in the argument and how these interact to produce divergent social orders. Specifically, it shows the mechanisms by which different levels of social density and the embeddedness of the DTO in the community lead to a co-produced or violent social order. First, a housing policy during the administration of presidents Frei Montalva (1964-1970) and Allende (1970-1973) that was characterized by the recognition and regulation of “occupied” land [*tomas de terrenos*] and promoted the *pobladores* agency and shape to a new type of popular neighborhoods. Second, a housing policy that favored a “contained social demand” through the delivery of housing solutions based on the market, merit, and the savings capacity of each applicant for state subsidies.

The evidence comes from primary and secondary sources and fieldwork conducted in three waves between 2022 and 2023. In each one, I interviewed residents,

civic leaders, and local public officials who work directly in each *población*⁷. I reviewed official documents from the Chilean Ministry of Housing and Urbanism and the *Corporación de Vivienda* [Housing Corporation], historiographic material, and speeches from parliamentarians regarding the approval of housing solutions between 1965-1973 and 1990-2000.

The chapter is organized as follows. The first section provides general information about the “Jalisco Nueva Melipilla” and the local drug market. Also, it describes the strategic location of Melipilla for the narcotics production chain in Chile. The second section shows how governments and *pobladores* interacted to achieve housing solutions and explains the long-term consequences of each housing policy on the structure of communities and the socio-spatial characteristics of neighborhoods. The third section shows how different levels of organizational density and embeddedness of the DTO shape a co-produced or violent social order. Additionally, it shows the functioning of each type of criminal social order, the mechanisms for negotiating arrangements, and both actors' efforts to maintain the established social order. The fifth section concludes.

1. The “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación” and the local drug market

The “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación” has controlled the drug market in Padre Demetrio and Padre Hurtado since 2014 and has been extending its territorial control to the rest of the commune of Melipilla (Biobio, 2024; La Tercera, 2024). Its organizational structure is a family clan type, and according to data from the Chilean Investigative Police, the organization is composed of approximately 40 members (24 Horas TVN 2022).

The *poblaciones* Padre Demetrio and Padre Hurtado are among the leading operations centers of the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación”⁸. Three reasons explain

⁷ To protect the identities of participants, I did not use the names of residents and interviewees. The interviews and fieldwork followed the ethical research protocols authorized by the Ethics Committee of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile for research project No. 220330008.

⁸ For more information see: <https://www.latercera.com/nacional/noticia/detienen-en-melipilla-a-chileno-vinculado-al-cartel-jalisco-nueva-generacion-tenia-granada-otras-armas-y-12-millones-en-efectivo/U5DJ7C42TVAOJEXSAIVLJAQRU/#>

its strategic importance. First, it is a critical piece in the local drug market and is one of the points of greatest commercialization of the municipality (Fieldwork notes). The group has specialized in distributing cocaine, creepy marijuana, and *tusi*. The latter is produced in clandestine laboratories in the rural sectors of the province, such as Codigua and María Pinto, and marketed by its members in specific sectors of the *comuna*. An interview with a local micro-trafficker stated, “Padre Demetrio and other neighborhoods are the points of sale of *tusi*. Here in Melipilla, everyone knows that you must cross to the train line's other side [Location of Padre Demetrio and Padre Hurtado neighborhoods] if you want *tusi* or quality cocaine.” (Int. 12, July 2022).

Second, both *poblaciones* serve as a criminal organization's logistical hub. The Padre Hurtado and Padre Demetrio are where drugs are stockpiled and distributed to other areas of the commune and the western sector of the Metropolitan Region. According to the Provincial Presidential Delegate of Melipilla, Sandra Saavedra Löwenberger, “[The *poblaciones*] have a strategic location that allows it to enjoy quick access to the main access road to the port of San Antonio and the municipalities of Cerrillos, Lo Prado, Maipú, Pudahuel, Quinta Normal, Estación Central, and Cerro Navia. Both *poblaciones* are critical to the local commercialization and distribution of drugs entering from San Antonio Port.” (Int. 2, June 2022). The growing increase in the consumption of synthetic substances and new routes for bringing drugs into the country have turned the port of San Antonio and its surroundings into critical areas for the operation of the narcotics industry in Chile⁹.

Third, some of the leaders and criminal organization members are residents or have family ties with the inhabitants of the Padre Demetrio neighborhood. In the residents' narratives, they frequently refer to the traffickers as the “*niños*” or “*chiquillos*” and express their social connectedness (de Souza, 2021; Stuart & Taylor, 2021). As I will show, this “insider” condition enhances the socialization processes that govern the neighborhood's inhabitants and simplifies the interaction between the gang members and the rest of the community.

⁹ According to the 2023 edition of the report published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Chile is becoming a hotspot for the illegal movement of drugs and other prohibited substances, such as cocaine. This is because the usual transport routes have added the port of San Antonio, in the Valparaíso region, as a stopover before the drugs travel to Mexico and Europe. For more information see: https://www.unodc.org/res/WDR-2023/WDR23_ExSum_Spanish.pdf

2. The Collective or Individual Path in the Struggle for Housing: Emblematic or Alluvial Neighborhoods


“Operación Sitio” and demand subsidies have led to new popular neighborhoods that differ substantially. These policies were articulated around the organization's dynamics, the inhabitants' popular pressure, and their demand for housing solutions (Garcés, 2002, 2013; Murphy, 2021; Pérez, 2022). However, each policy leaves long-term legacies in the social structure of the communities that are critical for the formation of criminal governance schemes. First, through them, opportunities for *pobladores* to become permanent social actors over time are enhanced or eliminated. Second, it shapes the morphology of poor neighborhoods and encourages criminal actors to decide to operate in those places, as well as the capacity for informal social control that the residents themselves can deploy.

Permissive conditions in the struggle for housing in the late-twentieth century in Chile: Housing shortage and *pobladores* movement

Since the mid-twentieth century, like most of the Global South, Chile has faced explosive urban growth that has challenged the capacity of state institutions (Caldeira, 2017; Holston, 2008; Pérez, 2022). The demand for housing has been understood as a social right that must be guaranteed by the state, which must satisfy the urban poor's lack of residence and access to homeownership (Murphy, 2021). The magnitude of the housing deficit and the modes of collective action activated by the *pobladores* to fight for the right to housing and homeownership has been the permissive conditions that produce new political horizons on which the State responds to the *pobladores'* demand.

Between 1950 and 1992, Chile's urban population grew steadily from 5 million to more than 9.3 million (Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, 2004). So did the country's housing deficit. According to population census figures, the number of people living in precarious housing increased from 156,205 in 1952 to 888,681 in 1992, with a maximum of 1,030,828 in 1988. Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the urban population and the housing deficit according to two relative indicators: as a percentage of the total stock and per thousand inhabitants.

Figure 3.1. Evolution of the urban population and housing deficit in Chile




Source: Own elaboration based on Minvu (2004).

As in many other cities in the Global South, poor city dwellers of Chile engaged in different forms of activism as a way to access homeownership. Between the early 1950s and 1973, the *pobladores* conducted large-scale land seizures [*tomas*] in the urban peripheries, developed self-built neighborhoods, and organized to improve the conditions of their residential space. This resulted in a new type of popular neighborhood known as “*poblaciones emblemáticas*” (emblematic neighborhoods). However, since the return to democracy in Chile, residents have enrolled individually in housing subsidy programs, social interest neighborhoods have been built by the private sector, and beneficiary families have been forced to abandon their original neighborhoods to live in subsidized housing projects in the urban peripheries. The result is a neighborhood of low-income residents that is alluvial in its heterogeneous and uprooted composition.

The Padre Demetrio and Padre Hurtado neighborhoods tell this story and the permissive conditions that led their residents to take a collective or individual path in the struggle for the right to housing, and above all, how housing policy has enduring

legacies on the community structures adopted by popular neighborhoods (See Figure 3.2).

Figure. 3.2 Causal paths



Source: Own elaboration

Between 1967 and 1973, more than 350,000 *pobladores* actively participated in *tomas de terrenos* in Santiago (Garcés, 2002, 2013; Murphy, 2021; Pérez, 2022). Land occupations were one of the most successful repertoires of collective action in the struggle for housing and “the right to the city” (Lefebvre, 1991) during the second half of the twentieth century. As a result of this action, hundreds of emblematic neighborhoods were established that persist to this day. However, the *tomas de terrenos* have been a practice observed since 1947 in Chile. But they were extraordinary events quickly dissolved by the authorities (Garcés, 2013; Goldrich, 1970). Only after the successful *toma* of La Victoria in 1957¹⁰ (Espinoza, 1988a; Garcés, 2002, 2013) and the

¹⁰ The land seizure of the La Victoria *población* marked a before and after in the urban history of Santiago de Chile. Although it was not the first organized land seizure, it had an unprecedented public impact, which is why it is considered the milestone that began the history of the Chilean settlers' movement (Espinoza, 1988; Garcés, 2002). The seizure of La Victoria was organized by the “Comité de Allegados del Zanjón la Aguada” and took place in the early morning of October 30, 1957. A total of 1,200 families, under the slogan “work without compromise or rest, until the house is conquered,” with

implementation of a housing policy for the city's poor called “*Operación Sitio*” did occupations increase rapidly. After the initiation of this housing plan, the number of land occupations increased from a few in 1965 to more than 560 in 1971 (Castells, 1973; Leeds & Leeds, 2015).

The *población* Padre Demetrio arose in this context. In 1970, a group of residents from different sectors of Melipilla organized a “Homeless Committee” [Comité sin Casa] and decided to illegally occupy a piece of land in the municipality's central-northern part¹¹. “The land where our *población* is today was an industrial zone that in the early 1970s was declared a green area. [In this place], there were plans to build a park for the municipality, which never happened. [We] had a need, and this land was available.” (Int 32, February 2023). For many of the founders of the *población*, the need for housing and shelter, together with the success of other occupations in various parts of the country, is the driving force behind their action. “We knew we had to do something, to fight for a place for our children and us. Initially, we were in transitory camps set up in the late sixties. People from all over Melipilla: Huilco, Teniente Merino, El Llano, and Santa Elvira. We all had the same need. But we could not wait any longer in those camps. Many lands here weren't producing, and we knew we could put up our houses there. We just had to organize ourselves as they were doing in many places.” (Int 31, February 2023).

The *toma* was baptized as the *población* “Pudahuel” around December 1970. This was the first name that the *pobladores* gave to the neighborhood and with which its founders identify themselves to this day –despite the multiple names that the neighborhood has had because of policies of resignification of space and social demobilization promoted by the military dictatorship between 1973 and 1990 (Fieldwork Notes).

“Operación Sitio” consisted of a massive program of housing solutions that delivered lots with essential urbanization, a minimum sanitary installation, and an intermediate or another type of affordable housing to low-income families. However,

nothing more than a few belongings, three sticks, and a Chilean flag, took the land of the La Feria farm and founded the La Victoria camp (Farias, 1989).

¹¹ The *población* Padre Demetrio is located in the north pericentral area of the county of Melipilla, in the western part of the Metropolitan Region. It extends over 10 hectares and borders the Ruta-78 highway that connects the port of San Antonio with the city of Santiago, and the railway line follows the same trajectory. According to the 2017 census, the total population is about 3,000 inhabitants, and 847 self-built housing units between 1970 and 1985.

the questions above led residents to seize land quickly to pressure government agencies to hand over the land. Interviews with founders of the *población* Padre Demetrio indicate that: “On the other side of the train tracks, there were large *paños* [tracts] of land that the Municipality was not assigned. They were municipal lands. One day, we said no more, and with a group of about 36 families, we organized ourselves and decided to settle there, with our hands, with our houses [...] We could no longer wait to answer our demands [...] The occupation took place at the end of 1970.” (Int 33, February 2023).

Twenty years after the land seizure that gave rise to the *población* Padre Demetrio, a few meters away, the democratic authorities began the construction of a new popular neighborhood: the *población* Padre Hurtado. The towns are the center of the illicit activities of the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación.” However, unlike the *población* Padre Demetrio, this new urban settlement that emerged in the 1990s follows the individual route of the struggle for housing for the country's low-income residents and is the result of a policy based on a system of demand subsidies.

In the 1990s the housing situation in the country was characterized by a deep deficit that reached more than 900,000 homeless families, and the existing supply only partially covered the needs of the poorest households in the country (Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, 2004, p. 230). Additionally, to avoid the resurgence of large-scale land seizures, the center-left governments that followed the dictatorship expanded the expenditure for subsidized housing projects based on the neoliberal urban policies implemented in the late 1970s (Pérez, 2022, p. 14). As government technologies, these programs seek to demobilize the urban poor by conceptualizing housing as a consumer good that can be accessed individually through the market and using vouchers (subsidies) to purchase a home produced by private developers.

The Padre Hurtado neighborhood results from this form of social housing production. In 1998, as a result of the Basic Housing Program of the Housing and Urbanism Service, XX families from different areas of the Metropolitan Region were notified that they could become homeowners of one of the XX units of the new housing complex, the “Padre Hurtado” neighborhood in the *comuna* of Melipilla. Some interviewees remember this period as follows:

RESIDENT XX: “We have been waiting for a house for a long time. We were living in the house of my wife's relatives. We had already registered with SERVIU some time ago to apply for a house, but we had no response. I remember one day, they told us at the Municipality that the construction of some blocks had been finished in the commune of Melipilla, and we had been selected for the subsidy. A house had opened up, but we had to decide soon.” (Int 17, July 2022).

RESIDENT XX: “I was one of those who first arrived in the town; we arrived when they had just finished stage 1. I did not want to come to live so far away. I did not know anyone here, and the apartments were small and were not finished [...], but the truth is that we had no other option; the other option was to continue living in close quarters.” (Int 18, July 2022).

The first stage of the *población* Padre Hurtado comprised six blocks of 3-story apartments without finishes and a bathroom, kitchen, living-dining room, and two bedrooms, totaling 38 mt². The blocks are connected by a central courtyard designed as a public space to encourage interaction among residents and access to the apartments through communal stairs.

The Padre Hurtado settlement has four stages, built successively by private developers, and residents from different communities of the Metropolitan Region arrived. “People came here from all over, from Conchalí, La Florida, Recoleta, Lo Espejo, La Granja, Pudahuel. We came from Lo Prado, and we didn't know anyone [...] there was a lot of distrust among those who were arriving.” (Int 17, July 2022).

By individual application, each family could be selected with a direct monetary transfer of 140 U.F. if they could demonstrate that they met specific socioeconomic requirements, such as belonging to the first quintile, being registered in the Single Registry of SERVIU, accrediting savings of 10 U.F. and having completed the Ficha de Caracterización Socioeconómica (Ficha CAS, for its acronym in Spanish). Each system user has a voucher to access housing according to the available units offered in the social housing market. However, to reduce production costs, private companies opted to develop housing on the urban fringes of the main cities, in areas with low-quality urbanization and without access to essential services (Castillo & Forray, 2014). The result was a displacement of residents to the urban peripheries, which discouraged the construction of

a common neighborhood identity among its residents and left multiple neighborhoods with a heterogeneous composition.

This market-led modality of social housing production resulted in hundreds of neighborhoods of low-income residents in the urban peripheries and, in turn, allowed the first democratic governments to reduce the housing deficit significantly. Moreover, in political terms, the success of the new housing solutions had achieved the objective of demobilizing and fragmenting the movement of settlers.

Both housing policies contrast profoundly and result from a series of permissive conditions that left a particular orientation of how the State and its institutions delivered solutions to the demands of the settlers. The orientation of self-construction and the recognition of the property title of the land illegally occupied by the group of settlers who founded the Padre Demetrio settlement differs substantially from the policy-oriented under a neoliberal model of production of housing solutions which sought to demobilize the grassroots organizations and their political identities.

The long-term consequences of housing policy on social orders: socio-spatial conditions of criminal governance

Throughout the twentieth century, housing policies have undergone substantial modifications that have implied changes in their nature and how the state orients its actions to respond to the housing and homeownership demands of the inhabitants. The experiences of the *poblaciones* Padre Demetrio and Padre Hurtado reflect this change in orientation and, more importantly, allow us to compare the long-term effects of each housing policy on each neighborhood's social and community structure.


The form taken by the community social structure of each *población* is shaped by a sequence of events triggered after each neighborhood's founding, particularly by the nature of the housing policy. In the first place, “Operación Sitio” encouraged the inhabitants to constitute themselves as political and social subjects, strengthened the autonomy of their community organizations, and promoted an active role for them in the production of the city through self-construction and the continuous improvement of their residential spaces. In contrast, the housing subsidy policy was oriented towards the

disarticulation of the inhabitants as a social subject through a new government technology that allowed the allocation of a direct monetary transfer to each family group and handed over to the private sector the primary responsibility for the construction of social housing and residential space. Figure 3.3 shows the long-term consequences of each housing policy on the socio-spatial conditions of the *poblaciones* Padre Demetrio and Padre Hurtado.

The redefinition of housing policy for low-income sectors at the beginning of the 1990s undoubtedly made it possible to considerably expand the supply of social housing and reduce the housing deficit in Chile. However, insufficient attention has been paid to the qualitative deficit of housing¹², the socio-spatial characteristics of the neighborhoods, and the incentives it promotes for the development of illicit markets. In this regard, in this section, I show how the *poblaciones* Padre Demetrio and Padre Hurtado differ substantially in the socio-spatial configuration they adopted after the founding of each neighborhood, as well as their impacts on the two crucial dimensions of the community social structure of the argument: social density and embeddedness of the DTO.

¹² To the best of my knowledge, the pioneering work of Ducci (1997) is the only one that critically assesses the qualitative deficit of housing solutions during the first years of the Concertación and the subsidy-based housing policy.

Figure 3.3 Long-term consequences of each housing policy on the socio-spatial conditions of the *población* Padre Demetrio and Padre Hurtado



State-led mobilization vs. State-led demobilization

While founding the *poblaciones* Padre Demetrio and Padre Hurtado, the Chilean state played a dissimilar role. Through different governmental devices, each sought to shape and contain the pressures of the *pobladores* in their struggle for the right to housing and homeownership. During "Operación Sitio," the governments of Frei Montalva (1964-1970) and Allende (1970-1973) were forced to recognize the land seizures as a collective practice of the settlers to gain access to housing and to recognize their ownership of property in the face of the strength of the "Homeless" groups to occupy and organize the space taken. To this end, a series of complementary initiatives were implemented that boosted the collective action of the inhabitants, the legitimacy of their institutions, and their capacity to govern their territories. In opposition, the state response of the Aylwin (1990-1994) and Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000) governments was aimed at offering a rapid solution to the housing deficit through a significant increase in public spending via individual vouchers and private participation in the provision of social housing. *Las tomas* were prohibited, and access to homeownership was encouraged through applications for state subsidies. This action articulated a "contained social demand" that fragmented the *pobladores'* movement and atrophied the collective capacity of residents to manage the new neighborhoods.

The narratives of the settlers in both cases suggest how housing policies have influenced the vitality of their grassroots organizations and community identities. "Operación Sitio" boosted the activism of the settlers, reduced the costs of squatting, and encouraged territorial rootedness. On the other hand, the success of demand subsidy programs in the 1990s discouraged disruptive collective actions, channeled demand through the institutional channels available to the authorities and fractured the territorial identities of the urban poor by displacing them in other neighborhoods.

The *tomas* were public and disruptive acts that required a sophisticated organization capable of guaranteeing their success. In the case of the *población* Padre Demetrio, this capacity was associated with three elements consistent with other historiographical research (Castells, 1973; Espinoza, 1988a; Garcés, 2002, 2013; Murphy, 2021). In the first place, most of its inhabitants were members of some grassroots organizations, such as neighborhood councils, residents' committees, and homeless people. So, they shared a pre-established collective identity when occupying

the land. This characteristic was encouraged by CORVI and the government policies of the time that favored organizations over individual registrations in “Operación Sitio” (CORVI 1966). Secondly, the *pobladores* shared a similar origin. Most of them came from the estates in the province of Melipilla and maintained previously established ties from their place of origin. One of the founders of the neighborhood pointed out that: “Almost all of us who arrived in the first stage [of the land seizures] to the settlement knew each other. We came from the same farm, shared friendships or family.” (Int 32, February, 2023). Third, some *pobladores* maintained regular ties with political parties and elected representatives.

The existence of ties with political organizations was vital to ensuring the success of the *toma* at Padre Demetrio. In the interviews and fieldwork, it was common for the inhabitants to refer to the role of Aldo Labarca, a communist militant and one of the historical leaders and founders of the *población*. For the interviewees, Labarca was the one who managed the support and political mediation of the Communist Party and Deputy Juan Acevedo Pávez¹³ (Int 32, February 2023; Int 15, July 2022). This party acted as the organization's link with state agencies, mainly by playing a substantive role in sponsoring the demands of the *pobladores* in the official proceedings of Congress and other governmental bodies. In addition, the communists provided logistical support through their activists to sustain the occupation's first days and organize the neighborhood's internal life in formation.

The strength of the organization that gave birth to the *población* Padre Demetrio cannot be explained solely by the cohesion of its members and their bonds with the Communist Party. Instead, some government initiatives, such as the Law of Popular Promotion and Neighborhood Councils (Law No. 16,880 of 1968), gave a new significance to the social organization of the *pobladores*. Various historiographical studies agree on the relevance of these government initiatives, which, by boosting the organization of the settlers' movement and their demands, contributed to turning the

¹³ Acevedo Pávez was a Deputy of the Communist Party for five consecutive periods (1953 to 1973) for the Eighth Departmental Group of Melipilla, San Antonio, San Bernardo, and Maipo.

poorest urban residents into valid interlocutors of housing and city-building policies at the end of the twentieth century (Garcés, 2013)¹⁴.

Image 3.1 Mural of the history of the *población* Padre Demetrio.



Source: author's images

The importance given to the organization of the *pobladores* would have long-term implications not contemplated by the designers of the “Operación Sitio” housing policy, which become more relevant to enable a social musculature and codes necessary for the co-production of the criminal social order. Through the incentive to popular associativity, the Frei Montalva government reinforced the importance of “adverse possession” (Murphy, 2021) and the seed for the emergence of alternative forms of territorial power or popular governance. By these means, the *pobladores* consolidated their organizations as valid interlocutors with other forms and regimes of authority coexisting in Padre Demetrio’s territory. Their foundation complemented their capacity to resolve internal disputes within the población with the ability to articulate actions with other actors, established or not. In this regard, during my fieldwork, I was able to observe how the leaders do not face dilemmas associated with the costs of making public their regular interactions with the members of the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación” and, above all, how the rest of the inhabitants of the *población* observe

¹⁴ Teresa Caldeira (2017) Teresa Caldeira (2017) describes this process for Latin America as a form of insurgent urbanisation

them as necessary for the stable coexistence between both regimes of authority. (*See section 3: The Coproduction of Social Order in the población Padre Demetrio*).

Additionally, social bonds encourage interactions based on a system of values and codes recognized by all its members and transmitted through the generations. Its pillars are twofold. First is a hierarchy inherent to specific categories of residents: the oldest, community leaders, and neighborhood founders. The interviewees and residents with whom I had regular conversations during fieldwork usually referred to them respectfully and were impregnated with an authority that allowed them to enjoy a privileged position in the community's social structure. In the interviews, it was common to use the category “mamitas” [mommies] to refer to these members of the *población*, accompanied by “[We all know that] you don't mess with ‘mamitas’.” ‘Mamitas’ are respected.” (Int. 3, June 2022). All the inhabitants of Padre Demetrio share this value, traffickers or not. Besides, the ‘mamitas’ are responsible for maintaining the value system that gives consistency to the normative regime of the *población*.

Second, there is a series of behaviors that are not admitted within the boundaries of the *población*. In the same way that seniority and leadership roles are fundamental in the system of codes self-defined by the residents, criminal actions against members of the *población* or other unjustified activities such as looting, violence, misuse of public spaces or community equipment, and participation of minors in illicit acts are prohibited for all inhabitants of the *población* (in the following section on Co-production of Social Order, the functioning and mechanisms of negotiation of this and other arrangements between the community and criminal actors will be discussed in more detail).

The importance of both elements of the system of values and social codes is wider than the more or less regulated structuring of interactions among the neighborhood's inhabitants. Still, it allows its residents to use them as cognitive shortcuts to differentiate who are natives or outsiders of the *población*.

Finally, the residents of Padre Demetrio and their organizations show a profound capacity for resilience and adaptability. Both conditions have been crucial in ensuring their survival and reinforcing their preferences for collective action during critical periods of the country's social and political history. These characteristics are not casual

and innocuous for the configuration of the social order in the *población*. According to the inhabitants, there are two sources of resilience and adaptability in their social organizations. First, the high investment of energy and time that founders and leaders devote to shaping and keeping the community organization vibrant. The network of delegates and the pooling of other instances of participation, such as the community library, the senior citizens' club, and sports centers under the umbrella of the Neighborhood Council, are designed to avoid fragmentation of collective action and reinforce the active participation of diverse groups of the *población* (Int, 3, June 2022). Secondly, the instrumental use of their interactions with local political, social, and criminal actors. In this regard, the following narratives are frequent in the interviews:

RESIDENT: “[Although] some leaders and residents have political militancy. It has always been understood that the greatest welfare is the neighbors and our organization. We can collaborate as long as the community benefits.” (Int 4, June 2022).

RESIDENT: “There is no problem cooperating with A or Z as long as we can meet our objectives and achieve our goals. We have matured and learned to work with many people from the beginning.” (Int 13, July 2022).

RESIDENT: “We have needs, and it is difficult to get help to arrive here. Why wouldn't we accept it when it comes or is offered to us? As the saying goes, “A caballo regalado no se le miran los dientes [You can't look a gift horse in the mouth].” (Int 15, July 2022).

Since the neighborhood's founding, residents have worked with communist militants, Christian Democrats, priests, and state agencies and programs. The former was vital in the early years of the settlement, helping during the occupation and the self-construction processes. The latter played a fundamental role during the military dictatorship and prevented further political repression of the *población*. The third ones have been critical for the foundational and recent stages of the neighborhood. The promotion of popular participation helped the organization of the residents to acquire an early vitality, and the second helped to renew the residents' enthusiasm for the social organization through the improvement of infrastructure and community equipment. A clear example was the implementation of the “Programa Quiero Mi Barrio”¹⁵ in Padre

¹⁵ The Neighborhood Recovery Program “Quiero mi Barrio”, was born in 2006 with the great challenge of working in those areas of the city built in 2006 with the great challenge of working in the city built in those territories where there are problems of qualitative where there are problems of qualitative housing

Demetrio. In a nutshell, the instrumental use of their interactions has allowed the residents' organization to act as interlocutors with multiple actors in Padre Demetrio's territory and to recognize that its survival requires more or less stable alliances with other non-traditional actors.

Instead, homeownership through subsidized-based programs was designed to reduce, at a minimum level, the collective action of settlers. Governmental technologies strongly promoted individual application to state benefit and, to a lesser extent, encouraged collective application through "Housing Committees", organized top-down and directed by official agents, who incorporated "allegados" families from different places of origin. For the most part, the Padre Hurtado's residents were not inhabitants of the municipality of Melipilla. On the contrary, they came from different communes of the Metropolitan Region, applied for housing through their municipalities, had no experience in grassroots organizations, and their residents had no stable links with political parties.

RESIDENT: "At the beginning, I did not know anyone; we came from Lo Prado [...], and everyone came from different places. We knew that Melipilla was far away, but it was either this or keep waiting for who knows how much longer." (Int 11, June 2022)

RESIDENT: "I applied for these apartments through a social worker of the Municipality [...] The truth is that no, I never participated in a housing committee." (Int 17, July 2022)

RESIDENT: "The history of the Padre Hurtado is not the same as the history of the *poblaciones* of the past [...] They built their neighborhoods with little effort and "pulse," as they say. Most of them were leftists and had the support of political parties. Those were other times. I have my political opinion, but I do not belong to any party." (Int 28, February 2023)

The formation of the Padre Hurtado neighborhood and hundreds of other popular neighborhoods built during this period and under this housing policy was based on a

deficit (1,217,801 dwellings, Casen 2015); as well as deterioration and deficit of public spaces and urban equipment. In order to address this problem, through an intervention strategy at neighborhood scale, the Program seeks to contribute to the improvement of the quality of life of the inhabitants of neighborhoods with the quality of life of the inhabitants of neighborhoods that present problems of urban and housing deterioration, segregation and social vulnerability, segregation and social vulnerability. This is achieved through the improvement and/or provision of public spaces, community facilities and neighborhood environments, and strengthening the participation of neighbors and the participation of neighbors.

radical change in housing policy and in the interaction between the State and population groups fighting for a social right. The "modernizing" nature of the housing policy assumes that the settlers are the main ones responsible for guaranteeing their access to decent housing through market logic, where the intervention of the state is restricted to the delivery of facilities in the access to private credits for the middle and lower-middle sectors, and debt-free housing for the most vulnerable sectors (Castells, 1973; Castillo & Forray, 2014; Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, 2004; Murphy, 2021; Pérez, 2022). In both cases, the beneficiaries of the housing subsidy programs must demonstrate that they are subject to the state benefit by fulfilling the socioeconomic requirement to qualify for the housing subsidy.

Although this market orientation and the application of targeting criteria originated in 1977 during Pinochet's military dictatorship, they remained in force as criteria guiding social policy as a whole (Rugiero Pérez, 2011). In the housing sphere, access to the subsidy is subject to compliance with the prior savings requirement of the respective housing program, and both the accumulated amount and seniority are considered. Prior savings were recorded in housing savings books opened in banks and financial institutions. In addition, the market banking system provides access to a mortgage credit mechanism. People not subject to credit from the private sector may opt for credit from public resources.

It should be noted that the family or individual's income does not provide points in the application for the subsidy. However, it conditions the housing program to which one may apply since once the price of the house, the housing subsidy, and previous savings are known. It determines the loan amount that completes the respective house's financing (Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, 2004):

RESIDENT: "We could not buy a house, but we managed with a lot of effort to raise the 10 UF we were asked to apply for the subsidy [...] It cost us a lot, but we made it, and thanks to that, we now have our house." (Int 26, February 2023)

RESIDENT: "I had previously participated in a "Housing Committee" that was set up where I lived. Almost all of us were single mothers [...], and there were some problems with the funds and bad information that led many of us to leave. We were suspicious. With my husband, we preferred to apply on our own and went to see a social worker from the municipality to be more relaxed and avoid problems." (Int 29, February 2023)

RESIDENT: “We applied directly to SERVIU. It was faster. I know that it took a long time for many committees and that most of them disbanded before because of problems, because they did not see much progress, or there was mistrust. Think that many of us had already been close to the committee for years, and at some point, patience runs out.” (Int 26, February 2023)

Table 6. Characteristics of the Basic Housing Program during the 1990s.

Users	1. Families or individuals who live in slum housing or are renters. 2. Families or individuals with incomes between 3 and 8 UF monthly. 3. Able to save and pay monthly dividends to repay the requested loan, equivalent to at least 0.6 UF.
Product	A new house without finishes (consisting of bathroom, kitchen, living-dining room and two bedrooms). Its typology can be semi-detached on 1 or 2 floors or in a block of apartments of 3 floors, and its built surface fluctuates between 38 and 42 m ² .
Financing	The price of the house is approximately 230 U.F. and is financed with: 1. state subsidy (maximum) 140 UF. 2. Applicant's savings (minimum) 10 UF. 3. Mortgage loan (optional maximum) 80 UF. This credit can be granted by SERVIU for a term of 8, 10, or 15 years, or by a bank or other financial entity for a maximum term of 20 years, and in order to obtain it, the applicant must comply with the requirements of the entity.
Requirements	1. Be 18 years of age or older. 2. Neither the applicant nor his/her spouse must be the owner or assignee of a house, sanitary infrastructure, or site, nor have they previously received a housing subsidy or municipal subsidy. 3. Proof of CAS I, CAS II Survey (since 1991). 4. Be the holder, or his/her spouse, of a Housing Savings Account. 5. Declare the legal personality of the group if applying collectively. 6. Be registered in SERVIU's Unified Registry of Registrants.

The accounts of the población Padre Hurtado residents are consistent with two crucial elements of the historiographic interpretations of the *pobladores*’ movement after the return to democracy. In the first place, the Concertación governments favored giving continuity to social policy guidelines based on subsidiarity criteria, which in the case of housing is expressed in its definition inherited from the 1977 Housing Policy, which understood housing as “a good that is acquired with the effort and savings of the family. This effort, the state recognizes and shares it subsidiarily, allowing each family, even the most modest, to obtain a housing solution of its own”. (Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, 2004). Secondly, by increasing public resources for housing subsidies,

which favored individual or family applications, for low-income groups, it was possible to prevent the articulation of the *pobladores*' movement and demobilize the urban poor in Chile (Hipsler, 1996; Oxhorn, 1994; Ózler, 2012; Paley, 2001). In this way, the success of the housing policy ensured a "contained social demand" that materialized in a passive attitude of the inhabitants in the elaboration of housing solutions, in the fragmentation of their collective identity, and particularly, in the loss of their capacity to shape governance schemes in the territories they inhabit. The following stories illustrate the above:

RESIDENT: "These neighborhoods are what they call "dormitory towns." We all work outside all day, and most of us in Santiago [...] Each family has its own needs, and it isn't easy to organize ourselves to achieve things together. Besides, you think you arrive late, and all you want to do is go to bed. There is no time for that." (Int 26, February 2023)

RESIDENT: "I know the neighbors in my block, and not all of them because there is a lot of rotation. There is mistrust; one knows that some neighbors do bad things here, and everything is known, but one prefers to mind one's own business to avoid problems. I prefer to be quiet and take care of my things." (Int 29, February 2023)

RESIDENT: "At the beginning, it was not necessary. Each family that arrived had to worry about finishing their house, flooring it, painting it, and those things [...] Of course, the worries were "inside." How do I make my house look nice and more dignified? The other thing is that not all of us arrived at the same time and the same stage, and even though we are all 'stuck together,' one on top of the other, it is difficult to get to know your neighbors." (Int 30, February 2023)

The fragmented and massive origin of *pobladores* from different parts of the Metropolitan Region in each stage of the *población* Padre Hurtado constitutes its alluvial nature. This characteristic, elaborated by design, did not contemplate during the first Concertación governments the formation of grassroots organizations as part of the housing solutions provided, as did the housing programs during the 1960s and the Allende government. Even if, in some cases, the beneficiaries of demand subsidies had a collective memory that could have contributed to the development of solid community structures in the new residential spaces, this was weakened through a forced allocation to places of residence that did not recognize the origin of the applicants as a mechanism to safeguard the social fabric.

Social or Market Production of Space

Space is not an empty and neutral entity. On the contrary, it is a product of the social relations of each time and, in turn, a generator of new social conditions (Lefebvre, 1991). The Padre Demetrio and Padre Hurtado neighborhoods tell two stories of how space has been produced and reproduced by divergent definitions of housing policy, both at the physical level and in how residents shape and appropriate social space. In the first, the *pobladores* gave rise to an insurgent form of urbanization of the periphery that allowed them to design their own spaces, assume social control practices among their inhabitants, and root their identity in the neighborhood. In the second neighborhood, on the contrary, market logic predominated in the definition of new neighborhoods for the urban poor of the city. In them, the *pobladores* were conceived as secondary actors who had to occupy the planned and organized space assigned by the technologies to achieve property ownership and reduce the housing deficit.

The difference between social or market production of space is fundamental to understanding the long-term effects of housing policy on criminal governance schemes. Through divergences in the dimensions of the social structure, which are inherited from the orientations and nature of housing policy, communities acquire or atrophy capacities that allow them to shape and govern their neighborhoods. Moreover, such divergences are maintained over time and produce consequences in how residents interact with and in the physical space.

In this regard, and in accordance with the theoretical argument, two lasting consequences are identified in how the inhabitants inhabit the housing solutions, which are distributed according to the type of production of space: the degree of territorial rooting and the urban morphologies acquired by the new neighborhoods. Both elements are present in the narratives of the inhabitants and in how they conceive their neighborhoods' physical and social space. Differences in the sense of territorial relevance and residential stability are frequently observed in interactions with residents. They are associated with the mechanism of allocation of physical space for the development of housing solutions.

RESIDENT: "I have lived all my life in Melipilla; for me, it was very important to stay in the commune [...] It was unthinkable to leave here. In this place I have my family, my people. I

grew up here, and my children and grandchildren have grown up here [...] When my husband and I decided to support the takeover, it was obviously because we had no home and were not thinking of going anywhere else.” (Int 31, February 2023)

RESIDENT: “This land was available. I believe it belonged to the municipality, but it had no use. We had a need, and we knew we had to take care of it. If we didn't do it, nobody else would. In the beginning, we had nothing, and it wasn't easy to build what today is our village. I wouldn't change this villa [neighborhood] for anything; even if I had a lot of money, I wouldn't leave here. This is my *población*, and I am proud to live in Pudahuel [the original name of the Padre Hurtado neighborhood], despite everything it has cost us and what we have had to suffer [...] Yes, I am sure that all my neighbors think the same thing, why would we leave? If we have made a whole life here.” (Int 33, February 2023)

RESIDENT: “Look, for me, it's super simple: I am a friend of Padre Demetrio, proud of his neighborhood and people. We have worked hard to see what you can see now. As I told you, there was nothing here. It was an empty piece of land with nothing; there was only mud. Between all of us who were arriving, we built everything: the streets, the sewage system, the electricity, everything. That marks you [...] Of course, I wouldn't leave for anything. I am fond of this land and of my neighbors. Look, even my children don't want to leave; here they have been parents and have their friends.” (Int 26, February 2023)

The residents of the *población* Padre Demetrio strongly demonstrate their territorial rootedness in conjunction with a sense of pride in having been the leading agents in the construction of their neighborhood. In line with Lefebvre (1991) and Holston (2008), the residents' experiences underline the nature of social action in the production of space as a critical element of territorial identity and the low residential mobility of its inhabitants. In addition, the reiteration of practices, relationships, and social experiences that are configured in space, but at the same time are part of them, are a support and a field of action for the settlers of Padre Demetrio.

The precarious material and legal conditions under which the settlers built their homes and shaped the neighborhood determined the symbolic field of their experiences of becoming owners. Likewise, the process of self-construction influenced how the *pobladores* elaborated their identities and subjective capacities anchored to the territory and how they are reproduced intergenerationally. In this regard, one interviewee points out, “It was not easy for anyone to decide to come to a *toma* and start a life like this. We

knew it would not be easy, and we were willing to push with everything to have our own home [...] I always remember how the first months were when we organized ourselves in shifts to take care of the land day and night, clean, and build. The women to cook and take care of the children also helped us put up the houses. All these experiences united us as neighbors and made us feel proud of how we managed to have our own house.” (Int 34, March 2023).

Another resident emphasizes how the history of the neighborhood's founding is part of the identity of its residents: “For no one, it is strange that here we are all pobladores. Today to say “*poblador*” is bad, like poor, marginal, flat [ordinary]. But not for us. We built this neighborhood with our hands and effort. We are proud of that. Everyone here knows the history of the takeover, how we organized ourselves at the beginning, the common pots, and everything we achieved. Look at the mural, that we did not paint, the older ones. The young people of the neighborhood painted it. That identity is in our people.” (Int 3, June 2022). Finally, a crucial element for the residents is to keep the identity of the neighborhood and the territorial roots vibrant in the new generations.

It is expected to appeal to collective practices, the notion of effort, solidarity, and struggle in daily interactions with young people: “Since my children were young, I always told them how we got here. Of the struggle we all put up to get to where we are, to be recognized as owners of our homes, of when we had to live through the dictatorship. Of course, we always help each other, and we are there when a neighbor lacks something. For me, it is important that they feel proud of their *población* and know how we have lived, and when we are no longer here, they will say the same to their children.” (Int 36, March, 2023).

The above examples show how the process of self-construction and the social production of space influences the level of the territorial rootedness of the residents, which is expressed both in their deep identification with the neighborhood and their residential solid stability. These elements are crucial to determining the capacity of residents to shape the social order within their *población*, particularly by maintaining active internal networks of solidarity, recognition of the neighborhood's value systems, and a keen sense of occupying and protecting the spaces of their daily life and physical environment. These findings are consistent with social disorganization approaches

(Sampson et al., 1997) and the ecological literature on crime (Wilson, 1990). These approaches emphasize that the effectiveness of informal social control mechanisms used by residents does not occur in a vacuum but appears in an environment endowed with resources such as residential stability and solidarity networks.

The self-construction process that shaped the *población* Padre Demetrio was based on a land and urban planning policy that managed to introduce mechanisms to reserve land for social purposes. In the 1960s, together with the creation of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning, an institutional framework was established that allowed the Urban Improvement Corporation (CORMU) to purchase or expropriate land. Also, in the area of planning, the first Intercommunal Regulatory Plan of Santiago (PRIS of 1960) defined three land use zones: industrial, green areas, and housing. In the latter, zones were established exclusively for self-built housing. In this way, a total area of 520 hectares was reserved for self-construction programs executed by the inhabitants themselves (Castillo & Forray, 2014).

On the contrary, in the *población* Padre Hurtado, a market-driven process of spatial production predominated, which left profound implications on how residents interact with the space and, in turn, weakened the mechanisms that favor a territorial rooting with the neighborhood. First, unlike Operation Sitio, the new housing policy of the 1990s increasingly favored market-oriented housing policies. According to this model, the government's role consisted of providing a general regulatory framework and the necessary incentives to encourage housing supply by the market (Castillo & Forray, 2014; Gil, 2019; Ózler, 2012; Pérez, 2022). In particular, this strategy promotes the privatization of public housing, the reduction and simplification of urban housing regulations, and the allocation of demand subsidies targeted to people with low incomes. It aims to allow urban markets to function as freely as possible and to focus the role of governments on stimulating a competitive supply of low-income housing with a minimum of regulatory constraints (Mc Cawley 2019, 590).

Second, this market-based approach must be designed to address the problem of access to well-located urban land. The increase in the value of land and the reduced availability of land have encouraged the real estate and construction industry in charge of social housing projects to produce housing solutions in degraded areas of the urban periphery where people do not want to stay. In practice, this housing policy has

encouraged the expulsion of the urban poor from the city and the formation of segregated and highly fragmented neighborhoods. A typical story among the residents of the Padre Hurtado neighborhood is “[...] Surely very few of us who are here wanted to come and live here in Melipilla. I didn't know where it was, but they told me that it was on the outskirts of Santiago. I never thought that it would be so far away [...] The truth is that we had to come here or keep waiting for another project.” (Int 18, July 2022).

Other residents say, “We are poor and had no other choice. I would have preferred to stay near the town where I grew up. We knew everyone there; we had friends and my family was there. If something was missing, we had someone to turn to.” (Int 27, February 2023). Finally, other accounts highlight this alluvial and fragmented composition of the neighborhood, together with the aspiration to migrate from the neighborhood: “When we arrived I didn't know anyone, well I still don't know many people because here there is a lot of turnover. Many apartments are rented, and people do not live here long [...] I come from Renca with my partner; in the nave [informal name for the social apartment blocks], there are people from many places: Puente Alto, Quilicura, La Florida, Conchalí, Cerrillos, from many places [...] And of course, everyone brings their own ways and habits. The truth is that if I have the opportunity to go somewhere else, even renting, I go. Without thinking about it.” (Int, 17 July 2022).

Forced localization is a component of the housing policy of the first Concertación governments, which was a continuation of the neoliberal approach of the dictatorship based on subsidies for purchasing houses in the private market. The accounts of the residents of the Padre Hurtado neighborhood attest to this. The lack of alternatives when deciding on the location of their homes resulted from lower availability of land, particularly at values that subsidies could cover, and the consequent expulsion to the peripheries of the cities left multiple consequences on the residents and their ability to govern their neighborhood. At the individual level, forced displacement destroys the incentives to share information and contacts with other residents about aspects of life in common. Mistrust of the other and ignorance of the normative practices that structure behavior in the new neighborhoods encourage a retreat into private space. At the collective level, the social capital accumulated by the inhabitants is eroded, and their functioning is put at risk by operating in territories different from those that shaped them.

Likewise, disparate territorial identities anchored in normative regimes inherited from the former neighborhoods of each settler often collide. Finally, neighborhood institutions are destroyed by a leadership deficit.

RESIDENT: “I don't know my neighbors, even though we live all cramped together and on top of each other. Think here most of them work in Santiago. So they get up very early and arrive at night. It is difficult to build trust like that. There is little time to get to know each other. Besides, we all come from different places and have different concerns.” (Int 28, February 2023).

RESIDENT: “It is tough to trust anyone. There are hard-working people here, but there is also everything. You don't know whether to say anything because here, everything is known. The walls have ears, as they say. What I want to tell you is that I don't trust anyone. I prefer not to say anything, I haven't seen anything, and I don't know anything.” (Int 27, February 2023).

RESIDENT: “My partner and I lived in my mother-in-law's house in Cerrillos. We came to this town because we got the subsidy, and the Serviu told us that they were delivering houses here and that we had to apply. When we arrived, we were very happy, we finally had our house. But very quickly everything started to become more difficult, not only because of the space, which is very little but also because people started to arrive from all over, some of them with bad habits and customs. Living together is very complex.” (Int 17, July 2022).

RESIDENT: “When we arrived, we had many needs. The first thing was to finish the apartments, put ceramic tiles, finish the bathrooms and paint [...] I thought that among the neighbors who had arrived and those who were arriving, we could organize ourselves and try to apply for some funds to build or work together. But no, nobody caught me. The idea of a community organization here does not work. The municipality has tried several times to get us to form a committee. Here, there are multiple concerns, and one would think that it would be easier to fight with your neighbors, who are all rowing for the same side. However, most of them come from contexts where the organization is not relevant. Others like my wife and I came from a población with a history of struggle and organization, and at the beginning, we tried. But it doesn't work. Or it only works among very few. And of course, later people complain that we can manage among ourselves. In the long run, those comments take away your desire to participate.” (Int 11, June 2022).

Historically, it can be argued that the popular segments of large cities tend to cluster in neighborhoods that are differentiated from the rest by the socioeconomic level of their inhabitants, as well as by a variety of features characteristic of the patterns of interaction within them (Katzman, 2001). However, the housing policy of the 1990s strengthened social isolation as a form of spatial concentration of the urban popular sectors, initiated during the Pinochet military dictatorship, and, in turn, favored the emergence of new experiences of residential segregation of the inhabitants. For SERVIU-provided housing, the recipients did not get to choose a location; they were given housing based on availability. The recipients moved into the social housing on the city's periphery, since it was tough to find affordable housing in the secondary market (Castañeda, 1993, pp. 130–131), thus contributing to further income segregation.

In addition, the territorial uprooting of the residents of the *población* Padre Hurtado can be observed in three features that differ profoundly from the *población* Padre Demetrio. First, an alluvial settlement of its residents. The permanent influx of new inhabitants into the neighborhood destroys, time and again, the weak patterns of sociability that are configured within the neighborhood and inhibits the formation of a strong community identity. The result is the absence of attitudes and a system of values shared by all capable of regulating the interactions between residents, oldcomers, newcomers and members of the drug trafficking organization. Second, a heterogeneous composition of the neighborhood activated by the mechanisms of expulsion from the city to the periphery. The housing policy redirects the expectations of the inhabitants, who, to become homeowners, must sacrifice their legitimate yearnings and aspirations to reside in their old neighborhoods with protection networks, services, and the right to the city. The negative effects of this process have an impact on the well-being of the inhabitants and their possibilities of social integration. The result is a formation of displaced identities that is not entirely resolved and further weakens their territorial insertion. Third, competition among *pobladores* for the individual conquest of housing. Given that the need for housing solutions exceeds the available assistance, the application processes encourage competition among settlers instead of the construction of solidarity ties (Hipsher, 1996; Ózler, 2012). This conflictive process encourages settlers to neglect the territorial component visible in other forms of settlement and privilege access to subsidized housing finance. Once again, the result is a weakening of

residents' territorial rootedness and their capacity to shape a neighborhood governance scheme coherent with the spatial characteristics of the *población*.

On the other hand, the way in which space is constructed has profound implications on the informal social control practices that the inhabitants can develop. In the case of the Padre Demetrio neighborhood, there was a predominant social production of space and an insurgent form of urbanization of the periphery that allowed the residents to be active agents in the configuration of the physical and social morphology adopted by the neighborhood. In contrast, in the Padre Hurtado neighborhood, the residents did not play any role in the spatial configuration of the neighborhood. This attribution was exclusive to the real estate and construction companies who designed the new neighborhoods based on market logic.

The *población* Padre Demetrio has an organization of public space and lot distribution known as 9x18 (El Diario, 1990). This typology of peripheral urbanization is characteristic of the emblematic neighborhood built in Chile since 1960s. According to urban planners and historians, this way of configuring space favors a more fluid daily interaction among residents by blurring the boundaries between the private, the communal and the public domains, which juxtapose and reciprocally reinforce each other (Holston, 2008; Murphy, 2021; Skewes, 2002).

Image 3.2 *Población* Padre Demetrio, distribution of streets and main areas



*1) Social Center and multi-purpose court; 2) Green area and soccer fields; 3) Secondary Plaza, Church and Community Services; 4) Green area; 5) Main avenues of community life.

Source: Own elaboration

The form of the *población* Padre Demetrio –a system of objects in space– is inseparable from the functional aspects and relationships that host it (Conzen, 1960). In its physical form, the *población* is characterized by an organization of streets in regular grids, primarily open and homogeneous. This configuration of the physical form promotes that the roads have different speeds and enables areas suitable for pedestrians and others for vehicles. The large number of intersections shown in Image 2.2 allows, according to (Sennet, 2002), the exercise of social control of the space over the roads and the way its inhabitants move in that space. The structuring axis of the *población* is *Ignacio Carrera Pinto Street*, which is the only access to the central area of the commune of Melipilla, making accessibility difficult and reinforcing its segregated and stigmatized condition. In addition, there is a low physical presence of government

agencies -only one Community Health Center (CECOF) is located at the access to the neighborhood. Residents perceive this characteristic as "abandonment" by the State. During the fieldwork and interviews, the lack of prioritization of the Municipality and the State in the discourse of its inhabitants repeatedly emerged.

The division of the land is related to the emergence of an informal settlement stemming from a road network configured of blocks and subdivided into lots with a family component. This process was crucial for land demarcation and the pressure exerted by the *pobladores* on the State after the *toma* of land that gave rise to the *población*. (See section 2: *The Toma of 'Pudahuel' and the Historical Legacies in the Social Structure of the Community of Padre Demetrio*). The construction resulted from a gradual process, mostly of self-construction, in which different uses and materials were used to build the houses. A long-lasting implication has been the promotion of greater autonomy and agency for the inhabitants over their problems.

The functional configuration of the *población* Padre Demetrio contemplates a network of public spaces of different scales with non-residential destinations. The green areas, community equipment, and commercial areas are structured from the lot and other elements of the urban form of the space. These spaces present a high level of deterioration, as shown in image 2.3. The only exception is the *Sede Social* [neighborhood headquarters], which was intervened by a government program in 2018, as shown in image 2.4. Community facilities such as neighborhood centers, sports infrastructure, and senior citizen centers are located at the intersections of the secondary streets. Despite the fact that this infrastructure is located on an interior street, the space acquires a central place in the activities of the residents. An important part of the dwellings are connected to this place, and it constitutes a focal point for the development of the residents' daily interactions. Its location allows the community to exercise social control through its neighborhood leaders and the delegates of the passageways in the rest of the neighborhood. Control, protection, circulation of information, social differentiation and reciprocal provision of services are integrated in this collective space. All these functions are perceived as the result of decisions taken by the *pobladores* at the time who actively promoted spaces for social interaction that broke with the domestic dimension of the lots during the neighborhood's founding process (Int. 13, July 2022).

Image 3.3 *Población Padre Demetrio* main green areas.



Source: author's images

Image 3.3 *Población* Padre Demetrio main green areas.



Source: author's images

The socio-spatial structure of the *población* Padre Demetrio reflects a symbolic configuration of the collective process by which its residents became owners. According to the interviewees, the collective capacity of the residents to organize the space was initially manifested in two ways. On the one hand, the organization played a critical role in preventing some *pobladores* occupying the best or largest sites designed for community spaces. On the other hand, by assigning lots based on kinship ties that favored mutual collaboration in the implementation of housing improvements and reinforced informal social control mechanisms in the internal streets of the *población*.

RESIDENT: “In the first years of the *población*, which is what is known as the 'first stage', the leaders were super visionary in how the lots were distributed. For example, I arrived with my husband's family, their sisters, and their husbands. We were all together in the same passage drawn with lime [...] No one had a better place, so problems were avoided.” (Int 33, March 2023).

RESIDENT: “In the beginning, the distribution of the lots was more handmade; it was done by all of us who participated in the *toma*. We always made sure that no one was worse off than anyone else. We always thought that the park towards the back had to be left. We thought about where to put some pumps to extract water, and that issue was for all of us.” (Int 35, March 2023).

RESIDENT: “I came to the *Población* in 73. I came with my family from the camps towards the hill and Teniente Merino. By that time, several important things had already been achieved

here. The first ones to arrive were able to get the Municipality to recognize the ownership of the land, and even if a neighbor came who was a bit problematic or had bad habits, and the right of the ground was still not given to him, in meetings, we would ask that he be removed from the *Población*. And so, it was." (Int 4, June 2022).

The strategies described by the *pobladores* to intervene in the spatial design allowed them to shape the internal organization and the visual and community dimensions of the new settlement. In this way, spatial design fulfills functions of self-protection and regulation of internal life. Functions that allow to reduce the social problems that are exacerbated in the context of the social housing projects of the return to democracy. And even more relevant, with a lasting effect on the configuration of social relations and interactions between residents and members of the Jalisco Nueva Melipilla.

The *población* has two entrances. One originates from Alcalde Avenue and crosses the railway line from the northern limit of the center of the *ccomuna* of Melipilla. It is the original access that the founders of the neighborhood gave at the time of the seizure in the seventies. In addition, it is the only access for vehicles and is used by residents and acquaintances to travel to the outside of the neighborhood. Its design allows residents to restrict and control access to the town from the interior. Whoever enters the town is seen before they can complete their transit to the interior of the neighborhood and their presence triggers, if necessary, a set of signals that mobilize the residents. This function is exercised by both community leaders and members of the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación”. From the main street, there are a series of interconnected passages that form the 8x7 blocks that form the edges of the town. The other access is located on the eastern edge of the Padre Hurtado neighborhood, and its design does not allow vehicles to enter. This entrance is restricted exclusively to residents and is a fixed checkpoint for members of the drug trafficking organization.

Besides, in the historical development of the *población*, its leaders have managed to produce and reproduce a complex system to regulate social interactions among its residents over time. This system is composed of two interrelated elements. First, the figure of delegates by passages or internal streets of the *población* exercise the function of representation and act as a more fluid channel of communication with the leaders of the Neighborhood Councils (Int. 13 and 14, July 2022). This figure is

maintained due to the neighborhood's creation process's inertia and morphology. At that time, the founders distributed the streets and plots of land in such a way as to favor greater collective control of the activities within the neighborhood. Second, as reviewed above, their allocation responded to family groups as a formula to reduce conflict, favor cooperation in each section of the plots, and guarantee protection and security measures during the first months of the occupation. “The delegates [of each section] have always existed here in the *población*. The *tomadores* [the persons who took the land] used this same idea in the early years to help take care of the streets, to help organize the needs of those who were arriving.” (Int. 36, March 2023).

Finally, the primary role of the residents in the socio-spatial design of the neighborhood, against a paternalistic attitude of the authorities in the delivery of housing solutions, helped to promote a sense of territorial appropriation among the residents. According to Jacob (1961) and Newman (1973), this feeling activates defensible space through two main elements. First, territoriality. Through the use of symbolic or real barriers, the residents' environment can be subdivided into zones that are manageable for the residents through the adoption of space as “their territories.” Second, the juxtaposition of residential areas with community facilities and other zones relevant to daily interaction. The mix of private and social areas maximizes security and natural surveillance.

The residents of Padre Demetrio, through the organization and effective pressure were able to exert to achieve legal recognition and ownership of the occupied land. This milestone in the struggle for housing is substantive in Chile's history of the *pobladores* movement. For Murphy (2021), its relevance is expressed in the link between property and propriety and how the *pobladores* transformed informal settlements into *poblaciones* with property titles. According to the author, this process has been a definitive feature of Chilean urbanization since the 1960s. In addition, as the *pobladores* became increasingly successful in achieving their demands, they had to enter with their struggles into the dominant frameworks of the State, in which the dynamics of private property had a significant weight.

RESIDENT: “The social organization has been strong since the beginning of the neighborhood. Everyone here understands that organization and the Neighborhood Council

are fundamental to achieving things. Without it, we would not have been able to improve our houses, sidewalks, electricity, and everything we have today.” (Int 32, February 2023).

RESIDENT: “The leaders were critical in how the *población* grew [emerged]. I remember Don Rubén Hernández; he was one of the pioneers in getting water, electricity, streets, and sidewalks. Others believed that we had to do everything ourselves. And yes, maybe we could have, but it would have cost us much more. In the end, we were already organized and had to apply for benefits from the municipality. It wasn't easy, but we got some things little by little, super little by little.” (Int 31, February 2023).

RESIDENT: “This neighborhood rises from the ashes. These neighborhoods were 3x3 rooms. There were no streets, no electricity, no water. The toilets were made of wells, and the roofs were made of fonola [tar-impregnated pressed cardboard sheets. Usually used for roofing popular houses]. We organized ourselves among the neighbors to improve our houses and streets. My husband, for example, was an electrician, and we were the first to get the electricity. From our start we gave to the whole *población*.” (Int. 3, June 2022).

In addition, as the *pobladores* became increasingly successful in achieving their demands, they had to enter with their struggles into the dominant frameworks of the State, in which the dynamics of private property had a significant weight. An example of this was how the *pobladores* of Padre Demetrio had to adjust their practices of struggle and political innovation to obtain a series of state benefits to access minimum infrastructure services, neighborhood urbanization, and self-construction of their homes. The following testimonies of some *pobladores* reflect this process of adaptation in the forms of their struggles:

RESIDENT: “When I arrived in the town in 1972, there was nothing. The streets were mud. This was pure mud. It was a pasture [...] The leaders who organized the occupation were later able to transform that energy into another way of achieving things for their people and the *población*. Among all of us, we achieved very important things, having streets and sidewalks. We had to join the popular participation projects that existed at that time. The municipality asked us to pool an amount of money close to 20% of what we wanted to do, and they put up the rest. We also provided the labor to build our houses, improve them, pave the streets, and install sewage and electricity.” (Int 4, June 2022).

On the contrary, a residential and socio-spatial design was imposed on the residents of the *población* Padre Hurtado, guided by profitability criteria for the

construction companies. The lack of protagonism of the residents in the configuration of the space and its uses left important consequences in the capacity of the residents to exercise social control and collective vigilance. In this sense, through the residents' accounts, it is possible to account for multiple implications left by the physical-spatial conditions of the neighborhood that inhibit a collective role in the control of the neighborhood. In the first place, a fragmented intermediate space hinders interaction and community appropriation of the space. The construction of the market-based space left an extraordinarily rudimentary architecture: apartments of no more than 36 square meters that are organized linearly around parallel blocks that generate an interior space of no more than 4 meters wide. Each line of apartments is connected to each other by a central staircase that saves on vertical circulation but, at the same time, divides the space in between and reduces the possibilities for the inhabitants to use the space (See Image 2.4). Circulations are linear, with no containment spaces for community meetings or social interaction. The absence of architectural support elements or urban furniture makes the collective appropriation of this interior space even more difficult.

RESIDENT: "The access courtyard to the warehouses does not belong to anyone. You might think that since we are so close together, one on top of the other, we would use that street to share or do activities among neighbors. But no. The truth is that this street or yard is a problem because everyone uses it to leave their things, but no one is willing to take care of it, to fix it. We almost always have problems because of that. [...] As I tell you, it is like a space that is supposed to belong to everybody but in the end it belongs to nobody." (Int 11, June 2022).

RESIDENT: "There are some blocks that have been closing those courtyards, for security and to try to control access to their apartments. The idea is good, but if you are not from that block and you want to enter, you cannot. And we are all supposed to live in the same town. The neighbors themselves have been breaking some of the fences to be able to pass through." (Int 18, July 2022).

RESIDENT: "It is impossible to do activities or things in the courtyards of the blocks. For a logical reason. The space is very small and it is not suitable for activities. Besides, those on the second floor have their doors directly to that street, and the rest of them also have their windows. And since the space is small, the noise bounces off the apartments. The children sometimes play. But we never do any activity in the internal street." (Int 17, July 2022).

Image 3.4 *Población Padre Hurtado*. Access to apartment blocks and central stairways



Source: author's images

A disruptive element of the interactions and community appropriation of the interior space are the common staircases and other elements to extend the apartments. Each block has 3 sets of stairs serving 12 residential units each. Although, architecturally they could contribute to the mutual recognition of residents and eventual intruders, and along with that to social control (Newman 1973). Their design did not consider that the apartments would face high density and overcrowding, which would

lead residents to seek new spaces to informally expand their dwellings. The staircase, back and internal courtyards serve this purpose, taking away space and fluidity from the weakened communal areas (See Image 2.4).

RESIDENT: “The stairs are an issue. Like the patio, as I said, the apartments are very small. And if you look, they have all been putting up diagonal railings to take a little bit of the staircase and leave things there, hang clothes or expand the living room. In the end, each neighbor takes care of that little bit and nothing else.” (Int 17, July 2022).

RESIDENT: “For a while now, the second and third floors have started to expand their apartments. The pillars that cross the courtyard or others that you can see behind the blocks are used for that. So the neighbors have added a new piece [...] Those structures are super dangerous, think that they are holding up a piece. At any moment it could fall on someone.” (Int 27, February 2023).

RESIDENT: “The stairs are super ugly. Look at them, they are horrible, crossed, some are broken and unpainted. Every time I see them and look at the apartments I imagine two things: the courtyard of the prisons or the wards of the general cemetery, where the dead are kept.” (Int 30, February 2023).

Second, a physical configuration that restricts a continuous and natural flow of residents, both within the neighborhood and through the apartment blocks. This configuration tends to reduce the natural demarcations between public and semi-public spaces and their functions (See Image 2.5). And it particularly reorients the transit and development of the daily activities of the inhabitants towards other areas of the *población*. The complex and narrow network of internal streets that connect the apartment blocks are ideal places for the transaction of drugs and other illicit activities. This characteristic is common in the accounts of residents who are forced to change their habits and spatial routines to avoid problems with traffickers and consumers. All the residents interviewed -and with whom I had conversations during the fieldwork- emphasize that the abandonment of public and semi-public spaces in the neighborhood is a response to the fear associated with the figures of robbery, theft, violence and shootings.


RESIDENT: “Getting around the town is problematic. There are streets that are closed by the neighbors themselves, others where you can only enter if you want to shop, and others where

it is not good to enter. For example, if you want to go to passage X, it is easier and safer to turn around on the outside street [the one that borders the town limits] and go back in. Besides, some of them are very dangerous, there is no lighting and what is worse, some consumers use them to be there. And when they are anxious [anxious about using], anyone passing by can be assaulted.” (Int 26, February 2023).

RESIDENT: “We all know in which passages and *naves* the transactions are made. Also, we know in which places we can transit and in which we can't. There are times when we know we can't leave our homes, for security reasons. There are times when we know that we cannot leave our houses, for security reasons [...] The ships that are further inland [towards the center of town] are theirs [drug traffickers]. That's where the drugs are sold and stored. As I was saying, we all know about it here, but nobody can do anything about it.” (Int 29, February 2023).

RESIDENT: “If you ask anyone, they will tell you the same thing. We cannot go everywhere in our *población*. I know that in other towns there are codes, that neighbors are not assaulted. Here that doesn't happen, if they catch you in an hour, or you go somewhere you don't belong, you will have problems. When I arrive late, I have to ask someone to pick me up at the bus stop.” (Int 30, February 2023).

Image 3.5 *Población Padre Hurtado*. Access to apartment blocks



Source: author's images

In addition, the urban fabric of the neighborhood and the location of the buildings in the territory encourages members of the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación” to "capture" the interior buildings, which, because of their layout, are usually more protected from unwanted intrusions -rival gangs and/or state agents not included in the collusion pacts. Image 2.6 shows a general plan for the distribution of the apartment blocks. Such capture, in turn, is facilitated by the control that members of the criminal organization have over the narrow and winding passages that connect the different ships. This, together with the informal practice of installing perimeter fences, prevents the access of vehicles and outsiders to the central blocks of the Padre Hurtado neighborhood.

Image 3.6 *Población* Padre Hurtado - Distribution and main drug collection and commercialization points



Source: Own elaboration

Third, the block design of the housing units encourages the fragmentation of the social fabric and hinders the homogeneous appropriation of all the territories of the neighborhood. The few sociability ties observed in the *población* Padre Hurtado are restricted to neighbors of the same apartment block. Each block is constituted as a co-ownership with the capacity to decide, without consulting the rest of the neighborhood, on matters pertaining to its own micro-space¹⁶. This physical distribution of the blocks reproduces a sort of archipelago of residential units that makes it difficult to build reciprocal trust beyond each block. In terms of social control, some blocks manage to accumulate conditions that favor it. However, there is a spatial pattern in this; it is the blocks located towards the outer edges of the neighborhood that achieve this condition to a greater extent.

RESIDENT: “Inside the town you can see how some buildings are better cared for than others. Even though we have a neighborhood council that is supposed to group us all together. Those neighbors [of the better maintained apartment blocks] took care to close the perimeter of their

¹⁶ Law No. 21,442 on co-ownership of real estate, which includes social housing.

bloque and make some improvements as a whole. They even installed cameras that worked for them for a while. The rest did not. Look at that *bloque*, the most neglected.” (Int 17, July 2022).

RESIDENT: “I don't know all the neighbors in my sector [*bloque*]. What am I going to know about the neighbors in other *bloque*? Here everyone scratches with their own fingernails [gets by on their own, without help from anyone]. Some ships cooperated to improve the few common spaces, but that depends on whether you were lucky enough to have motivated neighbors in the same *bloque* or a person who decided to do it more as a personal matter.” (Int 16, July 2022).

Fourth, the areas destined for community facilities are located on the periphery of the *población* and separated by roads. Informal social controls, such as self-regulation, mutual supervision and other routine behaviors that shape the codes of coexistence are related to the physical characteristics of the neighborhood, particularly by encouraging collective actions to maintain the social cohesion of the residents. In the case of the *población* Padre Hurtado, the scarce community facilities are deteriorated and not physically or spatially integrated to the daily activities of the residents. Its distance affects the approach to them to carry out social meeting activities that favor interaction, the construction of social fabric and community surveillance practices of their neighborhood.

Image 3.7 Población Padre Hurtado - Condition of green spaces and community equipment





Source: Own elaboration

In this *población*, the configuration of space based on market logics prioritized the construction of housing units, as opposed to the social construction of space that predominated in the *población* Padre Demetrio. The criteria for providing community facilities and green areas are governed by the minimum required by the regulations, outside the recurrent areas of the residents and with a low quality. The result is a lower use and hierarchy in the urban fabric. Its appropriation by residents is lower and it tends to be abandoned for collective purposes. In contrast, public spaces are often taken over by drug trafficking groups. In this regard, a neighborhood leader and some residents state the following:

RESIDENT: “The headquarters is destroyed, and the neighbors do not occupy it. Since the social outbreak, the building has been occupied by people who are not from the town. First there were some squatters, some kids who used it to sleep and hide after making disorder there at the toll booth [the town borders the access to Melipilla from highway 68]. Then some homeless people. Now it is occupied by drug dealers. There they have parties, consume and sell [...] When I have a meeting and we need chairs, I have to ask for permission to take them out of the building.” (Int 11, June 2022).

RESIDENT: “This multi-pitch used to be used for activities with the children. They used to have championships and things like that. Now it cannot be used. The light bulb is destroyed, we have changed it a couple of times and they [the drug traffickers] break it again and again [Why do they do it?] This place has been a place of consumption and sale since 18.00 hrs, they prefer it to be dark, so no one can see them or bother them.” (Int 26, February 2022).

RESIDENT: “One is afraid to use those places [multi-pitches and plaza]. They are theirs and use them for their [illegal] activities. I don't let my children go there to play, and I always tell them that it is not safe and that I can't see them from the house because it is far away. I prefer that they avoid going there, you can see everything and at night it's worse. I think it's better to isolate yourself a bit.” (Int 29, February 2022).

Fifth, the space is standardized in size, use and distribution and, above all, its function is exclusively residential. As mentioned above, the units were assigned by bureaucratic procedures without reference to previous sociability. The implication of this is that the new residents must inhabit a space in which they had no influence on the type of spatial characteristics and use that the neighborhood acquires. In addition, the public space is seen by the neighbors as a disputed terrain, where there is no control and where individual or block surveillance is privileged. On the other hand, residential use encourages a type of living centered on minimal socialization that favors the confinement of residents after their workdays and reduces the willingness of residents to intervene in the maintenance of informal social control. Limited interaction among residents contributes to the weakening of neighborhood networks.

RESIDENT: “I work in Santiago. I am out all day. When can I watch the neighborhood? Most of the neighbors are the same, many do not work in Melipilla. So we have to travel many hours a day to get to our work [place of work]. I arrive tired and the only thing I do is go straight to the apartment [...] At most I worry about my fence, but nothing else. I don't want to have problems with anyone.” (Int 18, July 2022).

RESIDENT: “I prefer to meterme pa' dentro [go inside] when I hear there is a fight, shouting or a shooting, I don't go in. I worry about my house, from the door of my apartment to the inside. From the door to the outside, it's not my problem. If they want to kill themselves, let them kill themselves. People like me, working people, surely do the same. We here want to live quietly and not mess with anyone.” (Int 17, July 2022).

RESIDENT: “I’m more sapa [nosy] and I look out the living room window most of the day. Of course I see who comes in and who goes out. Since I live on the second floor it’s easier, everyone who enters the block has to go through my window. But I really just do it as a sapa. I have never dared to say what I see, neither to my neighbors nor to the Carabineros. Everything is known here and I’m sure that many have already told you, I don’t want to have problems with anyone.” (Int 28, February 2023).

Finally, the *población* is isolated from the rest of the urban fabric of the city of Melipilla. Its location in the northern part of the city, behind the railway line and adjacent to highway Route 78, places it in a degraded sector of the commune, with no access to services and surrounded by micro-trash (See Image 2.7). In addition, this sector has a single vehicular access located more than 800 meters away from the town, which makes it difficult for police and other emergency vehicles to enter and favors territorial control by members of the drug trafficking organization. In summary, these characteristics contribute to the isolation of residents, causing feelings of relative deprivation and a generalized distrust of formal and informal social control mechanisms.

RESIDENT: “The *población* is isolated. We are like an island in Melipilla. On one side we have the toll road and the highway. On the other side we have garbage dumps and those half-abandoned stables. On the other side we have a wall that separates us from the Lider [supermarket]. And on the other side we have Padre Demetrio. Think that we have only one street to enter by car. We have no one to take care of us and the way things are, those of us who live here, the people who work here, don’t feel like doing it either.” (Int 11, June 2022).

RESIDENT: “Look, here very few people get involved. I would say that at the beginning there was more desire to do things to prevent violence, robberies and drug dealers. But we all stopped doing it, some out of fear, others because they are not interested or prefer not to get involved. I used to do it, but not anymore, I got tired of it. A couple of times I called the pacos [police], but the truth is that they don’t get involved in this *población*. Every time I called, two things happened: either they told me ‘let them kill each other’ or they told me we sent a mobile [police car], but they never arrived.” (Int 17, July 2022).

In summary, the type of social construction of the space of each neighborhood leaves persistent effects on the way residents inhabit their territories, appropriate their surroundings and favor or hinder a musculature necessary to exercise informal social control. The ability of residents to regulate their behaviors and exercise mutual supervision, in accordance with agreed principles and values (Janowitz 1988), has a close relationship with the physical-spatial dimension of neighborhoods. According to the evidence presented, the way in which individual and collective surveillance practices are deployed is often mediated by the environment. In each neighborhood the public space represents on the one hand the locus where encounters, interactions and local social relations take place, and on the other hand, the climate of violence, friendship, mutual recognition or indifference (Lunecke & Ruiz, 2007).

Table 7. Causal inference: How housing policies shape social community structure.

Mechanism	Evidence	Observation (CPO)	Test Type
Autoconstruction programs boosted the organizations and agencies of pobladores	-based Toma de La Victoria “Operación Sitio” and Law of Popular Promotion and Neighborhood Councils (Law No. 16,880 of 1968)	The narratives of the settlers show how housing policies have influenced the vitality of their grassroots organizations and community identities. Operation Sitio" boosted settler activism, reduced the costs of squatting, and encouraged territorial rootedness.	Double decisive (sufficient and necessary evidence)
Subsidy-based housing programs disarticulate and demobilize the pobladores movement	This program was designed to reduce, to a minimum level, the collective action of the inhabitants. Government technologies strongly promote individual application for state benefits and, to a lesser extent, encourage collective application through "Housing Committees",	The pobladores’s accounts argue that it is much easier to apply for and obtain the grant through an individual application than a collective one.	Double decisive (sufficient and necessary evidence)

Table 8. Causal inference: How community structure shape criminal social orders.

Mechanism	Evidence	Observation (CPO)	Test Type
Variation in the vibrancy and density of community organizations and the entrenchment of organized crime organizations affects how residents and offenders interact on a daily basis and how communities perceive those interactions.	The existence of pre-existing social hierarchies and authority regimes are recognized by DTO members. The lack of a solid social organization reduces transaction costs and allows the use of violence as the main vehicle for regulating behavior.	The narratives of the villagers give an account of the DTO members as part of the community (insiders). Villagers recognize DTO members as outsiders.	Smoking gun (sufficient but not necessary evidence)
The special configuration of neighborhoods (morphology) impacts the ability of residents and criminal actors to exercise social control.	DTOs recognize hierarchy of social space and restrict their activities to secondary locations DTOs control internal blocks and prevent access to residents.	The pobladores accounts argue that the sale is reduced to minimum spaces and in case of deviations are quickly adjusted by social and DTO leadership.	Smoking gun (sufficient but not necessary evidence)

3. Co-produced or Violent Social Order

The “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación” generates different relationships with inhabitants based on the structure of the community. I argue that shifting forms of housing policies generates persistent effects and divergent on social density and the embeddedness of drug trafficking organization to each *población*. The interplay among two variables characterizes the social order regime that emerge. One of the main arguments is that co-produced and violent social order are the outcome of a process in which the inhabitants deploy their authority as much as possible and are capable or not of regulate the behaviors of each other and establish sanctions. In this process, the inhabitants have bargaining power if they have quality local institutions, regimes of authorities and recognized values and sociability ties based on their shared status as inhabitants of the same neighborhood. As I will show, the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación” and the Padre Demetrio’s residents prefer to establish a co-produced social order to violent order in order to promote obedience, voluntary cooperation and spontaneous support in the long run. By the contrary, in the *población* Padre Hurtado the drug trafficking organization are not willing to share their rule, and, in turn, the residents are unable to limit their control.


Variation in the social density of each neighborhood is a key element. To the extent that residents maintain active local institutions and authority regimes that are widely recognized by all neighborhood members, criminal or not, civilian are more likely to be able to use them as legitimate mechanisms in their day-to-day interactions with traffickers. Alternatively, if social density is weak or nonexistent, neighborhood residents lack a legitimized system of norms and leadership capable of articulating effective collective actions to address threats to their well-being and neighborhood coexistence. In these cases, traffickers will base their behavior on the expectation that residents are unable to exercise collective resistance to their illicit activities and territorial control. In turn, it is more likely that the criminal organization will decide to exercise coercive actions that induce conformity with the existing social order.

However, a high social density is no guarantee that the traffickers will accept that the inhabitants will restrict their actions and dominance. For collaboration in the production

of social order to occur, the members of the drug trafficking organization must be strongly embedded in the neighborhood. On the one hand, in the *población* Padre Demetrio, in its double condition of neighbor and trafficker, its members are not perceived as isolated groups, but rather there are stable sociability ties that favor their integration and recognition of neighborhood dynamics, particularly by accepting its norms and community authorities. The maintenance of strong ties and a common identity between residents and members of the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación” helps to reduce potential conflicts in the exercise of their authorities, as each party is able to recognize the scope of action of its realm and to constrain its behavior on the other's grounds. The result is a voluntary collaboration that admits the coexistence of both authority regimes. On the other hand, in the *población* Padre Hurtado, the organization's members are outsiders with weak or non-existent ties to the community. Their presence is disruptive in the impoverished community dynamics, and both traffickers and residents lack routine mechanisms to mutually supervise each other's actions. Cooperation is perceived negatively by residents in that the traffickers are not recognized as neighbors; on the contrary, they are perceived as illegitimate occupants who engage in illicit and violent activities in the territory.

On the other hand, the interaction between social density and the level of embeddedness of the drug trafficking organization in each community has an effect on the characteristics and functioning of the social order adopted by each neighborhood. According to the criminal governance scheme, it is possible that residents and traffickers maintain stable mediation mechanisms for dispute resolution based on permanent ties between the two authorities and adherence to the neighborhood's pre-existing regulatory regime. Or, on the contrary, the intensive and widespread use of coercive control of residents is preferred in the absence of shared principles and norms and of local institutions capable of regulating residents' behavior. Likewise, the type of social order may alter the way in which goods and services are distributed by the criminal organization. In the case of the co-produced order, residents have access to broad assistance that is articulated through community mechanisms and allows all residents to benefit. In contrast, in the violent order, selective assistance predominates and is strongly conditioned on individual favors and the maintenance of pacts of silence. Figure 3.3 shows the implications of each social order and the characteristics it acquires.

Figure 3.3. Characteristics of the Social Order that emerges between residents and the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación”



In what follows, this section is structured as described below. First, the social order co-produced in the *población* Padre Demetrio is presented, followed by evidence that shows its functioning in the daily activities of the neighborhood. Second, I show how the violent social order emerges and is installed in the *población* Padre Hurtado, and then provide evidence of how this social order operates.

Coproduction of Social Order

The DTOs and the inhabitants of Padre Demetrio have strategically aligned themselves to achieve mutual objectives and guarantee a stable and sustainable coexistence in the long term. These actors work together to build the social order necessary to promote

behavior oriented to ensure these objectives. The ultimate objective is to allow the peaceful and secure functioning of the illicit and day-to-day activities of its inhabitants.

The reference to the inhabitants as a whole is a crucial element in the co-construction of the social order. As I will show, the embeddedness of DTO in the community is an essential part of the social order conditional on the structure of the community. A high density of social organizations is necessary but insufficient for a co-produced social order. Under this context, an actor will likely recognize himself as a valid authority to shape the social order he considers closest to his preferences but face resistance from the other actor (this type of order is discussed in Chapter 4). Conditionality, in this sense, reinforces the necessary collaboration between criminal and social actors.

By coproduction, I mean “the process through which inputs used to produce a good or service are contributed by individuals who are not in the same organization” (Ostrom 1996, 1073). This collaboration is sustained by two main elements that are the result of a sequence of events motivated by the housing policy called "Operación Sitio": a high level of embeddedness of the "Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación" in the community and a dense and legitimate community network of the inhabitants of the población Padre Demetrio. Both elements provide the necessary inputs to produce a social order that allows all members to recognize the expectation of their behavior, the risks of transgressions, and the benefits of participating in the social contract.

However, for the actors to decide to make specific contributions available and for these to be accepted by the other actor, it is necessary, among other elements, the mutual recognition that without the participation of the other actor, the desired result is not achievable. In other words, we would be facing a suboptimal position that may weaken the development of the inhabitants' illicit and daily activities and increase the individual costs of each actor as they try to get closer to their preferences. Therefore, to understand the emergence and functioning of the co-produced social order in the población Padre Demetrio, it is necessary to identify the actors' preferences, the bargaining process, and the resources they mobilize in such interactions.

The process of negotiation of the criminal social order within the población Padre Demetrio.

On one of the first days of fieldwork in the población, a community leader asked me to accompany her on a neighborhood tour. During the walk-through of different parts of the neighborhood, I realized we were being observed with concern from different passages and places that I would later recognize as areas where drugs were collected and sold. This walk is a regular activity for the leader every time someone from "outside" comes. Its objective is to prevent people outside the población from being mistaken for unwanted subjects by the members of the DTO and the residents. The “sapos” [informers or infiltrated police agents], members of other gangs, common criminals, and police are not welcome in the población.

This vignette describes, in first person, one of the multiple results of the negotiation processes of the criminal social order within Padre Demetrio. The leader later explained that this action sought to protect my safety while I worked on my research and their interests as residents: “We know that ours ‘niños’ [DTO members] are super territorial. And, logically, they are suspicious of new faces [...] We want to keep the place quiet and avoid problems. It's not a matter of going around giving out information, but of maintaining the tranquility we have achieved and not breaking the balance with the “chiquillos” [little guys]. Let's say walking with me, or other leaders is a way of introducing yourself and telling them [DTO members], 'it's not a sapo. He walks with me. Chill out.’” (Int 3, June 2022).

The residents of Padre Demetrio know that the criminal gang's presence in the neighborhood risks their safety and that those who pass through it. In conversations, they often say the “chiquillos” [DTO members] are not violent with the “people of the población”. Still, they recognize that their illegal activities can negatively affect their safety and the stigmatization of the neighborhood. In this regard, residents point to three closely interrelated interests: reducing violence to avoid stigmatization of the neighborhood, restricting illicit activities to secondary areas of the población, and access to security and protection for all inhabitants.

First, residents express an interest in avoiding the stigmatization of the neighborhood due to the use of violent means by DTO members in their illicit activities. Residents have a strong consensus about the need to restrict the use of weapons and criminal situations associated with drug trafficking. Also, they are concerned about the stigmatization of the neighborhood, which weakens their neighborhood identity of sacrifice and resistance. One social leader argues, "Obviously, we want to keep violence levels at minimum. We don't want to live in a neighborhood where gang shootings and fights occur daily. A few years ago, we lived through it, which were terrible times [...] Today, we are all aware that we want a quiet place and that the población should not be stigmatized." (Int 13, July 2022).

Secondly, the pobladores seeking drug trafficking activities should be kept away from or as hidden as possible from the rest of the people's daily activities. For instance, some residents told me during interviews: "We don't have a major problem with the 'niños' selling and smoking their 'monkeys' [drugs] everywhere. We even know they have guns. But we don't want them selling everywhere, nor do we want to see 'zombies' [drug addicts] walking through the neighborhood." Another neighbor points out, "I have small children and grandchildren. I don't want them to enter this business tomorrow because it is a business at the end of the day. Our children mustn't think this life is normal." (Int. 31, February 2023). The spatial configuration of the población has been useful in allowing illicit activities to continue without harming the daily lives of the rest of the inhabitants. Although these spaces are recognized and respected by gang members, there is tension regarding the use of these spaces for other activities that are not valid for residents. "Let them sell if they want to sell [drugs]. That is not my problem. My problem as a neighborhood leader is that they don't do it in places they know we don't want them to do it: the multi-pitch, the square, and the places where the children play. They should not go around with guns and show them to everyone. We don't accept that." (Int 3, June 2022).

Finally, access to security and protection from other gangs and criminal acts that may occur within the neighborhood. This is one of the main interests of the residents. The "Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación" provided security and protection to the neighborhood. These services are perceived as a "positive aspect" of the gang's presence in

their *población* and are valued by all its inhabitants. One of the most common references used by residents is the notion of “clean streets”:

RESIDENT: “Our ‘*niños*’ look after us because we are all here [in the same neighborhood]. They know that we need their protection from other guys outside who sometimes come to rob or assault us. Obviously, we see that as a benefit.” (Int 3, June 2022).

RESIDENT: “We are interested in clean streets. The “*muchachos*” understand that. They keep the streets clean and respect us in that; as I was saying, they even prevent us from being mugged. For us, that also means that the streets are clean. The “*chiquillos*” have always been concerned that there are no problems here. And, logically, it's good for them too. The “*chiquillos*” have always been concerned about that detail. This way, they prevent the police from entering the *población*. If you have a quiet neighborhood, it is not a red-light district, and therefore, less attention from the police.” (Int 14, July 2022).

RESIDENT: “Keeping our streets clean is a task for all of us who are part of the *población*. The “*chiquillos*” are also. They help us in their own way to clean the streets. We are no longer assaulted as before, and nobody steals from our houses anymore. We are grateful for that.” (Int 15, June 2022).

The incentive structure that shapes the boundaries of the criminal order bargain processes is not complete without considering the preferences of criminal actors. According to a local micro-trafficker, the profit margin is one of the main incentives of the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación”. A straightforward action to do this is to reduce their operational costs. In this calculation, the DTO leaders know the virtues of a dense organizational network in the territory and will likely use to their interests. Some interviewees share this perception. “The way that *población* is organized provides opportunities not available elsewhere. Here, each street has delegates, and the leaders are active. I imagine this is useful for the groups here. I think it is easier to use this network of leaders to get information and be aware of what is happening in the *población* than to create a new one.” (Int. 35. March. 2023)

A second interest of the DTO is safeguarding the functioning of the pact of silence within the *población*. This preference is common among criminal gangs, and they usually

manage to reinforce this type of arrangement through the intensive use of capital and/or coercion (Feldmann & Luna, 2023). However, the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación” members have innovated by using social codes to preserve the villagers' silence. On the one hand, DTO members reduce the incentives to collaborate with the authorities through the use of specific negative categories in the value system of the población. Two categories are most commonly used for this purpose: “sapo” [informant] and “perkin” of the authorities [person who obeys orders and does not have the conviction to refuse them]. On fieldwork, a member of the gang explained, “We trust in the población. Here nobody is perkin of the packs [police], nor of any authority. Whoever talks is a perkin, and nobody in the *población* wants to be one” (Int 12, July 2022). In the same vein, a neighborhood leader explains that the notion of perkin not only implies the loss of agency on the part of the residents but is linked to a naive person whom third parties can easily deceive: “It is a matter of looking at the houses, and you know where the places where drugs are sold and stored are. But I don't get involved and don't have to go around telling the police. In meetings with the police, they always tell me: 'Now give us a map of the streets and the houses where they are located. And I tell them no. Forgive me, but I'm not here to do that. Why should I tell them? That is their job, not mine. I am the leader of my neighbors and not their perkin, as they say.’” (Int 15, July 2022).

On the other hand, DTO members seek to protect the pact of silence by reinforcing positive categories in the Padre Demetrio social code system. Loyalty among members of the población is the main vehicle used for this purpose. Loyalty regulates the residents' silence by mitigating disloyalty as a substantive element in their social interactions. One resident argues: “Loyalty is key in the población [...] Those who live or have grown up here know that no neighbor is betrayed. Yes, we have our problems, but we are loyal to each other. For example, if you have a problem with the “chiquillos”, you don't go to the police to ask for help. Things are solved here. Dirty laundry is washed at home, as they say. Some codes are respected.” (Int. 3, June. 2022).


Like any other criminal organization, the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación” is interested in securing territorial control to maintain the sustainability of its operations and remain a leading player in the local drug market. Their ability to dominate the territory

depends on three factors: the loyalty of the local population, the existence of collusion pacts with state agents, and reducing the chances of competitors entering. Loyalty is guaranteed through their identification as residents of the neighborhood and their deep networks of interaction with its inhabitants. The collusion pacts are challenging to prove. However, most inhabitants argue that the police and the members maintain cooperation agreements that allow them to operate in the territory without worrying about the local authorities. In their testimonies, they state that “The pacos [insulting ways of referring to the police] are super wet [they are recipients of money or other species in exchange for favors]. We all know that on local market days at around 6.00 am, two policemen come in on motorcycles to collect.” (Int. 13, July 2022). In addition, a local micro-trafficker explained that the transaction is not necessarily restricted to the payment of money but may include small quantities of drugs for the personal consumption of police officers. Finally, to reduce the entry of rival gangs, the DTO can perform deterrent actions. Members of the organization highly value the public demonstration of their firepower. According to a journalistic investigation, one of the most common activities of the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación” is the ostentation of weapons as a mechanism to demonstrate their power. These actions are recorded in videos that are then circulated among its members and the inhabitants of Melipilla. From the inhabitants' perspective, the entry of a new criminal actor.

The preferences of traffickers and residents are essential to understanding the negotiation process that leads to the emergence of co-produced social order. For both social and gang leaders recognize each other's preference structure and, above all, are able to anticipate potential changes that could affect peaceful coexistence and reduce their well-being. Therefore, the alignment of expectations reduces the sources of conflict among the inhabitants of the *población* Padre Hurtado and encourages both groups to actively collaborate in the establishment of a mutually beneficial social order. In sum, the leaders of the “Jalisco Melipilla New Generation” can offer security, protection, and material benefits for the inhabitants, as well as a commitment not to degrade community spaces with illicit activities. For their part, community leaders offer their ability to mediate with residents to maintain stable pacts of silence that can reduce the costs of the group's operations in the

territory. This modality offers spontaneous and long-term support. The figure 3.4 shows this negotiation process in a stylized form.

Figure 3.4. The governance structure of Padre Demetrio neighborhood and the process of negotiation of co-produced social order



Source: Own elaboration

The mediation role of community institutions and authorities

Collaboration does not occur in a vacuum. When local institutions and community leaderships are both effective and legitimate, and also, the traffickers are inhabitants and shared strong sociability bonds with the rest of residents, is more likely that both groups make a significant effort to agree on a mutually beneficial social contract in which the existing structure of governance is respected. The mechanism is that the pre-established governance structure acts as a common normative regime that promotes compliance with

certain norms endorsed by the entire community and, in turn, establishes the tolerable boundaries over which the leadership and traffickers can interact and negotiate fluidly.

The legitimate and pre-established normative regime brings together members of the criminal organization and community leaders in a flexible, informal, and horizontal network to safeguard local order. This network serves as a simple, but well-established system for mediating disputes between *pobladores* and traffickers. The flexibility enables free flow of information within the community which minimizes the episodes of disputes between *pobladores* and criminals. It also helps to ensure that interactions between both occur on a day-to-day basis and do not require a formal structure for communication and dispute resolution. In this sense, the most relevant aspect of the pre-established governance structure is that it enables community leaders to maintain daily interactions with the traffickers to mediate potential controversies in the functioning of the social order. In this regard, a social leader of the *población* Padre Demetrio told me that “I don't have to worry about whether my neighbors see me talking to the *chiquillos* [traffickers]. The truth is that I have nothing to hide [...] It is not inappropriate at all. The reason is very simple, we all trust each other, and we know that if I or any other leader comes to talk to them [drug dealers] it is to take care of the community or because my own neighbors have told me that it is important that the *chiquillos* stop doing something they shouldn't do. As I had already told you, in our *población* there are rules that we are all interested in respecting and maintaining.” (Int. 3, June. 2022).

When I asked the inhabitants how they perceived the fact that their social leaders maintain regular meetings and relations with members of the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación”, they explained that this is a normal part of the daily life of the *población* and that they want the traffickers to continue to adhere to the norms that everyone in the *población* respects. They also mentioned that this form of relationship is preferable because it helps to deal with “more delicate situations,” such as when some gang members sell drugs in spaces restricted by the co-constructed order, carry weapons visibly in broad daylight, or their users engage in practices that are undesirable for community life. As a neighbor notes: “We've all grown up together. We know each other. I even took care of some of them when they were kids. We all know that there are rules and codes that are

respected in the *población*. It doesn't matter if you're a dealer or a neighbor. [...] The fact that we all respect those rules helps us to talk and agree on what we can do. Like I told you, it helps us talk more easily and know that everyone will do their part. It's important for everyone to keep things that way.” (Int 13, July 2022).

As I noted before (see State-led mobilization vs. State-led demobilization), the community leaders enjoy a position of relative strength in structuring mechanisms for mediation and dispute resolution with the drug trafficking organization. First, they hold a well-known status and hierarchy within the neighborhood. Second, they have the necessary legitimacy and support from the inhabitants to process and channel disputes with criminals through multiple informal channels. Third, they centralize, filter, and organize community demands regarding social order. Over the course of several months of fieldwork and informal conversation with residents I note how social leaders are able to maintain community cohesion, both criminal and civilian, around the idea of a stable social contract. To do so, they deploy the resources they possess and actively promote the mutual benefits of the co-constructed social order.

On the other hand, routinized interactions between civilians and members of the Jalisco Nueva Melipilla transmit a learning effect that promotes long-term commitment to the social order. Each actor has learned that in order to protect its interests, it requires the collaboration of the other, and that each has resources that can destabilize the social contract. In essence, both groups recognized that their well-being and survival rests on a balance that it is preferable to safeguard and that in the event of disputes it is desirable to use the pre-established channels in the regulatory regime of the *población*.

The co-produced social order at work

The social contract governing the *población* Padre Demetrio is based on the legitimacy of the criminal and social authorities. Each exercises control over the rules and commitments established in the multiple daily interactions and maintains differentiated spheres of authority. For instance, many domains of resident life and social relations are

restricted attributes of drug lords and could only be influenced through social leaders' acceptance. An interviewee described these situations as follows:

RESIDENT: "They have a lot of influence on how we live our life. However, they also know some aspects of our life they must not enter. For example, we have never denied them participation in our Neighborhood Council meetings. Still, they know many neighbors would not like that and do not do it [...] They generally do not get involved in our issues unless it may affect them. There, of course. They approach our leaders and let them know." (Int 3, June 2022).

Criminal and social groups are equally interested in ensuring that all inhabitants maintain and respect the established rules and informal arrangements. These groups collaborate to ensure that the social order continues to function and that the mutual benefits of the contract can be extracted. Specifically, the actors cooperate in the execution of some governance functions at the neighborhood level, which allows us to identify how the co-constructed social order operates. According to what was observed during the fieldwork and what was argued by the interviewees, two functions are crucial: policing and street cleaning, and providing social and economic assistance.

Policing and "street cleaning".

The *población* Padre Demetrio has one of the lowest crime activity rates in the commune of Melipilla. Since 2017, complaints to the police have decreased drastically. They have motivated the authorities not to consider the sector as one of the priority neighborhoods in implementing government intervention plans. These figures are consistent with the perception of residents who argue that the neighborhood has ceased to be dangerous and that they have managed to regain security and tranquility for all its inhabitants.

The process of "cleaning the streets" in the *población* reflects one of the functions of the co-constructed social order. It shows how both actors have interacted to eliminate undesirable activities. Many interviewees indicated that high levels of violence, delinquency, and indiscriminate assaults characterized the neighborhood before forming the social

contract. Furthermore, the neighborhood does not have a permanent police presence, and state agents frequently ignore residents' complaints of theft and other activities. In the narrative of the interviewees, it is frequently that they express that the response of the police authorities was: "Let them kill each other. They are just criminals" or "We will send a patrol car," which never arrived.

This conflictive setting allowed gang members and residents to pool their resources to build their capacity to "monopolize" the provision of order and security within the *población*. In the first stage, efforts were directed toward developing community policing groups composed of criminal members and residents. Their initial objective was simple: to allow access to the *población* without being extorted and assaulted. Some interviewees recall the following:

RESIDENT: "In those years, we could not go out or enter the *población* without being assaulted. They were groups from other places, from the hills that came here. The delinquents would stand at the only entrance and rob everyone who passed by. We had to go and look for people at the bus stop to avoid robberies. It was common for them to break into houses or enter businesses in groups to steal. It was a very difficult time for the *población*." (Int 36, Mar. 2023).

RESIDENT: "All the neighbors see it as a good thing that "our kids" protect us, that they take care of us and the neighborhood. They give us security and prevent bad things from happening to us. Some time ago, there was a lot of stigma with the "Pudahuel" here in Melipilla. It was said that you had to go in with your back turned so that you would think you were going out, but that has changed now." (Int 33, March 2023).

RESIDENT XXX: "Thanks to the "chiquillos" things have changed. They achieved that, there were no more assaults or fights between gangs. Some of these problems were indeed caused by the sale of drugs and those who came to consume here in the *población*. But it was the "chiquillos" themselves with some of our neighbors who were in charge of changing things." (Int 35, March 2023).

During the process that led to the establishment of policing activities, the drug lord and villagers interacted intensively. The residents made available their network of passer-by delegates to gather information on the criminal activities of drug users, suspects, or other gangs seeking to contest territorial control. For their part, members of the local trafficking gang made available their ability to use violent means to improve security conditions and secure their territorial control. A resident who participated in the patrol groups explains:

“Not everyone wanted to report. Many preferred to remain silent for fear of reprisals. Confidence in our organization helped eliminate that fear. The delegates knew everything in their streets and helped us identify where things were happening that affected our security. For example, I remember that some guys broke into neighbors' houses on one occasion. In one of them lived an old lady. They broke in through the roofs to steal and exchange them for drugs. They beat her, and she was in serious condition for a while. The delegate told us what had happened. There was little we could do. We could only try to identify who they were [...] The “chiquillos” found them, made a “trap” and then caught him: they kept him locked up in a house for 15 days and did everything they could to him. Finally, they released him and told him: “go to the police and report us”. They knew he wouldn't do it.” (Int 3, June 2022).

This act suggests that drug lord seek to established clear punishments for those committing these crimes inside their territory. Disobedience to these rules is publicly punished and used to send messages to rival gangs or ordinary bandit. In several interviewees the resident argues that the violence exercised by the “chiquillos” is a territorial action that seeks to protect the *población* from outsiders. In addition, while they recognize that the violence is not directed at them, it does have a deterrent effect on other types of activities, such as domestic violence or violence between neighbors in the neighborhood. Once these rules have been communicated, inhabitants regulate their behavior and avoid breaking them.

Over time, this policing action has improved Padre Demetrio's security conditions and the withdrawal of the residents from security functions. At present, the residents' participation is restricted to maintaining the information network, “eyes and ears”, that allow them to alert the gang about irregular activities to the social order. To this end, the leaders play a crucial role. They are the ones who gather information and inform the drug gang about

criminal or violent acts within the *población* and regulate the entry of outsiders into the neighborhood.

Pobladores are aware of the benefits of providing security. However, they are equally concerned about reducing the visibility of violence and restricting its use to members of Padre Demetrio. In this regard, one of the critical functions of social leaders is to prevent traffickers from exercising physical violence or extortion on the residents. This balance in the exercise of policing is maintained exclusively in the authority of the social leaders and their ability to ensure compliance with the rules of both the villagers and the traffickers. One social leader argues that:


“We are the first to prevent the “chiquillos” from doing something bad to our neighbors. Just like we do if we have a problem with them, we go and talk to the group leader. And he takes care of ordering his people. We asked for the same treatment [...] There was an occasion where we had a serious problem because of this. They were very impulsive and did not wait to get more information. They beat up a neighbor for something they thought had happened. I asked them, “ Why didn't they ask me?” Why didn't they come and talk to me? I would have told them what really happened, and together we would have sorted things out”. (Int 31, February 2023).

Provide social and economic assistance.

Several studies suggest that criminal gangs provide goods in the form of food, credit, and medicine, among others, to gain the collaboration or silence of communities where drug syndicates operate (Magaloni, Franco-Vivanco, et al., 2020). The “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación” are not the exception, and drug lord is committed to providing social and material assistance to the community. However, this process is not extensive for all members of the *poblacion* for two reasons that suggest how the co-constructed social contract operates: resistance of social leaders to the possibility of a loss of autonomy of the social organization and limit the areas of influence that the DTO has over the aspect of social life. Both reasons are crucial to maintaining the differentiated spheres of authority and reducing potential conflicts in exercising their attributions.

The *pobladores* remain excluded from local markets and have difficult access to critical goods and services, and some residents turn to illegal markets and actors for welfare and financial aid. According to the last census in Chile, 83.8% of residents belong to a socioeconomic stratum equal to or lower than the vulnerable middle class. In strict terms, 22.7% correspond to the lower middle class (C3), 37.6% are classified as vulnerable middle class (D), and 23.8% as poor (E). Figure 3.5 shows in a map the territorial distribution by census blocks for each socioeconomic group previously mentioned.

Image 3.8 Distribution of socioeconomic groups E, D and C3 in the *población* Padre Demetrio





Source: Author's elaboration, based on National Census 2017

In this situation, the drug trafficker has played a critical role in the provision of services. Many interviewees recall that during the Covid-19 pandemic, gang members were instrumental in providing food and economic assistance to some residents. For instance, one resident argues, “During the pandemic, many of our neighbors were left without work. Many of us here are informal vendors or work at the local market [...] Obviously we needed help. The “chiquillos” behaved super well. They helped many neighbors who needed it the most with a box of food, others by helping to pay the bills. I got all the help I could get.”

Social leaders know that *pobladores* can access improvements in their welfare through contact with traffickers. However, they are concerned about setting limits to the manner in which financial assistance is delivered. In different conversations, social leaders argue their concern around three "problems" that could negatively affect how villagers interact with drug traffickers in this regard. First, neighbors could be tempted to abandon collective dynamics to access benefits and social benefits through the illegal market. Second, social organization could lose strength through a reduced capacity to address the population's needs. Third, the loss of autonomy could occur through stable collaboration with drug traffickers.

Under coproduction of social order, *pobladores* are aware that the local or embedded character of the members of the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación” is a necessary but insufficient condition to safeguard the social contract. Therefore, a crucial condition for maintaining social order is that the social organization remains vibrant and a legitimate organism of the villagers. One social leader argues as follows:

“No, we do not oppose that neighbors who need help can receive what the "chiquillos" can give them. They are concerned about their neighborhood, which is also a way of caring for their people. What we are not going to allow is that this weakens our role as social leaders, our Neighborhood Council, and our history of struggle [...] We know that our organization is strong and that we can achieve things together, look at our *población*. But we also know that if these increases [social and material aid from the DTO] it can weaken our position in the community, and that even the organization is no longer a valid authority among the neighbors.” (Int, 13 July 2022).

Since the foundation of the neighborhood, the *pobladores* have built an ability to maintain coexistence relationships with other relevant actors in the territory. In each of them, the leaders have opted for an instrumental relationship that allows the achievement of their objectives and the development of peaceful, non-competitive relationships. However, in each interaction with other actors, the leaders have had to reinforce their autonomy through deliberate actions to ensure the organization's survival and avoid being co-opted by their

allies. To this end, it is common for leaders to reinforce two elements that are transmitted between generations: the collective and fighting identity of the *población* and effectiveness in achieving their demands. Along these lines, a resident who participated in the land occupations points out:

“In our history, we have had to get involved with many groups. In the beginning, members of the Communist Party helped organize the takeover. After the coup, the military intervened very violently in this neighborhood. In the eighties, with members of the Christian Democracy and the Catholic Church. Each one has had their own interests in being here, but we learned to relate to each other [...] Of course, there is a risk, but we have always been smart enough to know when to collaborate and when not to. Besides, we have always been confident that the depth of our identity as *pobladores* is stronger. Everyone in the *población* recognizes the importance of the organization and the struggles we have put up to have what we have. If you hurry me, that has been the most important thing to prevent other groups from using us. Our strength has been our unity as neighbors.” (Int 3, June 2022)

The legitimacy of the social organization and its vibrancy give the villagers' organization a strength recognized by the drug lord. This recognition functions as an asset that allows its leaders to regulate flows in providing social and financial aid. The ultimate goal is not to dispute each other's spheres of action and to safeguard the authority regimes on which the social order is based.

Violent Social Order

The “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación” are the lords of the *población* Padre Hurtado. Here, unlike in the Padre Demetrio neighborhood, the inhabitants do not have the resources that would allow them to modify the behavior of the criminal organization, and the latter has no incentive to negotiate the criminal governance scheme with the residents. Thus, the traffickers, through the intensive use of violence, intimidation, and coercion, manage to shape the life of the neighborhood and the way in which they expect its inhabitants to respond to their presence, to their illicit activities, and, above all, to the discipline they exercise in the territory.

In this *población*, the criminal organization is oriented toward securing control and reducing the costs of operating in the neighborhood. The residents are motivated to reduce the risks of living with an armed criminal group and minimize their exposure to the forms of violence and intimidation that the traffickers may exert on them. However, although the objectives of both actors are not aligned, a balance is produced that results in the emergence of a specific social order that allows each to anticipate the behavior of the other. As I will show, a violent social order is the result of a criminal organization not embedded in neighborhood dynamics and of a community with an absent or weak organizational density.

By violent social order, I mean a particular scheme of criminal governance characterized by the presence of an armed group in which its members deploy intimidation, extortion, and public violence as the predominant means of modifying the behavior of the inhabitants and achieving adherence to the norms that the criminal organization imposes on the territory.

However, unlike in the Padre Demetrio neighborhood, where criminals and residents recognize that without the collaboration of the other it is impossible to achieve common objectives, in the Padre Hurtado neighborhood the balance is produced by the search to reduce the resources used to shape the social order that both parties develop. The residents avoid being objects of reprisals and coercive actions by the gang, so they are willing to look the other way and keep silent about illicit activities. For their part, the traffickers want to reduce the investment of resources needed to secure control over the territory, and therefore operate as efficiently as possible. To this end, they are willing to selectively employ violence so as not to capture the attention of the state.

The forced procedure to impose a social order at *población* Padre Hurtado

During the first days of fieldwork in the *población* Padre Hurtado, its leaders would meet me outside the perimeter of the neighborhood. They were concerned that members of the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación” may see them conversing with an outsider on a regular routine basis. Moreover, in the initial interactions with the inhabitants of the

población, it was very often emphasized to me that “they did not know anything”, “they preferred not to talk” or “it is not our place to talk about these things”. In those situations, it was reiterated to me that the “narcos” were the ones who governed the *población* and decided what could be done within it (Fieldworks Notes).

The inability of the Padre Hurtado residents to restrain or compete the rule of the drug trafficking organization is explained by the combined presence of two variables. On the one hand, at the community level, the *población* has a profoundly weakened organizational density, characterized by the absence of strong leadership recognized by all the inhabitants of the neighborhood, its community structures are incapable of resolving needs or disputes among its members, and its leaders find it practically impossible to establish alternative modes of social control. On the other hand, the members of the criminal organization are strongly uprooted from the community structure of the *población* and from the weak ties of sociability existing within it. Thus, traffickers have no incentive to align their behavior to a pre-established normative and authoritative regime. On the contrary, it is preferable to shape one's own based on the intensive use of violence and coercion.

Although, why would the drug trafficking organization prefer to use violence to impose a type of criminal governance instead of opting for one that generates long-term legitimacy and adherence to norms among the *pobladores*? According to the theoretical argument developed in Chapter 2, there are two pathways to drug trafficking organizations deciding to impose a social order by force. In the first pathway, traffickers are not embedded and faced strong and coordinated opposition by the community (see section Competitive Social Order at Chapter 4). In the second pathway, criminal actors are also not embedded but enjoy positions of strength in the absence of social organizations and, if the *pobladores* prefer to restrain the arrangement of criminal governance, they still lack the capacity to do so. Unwillingness to use coercive control may provide *pobladores* organizations with considerable signs to seek to improve conditions and redress grievances generated by persistent territorial control and illicit operations under their neighborhood. Therefore, the criminal organization opts for the use of violence, as its ongoing and open use prevents the emergence of alternative modes of social control, inhibits the formation of

civic groups and vigilantism, and is more cost effective due to the high turnover of neighborhood residents that discourages the investment of resources in a more legitimate governance structure. In sum, coercive control is sufficient to achieve effective territorial control.

An essential element of this process is the absence of a pre-existing normative regime within the neighborhood. The alluvial nature of the *población* Padre Hurtado, inherited from the market-based housing policy, inhibits the inhabitants' capacity to shape community governance and social control schemes for their members. Three mutually reinforcing processes can explain this. First, the fragmented and disjointed origin of the settlers tends to foster the emergence of conflicting identities and social codes as each new inhabitant brings with him the community and territorial practices of his previous settlements. This situation hinders the crystallization of homogeneous and predominant norms and codes of conduct among the *población*. Secondly, the *pobladores'* arrival took place piecemeal as the subsidies were delivered to each family nucleus and in the different stages of the social housing project. This prevents the formation of social leadership capable of assuming the task of organizing the new neighborhood dynamics. Finally, the undesired location of the residents, in many cases, encouraged a rapid abandonment of the housing solutions provided. It is common in the narratives of the residents to strongly question the location of the *población*, the scarce habitable meters that prevent them from developing their life projects in a reasonable way, and the difficulties of getting used to a new local reality far from their family nuclei and assistance networks. Faced with this, a common alternative is to rent the social housing provided and migrate to another neighborhood closer to their preferences. The effect of this is that the *población* faces time and again a fracture of its social and territorial identity according to the continuous flow of new inhabitants. In this regard, different residents describe this situation as follows:

RESIDENT: “In the *población*, there is no common identity or something that identifies us all, let alone shared codes. The closest thing to an identity is being a member of a soccer team. It seems like a joke, but it is true, and even more than unity, it often brings us fights among neighbors [...] Some of us share these [codes and social norms of conduct] but not because

they are valued in the town but because they coincide with some values that our families or the church gave us.” (Int, 12 July 2022).

RESIDENT: “I was among the first to arrive in the neighborhood. I come from a neighborhood where there were organizations, and they were important in everyone's life. In the beginning, I wanted to participate in a neighborhood council or something like that, but the truth is that nobody here is interested. Think that you work all day in Santiago and you have to travel 3 hours a day to get there and back, there is no time or desire [...] Another issue is that at the beginning nobody knew each other and there was distrust among everyone. Think that many of us came from different places, and many of those who arrived later brought bad practices with them.” (Int 11, June 2022).


RESIDENT: “The *población* has 4 stages and in each one people arrived according to when Serviú was handing them over. Others came first and once they were here they worked on their houses to get them ready, others came on weekends to work and when they had everything ready they came back [...] This of course made it more difficult for us to get to know each other and create trust among those who were arriving.” (Int 18, Jul 2022).

RESIDENT: “Many of the apartments are not owned by their owners. For example, I rented and arrived in 2015 from San Miguel because I got a job there. I understand that the owner only lived a few years in the town and left [...] I think this affects us a lot as a neighborhood; the turnover of people is high, and each of those who arrive brings their own habits, which are often not very good. It is typical that we have problems because of noise, disorder, or because no one respects the common spaces.” (Int 26, February 2023).

The result of this scenario is that the criminal organization does not have a normative system to refer to when it arrives in the Padre Hurtado neighborhood. More importantly, unlike what happened in the Padre Demetrio neighborhood, the members of the “Jalisco Melipilla New Generation” have no restrictions imposed by the framework of reference and authority that the inhabitants of the neighborhood have been building. Thus, faced with this situation, the criminals can choose to shape their own through the intensive use of capital, which would reduce the profits they can extract from the new market, or, on the contrary, they can decide to use coercion as a means to ensure predictable behavior on the part of the inhabitants and adherence to the norms they impose.

On the other hand, the use of violence to structure social order produces an equilibrium between social and criminal actors that discourages them from seeking alternative ways to coordinate their interactions. For the traffickers, the use of coercion, intimidation, and physical violence against the inhabitants is less costly than other, more sustainable, and legitimate options. For the *pobladores*, any attempt to modify the configuration of the social order imposed by the criminal organization may mean the application of violent methods against them. Therefore, even though the preferences of the social order differ between one or the other, there is a balance that reinforces the existence of the criminal governance scheme based on violence. “For them, they don't need to tell us who we can talk to and who we can't talk to. We are all very clear that we can't call the carabineros. If we do, they blow up [attack by shooting] our houses,” says one resident of the neighborhood. Another adds, “For example, everyone in the neighborhood knows that we can't enter that building [referring to the apartment block where the gang concentrates its drug dealing], so we avoid it. Or if we see something [referring to drug sales or other illegal activity], we have to look the other way or pretend we didn't see it. That's why here, everyone will tell you, 'I don't know anything, or I haven't seen anything.'”

Figure 3.5. The governance structure at *población* Padre Hurtado and the emergence of Violent Social Order.



Source: Own elaboration

Extensive and intimidation control

In the absence of effective and legitimate local institutions and community leadership, traffickers have strong incentives to shape the social order through intensive and extensive use of force. In these cases, criminal groups do not need to make concessions to *pobladores* in order to agree on a beneficial social contract or define mechanisms for resolving disputes over the functioning of the social order. Thus, the violence exercised is the main mechanism of intimidation and enforcement of the imposed order.

Given that the type of social order is characterized by its coercive capacity, it is expected that disputes over the rules and norms that structure the scheme of territorial control will be kept at low levels in the neighborhood. But even so, they tend to arise. “In the *población*, the narco is in charge. They have weapons and have no problem using them if necessary. In general, everyone in the *población* prefers to keep quiet, pretend we don't know anything, or stay out of their business. But from time to time, problems arise with the gang [...] like someone talking too much or passing through the wrong side of town. When that happens, things get difficult,” a resident of the Padre Hurtado neighborhood told me.

Therefore, any conduct that deviates from the expected behavior of the criminal organization is quickly “corrected.” However, from the villagers' own narratives, two strategically differentiated mechanisms are identified by which the criminal group is able to force compliance with norms. First, traffickers may threaten the use of physical harm to inhabitants in a selective or generalized manner. When members of the “Jalisco Melipilla New Generation” directly threaten residents, indiscipline decreases and, therefore, adherence to the norms imposed by the criminal group increases. The selective threat is used strategically by the drug traffickers in that it is mostly used with some authority figures in the neighborhood who act as an amplifier of the coercive message to the rest of the inhabitants.

RESIDENT: “A few months ago, the police raided several apartments in the *población*. A few days later, the girlfriend of one of the arrested [traffickers] came to see me. She needed a certificate of residence for a procedure with her lawyer. I was doing that, and she told me they knew who sapeo [gave information to the police]. He pulled out a piece of paper from

the prosecutor's office showing where the calls had gone. They know everything. The only way for us to be calm is to look the other way.” (Int 11, June 2022)

RESIDENT XX: “The narcos have no problem threatening anyone in the neighborhood. Why would they? But they prefer not to do it with everyone [...] They generally do it with those who are more recognized in the neighborhood or those who like to be in everything [more active in neighborhood life]. I think it is because the message also reaches the rest; that is, if they threaten neighbor X, we will all know where everything is known. That doesn't mean that she has made the traffickers angry, but that it is easier for her to transmit the message than to threaten everyone. The truth is that they are super smart.” (Int 18, July 2022).

Additionally, the threat can be applied in a generalized manner through shootings or other disruptive acts in the fragile coexistence of the neighborhood. When this happens, an immediate reaction is sought from the *población*. In this regard, some inhabitants narrate the following episodes:

RESIDENT: “Some time ago, we had a soccer school for the children of the neighborhood. A teacher came from outside, and the children practiced and had fun; we even had some tournaments with other towns. Well, the thing is that when this was taking off, and the neighbors were getting enthusiastic about the school and what we could do from the Neighborhood Council, one day, the delinquents came to the multi-pitch and asked us to leave because they wanted to play. I tried to talk to them and ask them to let us finish the class, that we didn't have so much left. But they went into the field and took the balls away from the children and all that. Obviously, we left. The thing is that the next day, we came to see the multi-pitch, and these guys had broken the lights, the goal nets, and the access gate. The soccer school was never built again.” (Int 29, February 2023).

RESIDENT XX: “I've never really understood why they start shooting bullets in the air every so often. They usually do it at night and they are *carreteando* [partying] in the plaza. The only logical explanation is to show that they have the guns, that they can use them, and remind us every now and then that they are still there.” (Int 27, February 2023).

The second mechanism that the criminal group uses to exercise control and resolve disputes regarding the imposed social order is direct physical violence. This route is less frequent than threats and is restricted, according to the residents' accounts, to serious

deviations from the rules and norms imposed by the narco. Serious deviation is understood as collaboration with police authorities, handing over information, or disobedience to previous threats.

RESIDENT: “Before this, I wasn't afraid of the narcos here. I come from a conflictive *población* of Santiago and I thought I knew how to handle myself. The thing is that months ago the PDI [Chile's investigative police], carabineros and officials from the municipality came, they wanted to set up a working group with the community on security and drug issues. At that time I was president of the neighborhood council of stages 1 and 2 of the town. They asked for our help because they were conducting an investigation and they knew that a drug gang was operating in the neighborhood. I did not say anything; my answer was always that it was not my job; I am only a neighborhood leader and not in charge of security; that is the job of the police, not mine. A few days later, I was repairing a water heater in an apartment; I am a gas fitter when suddenly they started shouting my name from the street. I looked out of the bathroom window to see, and then I realized that there were four guys from a car. One of them got out and started shooting at me. Luckily, none of them hit me, but I felt the bullets pass by my head. What's more, if you look at the wall of the building, there are still marks from the bullets fired by these guys.” (Int 11, June 2022)

In addition, the “Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generation” has incorporated an additional control device aimed at consolidating their rule in the *población*. Several interviewees told me that members of the criminal group have been occupying the community headquarters since October 2019 and preventing the development of activities in the neighborhood. This action is interpreted by the residents as an act of dissuasion of any form of neighborhood associativity that puts at risk the control that the gang exercises over the neighborhood. “Since the social outbreak, we have been unable to enter the *Sede Social* [community center]. First, some punks began to occupy it during the outbreak. Our *población* is next to the tollbooth, and this was one of the most conflictive points for the social outbreak. We managed to kick them out. But a few days after that, some members took it over. The truth is that they don't even occupy it; that is, sometimes they make reels, and you see them there. But they even put a new lock on the door. For example, when I want to hold a meeting with the neighbors, I have to ask them to open the door so I can take out some chairs and hold the meetings on the field or in the courtyard of a building”, says a leader of

the neighborhood. Another resident told me, “For me, this is a very clear sign that what they are looking for is to tell us who is in charge and that they prefer us to be unorganized and afraid of what they can do”.

4. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the conditions and processes that lead to the emergence of a co-produced and violent social order. It explored how variation in the structure of communities can alter the preferences and capabilities of criminal actors with respect to social order. Specifically, it shows that the same criminal organization faced with two different socio-spatial conditions can choose to shape divergent social orders. On the one hand, when communities have broad and recognized associative capacities, their authorities are legitimate, and their organizations are capable of managing conflicts within the neighborhood, in turn, the traffickers are members of the *población* and are socialized in the same codes and normative schemes, they are more likely to decide to respect the local authority system. Thus, both criminals and inhabitants can agree on the joint construction of a social order that allows both to extract the greatest amount of benefits and restrict their behavior to safeguard the sustainability of the governance scheme. On the other hand, communities may lack associative capacities or be strongly weakened, which prevents them from shaping their own behavioral regimes. In addition, it was shown that if the criminal group is foreign and not embedded in neighborhood dynamics, a violent social order is more likely to emerge. The empirical evidence helped to illustrate how these interactions actually work.

In addition, it offered evidence about the functioning of these social orders and how, in each of them, inhabitants and criminals maintain a strict adherence to the system of norms and rules that regulate behavior and daily interactions in both *poblaciones*. In the co-produced social order, its inhabitants are strongly constrained by the broad support for the social contract they have shaped with the criminal group, thus recognizing that their attachment to this order is based on the fact that it does not alter their pre-existing normative regime and provides welfare in sensitive areas for the dynamics of the

neighborhood and its members. In addition, it was shown that in the co-produced social order, daily interactions between gang members and residents are fluid and without additional cost to the community authorities. This makes it easier for residents to actively approach members of the "Jalisco Melipilla Nueva Generación" whenever they feel that any of the relevant aspects of the agreed social pact have been transgressed. In contrast, in the violent social order, adherence to the norms imposed by the criminal group is the result of a learned strategy on the part of the inhabitants to reduce their exposure to threats or use of physical violence against them. In this case, residents do not adapt their behavior because of the benefits that the social order generates for them, but on the contrary, they constrain their behavior and daily interactions as a result of the violent practices exercised by the criminal organization.

On the other hand, the chapter showed how the state, through housing and urban planning policies, plays a significant role in enabling conditions for the emergence of divergent social orders. In particular, the chapter gathered pieces of evidence that support the theoretical argument about the long-term effects of housing solutions for the urban poor in the city. The tracing of the founding processes of each settlement and the role assumed by its residents shows that housing policies acted as devices aimed at shaping and containing the pressures of the settlers in their struggle for the right to housing and homeownership. Through "Operation Sitio", the state was obliged to recognize land seizures as a collective practice deployed by the popular sectors to gain access to housing and recognize their ownership of the territory. This housing policy, together with other initiatives, boosted the collective capacities of the inhabitants and allowed them to develop skills to govern their neighborhoods and exercise social control over community life that persists over time. In turn, the market-based housing policy was inspired by the need to contain social demand for housing and to disarticulate the social movement of *pobladores*. To this end, actions were designed and implemented that fragmented the social cohesion of the inhabitants and atrophied their collective capacities to manage the new neighborhoods. In summary, this chapter offered evidence of how housing policy alters the community social structure and generates more or less favorable conditions for the inhabitants of *poblaciones*, whether criminal or civilian, to collaborate or not in the construction of social order.

These findings have important implications. First, the cases used shed light on some issues not addressed by the literature on criminal governance, particularly that space and communities are not neutral in the emergence of different arrangements of social order. Socio-spatial characteristics exert an enormous influence on the decisions that criminal groups make when structuring a type of territorial and control. If the social density is weak or nonexistent, neighborhood residents lack a legitimized system of norms and leadership capable of articulating effective collective actions to address threats to their well-being and neighborhood coexistence, which is more likely to emerge violent social order. The evidence shows that traffickers base their behavior on the expectation that residents are unable to exercise collective resistance to their illicit activities and territorial control. On the contrary, if the inhabitants are capable of deploying their authority as much as possible, the criminal group recognizes the bargaining power and is more motivated to align their expectations to the preexisting normative regime.

Second, the cases and their paired comparison have allowed us to move forward with respect to some assumptions established in the literature. In particular, the evidence and methodological design of a natural experiment allowed us to take full advantage of the differences that arise when considering the long-term effects of the housing policy that gave rise to each *población* and to move beyond the notions that criminal governance arrangements vary according to the level of territorial competition, the form and organization of the criminal group, and the type of collusive pact with the state.

Finally, empirical evidence also suggests that in both co-produced and violent social order, there is a trade-off between the preferences of inhabitants and criminals. The mechanisms differ, but in both cases, the actors have learned that any change in their preferences can lead to outcomes that weaken their current welfare. In this sense, the most subtle feature in the functioning of the types of social order analyzed in this chapter is that both actors are willing to invest resources in maintaining the social control that prevails insofar as it allows them to predict and anticipate the actions that the other actor will deploy in maintaining or deviating from the norms and rules of conduct.

Chapter IV

Competitive and Co-Opted Social Ordes

“At first, we tolerated their [drug gang] presence until they started selling drugs to the neighborhood kids or tried to recruit them. We organized ourselves and managed to displace them, at least for a while. Then they came back but with more violence. They would assault anyone at any time, beat you on the ground, and didn't even take your belongings. They would go into houses to steal to show they could do it and that they could rule us. Since then, our reaction has been fear. Even though our organization is strong, some are no longer willing to confront them.”

Social leader of *población* Santa Elena – El Bosque, June 2022.

“I don't know if they [the social leaders] are part of the gang. Maybe they are not traffickers; I don't know. But we all know they are super-connected. Nothing is done in the población without them [the traffickers] knowing about it. They have dedicated themselves to painting and remodeling some spaces in the neighborhood, also they organize Christmas parties for the children. That's how they buy the población and people's loyalty.”

Social leader of *población* Los Almendros I – El Bosque, June 2022.

Santa Elena and Los Almendros I are two low-income neighborhoods located in the commune of El Bosque in the southern part of the Metropolitan Region¹⁷. In them, the criminal organization “Los Lete” has deployed a lucrative illicit market for the sale of drugs and a differentiated scheme of territorial control according to the socio-spatial

¹⁷ El Bosque, along with other sectors in the southern part of the Chilean capital, has been considered by authorities and police reports to be one of the areas with the highest levels of illicit activities and drug trafficking.

characteristics of each *población*. In the *población* Los Almendros I, a neighborhood that emerged from the plans to eradicate camps during the military dictatorship in 1985, and which combined the implementation of housing subsidies with an effective policy of social demobilization and repression of the inhabitants, “Los Lete” are able to shape a social order characterized by the distribution of selective benefits through the capture of weak community organizations and sanctions against those who decide to deviate from the established norms. The result is a co-opted social order. In contrast, in the *población* Santa Elena, an emblematic neighborhood that originated due to eradication plans in the early 1960s but which combined self-construction and popular promotion initiatives, the territorial governance scheme is in dispute between the inhabitants and the criminal organization. In it, each tries to deploy its authority to the maximum to govern the *población* and prevent the imposition of norms and restrictions on their behavior by the other. The result is a competitive social order.

How can we explain that two *poblaciones*, similarly shaped by camp eradication policies and under the control of the same drug trafficking organization, experience divergent criminal governance schemes? Why do the inhabitants of the *población* Santa Elena manage to resist the criminal organization and defend their normative regime and authority, while in Los Almendros, they do not? Why are “Los Lete” more successful in shaping social order in one neighborhood, while in the other they must compete with community organizations over who governs? This chapter shows how the interaction between the social density and level of embeddedness of drug trafficking organizations leads to divergent social order outcomes and particularly deepens how modifications in housing policies produce long-term effects on community structures and composition. Thus, according to the theoretical argument, a competitive criminal order is more likely to emerge when communities manage to develop and maintain stable organizational capacities over time and criminal gangs are not territorially rooted in them. On the other hand, when neighborhoods do not have strong or weakened community structures and the criminals are insiders or inhabitants of the *población*, the latter have more incentives to seek to shape the social order through the co-optation of social organizations and the distribution of selective benefits that boost the legitimacy of their presence and territorial control.

The chapter also shows the mechanisms that lead some communities to be better equipped to confront criminal organizations and the conditions that drive their members to mobilize collectively in defense of the autonomy of their community organizations and the pre-existing normative regime. And, in turn, the factors that discourage drug trafficking gangs from deciding to collaborate in the construction of a social order with the communities –as in the case of the *población* Padre Demetrio. Thus, the evidence provided allows us to complement the idea of conditionality of the criminal social order based on the characteristics of community structures and composition.

Finally, it shows how variations in the policy of camp eradication lead to contrasting results in the structure of the communities. On the one hand, combining forced localization with self-construction programs does not destroy the social fabric of the new neighborhoods, but it does weaken the capacity of control and administration of the inhabitants over the neighborhood members. This leaves a type of *población* characterized by a heterogeneous composition and not entirely coherent in its territorial identity and socialization practices. On the other hand, it is shown how the policies of camp eradication that included subsidies to the demand and dynamics of space construction based on the market, produce neighborhoods that recognize the relevance of community organizations, but their inhabitants are unable to lead and that traffickers are willing to use as vehicles to obtain greater legitimacy in the territories.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides general information about “Los Lte” and the local drug market. It also describes the strategic location of El Bosque for the narcotics industry and commercialization in the peripheral areas of Chile's Metropolitan Region. The second section analyzes how the Alessandri government and the Pinochet dictatorship employed eradicating encampments to address the *pobladores'* demands for housing solutions and mobilizations. This section examines the mixed nature of the encampment eradication programs according to two factors: i) the level of political and social organization of the irregular settlements that were subsequently displaced and the resistance capacity of the settlers during eradication; ii) the degree of instrumentalization of the eradication schemes, which in addition to displacing the urban poor from the city center, were aimed at demobilizing and politically intervening the

movement of the settlers. The third section illustrates how different levels of organizational density and integration of DTOs shape a co-opted or competitive social order. Additionally, it shows the functioning of each type of criminal social order and the efforts of both actors to maintain the established social order. The fifth section concludes.

1. “Los Lete” and the local drug market

In recent years, “Los Lete” has become one of the main drug trafficking organizations in the southern part of the Metropolitan Region. Their operations center is located in the Los Almendros neighborhood of the El Bosque district. They are originally from there and are the main authority that governs the neighborhood by controlling community organizations. Their organization has managed to establish a drug supply and distribution network in the communes of El Bosque, La Pintana, San Bernardo, La Granja and some localities of the Valparaíso region.

“Los Lete” are a mainly family organization, composed of approximately 60 members. However, the gang adopts a structure similar to that of a microenterprise. The main core is composed of the Letelier family members, the leaders of the gang, who are the ones who concentrate the decision-making and shape the organization's illicit business. At the second level are the “bodyguards” who are in charge of protecting the central core. They are mostly childhood friends or members who are experts in protection and the use of violence. They are followed by the “soldiers” who are usually young men recruited from the neighborhoods where they maintain a presence and have shown loyalty to the members of the central nucleus or the circle of bodyguards. The microenterprise-type structure of “Los Lete” is characterized by its flexibility and a high capacity to outsource tasks in the drug distribution chain through small neighborhood organizations that sell drugs at the retail level or move money between the different points of sale (Fieldwork note).

Most of the “Los Lete” members are based in three *poblaciones*: Los Almendros I, Valparaíso, and Santa Elena. The first two are the bases of their territorial power, where they have their drug, money, and weapons storage centers, and the last one is some of their

main points of sale and the distribution chain to other areas of the southern metropolitan area. The presence and control that the criminal group maintains in these three neighborhoods is key to the success of its operations. In particular, these neighborhoods are located around the main avenues that cross the commune: Avenida Observatorio to the north of Santa Elena, Avenida Lo Blanco to the south of Los Almendros, Avenida San Francisco to the east, and Avenida Padre Hurtado to the west. The crucial thing about these axes for the operation of the drug market is that they connect with three other communes in the Metropolitan Region: La Granja, La Pintana, and San Bernardo. Additionally, despite their importance for local life, these are secondary avenues with less police presence than other structural axes in the southern zone, such as Gran Avenida and Avenida Santa Rosa. Therefore, this condition allows “Los Lete” to control a neuralgic point of access to the southern periphery of the Metropolitan Region, characterized as one of the main points of distribution and consumption of drugs in the country¹⁸ and, at the same time, to protect their operations from the attention of other actors, state or criminal.

As for the drug market in the southern metropolitan area, it is characterized by low articulation and high competition between criminal organizations. According to a study by the South Metropolitan Prosecutor's Office, more than 90 criminal groups dedicated to drug distribution operate in its jurisdiction (Observatorio del Narcotráfico, 2022). Most of them are nationals and distribute territorial control based on their places of residence. Only some organizations that have been more successful in controlling areas of high consumption have managed to expand into other neighborhoods of their communes. “Los Lete” is one of them. According to some interviewees, this drug trafficking group began its operations during the first decade of the 2000s, selling cocaine base paste, marijuana, and cocaine, and restricted to a few points of sale inside the Los Almendros neighborhood. Its expansion began after the dismantling of other local gangs operating in the area towards the end of 2010. This situation, according to some residents, allowed “Los Lete” to quickly go from being a family that sold drugs around a few streets in Los Almendros to controlling an

¹⁸ According to the Violent Crime Observatory Network, the southern metropolitan area has the highest prevalence of infractions of Law No. 20,000, particularly drug distribution and commercialization. In 2022 alone, more than 15 billion pesos in illicit substances were seized. For more information see: <https://www.gobiernosantiago.cl/gobernador-orrego-lidero-reunion-con-municipios-y-fiscalia-de-la-zona-metropolitana-sur-para-abordar-problematica-de-delitos-violentos/>

important part of the local illicit drug consumption market and to concentrate significant resources to attract new members and buy loyalty among the neighborhood's inhabitants (Int 9 & 10 June 2022).

The Path of Forced Displacement in the Struggle for Housing: Eradicated Neighborhoods and Political Demobilization

The eradication of irregular settlements has been a common practice of governments in Chile to respond to the housing demands of low-income sectors. (Garcés, 2013; Hidalgo, 2002; Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, 2004, 2013). This measure was based on police intervention and displacement of settlers from central urban areas to the city's outskirts or other regions of the country. (Abufhele 2019; Skewes 2002; Morales and Rojas 1986). However, it is a housing policy that leaves mixed results depending on how the authorities used other complementary tools in conjunction with the displacement of the settlers. Thus, on the one hand, an attempt was made to provide solutions to housing and homeownership demands through plans that encouraged self-construction in sites with lower land use value. On the other hand, eradications were accompanied by incentives for individual savings and access to subsidies to gain access to definitive solutions, in addition to political intervention actions and the destruction of community ties.

These types of policies have had long-term effects on the community structures of the new popular neighborhoods. By dissolving settlements through forced displacement, kinship ties, and generalized local associative links are eroded (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974), and particularly the sense of appropriation of the place of residence and the development of attachment and identities with their new dwellings are destroyed. In short, the geography of opportunity that irregular settlements possess as a collective and insurgent practice of urbanization is eliminated.

Permissive conditions to erradications in late twentieth century

In Chile, since the second half of the twentieth century, different political initiatives have been developed to deal with land seizures. Among them, "Operation Sitio" stands out, giving rise to a popular neighborhood characterized by the territorial roots of its inhabitants and a solid community organization (see Chapter 3). Between 1965 and 1971, this housing policy delivered more than 71,000 housing solutions (Hidalgo, 2002) through a process of self-construction promoted by the State and the regularization of sites that the settlers had illegally occupied. A second alternative has been the massive eradication of camps or irregular settlements, which have accelerated socio-territorial segregation through the forced displacement of families from areas with higher incomes and access to facilities and services to the periphery of the cities (Morales & Rojas, 1986).


This alternative has been used by different governments seeking to "sanitize" the city of the "*callampas*" *poblaciones* by massively relocating the inhabitants to other places and providing a definitive solution to their housing demand. By the end of the 1950s, the government of Jorge Alessandri implemented the first eradication plans and relocated the urban poor to new sites developed by the Housing Corporation (CORVI). This entity established that the eradication plans "consisted of the massive transfer of settlers from the so-called "*callampas*" *poblaciones* that were close to the big cities".

This same policy was used during the Pinochet dictatorship. However, during this period, it acquired a new orientation in line with the transformation that the regime sought to bring about in Chilean society, particularly the eradications that were given a profound political character. On the one hand, this housing policy helped to dissolve and demobilize the relocated *poblaciones* after the intensive use of repression against their leaders and forms of community organization. On the other hand, private participation in the distribution of access to land was encouraged through the National Urban Development Policy, which sought to modernize Greater Santiago.

The magnitude of the eradications is brutal. Between 1959 and 1962, a total of 27,864 people were relocated. (Mensaje Presidencial 1962). Between 1978 and 1985, more than 78,000 families were relocated. In the first stage, during the Alessandri government,

CORVI played a central role in the construction of low-income housing. In the second stage, during the authoritarian regime, private enterprise made a definitive entry by displacing the state and the inhabitants themselves in the solution of the housing problem. In this sense, the *poblaciones* Santa Elena and Los Almendros I tell this story and allow us to observe the causal mechanisms that lead to different socio-spatial configurations that impact in the long term on the emergence of differentiated social orders (See Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 Type of *poblaciones* and characteristics of the community structure



Source: Own elaboration

The Alessandri administration played a critical role in the trajectory of housing policies for low-income sectors in Chile. During his term, the first mass eradication were implemented as a central part of a solution to the housing deficit. This measure was accompanied by the “Housing Plan” presented to the National Congress on May 21, 1959. In the message, he indicated that the housing policy he was promoting was aimed at satisfying “the most pressing needs of the neighborhood by intensively addressing the construction of 250,000 rooms, taking into account that the definitive solution to the problem implied attending to a deficit of no less than 400,000 houses” (Presidential Message 1959). To meet this goal, the Alessandri government issued a special decree aimed

at intensifying the construction of housing, exempting from taxes and part of the contributions on the construction of affordable housing¹⁹.

Along with these measures, the reorganization of CORVI was announced so that only this entity would be in charge of the construction of popular housing. This meant merging the agency with all the technical or architectural departments of the Social Security Funds and the National Investment Corporation. Likewise, CORVI's resources were increased through new fiscal resources to implement a three-year execution plan to construct more than 45 thousand housing units throughout the country (Gárces 2014, 168). All these measures were established from enacting the Decree with Force of Law or DFL 2, of July 2, 1959. DFL 2 also authorized CORVI to eradicate the *poblaciones* callampa. For this purpose, the entity was authorized to organize the relocation of families settled in informal neighborhoods in “both urban and rural areas; on the most suitable types of land in each region [...] all this in accordance with the economic capacity of the country and to elaborate based on all this information the Housing Plan for Affordable Housing.” (Godoy, 1972, 29)

A direct effect of this policy was the expansion of Santiago's urban ring and the socio-spatial segregation that implied relocating and concentrating poor groups on the margins of the city, with the consequent problems of displacement and access to services. This process was most intense in the southern part of the city of Santiago, in the *comunas* of San Miguel, La Cisterna and La Granja²⁰. Furthermore, despite the efforts of the Housing Policy, the response was insufficient and limited in its scope with respect to the magnitude of the housing deficit. According to data from the Second Housing Census of 1960, the problems of habitability were still acute. In Santiago, out of a total of 446,680 registered dwellings, 119,878 corresponded to round quarters, tenements and similar round quarters, tenements and similar, and to improvised dwellings erected in *poblaciones*

¹⁹ The decree establishes that to ensure the maintenance of these benefits, it contemplates a contractual guarantee granted by the state to the owners so that such exemptions cannot be modified later, even by a law.

²⁰ The commune of El Bosque was created, along with 16 others in the Metropolitan Region, by D.F.L.1-3260 of 1981, under a policy that sought greater efficiency in the administrative management process through the application of population volume standards considered optimal (this was around 150,000 inhabitants). Once the territory was defined in the aforementioned decree, its formation as a municipality materialized only 10 years later, on August 12, 1991, when President Aylwin appointed its first mayor, Sadi Melo.

“callampas” and which were defined as “a construction of waste material in foreign and unoccupied sites in which there is no urbanization or hygienic conditions of habitability” (Dirección de Estadísticas y Censos 1960). This situation led to popular pressures to find alternative solutions to those offered by CORVI, especially by testing insurgent strategies of land seizures²¹.

The *población* Santa Elena emerges in this context. However, it is not the product of a land seizure but of two eradication processes of other illegal occupations that were dissolved and disabled by the eradication plans of the time. The first group of eradicated settlers came from an occupation in the Germán Riesco sector of the same commune in November 1960 in some sites of the former Navidad *población*, belonging to CORVI. The second group came from a land seizure carried out in the El Llano sector, in front of the San Miguel Municipality. In this regard, some of the settlers interviewed described the process that led them to occupy the land in the German Riesco sector as follows:

RESIDENT: “We were on a soccer field that we had taken and they moved us to a wide vereda on Germán Riesco. Just like the Lo Ovalle alley. There we had to put up our little tents. We were there for 90 days” (Extraído de Grupo de Educación y Recreación Las Patotas 1994, 7)

According to Garcés (2013), this corresponds to the first group of settlers eradicated from the *población* Santa Elena. According to the historian, on November 23, 1960, a group of approximately 360 families occupied the Navidad neighborhood but were quickly evicted by the carabineros. This situation led them to settle on the street, on Estrella Polar Street. As the days went by, the number of occupants increased. Some chronicles in the newspaper El Siglo (November 26, 1960) indicated that 360 families had settled on Estrella Polar Street, but by December of the same year, there were more than 1,600 families. The same Executive, in his presidential message of May 1961, recognized more than 1,300 families as the main occupants in the sector.

The second milestone in the eradication processes that led to the formation of the *población* Santa Elena was the occupation of several blocks in the Gran Avenida - El Llano

²¹ Hacia fines de 1960, solamente en la CORVI tenía a más de 18 mil postulantes en lista de espera solo en Santiago (Garcés 2004, 195).

sector by various Housing Committee organizations. In this regard, some of the residents interviewed describe the occupation process as follows:

RESIDENT: “Several of us could already see that the situation had no solution. Several of us had been waiting for years for a solution through CORVI, for a site to be assigned to us so that we could build our houses. But we were no longer willing to wait. We knew of other Housing Committees that were taking land to put pressure on CORVI and speed up the process [...] A large movement was set up in front of the Municipality of San Miguel; people came from all over Cerrillos, La Legua, José María Caro. There were a lot, a lot of people.” (Int 6, June 2022).

RESIDENT: “I lived in a sister's house in La Legua. I remember that one day, I was with some neighbors, and they told us that the communists were going to hold a meeting to organize a movement to press for a house of our own. A few days after that, there were several of us at the 5th stop on Gran Avenida. I didn't stay there. My husband did. Many set up tents or whatever [...] the thing was very big, we started from there in Lo Vial and reached further down from the Muni.” (Int 8, June 2022).

Twenty years after the events that led to the takeovers in Estrella Polar and El Llano, *pobladores* occupied land as a mechanism to obtain housing. This occupation was carried out and ended with the eradication of the *pobladores* to different areas of Santiago. Only a minority group managed to remain in the vicinity of the occupied territory and relocated to Los Almendros I. However, unlike the previous period, this seizure took place during the military dictatorship of Pinochet and in a process of reactivation of the movement of settlers during the national days of protest in 1983 (Garcés, 2013; Giannotti & Braithwaite, 2021).

As in the other cases analyzed, the housing deficit has been a precondition for the mobilization of the population. Thus, using data from the 1982 Census, the National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) estimated a national housing deficit of about 752,000 homes. In addition to the above, the housing situation had increased considerably towards the end of the 1970s as a result of the freeze in housing production by the State and the strict control over occupations and popular neighborhoods imposed by the military dictatorship

since 1973 (Morales et al., 1990). A second factor was the restructuring of housing policies since 1979 based on neoliberal principles. In particular, housing assistance and programs were reoriented towards sectors of extreme poverty and the role of the state was reduced to the allocation of subsidies and the establishment of conditions for private participation in housing construction (Buey, 2012; Campero, 1987).

Additionally, the reactivation of housing mobilizations and land seizures as a repertoire arose within a broader process of reorganizing the *pobladores*. According to Gallardo (1986) and Wilson (1988), the organizations of the “allegados” initiated a process of reorganization under the protection of the Catholic Church, which formed Housing Committees to demand urbanized land. Some 1981 s more active groups attempted land seizures as a practice between 1979 and June 1980 but were quickly and violently repressed by the authorities (Giannotti and Braithwaite 2021; Garcés 2017). However, a small number of seizures were able to successfully establish themselves, occupying public attention and the reaction of the authorities. In spite of the dictatorship's efforts, from 1981 onwards, multiple land occupations took place, claiming the granting of these sites as a housing solution and a demand for housing.

In this scenario, on September 22, 1983, there was a seizure that resulted in two encampments: Cardenal Silva Henríquez and Monseñor Francisco Fresno. Both in the *comuna* of La Granja. The Cardenal Silva Henríquez camp is the main antecedent of the organization and action of the *pobladores* who were later eradicated in the Los Almendros I. Some residents remember this process:

RESIDENT: "The *tomas* had been reactivated, people were slowly losing their fear of the dictatorship. Of course, the 1982 crisis helped in that. The protests that were appearing everywhere made many of us decide to participate in the takeovers. I, for example, had never participated in anything. But we could no longer live as close friends, and we thought that this was the moment to take action." (Int 9, June 2022)

RESIDENT: "We came from all over. I came from La Pintana, but there were people from San Miguel, San Joaquín, Puente Alto, from many places. [...] As there were protests and people were

getting organized again, we were helped by the Coordinadora Metropolitana de Pobladores, which was an organization started by the Communist Party at that time.” (Int 10, June 2022)

RESIDENT XX: “The Coordinadora was very important in helping to organize the occupation. It also helped to quickly mobilize contacts and solidarity that allowed the occupation to consolidate and not be evicted at once by the police.” (Int 20, January 2023).

As has been noted, both *poblaciones* have a history of land seizures that ended in massive eradications, more or less violent, depending on the orientation of the governments of each period. The way in which these forced relocations took place had long-term effects on the socio-spatial configurations of the *poblaciones*. This will be discussed in the following section.

Long-term effects of the encampment eradication policy: The dual nature of forced displacement


The housing policies implemented by Chilean governments have had profound implications on the forms of social activism adopted by the homeless. Through them, the different administrations have sought to restrict the leading role that the *pobladores* have acquired through their repertoires of access to housing and homeownership, particularly the strategy of land seizure as the most radical and, at the same time, the most successful practice for the settlers. In this regard, the eradication of encampments has been one of the most widely used housing policies by different governments since the irruption of the first *poblaciones callampas* in Chile's urban areas (Gárces 2017). However, its use has left profound consequences in the community structures of the neighborhoods that have emerged from the various eradication plans promoted from the late 1950s to date. The trajectories of the *poblaciones* Santa Elena and Los Almendros I describe this process.

The extensive use of this housing policy derives from its versatility and suitability for complementary mechanisms for the allocation of definitive housing solutions. On the one hand, during the Alessandri administration, it was used as a tool to evict land that had been acquired by CORVI and was in the process of urbanization. Here, the displaced

inhabitants settled in new sites where they were allowed to build their homes through self-construction processes. The result was a mixed neighborhood with a strong social and community organization, although it was uprooted from the territory as its composition mixed different inhabitants from other displaced areas. This is the trajectory of the *población* Santa Elena.

On the other hand, during Pinochet's military dictatorship, the eradication of camps was used mainly under two guiding principles. First, it was a practice of political intervention and disarticulation of the social fabric that had begun to be recomposed by the organizations of settlers and the role of the Communist Party in some emblematic *poblaciones* in the early 1980s. Second, it is a mechanism for the displacement of low-income sectors from areas with greater real estate development and market participation as per the new Urban Development Policy of 1979. However, under certain conditions, the settlement of new sites took place in desired locations or close to the areas occupied by the *pobladores*, but it was based on housing subsidy policies for family groups and not for social organizations. The result, in this case, was an alluvial neighborhood but one that developed territorial roots and identity with the space. This trajectory is followed by the *población* Los Almendros I. Figure 4.2 shows the long-term consequences of each housing policy on the socio-spatial conditions of the *poblaciones* Santa Elena and Los Almendros I.

Figure 4.2 Long-term consequences of each housing policy on the socio-spatial conditions of the poblaciones Santa Elena and Los Almendros I



Political vs Non-political Orientations

The way in which the Chilean state has responded to land seizures and irregular occupations of sites by *pobladores* differs substantially from one historical moment to another. At first, during the government of Alessandri Rodríguez (1958 – 1964), massive eradications of the homeless were promoted as an immediate response to the occupation of territories assigned to other homeless or displacement from urban areas to peripheral zones. The purpose of this action was not to disarticulate the movement of *pobladores* but rather to respond to the lack of housing and to disable *poblaciones* “*callampas*” in the face of the housing crisis of the late 1950s. In a second moment, during the authoritarian regime of Pinochet (1973-1989), eradication was deeply inspired as a political action aimed at preventing the social re-articulation of the *pobladores*’ movement and party structures in opposition to the regime. The type of orientation assumed by the housing policy is not neutral with respect to the integration and recognition of the settlers as political actors. Thus, one is indifferent to the social and political organizations of the homeless, while the other is directed towards their elimination.

As I have argued in previous chapters, the *tomas de terreno* are a disruptive act that requires a high level of organization and coordination on the part of the occupants (See chapter 3: State-led mobilization vs. State-led demobilization). Through this action, the *pobladores* seek to exercise their right to housing and/or pressure the state to provide housing solutions. In addition, the success of the occupation requires the existence of organizational networks of intra- and extra-taking cooperation. The former is expressed through structures that organize the internal life of the settlement to distribute territories and, above all, guarantee the subsistence of newcomers, among other actions. The latter refers to the need for the *tomadores* to have external reciprocity networks that contribute to avoiding eviction, providing necessary materials, and establishing political support networks capable of mediating with state authorities.

Evidently, this situation poses a challenge for the authorities of any period. However, the threat may be greater in autocratic contexts where unrestricted control of the *población* predominates, and the aim is to reduce their political activity to a minimum. In

democratic regimes, on the other hand, governments may not be motivated to disable irregular camps as a means of political control of the *pobladores*.

The nature of the relationship between the state-*poblador* is critical and determines the type of response to their demand for housing and homeownership. In the case of the *tomas* of La Estrella Polar and the El Llano sector that culminated in eradicating its residents to the *población* Santa Elena, the state was not interested in dismantling the social organization. On the contrary, it encouraged it after the displacement of the settlers as a vehicle to achieve a quicker solution to the processes of construction of housing units. This is expressed in the narratives of several *pobladores*:

RESIDENT: “They took us out of there [Estrella Polar] and took us to Santa Adriana and others to the FAMAE sector. They took us in trucks from the municipality and CORVI. They left us with our things, there is a “pleader” [a vacant lot]. There was a lot of mud, dirt, and nothing else. As others from Estrella Polar or other sectors arrived, people from CORVI suggested to us that it was better for us to organize ourselves to clean up and put our things there. That we were going to stay here.” (Int 25, January 2023)

RESIDENT: “When we arrived, we had nothing; there was nothing in this place. The municipality set up some water pylons over there in Los Raulíes [internal street of the current *población* Santa Elena]. As more and more people arrived in trucks, it became clear that we would have to organize ourselves to get this new site up and running. There, those of us who had known each other since the Estrella Polar takeover got down to work, as they say, and began to try to organize ourselves.” (Int 7, June 2022)

RESIDENT: “I came with my husband in the first group that left for here [Santa Elena], that was more or less on February 11, 61, from German Riesco, on Estrella Polar Street to here. There were people who knew each other and others who did not. Not all of us who arrived had come to Estrella Polar at the same time. Some came from the occupation in front of the San Miguel [El Llano] City Hall. It was difficult; we were not so united at the beginning, but little by little, things began to get organized. We just had to do it.” (Int 8, June 2022)

RESIDENT XX: “The leaders who were arriving, whom we had there in El Llano, arrived acting. This was a farm; it was a rural area; a few passages further down, another estate began, where Valparaíso and other towns are now [...] The thing is that the need to organize ourselves was

created between those of us who knew each other and those who did not but were brought together in the trucks or who were put in the subdivision. CORVI divided us into sectors. We were from sector B, which starts here and ends just past the 39th police station. That is how we organized ourselves at the beginning, by sectors. It was easier.” (Int 24, January 2023)

The trajectory of Santa Elena indicates that the social organization that the settlers had achieved during the seizure of Estrella Polar and El Llano suffered alterations depending on how the settlers were relocated to the new lands of the town. Or if they were being eradicated in this or another area. However, despite the forced displacement, it did not disappear. After the settlement, it was reactivated both by the urgency of shaping the neighborhood and organizing those who were arriving, as well as by the Housing Corporation officials who were directing the eradication process. The latter encouraged neighborhood organization as a mechanism to facilitate the settling-in process and to organize the distribution of construction materials that CORVI itself assigned to each lot and a group of settlers so that they could build their houses. “CORVI gave us some materials, not many, but very useful, especially at the beginning. We came from a squat that we had set up with tents and cardboard in the middle of a street. And when we arrived here, we had nothing [...] as there were many of us; I didn't tell you that we had more relatives than land; the materials and tools were not enough. So, some of us who had *maestreábamos* [construction skills] made do. Others helped to collect water, to organize the streets, that kind of thing”. (Int 5, June 2022).

Furthermore, the displaced villagers were able to rebuild neighborhood ties based on their shared experience of the displacement and eradication process. From networks of reciprocity and cooperative interactions among Santa Elena members, valuable social capital was accumulated (Coleman, 1988) that contributed to the consolidation of strong and effective local social institutions that allowed residents to shape governance schemes. These networks promote a level of commitment and adherence to norms that the *pobladores* themselves have endowed. These attributes are reflected in the following statements from some of the early inhabitants of Santa Elena:

RESIDENT: “Building trust took some time. Each family had its own needs and problems. In general, you would rely on those closest to you, those you already knew. Since other neighbors

tried to take over this place after we arrived, there was resistance to continue receiving more people. But as time passed, we realized that we all shared something, and it was the urgent need for a house. In that sense, the leaders who rose up were very important. The realization that we all came from the same background, maybe different places, but we shared this urgency made us start to have confidence in each other.” (Int 7, June 2022)

RESIDENT: “[...] Necessity helped us to start organizing ourselves. When they moved us from the North Star we were happy, we thought we would finally have a place to set up our little houses. But when we arrived and realized that it was pure mud, it was difficult, it was very hard at the beginning. Now, if I think about it, it helped us to believe again in our strength as settlers, we built this town by hand, between all of us, women and men” (Int 9, June 2022)

RESIDENT: “Everybody contributed their share. Those who knew electricity oversaw installing electricity. They helped us a lot from La Legua; they came to leave us some eucalyptus poles and cables that we used to hang up to the electricity [...] Others were bricklayers, and they organized crews to build shelters with panels and other materials that they donated to us. The women organized themselves and took care of the children in a kind of neighborhood council that was improvised. They were in charge of cooking or fetching water. [...] Obviously, this helped us build trust among all of us and continue trusting in our organization. As they say, unity is strength.” (Int 5, June 2022).

These pieces of evidence show that the option for self-construction as an alternative housing solution reemphasized the need for and importance of social organization for the settlers. This is despite the fact that the eradication plans fragmented the social fabric that had been formed during the land occupations. Additionally, self-construction as a settlement practice of the popular sectors encourages an insurgent type of property (Murphy, 2021) characterized by the activism of the settlers and a marked protagonism in the trajectory of their neighborhoods. In the history of the *población* Santa Elena, this role was not exhausted in the process of installation and construction of housing after eradication but expanded throughout the urbanization process that followed in the coming years. Social organization and the role of autonomous community structures played a vital role in this process. One of the daughters of the first social leaders points out that “About three months after we had been here, the need arose to have a Neighborhood Council to lobby and represent us with the municipal and government authorities. My father always

said that when the Neighborhood Council was constituted, they started to pressure and lobby so that the streets would be paved, and they put more water pylons. My old man always said we stopped the houses ourselves, but there are issues that we need the municipality or CORVI to take care of, like building the sewage system.” (Int 22, January 2023).

On the other hand, the path followed by the inhabitants of the Cardenal Silva Henríquez settlement was totally different. In this case, the eradication was based on the doctrine of national security of the state and the struggle of the dictatorship against the different forms of political organizations that weakened the regime. Thus, even though the occupation had initially succeeded in establishing itself, during the early morning hours of November 10, 1984, the camp was overflowed by two helicopters that initiated the military intervention in the area. A resident describes this experience as follows:

RESIDENT: “¡Oh!” It was terrible because we felt the helicopter at night, at two in the morning, three in the morning, then everybody got up, what do I know, because they jumped with parachutes, they were arriving like that. And all of a sudden they entered the houses [...] we could hear the screaming of the kids, the women screaming, they took out all the men, all of them there in the middle of the camp, and threatening that now I will kill you and what do I know, and taking out everything that the people had. Literature and everything and so many things and taking pictures of them. It was all very terrible, very dramatic, terrible, terrible, terrible. After they left, they took all the men, all those they wanted to take away; they also took some women away.” (Int. 37, April 2023)

The intervention of the camp involved members of the Army, Carabineros, Investigative Police, and the National Intelligence Center (CNI). According to historian Reyes Soriano (2015, p. 14), in the eviction and eradication of the camp, “all the homes were raided, taking out the heads of households and young people over 14 years of age to register them and search their meager belongings. Those suspected of being “subversives” were beaten and loaded onto one of the 100 police buses that were in the sector.” Francisco Javier Cuadra, Minister of the General Secretariat of Government, informed *El Mercurio* that during the process, “323 individuals were arrested, and weapons and subversive materials were seized. It was also reported that 263 of those arrested had a criminal record

and 60 had a subversive history and that in their possession were found light weapons, automatic weapons, rifles, revolvers, pistols, and submachine guns, as well as explosive material, mainly dynamite, cutting weapons, lynchets, subversive literature and material for future printing.” (El Mercurio 11/11/984).

Military occupation and political intervention were the cornerstone of the eradication of the Cardenal Silva Henríquez camp. Despite the fact that this area was not considered a primary site within the strategy of modernization of the urban land of the metropolitan area, the regime decided to use an aggressive strategy against the occupation and to establish a signal to the rest of the occupations and social protests that were taking place in Chile within the framework of the National Protest Days²². In this regard, the aggressiveness with which the dictatorship acted in this camp can be explained by the strong popular pressure and that of the middle sectors that challenged its political control, and particularly the role that the Communist Party of Chile had acquired in the reactivation of the land seizures since 1980. The collective had developed a new mass policy known as the Policy of Popular Mass Rebellion²³. This policy sought to actively promote social agitation in the popular sectors and incorporate the exercise of violence and military actions to destabilize the regime into the party's political practice. Thus, *tomas de terreno* and other forms of organized social struggle were part of this repertoire. Luis Corvalán, Secretary General of the PCCh, described the policy as follows: “The days ahead will be of arduous combats, where Pinochet will impose his constitutional program by means of repression and state violence, but the people will know how to defend themselves from the dictatorial onslaught. The people will have no other way but to resort to all the means at

²² E In May 1983, copper workers called for a strike and protest against the Pinochet dictatorship. Although originally intended as a limited action, its effects were surprising, as not only the miners protested, but also broad sectors of civil society joined in spontaneously.

²³ Under the new policy, the PCCh made frequent calls for the masses to exercise their right to rebellion, encompassing multiple social sectors. The party called on “the workers, the people, the democratic sectors of the Armed Forces to rebel against the dictatorship, to break its decrees and laws, as well as the illegitimate Constitution that it has dictated” (Boletín Exterior, No. 47, 1981). The unity of the democratic social sectors was a condition for victory, but it did not guarantee it. To this end, the CCP sought to deploy “all the necessary forms of struggle, resorting to legitimate violence for the sake of the noblest objective: to put an end to fascism and conquer the freedom of Chile” (Communist Party of Chile, 11/09/1982).

their disposal, to all forms of combat that will help them, including acute violence, to defend their right to bread, freedom, and life.” (Corvalán, 1982, pp. 239–240).

Thus, for the PCCh the *tomas de terreno* were interpreted as an expression of how the settlers "promote the struggle as a form of protest against the dictatorship" (Communist Party of Chile, 1982: 92). A clandestine bulletin of El Siglo explained the following:

“The consolidation of the land seizures is due to the fact that the inhabitants make the policy of Popular Rebellion their own since it implies a higher level of organization of homeless families and their relatives and, on the other hand, the weakness of the regime, as well as the rise of the mass struggle in general.” (Boletín de prensa El Siglo, N° 49, 1984).

In this context, the expulsion that gave rise to Los Almendros I was deeply aggressive and violent towards the *pobladores*. But it was even more acute towards the leaders of Cardenal Silva Henríquez.

“Belisario Ocaranza Tamayo was taken out of his half-water with his head covered with a blanket, handcuffed, and amidst blows and insults, was taken to a kind of square: there he was surrounded by political documentation and other objects, being photographed and filmed. Another leader, Raúl Valenzuela Escobar, who was bleeding profusely from wounds caused by the blows, was driven around the camp. All were put into private vehicles, without license plates, driven by civilians. To the brutal treatment must be added the destruction of their shelters and belongings.” (VS-DJ, Noviembre 1984: 53-54).

The military intervention during the seizure dissolved the organizations, and the entire leadership of the camp was transferred to Pisagua. According to the Vicariate of Solidarity, 123 people were sent to different parts of the country (VS-DJ, November 1984: 103-105). One of the leaders of the camp stated the following:

“I was taken to CNI barracks 3 in San Bernardo, where I was interrogated all morning. There, I found that there were many detained leaders and villagers. They blindfolded me. Then we were separated from the president from the rest because we were the public men of the leadership, the ones who had been with the authority making arrangements. They took us to Borgoña, the CNI headquarters. There, we were held for 17 days, blindfolded, interrogated. There were 50 villagers there.” (Raúl Valenzuela in Korol, 1986, 80).

The events of November 10, 1984, were followed by a series of events aimed at ensuring the political deactivation of the settlers and their disintegration as organized political actors. In the first place, the Army organized the whole process of disabling the Cardenal Silva Henríquez camp and the displacement of the settlers to different areas of the Metropolitan Region. This process took several months. Secondly, while the eradication and settlement plans were being organized in new neighborhoods, the dictatorship installed a new directive in the camp led by a unionist settler, Rubén Carvacho, and advised by Pablo Longueira and Andrés Chadwick (Reyes Soriano 2014). The new leader declared a few days after the intervention of the camp: “I take control of the camp because we have been deceived by leaders who have not fulfilled any promise of a solution and who only wanted to use us politically”. (El Mercurio 7/12/1984). Likewise, the new directive established among its objectives “to reach a definitive solution to our housing problem, a will that the command did not show [...] We are decent and honest people who have never wanted to cause problems for the authorities. We know that our seizure is illegal, and that is why we only wish for a definitive solution to our problems in order to put an end to this camp.” (El Mercurio 9/12/1984).

Finally, the new leadership, aligned with the housing policy of subsidies to demand, actively promoted this alternative among the settlers who were waiting their turn in the successive eradications that followed the November 1984 intervention. Some residents describe this process as follows:

RESIDENT: “After the intervention, some families decided to leave; it is logical *po*. There were people arrested, many wounded, many people were taken away, and we thought the worst. After a few weeks, a new leadership was formed with the approval of the military. And there they started; they tried a little before raiding us; they tried to charm us with a site where apartments were being built, that we only had to apply for subsidies.” (Int 38, April 2023)

RESIDENT: “I applied for the government subsidy shortly after the raid. We were afraid, and we also wanted a quick response. We could not wait any longer. We knew they were going to eradicate us; the new leaders told us this every day. It was like a threat, either we applied, or they would take us out with nothing [...] After they raided us, a few months passed, I don't remember

how long, and they began to eradicate people there, to La Castillo, to La Pintana, others to La Granja, everywhere.” (Int 39, April 2023).

Primary vs. secondary urban areas in eradication plans

The dismantling of camps and their relocation to new spaces is not a neutral action of the housing policy based on eradication. According to the theoretical argument, three sets of effects are observed in the structure and composition adopted by the communities. First, it alters the mechanisms of local integration of residents with the territory by disarticulating the links with a space of origin. Second, it dilutes the socialization processes that are rooted in territory and that act as mechanisms of adhesion to norms, codes of conduct, and community structures. Third, it modifies the ability of the settlers to act on the residential design of the new space where they will settle. These implications have long-term effects on the ability of communities to shape the territorial governance schemes within their neighborhoods and, above all, alter the preferences of residents and criminal groups to operate in each sector.

The trajectory followed by the inhabitants of the Santa Elena and Los Almendros I neighborhoods in their struggle for housing and homeownership tells the story of this process. However, despite the shared elements, each neighborhood followed a different route based on the land hierarchy assigned by the authorities both to the land initially occupied and to that of their final settlement and on the relevance of the processes of social construction or market of the space. Thus, the *población* Santa Elena describes a route marked by a displacement from a space of greater hierarchy in the distribution of urban land to one of lesser relevance, located on the periphery of the Metropolitan Region. In addition, the inhabitants of the new settlement were allowed to shape the residential design of their neighborhoods through self-construction practices technically supervised by CORVI. On the other hand, in the *población* Los Almendros I, the inhabitants were eradicated from a secondary place in the configuration of the city's urban land, since they were already on the periphery, and their relocation did not profoundly alter the territorial

roots of the homeless. However, they had no influence on the design of their neighborhoods since the construction of space based on the market was privileged.

Eradication from primary urban areas to secondary ones responds to a process of urban planning and territorial organization that left the best-located areas for the development of private real estate projects and displaced low-income sectors to the peripheries of the cities (Castillo & Forray, 2014). In this sense, a crucial issue to be solved by the eradication plans was to which areas the settlers should be mobilized. In the case of the eradication of the Estrella Polar street and the El Llano sector, the authorities of the time expressed their deep concern about the location of the irregular settlement that had been established in the area of Gran Avenida –one of the main arteries of the city and which during that period was the only access that the Metropolitan Region had with the city of Rancagua to the south of the country (Calderón & Muñoz, 2019).

The camp in the El Llano sector occupied a neuralgic point of the city as it was located in front of the Municipality of San Miguel and the Barros Luco Hospital. Additionally, caravans of authorities and foreign visitors moving towards the south of the city of Santiago frequently passed through Gran Avenida. In this regard, Garcés (2013) highlights that the irregular settlements around this road were eradicated as part of a plan promoted by the Alessandri administration to “sanitize” the area of the problems of social marginality that affected the modern image sought to project to the outside world and the visits of authorities around the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Rancagua.


Among the residents eradicated from the land of the former Santa Adriana farm in the southern part of the Metropolitan Region were not only some of the homeless from the Estrella Polar and El Llano sectors, but also residents from different parts of Santiago who were being relocated by the CORVI authorities. This is described by some residents of Santa Elena as follows:

RESIDENT: “I arrived here without ever having been in El Llano or Estrella Polar. I didn't have enough money to pay the rent, and I lived in the house of my wife's family. There were many of us, imagine that all the daughters lived there with their husbands and sons, we were about 15 people in a small house [...] The thing is that we knew that they were moving the inhabitants of

El Llano to the Santa Adriana farm and that CORVI had promised to urbanize those lands. So, we went straight there [...] And of course, many of us arrived, as I said. Not all of them came from the tomas.” (Int 25, January 2023).

RESIDENT: “When we arrived here with my husband, I wanted to leave. This was a dump. All there was was mud and dirt [...] No, we didn't come from the land grab. I applied for housing through CORVI, and from there, in the municipality, they sent us here. Here, we were assigned a site and a 3x3mt hut with a cesspool. At the beginning, we had nothing else.” (Int 23, January 2023).

Image 4.1 Location of the Santa Adriana farm



Source: CORVI, Construction Department. Lot Chacra Santa Adriana, urbanization plan, May 1966.

An additional consequence of the settlement process through eradication policies was the emergence of fragmented identities in the destination neighborhoods. In the case of the *población* Santa Elena, the irregular arrival of some settlers without a common root promoted, during the initial stages, the emergence of conflicts within the neighborhood over social codes and norms, the dispute over authority, and the administration of the different sectors of the *población*. “At the beginning, it was difficult. I didn't come from the takeover. We arrived later when this was already underway. They saw us as strangers as if we had appeared,” argues one resident (Int. 22, January 2023). Another resident points out, “We came from a shantytown, and we knew what it was like to live in a land grab. We had no problems with that. But as we were all arriving from many places, some were lucky enough that the truck that brought them was leaving them in common lots that then had to be distributed. Others were not. You had to deal with people you had never seen before. But well, you just had to give it to them [...] This stage was difficult at the beginning because, as I was saying before, there was not much trust among those who were arriving and did not know each other. [...] In the beginning, we were organized by sectors A, B, and E. Each group was putting together its own streets. This changed, yes. After a short time, we had to start coordinating among all the sectors.” (Int 9, June 2022).

In this sense, the self-construction processes acted as a mitigating force against the erosion of eradication and forced displacement policies on community organization. Based on the experience of other cases, it would have been expected that social organizations would have disintegrated during relocation. However, the insurgent urbanization that followed in the case of the *población* Santa Elena managed to contain this effect of the eradications. In contrast, in the *población* Los Almendros I, the eradication and its political intervention orientation was effective in dismantling the social organization and persecuting social leaders opposed to Pinochet's military regime. However, it did not alter the territorial roots of the settlers by relocating them to the interior of the same *comuna* and a few blocks away from the area that had been occupied by the Cardenal Silva Henríquez camp.

Prior to the military intervention that culminated in the disabling of the Cardenal Silva Henríquez camp, the leaders of the occupation were already expressing their priority

to be settled in the same occupied lands or, alternatively, in other sites but within the commune. In this regard, the following pieces of evidence indicate the preference of the *pobladores*.

EDUARDO VALENCIA: “We should be located on municipal or public land within the commune or, at the most, within the Metropolitan Region [...] We are not going to accept being divided by any means.” (Las Ultimas Noticias 28/09/1983)

LUIS MOLINA: “We do not accept housing relocations. We want our problem to be solved in the same sectors where we live. Where do our children go to school, and where do we at least have access to the PEM or the POJH? We get nothing out of going to increase the high unemployment rate in the provinces [...] We help each other's families so that the children do not go hungry. We are not going to have that in Region III or Region VII.” (Las Ultimas Noticias 28/09/1983)

ISABEL CORTÉS: “We want to stay here or in another land in the *comuna* of La Granja. There are many places in the 40-bus stop. We are not moving from Santiago.” (La Segunda 28/09/1983)

BELINDA: “We will go to Colina and Curacaví if they all go, both camps, and they assure us stable work, other than PEM and POJH. If not, we prefer to stay on this land. We will stay here until the last consequences. If these lands were dumped, they were garbage dumps; as human beings, we believe that we have the right to occupy them, even if only momentarily. Besides, we are not asking for anything for free: we are willing to pay monthly for the land.” (La Tercera 28/09/1983)

In the interventions captured by the newspapers of the time, the settlers referred to the alternative solutions that the military regime was offering them within the eradication plans and access to subsidies. On September 27, 1983, a meeting was held between the settlers and the Metropolitan Intendant, General Roberto Guillard. This meeting was described by La Segunda as follows

“Around 50 residents of La Cisterna, La Granja and San Bernardo participated in a meeting that began at midday and arrived at the Intendencia. The Metropolitan Intendant, General Roberto Guillard, urged the *pobladores* to leave the properties as soon as possible because they are private property. The Intendant argued that the Fundamental Charter establishes that private property is

an inviolable right, and if 'we were to allow it not to be respected, the law of the jungle would prevail, with deaths, robberies, and usurpations.

The Mayor then pointed out to the settlers that the public forces had not intervened to evict them solely and exclusively because they had detected a plan aimed at producing confrontations with the authorities and deaths. He reported payments of two thousand pesos for being at a barricade every night and up to five hundred pesos for throwing miguelitos [handmade device made with nails to produce punctures of tires of police vehicles].

Next, the metropolitan authority informed the residents about the regular housing programs, referring to the housing subsidies as a solution instrument.

He gave statistics on these programs and then gave the following alternatives to the 10,000 people who took part in the protests:

Those families who were in a critical situation were offered relocation to two public properties in the municipalities of Curacaví and Colina. This was for a short period of time, while they applied for housing subsidy programs. The second alternative was free relocation to the III, IV and VII regions of the country where, in addition, they were offered a total of one thousand jobs in mining and agriculture. For the III Region, the cities of Copiapó, Tierra Amarilla and Diego de Almagro were offered. In the IV Region; Andacollo and Punitaqui, and finally, in the VII Region; Talca, Curicó and Linares. In order to apply for subsidies, respect for the law and private property would be required. Those who participated in new land seizures would be disqualified from applying for subsidies" (La Segunda 27/09/1983).

Pressure from representatives of the civil-military dictatorship increased during this period. From the first meetings with the Intendencia, the threats of raids and sanctions against those who remained in the occupation were intensified. The main alternative solution to the housing problem was the allocation of subsidies for families to move to other regions where social housing projects were being developed. Thus, a first group of approximately 760 families enrolled in the proposed housing solutions at the end of September, which were to be located in the III and IV Regions. The newspaper La Tercera reported this eradication with the following headline: "Three thousand settlers traveled to the north" (La Tercera 1/10/1983).

The regime's promotion of this eradication encouraged thousands of families from the Cardenal Silva Henríquez and Fresno Camps to enroll in the housing plans. Thus, in the next few days, more than 11,000 families had already enrolled in the eradication plans. The success of these registrations was announced to the public by the media and presented as an effort by the dictatorship to reach peaceful solutions with the mobilized inhabitants.

After the military intervention of the camp on November 10, 1984, and the displacement of many families to different parts of the country, only a small number of families maintained their decision to settle within the commune. A total of 350 families were relocated to the Los Almendros I sector through the allocation of a subsidy for social interest apartments.

The physical configuration adopted by this new *población* followed a market logic. In particular, the settlers had no say in the distribution of community or private spaces. On the contrary, the real estate companies in charge of the construction of the new settlement were the ones who designed housing based on profitability criteria. Thus, as in the Padre Hurtado settlement (see section XX Chapter 3), the secondary role played by the residents in the configuration of the physical space had important consequences on their ability to exercise social control and collective surveillance practices. In the different conversations with residents, it is identified that the space hinders social interactions and a more active role of community organizations. “It's really good to have your house, that it doesn't get rained on. But the truth is that this place looks more like a prison than anything else. Look at the narrow streets. Not even cars can get in. The stairs look like a jail, too. There is no social life anymore; it is difficult even though we are closer together and everything here. Each one started to take care of his own, and with time, life in the street and on the patios disappeared,” he says.

The form assumed by the physical space of the neighborhood is identical to other neighborhoods built with the allocation of subsidies. The similarity of the residential space responds to a strategy adopted by the private sector to reduce their social housing construction costs, regardless of the characteristics of the environment and social needs. In this sense, the configuration adopted by the new neighborhood maintains a rudimentary

architecture of apartments of no more than 36 square meters that are organized linearly around parallel blocks that generate an interior space of no more than 4 meters wide. Each line of apartments is connected to each other by a central staircase that saves on vertical circulation, but at the same time, sections the space in between and reduces the possibilities for the inhabitants to use the space (See Image 4.2). Circulations are linear, with no containment spaces for community meetings or social interaction. The absence of architectural support elements or urban furniture makes the collective appropriation of this interior space even more difficult.

RESIDENT: “When we arrived we were happy, we had our house. We had a roof over our heads, as they say. We are grateful for that, because it took us a long time. But the blocks [a group of social apartments] made us all cramped together, one on top of the other. That's why, over time, we all expanded and got bigger. It is impossible to live a normal life with 30 square meters.” (Int 42, April 2023).

RESIDENT: “The yards belong to no one. Of course, some children play there, but since it is so narrow, there is not much to do. Besides, since things are difficult, as soon as we arrived, each block began to lock itself in. They put up those fences to try to control who goes in and who comes out [...] I never agreed with them, the truth is that whoever wants to go in keeps going through, the only thing that fence does is to increase the feeling that we are locked in, we look like prisoners.” (Int 37, April 2023).

Image 4.2 Distribution of apartments of the *población* Los Almendros I





Source: author's images

In summary, the trajectory followed by the Santa Elena and Los Almendros I neighborhoods, despite having a similar origin, through processes of mass eradication of settlers from land seizures, adopted divergent characteristics. These can be explained by combining two factors that interact to shape the type of neighborhood. On the one hand, the political and military orientation or otherwise of the eradication plans. The evidence obtained suggests that the eradication of the Cardenal Silva Henríquez camp was deeply motivated by a need to disarticulate the social and political movements that had been reactivated in the early 1980s. Of these, the *pobladores'* movement was one of the strongest. The consequences of this process left a disarticulated residents with weak community structures once they settled in their definitive residences. In addition, this process was fed by a policy of demand subsidies to which displaced *pobladores* had to opt as the only housing allocation mechanism for low-income sectors. On the other hand, in the

eradication of the "Tomas" of Estrella Polar and El Llano streets, the inhabitants managed to maintain active some of their institutions and social organization practices that were critical for the processes of self-construction of their homes and urbanization of the new Santa Elena neighborhood. In definitive terms, the type of policy that shapes each neighborhood has persistent effects on the way residents inhabit their territories, appropriate their surroundings, and favor or hinder a musculature necessary to exercise informal social control or hinder a musculature necessary to exercise informal social control.

2. Competitive or Co-opted Social Order


The community structure of the Santa Elena and Los Almendros I communities differs substantially. In the former, the community has an autonomous organizational structure capable of regulating the behavior of the inhabitants and responding effectively to the needs of its members. However, "Los Lete" are not rooted in the neighborhood and do not have incentives to adhere to the normative scheme of the community. This leaves as a result the emergence of a competitive social order where both actors confront each other to impose their governance scheme on the other. In the latter, the community does not maintain a vibrant social organization and socialization links based on community practices. But "Los Lete" are originally from the neighborhood and have adopted as a legitimization strategy to co-opt the weakened social structures existing within the neighborhood and from there exercise their dominance over the inhabitants. The result is a co-opted social order.

As I will show in this section, the way in which "Los Lete" interact with the inhabitants of one or another *población* responds to the community structure and, particularly, to the historical legacies inherited from the eradication housing policy that combined in one case self-construction processes, and in another housing, subsidies oriented to family groups. One of the main arguments of this section is that the competitive and co-opted social order is the result of a process in which the autonomy of local and community institutions is at stake. However, although communities may be able to deploy

their authority to the maximum and remain hermetic from the influences of criminal organizations, their bargaining power will be restricted if the traffickers are external and do not recognize the pre-existing normative scheme of the neighborhood. Alternatively, traffickers may choose to capture community organizations in an effort to produce structured behavior that reduces residents' resistance to their presence. This situation is more likely when communities fail to form autonomous organizations.

The autonomy of community organizations is a necessary but not sufficient condition for guaranteeing one type of social order or another. For a competitive social order to emerge, as opposed to a co-constructed one (see section 3.1, chapter 2), the drug trafficking organization must be external to the neighborhood or not maintain ties with the community. Thus, their presence is disruptive in that it affects the dynamics of the *población's* own social life, and both traffickers and social leaders have no incentive to form routine channels of collaboration or communication that would allow them to reduce the levels of conflict. In these cases, cooperation is perceived negatively by both actors. For the community, it could send a signal of weakening and loss of autonomy that is desired by its inhabitants in the face of criminal occupants. For the traffickers, any rapprochement with the community could be perceived by other criminal actors as a clear weakness that could jeopardize their privileged position in the illicit market. Figure 4.3 shows the implications of each social order and its characteristics.

Figure 4.3 Characteristics of the Social Order that emerges between residents and "Los Lete".



Source: Own elaboration

This section is structured as follows. First, the competitive social order in the *población* Santa Elena is presented, followed by evidence that shows how it operates in the daily activities of the neighborhood. Second, it shows how the co-opted social order emerges and is installed in the *población* Los Almendros I, and then provides evidence of how this social order operates.

Competitive Social Order

"Los Lete" and the inhabitants of Santa Elena are confronted over exercising the social contract within the neighborhood. Each identifies that their preferences regarding the order and authority regime are contrary to the expectations of the other. Both actors are willing to mobilize the resources at their disposal to make prevail –in the case of the

residents– or install –in the case of the DTO– a scheme of regulation of behavior and social interactions that is functional to their objectives as an organization. In this interaction, the actors seek to weaken each other and subtract spheres of influence on which their autonomy or capacity to regulate social life in the *población* rests.

The strength and autonomy of the community is a crucial asset in the resistance that the inhabitants of Santa Elena carry out on a daily basis, although it is insufficient to allow them to shape the social order unilaterally. According to the theoretical argument, the capacity of the inhabitants of the neighborhood is constrained by the status of outsiders or the low level of incrustation that the members of “Los Lete” have in the *población*. The gang members' status as foreigners and the fact that they do not belong to the neighborhood has a twofold effect. On the one hand, they discourage cooperation with the inhabitants because they are perceived as occupiers and predatory bandits (Olson, 2000). Thus, any attempt at rapprochement is considered a “betrayal” of the autonomy of the community organization. On the other hand, the gang members are not socialized in the codes of conduct, values and authority system that the *población* designated for itself during its formation and the trajectory of the neighborhood. This makes it difficult for the traffickers to adhere to the *población*'s legitimized procedures and the use of a common language to maintain more fluid interactions with social leaders and the rest of the inhabitants.

To understand the emergence of the competitive social order, it is necessary to identify the mechanisms of collective resistance that the inhabitants of a neighborhood can deploy. By resistance, I refer to coordinated instances of opposition, disobedience, and imposition of community authority in the areas where the criminal organization seeks to exert control (Arjona, 2016; Ley et al., 2019). The capacity to oppose criminal organizations rests on the ability of residents to make their threats credible and to effectively control disputed spaces.

As I will show below, in this process, there is an equilibrium characterized by the inertia of the actions prior to each interaction. From the initial confrontation, neither of the two actors has the incentive to alter the relationship they have constructed and seek

alternative ways of social order. The result is an unstable social order where normative regimes overlap, and the exercise of authority is in conflict.

Competing overlapping regulatory regimes

The *población* Santa Elena is an emblematic neighborhood in the southern part of the Metropolitan Region. Its people are proud of their struggle, history, and organizations that allowed them to achieve “decent housing.” In the regular conversations that its inhabitants have, they often recall how, through the organization, they “gave life to the *población*” and “overcame all the resistance they had to face.” In each of their interactions, one can perceive a deep-rootedness and territorial pride that seeks which is transmitted to the generations born and raised there, as well as to those outside the neighborhood.

However, this landscape is threatened by the growing activity of “Los Lete” in the *población*. This gang, which does not belong to the neighborhood, has challenged the authority of the community and has deployed intimidating actions extensive to all its inhabitants. In addition, it has sought to regulate some activities and movements of residents through some critical areas for drug distribution and commercialization, leaving some “no-entry” points for residents. Meanwhile, the inhabitants reinforced their activism and organized actions to confront the gang. Their objective is to displace the drug traffickers from the area and exercise their authority as they have already done in the face of other threats.

How did we arrive at this scenario that leads criminals and residents to confront each other and regularly use violence to exercise control over the *población*? What is the result of the development of daily activities and the expectations of one or the other? Why is the criminal organization unable to displace the community, or vice versa? According to the theoretical argument developed in Chapter 2, there are two pathways to drug trafficking organizations deciding to impose a social order by force. First, because criminal groups do not face opposition from the inhabitants, but their community lacks routine mechanisms that allow them to exercise control from above or via legitimate local institutions. In these

cases, violence is exercised as an effective vehicle to discourage certain behaviors that the group does not want and to shape a behavior aligned with its presence in the territory. Second, criminal groups face collective opposition and resistance that community organizations have coordinated. Their objective is to protect their normative scheme and the autonomy of their local institutions. In these cases, violence acquires a different role from the previous route; here, the threat and the use of physical force are used as tools to stop the advance of the opposing group and to establish their conditions and preferences over the social order.

In both cases, the other organization may interpret any sign of decreasing intensity of violence or willingness to not use coercive means as a strategic triumph of the rival, which it seeks to avoid at all costs. In the case of criminal organizations, if they reduce the use of violence, there is a risk that the inhabitants may decide to increase their pressure on the group, establishing conditions that increase the costs of operating in the territory. In particular, the inhabitants may seek to strengthen their position in the normative order and reduce the gang's spheres of influence in areas that are unattractive for drug distribution and commercialization. In addition, it is possible that reduced use of violence and intimidation by “Los Lete” may encourage other rival gangs operating in the southern zone to interpret this situation as a weakening of the organization and see an opportunity to reclaim those territories. In the same way, for the residents, the reduction in the use of violence and resistance practices is not an alternative. For the residents, ceasing to confront the members of the organization has a double meaning: loss of autonomy of their institutions and of the historical legacy of struggle and resistance of their ancestors, and submission to a normative order that does not guarantee an advantageous position and well-being for its inhabitants. Whatever the case, the confrontation maintains its development.

RESIDENT: “Our organization has always been present in the neighborhood. We, the younger ones, know it, and we also recognize our responsibility in taking care of the *población* and our organizations [...] Obviously, we do not have the same strength as a narco gang; we do not have weapons, but we do have a lot of heart and affection for our *población* and its people. And we are willing to defend it.” (Int 5, June 2022).

RESIDENT: “When we decided to defend the *población* and to run [move the traffickers out of the neighborhood], we did it because they began to sell drugs to children from the neighborhood and to others who came from outside. That was unacceptable. So, we organized ourselves, and among the younger ones, we went with sticks and whatever we could find to get them out of the square and other passages where they were selling. We really thought that would be enough, but we were wrong. When they came back and started attacking us again at the beginning, we didn't know what to do. But when they started to threaten all the neighbors, without discriminating if they had participated in that initial fight, we knew that we would have to maintain the confrontation and fight them for the spaces of our town.” (Int 7, June 2022).

RESIDENT: “It is difficult to keep the neighbors mobilized against an armed group. And although many of those who at the beginning congratulated us for defending our *población* and participated in these confrontations, now many have given up [...] It is logical that there is fear. Many have been threatened. But the truth is that we also know that this is a road of no return. If we stop defending ourselves and fighting for our people and *población*, they will feel that they are the rulers of the place. They are not interested in taking care of the neighborhood or anything; it is not like they do there in Sector 1, where they are the owners of the *población* and control the Neighborhood Council and the sports clubs. Here, they know that the people are not going to put up with people from outside, delinquents deciding what can or cannot be done. The *población* has been through a lot, and they are not going to allow it.” (Int 8, June 2022).

Additionally, these pieces of evidence show an essential process of the construction of a competitive order: the existence of a pre-existing normative regime by which the settlers are willing to deploy their authority in the face of an external agent that weakens it or seeks to replace it. The idea of autonomy of its local institutions and authority system is fundamental to the identity of the neighborhood and its members. It is the basis for the survival of its organizations and a kind of territorial sense, a kind of glue that binds its daily interactions with the historical processes that shaped the neighborhood. It is recurrent in conversations with the inhabitants that they allude to their system of codes and social values, to other cognitive shortcuts that allow them to decide what is right or wrong about aspects of social life in the neighborhood. In this regard, in one of the conversations, a settler told me: “Look, here we value the way things are, what we have achieved and what we have suffered to have what is ours. And I don't just mean our houses, but our way of life

[...] of course they are important, here we teach everyone who grows up here what our values are as a *población*, why our organizations are important. Think that without them we wouldn't be here, everything we have as settlers is thanks to our organization.” In the same sense, another settler indicates to me the relevance that certain codes and authorities have, as well as the centrality they have in community life: “I take my hat off to the leaders of my neighborhood, the women and men who have led the different stages of our *población* have managed to keep us united, even in the most difficult moments. Here, we all know that the leaders care for themselves; they are an authority in the neighborhood, a kind of queen. What they tell us is sacred. We trust them and what they do for the *población*. Not because we are blind and follow anyone. But because our history has shown us the importance of our leaders. This, for everyone, is a code that is respected and cared for.”

When “Los Lete” arrived to the *población* Santa Elena, they did not encounter immediate resistance. In fact, at the beginning there was a peaceful coexistence between the traffickers and the community. The latter tolerated their presence as long as it did not alter the pre-existing normative regime. Thus, and as has been explained in the villagers' narratives, this situation changes when the DTO members transgress basic coexistence norms for the inhabitants. The above is a sample of the relevance that the community gives to its value system and how it uses its institutions to seek to resolve issues that threaten its welfare. “We can't go to the police; they are in collusion with these gangs. But how do you understand that one of the places where these guys sell is right behind the police station and in broad daylight. On occasions we have called the carabineros to intercede, but they do nothing, they usually tell us they will come, and they don't come. Other times, when we have called the neighbors have then been threatened by the dealers [...] The truth is that the only way we have to defend ourselves is by our own, with our hands.”

This scenario leaves the criminal organization facing an entrenched normative system that is contrary to their expectations of ruling the territory without resistance. However, just as the inhabitants of Santa Elena will protect their normative system and authorities, the criminal group also has an interest and a manifest will to govern the *población*. To do so, they are willing to use violence as a mechanism and weaken the community structures that prevent them from advancing in absolute control of the territory.

In this regard, during the fieldwork in the *población* I asked the inhabitants on multiple occasions their opinion as to why they believed that “Los Lete” did not exercise their authority in another way, either by co-opting some neighbors or by distributing material benefits that would ensure them a beneficial position in the town. In each of these interactions, the answers received indicated that “it was not possible”, “the *población* is not for sale” and that “the traffickers know that they cannot do it, here there is pride and dignity.” Here are some of the most frequent responses I received:


RESIDENT: “Never. We are hard-working people, poor but hard-working. Obviously, there have been some neighbors who sold their things before, but it was nothing problematic. As I was saying, the traffickers are not interested in creating a bond with us, nor are we interested in creating a bond with them. It is clear to them that they are not welcome here. If they wanted to buy us something, they knew they could not. In our town, if any neighbor needs something, we are there, and our Neighborhood Council is there to support them. The truth is that the *población* is not for sale.” (Int 5, June 2022).

RESIDENT: “They have tried. Sometimes, they offer things. It hasn't worked for them. Although we do have a delegate from one of the passages who seems to accept things from them. We have had many problems with her. We have thought about expelling her from the Junta de Vecinos, but we have convinced ourselves that it is better to have her inside the organization and know what she is up to than on the outside. This is the most we could allow them to meddle in our affairs.” (Int 7, June 2022).

RESIDENT XXX: “We don't need your help. The traffickers know they can't do it, there is pride and dignity here. Part of taking care of our people and our organization is not to fall into the temptation of easy money or the help they can give us. Look what happened there in Sector 1, in Los Almendros, the people accepted things and everything in this world is paid for and has a price [...] What do they want? To take over our *población* and what better way to do it than through our Neighborhood Councils and organizations?” (Int 6, June 2022).

Figure 4.4 shows how the competitive social order is produced and draws attention to the existence of contentious relationships between *pobladores* and criminals based on competing expectations and the existence of conflicting normative regimes over which each seeks to exert its dominance in the *población* Santa Elena.

Figure 4.4 Governance structure of Santa Elena neighborhood and the process of emergence of competitive social order.



Source: Own elaboration

The competitive social order at work

The social contract governing the *población* Santa Elena is based on dual legitimacy and authority. Despite the competition for the establishment of a single dominant social order, both criminals and residents can exercise their authority in a differentiated manner over their own members and some spaces within the *población*. This is recognized by residents and criminals, who have assumed an implicit distribution of some territories where each one manages to rule without major inconveniences. The only limit is the regulation of the behavior of the individuals of the opposing organization. In this regard, a social leader explains to me:

RESIDENT: “The narcos, despite our pain, have still managed to maintain an important presence in the neighborhood. They control the square next to the police station and towards Padre Hurtado, the whole area where there are barbershops and barbershops. We have managed to keep them at bay there, but we also know that we do not have the strength to expel them from our *población* or to fight them in those places that are crucial for them. Now, they also know that they cannot interfere with us in certain places, such as our social headquarters, and in the central sector of the square. That area is vital for us. That is where we do activities as a Neighborhood Council, with children and all the neighbors [...] Of course, just like them, we would not allow them to try to get in there.” (Int 9, June 2022).

The hegemonic position of “Los Lete” in some parts of the *población* is limited to some areas that are related to the functioning of the illicit drug market in the sector. In these areas, the organization is able to enforce some rules and reduce the presence of neighborhood residents who do not attend such places because of possible direct consequences for their safety (Field Notes, Jun 2023). For their part, members of “Los Lete” have limited their drug dealing to the initial part of the central plaza that runs through the town (See Images 4.3). In this way, residents and criminals recognize that they achieve coexistence in the context of an ongoing contentious relationship.

Image 4.3 “Los Lete” distribution and control point in the *población* of Santa Elena.





*Points 1 to 3 are located in Santa Elena square just behind the 39th Police Station.

Source: Own elaboration

In periods of non-confrontation both actors manage to coexist and the community can experience relative calm. However, the absence of a hegemonic social order and of regular channels that allow actors to adjudicate disputes among their members, and subsequently each organization can enforce them, results in the reactivation of episodes of confrontation and disputes over social order. To this end, the use of violence is the main vehicle for attempting to shape a social order or protect the existing one. In this dispute, two schemes of authority and normative regimes confront each other. In this interaction, although it does not crystallize in a social contract favorable to one or the other actor, a criminal governance scheme is produced that both settlers and criminals recognize: a competitive social order. This order is characterized by an unresolved nature where each agent has adapted his behavior to protect essential areas of his organization and the exercise

of his authority. In addition, sporadic confrontations occur as a by-product of a deficient social contract and the absence of a dispute resolution mechanism between criminals and settlers.

RESIDENT: “Conflict is activated from time to time. We are not always in direct confrontation. It depends on how much they respect our rules and do not give us trouble. Generally, in those periods we manage to coexist peacefully. This does not mean that we like their presence and do not want them to leave, but we also know that we cannot be in conflict with them all the time. As I also imagine that to be permanently attacking and threatening is bad for your business.” (Int 22, January 2023).

RESIDENT: “Conflicts are activated when we see our security threatened, either by consumers or by direct aggressions and threats to one of our neighbors. That is when it becomes more evident that something is wrong, that something is not right. We do not recognize them and we want them to leave our *población*.” (Int 24, January 2023).

In contrast to the *población* Padre Demetrio, where the criminal organization and the residents have managed to build a peaceful and stable coexistence (see section 3.1 of Chapter 3), the outsider and uprooted status that “Los Lete” have with the community is a crucial condition for the residents to resist creating mechanisms for communication, dispute resolution or a social order that is divided but explicit and recognized by criminals and residents. At the time of my fieldwork, I asked some leaders in informal conversations why they did not seek alternative ways of relating to the gang. I asked them if they were already able to have moments of non-violent coexistence and why they should not establish a kind of truce that would allow them to reduce the costs of direct confrontation. The answers always reminded me that it was unthinkable, that they did not see clear benefits from such an agreement, and, above all, that this alternative could allow the drug traffickers to acquire greater influence in their decisions “that would prevent them from later wanting to take over our organization.” (Fieldwork Notes).

The conflictive nature of the criminal-resident relationship in the *población* Santa Elena is permeated by the way in which “Los Lete” exercise their authority and shape the

social order in their neighborhood of origin. There, as I will show in the next section, the criminal group does not need to use violence to modify the behavior of the residents and establish expectations regarding following the imposed rules or deviating from them. Rather, it does so through the capture of social organizations. This threat is persistent for the residents of Santa Elena. The relevance they assign to the autonomy of their local institutions and authorities is greater than any arrangement that would allow them to build an alternative social order. Additionally, and in accordance with the idea of conditionality of the social order, neither inhabitants nor criminals are capable of structuring a common language based on shared norms and codes of socialization that would facilitate new interactions. On the contrary, in this situation, the community understands that it must reinforce its own governance schemes and social behaviors that allow it to maintain the unity of its members in the face of external threats and the risk of losing control of its *población*.

Finally, in the *población* Santa Elena, there is a predominant equilibrium in the competitive interactions between criminals and inhabitants. This equilibrium is manifested in the fact that both actors restrict the range of options to the previous interactions and take actions based on the expectation that the other group will act in a similar way to those already carried out. The starting point of this situation is given by the initial confrontation and the coercive reaction that "Los Lete" had. From that moment on, a contentious inertia was configured, and the actors accommodated their lives and ways of interacting on a daily basis.

Co-opted Social Order

"Los Lete" are the lords of the *población* Los Almendros I. Here, unlike the *población* Santa Elena, its inhabitants do not have the resources that would allow them to resist the organization's administration and control over the territory. The weakness of their organizations and the absence of strong community leadership are fertile ground for "Los Lete" to try an alternative form of government in the neighborhood. They have decided to make instrumental use of the fragile community organizations to influence the perception

of the inhabitants, co-opt social leaders and shape the community's behavior with respect to their illicit operations.

The subordinate relationship between community organizations and traffickers is not only due to the weakness of their institutions and leadership. Other mechanisms related to the administration of benefits and social assistance are also at work, as well as the capture by members of the criminal organization of their internal decision-making processes. This is facilitated by the status of insiders or natives that “Los Lete” have in the *población* Los Almendros I. Thus, as I will show, the co-optation of the social order is the result of a criminal organization deeply rooted in the social structure of the community and a weakened autonomy of the local institutions of the inhabitants.

By co-optation I refer to a particular formula of control and capture of one organization over another that is oriented towards absorbing new elements into its leadership or structure as a means of avoiding threats to its stability or existence (Selznick 1994: 208). This way of understanding co-optation does not inhibit the possibility of cooperation between the criminal group and the social organization. On the contrary, and following Gandhi and Przeworski (2006), it admits two instruments that the primary structure can use in its objective of capturing the secondary organization: political concessions and rent exchanges. The former is more common when the criminal organization faces no resistance, and it is possible for it to instrumentalize other organizations in achieving its objectives. The latter is usually used when the criminal group anticipates deviations from the delegation of the leaders, and it is necessary to ensure the organization's long-term capture by managing the supply of social assistance.

In this sense, the co-opted social order alters the way in which community organizations are able to adopt and implement their decisions, the performance of their leadership and the structure of the communities themselves. Its purpose is to control and favor the stability of a social contract where the criminal group maintains a dominant position.

The capture of social organizations as a foundation of social order in the población Los Almendros I.

At the time I began my fieldwork in Los Almendros I, it was interesting that in my conversations with the inhabitants, they did not refer to their social organization or community leaders. However, this situation contrasted with what I observed in the first few days: most of the residents' daily interactions were mediated by the Junta de Vecinos and an almost omnipresent presence of social leaders. A few days after meeting with residents who facilitated my access to the neighborhood, I asked them about the importance of their social organization and how it was central to their lives as residents. To my surprise, the residents evaded the question and preferred to remain silent. After a while, they pointed out that “the Junta de Vecinos [Neighborhood Council] had eyes and ears and that it was better not to talk about it. That in time, I would understand.” With the passing of weeks and visits to the *población* I began to understand that the social organization did not respond to the needs of the residents, that it was rather a facade used by “Los Lete” to operate in the neighborhood and maintain effective control of the inhabitants.

Why would the criminal group choose to control the community organization instead of using force and intimidation? What mechanisms does the gang use to control social leaders? If the criminal organization is captured by the drug traffickers, how did this capture occur? According to the theoretical argument, when the inhabitants do not have effective and quality local institutions, but the criminal organization belongs to the neighborhood and its members are recognized as a regular resident of the *población*, a co-opted criminal order is more likely to emerge. The logic of this social contract is based on the fact that criminals will prefer to invest resources to consolidate their position in the neighborhood to which they belong, and through the capture of social organizations they can achieve levels of legitimacy that allow them to secure the commitment and loyalty of residents.

Additionally, there are two routes by which criminal groups choose to target social organizations as a vehicle for shaping social order. In the first, the community possesses strong and solid local institutions capable of intimidating the gang's survival. In these cases, residents maintain autonomy from their organizations while recognizing the criminals as

part of the community and inhabitants who respect the pre-existing normative regime (see Section 3.1 Chapter 3). In the second, on the contrary, the community has not been able to establish stable community structures and its leadership does not enjoy extensive and clear recognition. However, criminal groups do belong to the neighborhood and prefer to secure their position by investing resources that are distributed by community organizations. Through this formula, they not only manage to legitimize their presence, but they can also make their control of the territory and its inhabitants more efficient through other intermediate structures that act according to their interests.

The second route is the one followed by the *población* Los Almendros I. This trajectory is strongly determined by the socio-spatial characteristics of the neighborhood and the long-term effects of the eradication housing policy in complement to the demand subsidy programs used by the military dictatorship to disable the Cardenal Silva Henríquez camp. In the social dimension, the intervention has left two lasting consequences. In the first place, the intense repression and persecution of the social leaders of the encampment after the intervention in 1984, together with the destruction of the fabric of the camp by means of their relocation to different regions of the country and localities of the Metropolitan Region, have meant a disincentive for families to decide to get involved voluntarily in community organizations, exercise active control of their representatives and acquire a stable civic habitus. Secondly, after the military intervention of the camp, the regime imposed a directive aligned with the policies of the time and supported by important figures of trade unionism (See section 2.2 of this chapter). Since then, the autonomy of the local institutions has been truncated and the residents have been socialized, now in a new territorial space, based on clientelism and political capture of their organizations. Whoever exercises control and delineates the orientations pursued by the social organization of Los Almendros I may change, but inertia is maintained through the existence of feedback mechanisms that reinforce the route being taken: access to social and material assistance coordinated through the Neighborhood Council.

RESIDENT: “I don't have time to participate in the Neighborhood Council. The truth is that I am not interested either [...] One has things to do, and being a leader takes time and responsibilities, as well as being bothered about this or that. No, thank you very much. But

I'm sure everyone here wants to have a Neighborhood Council; they have given us a lot; they always do activities for the children, and they painted some blocks [a set of social apartments]. During the pandemic, they gave us boxes of merchandise. It was very good, I can tell you. Better than those given by the government and the municipality [...] The truth is that I am not interested in who is in charge of the Neighborhood Council but that the benefits continue.” (Int 21, January 2023).

RESIDENT: “I was in the takeover, I come from there with my husband and little *cabras chicas* [girls]. There we had a very strong organization, the Coordinadora Metropolitana de Pobladores or something like that was called. You think that in that place there were thousands of people like you, and you needed strong leaders to organize things. We had a school and a polyclinic that we built ourselves, with outside help, but they were ours. But as we have already said, all that ended, and it ended badly, with force. The repression of the dictatorship was very hard, there were many detainees that we never heard from again [...] How does that affect the idea of an organization? But very, very much so. After that you really don't feel like doing anything, it's better to lock yourself in your square meter and that's it. I think that put fear in our veins and it is difficult to get out of there. And those of us who still believe in the importance of organizing ourselves, well, besides the fact that we are few, they divided us, some were sent here, others to the regions, others who knows where.” (Int 9, June 2022).

RESIDENT: "The truth is that we have become accustomed to receiving things from the Neighborhood Council, from the Municipality, from whoever. When one has needs, one does not question where a hand comes from. [...] I tell you that we have become accustomed to it because that is how it has been since the subsidies were given to us and then here. I am grateful to have a roof to live under with my family. If the board is right-wing, left-wing or whatever, it doesn't matter to me. I think many of us here think the same way. We don't care about that, but I hope they help us.” (Int 40, April 2023).

Similarly, in the spatial dimension adopted by the neighborhood, there are other mechanisms that reinforce the route followed by the *población* Los Almendros I. First, after eradication, access to housing and homeownership was encouraged through special subsidy programs for displaced residents. This feature reinforces the disarticulation of the social fabric that had already been forcibly intervened during the dismantling of the camp. The emphasis on individual application and under resource targeting criteria has consequently

caused the inhabitants to progressively assign less relevance to collective and shared processes to respond to their needs, to the detriment of other institutionalized and coordinated mechanisms from above or other entities external to the inhabitants.

Second, the marked emphasis on spatial production through the market adopted by subsidy-based housing allocation programs means that residents have no influence over the spatial configuration of the *población*. This condition affects the way in which residents are unable to establish hierarchies over physical space and its use. In addition, given the uniform feature, without containment spaces and difficult access to certain interior areas of the *población*, an ideal urban morphology is configured for the development of criminal practices and territorial control of “Los Lete.”

Finally, eradication and the delivery of subsidies reinforced the alluvial composition of the neighborhood. Thus, the *población* Los Almendros was populated as different contingents arrived without any common bond other than their status as “allegados” and beneficiaries of the subsidy program. This situation, as in other neighborhoods built under this urbanization model, means that the new residents do not develop a sense of appropriation and relevance linked to territorial and support networks.


RESIDENT: “I was one of the first to arrive here. When we left the seizure and they brought us to this *población*, very few wanted to remain linked to an organization [...] I think it was due to several things; the repression they put on us was harsh, and that marks you. There is also the fact that not all of us came from the same area of the camp; it was a very large occupation, and we were organized by sectors. In addition, other settlers were arriving from many places who had applied for subsidies. But I think that the most important thing is that many of us understood that we had already achieved our objective, which was to have a house of our own, and that organization was no longer necessary. From that moment on, everything became more personal and less collective.” (Int 9, June 2022).

RESIDENT: “If I were a trafficker, I would stay here too. The *población* allows you to control who enters and who leaves; the streets are narrow, and you can only walk into the inner ones. The truth is that these guys are very smart. If they dedicated that intelligence to a legal business, they would be millionaires [...] I work in construction, and the truth is that I don't know who imagined this place. The only idea I have is that they had a piece of land and

wanted to put in as many apartments as possible. If they had asked us or thought about how those who were arriving were going to occupy the space, I can imagine the neighborhood would be different.” (Int 38, April 2023).

Each of these factors conditions the capacity of the settlers to build and sustain an effective normative regime over time. Thus, although some groups of settlers maintain a memory of organization and collective action as the driving force of community life, for most residents the existence of local institutions is a secondary aspect to which they are unable to attribute direct and immediate benefits. In other words, the terrain on which the co-opted social order is built is characterized by its porosity that allows criminal organizations to act on and through it. Figure 4.5 summarizes the characteristics of the predominant governance scheme in the *población* that result in a co-opted social order.

Figure 4.5 Governance structure of Los Almendros I neighborhood and the process of emergence of co-opted social order.



Source: Own elaboration

The porosity of the normative regime and the weakness of the social organization facilitate the criminal organization's ability to control its leaders through the distribution of material benefits. Through a period of initial interactions with social institutions, “Los Lete” is able to absorb the community organization and shape its decision-making processes, external links, and information gathering on residents' daily activities. This process involves a strong bond of dependency and subordination that criminal groups transmit to both social leaders and residents. To the former, insofar as they are one of the sources of material resources to which they can turn and on which they can build their support as leaders. Moreover, since the criminals have no interest in disputing their leadership, political concessions are made. The latter is because they recognize that changing the type of relationship with the criminal organization could mean a reduction in their personal welfare and access to social assistance. The following section describes the way in which “Los Lete” distributes social assistance as a vehicle for the distribution of social assistance.

Co-opted social order at work

In Los Almendros I, the rulers are “Los Lete”. The social contract that emerges in the neighborhood is based on the capture and indirect control of the social organizations that remain in the neighborhood but where their power and autonomy are eroded. While the criminal group directly deploys its authority in the illicit markets and other territories under its control, in Los Almendros I, “Los Lete” uses local institutions to administer and exercise their authority over the inhabitants and the territory. By capturing social organizations, the criminal group secures a structure that allows them to interact with the neighborhood in the most efficient way possible, without the need to directly intervene in civic affairs and outside the area of their specialization: drug trafficking.

The inhabitants of Los Almendros I, in spite of recognizing the existence of community organizations, manage to differentiate without difficulty who effectively governs the *población*. In this regard, some residents describe this situation as follows:

RESIDENT: “We all know who really governs but we play *leso* [no understanding or insight]. The truth is that we don't want problems with anyone, least of all with them [members of “Los Lete”]. Besides, as long as they are on our side it's better for everyone, we can [laughs] get a little something out of them. Everybody wins *po*.” (Int 37, April 2023).

RESIDENT XXX: “I don't know if the leaders are traffickers and are part of “Los Lete”. As well as a formal member of the gang. I don't put my hands in the fire for anyone [I can't say otherwise]. But for me, it's pretty simple. Both benefits are that the leaders remain leaders, they have the favor of the gang bosses, and they can also buy loyalties among the neighbors. The criminals manage to keep us all happy looking the other way while they go about their shady business.” (Int 41, January 2023).

Both narratives refer directly to the mechanisms that operate in the instrumental relationship that exists between criminals and inhabitants of Los Almendros I. First, political concessions are a feature of the co-opted social order. Here the criminal organization has no interest in directly directing the social institutions they absorb, but they do establish mechanisms of control and accountability with the leaders of these social structures. In informal conversations during the fieldwork in the *población*, I repeatedly asked different residents why they believed that “Los Lete” did not show interest in exercising the leadership of the Neighborhood Council directly; despite differences in emphasis, the answers most of the time indicated “For what? With what objective? Why would they do it if they achieve the same thing and do not have to expose themselves to other types of criticism or receive complaints all the time?” In this sense, the first feature of the co-opted social order is the concession or indirect administration of the *población* by structures outside the criminal organization.

A second characteristic is the delivery of economic concessions to the *población*, either extensively or selectively to some members of the neighborhood. In the first, the criminal organization redirects resources or economic benefits to the residents of Los Almendros I as a whole. With it, they seek to demonstrate a certain level of commitment to the well-being and general improvement of the neighborhood to the residents. The expected

effect of these actions is to ensure the *población's* silence in the face of their illicit operations, as well as to make the delivery of material concessions predictable if the residents manage to maintain a collective behavior aligned with “Los Lete's” expectations of order. One resident argues the following:

RESIDENT: “A few years ago we decided, in a meeting of the *población*, to paint the blocks [a group of social apartments]. To do this we had to apply for funds from the municipality. The thing is that there were some requirements we had to fulfill, one of which was that we had to contribute something like 30% or 40% of the total cost of what we wanted. Since we had no money, we thought we could not. Well, the thing is that one of the leaders got the funds, we all knew where they came from, but nobody asked or wanted to ask. From that moment on we have applied for several funds and questions of that kind. The mechanism has been the same as I was telling you just now. We all know that if we want to have access to things that can benefit all of us, well, we have to look the other way, and if you ask me, I don't know anything.” (Int 37, April 2023).

At the individual level, benefits are also distributed. Although in a selective manner, to “certain neighbors, not to all, to those who are more intrusive [intruders],” a neighbor indicated to me. According to this interviewee, this disaggregated mechanism of social and economic assistance does not require the intermediation of the social organization but is more direct and depends on “Los Lete” being able to “get something in return, usually information.” (Int, Feb 2024). This means of social control and regulation of the neighbors' behavior shapes the way in which the rest of the inhabitants relate to each other and prevents deviations from the norms established by the criminal organization.

In the same way, local institutions can act as filters for processing information on the neighborhood's daily life. “The social leaders are involved in everything that happens in the neighborhood, and I don't mean that they participate in things, but that they know everything, in some way or another they receive information [...]” argues a resident. Also, as pointed out to me in several conversations, some social organizations have allowed “Los Lete” to attract new members or to use them as a space for drug distribution: “A few years ago a Cultural Center was organized. In the beginning, many young people participated and did nice things. Then, it became distorted. They asked for the headquarters and had a lot of

parties, and it became a mess [a very problematic situation]. There was a lot of drug use and selling. Many of the kids [young people] entered the group of traffickers.” (Int 42, April 2024).

3. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the conditions and processes that enable the emergence and functioning of the competitive and co-opted social order. It explored how variation in community structure can alter criminal actors' preferences and capabilities concerning social order. The chapter provides evidence, on the one hand, on how socio-spatial conditions alter the way in which communities interact with criminal organizations operating in their territories and alternative governance schemes are produced. This is despite the fact that it is the same criminal group operating in two different *poblaciones*. On the other hand, to explain this variation it was shown how the housing policy of eradications leaves long term effects on the way in which the inhabitants are able to rebuild the social fabric or not that was eroded by the processes of displacement and forced disabling of land takeovers. In addition, as this type of policy maintains a flexible nature that allows for the possibility of settlement through self-construction programs or based on the allocation of subsidies to family groups.

In line with the argument developed in Chapter 2, the paired comparison of two cases from the commune of El Bosque that start from a common point - the eradication of encampments - illustrates why we need to consider both the lasting effects and consequences of housing policies and the conditionality of the community structure and its composition for the criminal social order. First, the way in which governments used eradication as an alternative to the demand for housing, homeownership and the protagonism of the *pobladores*, leaves two differentiated routes on how in future settlements and their capacity to manage the territories. When eradications combined a political orientation that sought to disarticulate social organization with demand-side financing schemes, communities atrophied their muscle and were unable to safeguard the autonomy of their institutions and regulatory regimes. In these cases, criminal groups have greater incentives to operate on weakened and diffuse institutions with respect to their decision-making processes. In contrast, a competitive social order is more likely to emerge when eradications do not have a political driver against the inhabitants as social actors but rather seek to “clean up” spaces in urban centers and displace marginal groups to the peripheries. In these cases, local organizations and institutions are reactivated as a result of

marginal urbanization processes that leave the inhabitants themselves as the developers of their neighborhoods and the spatial distribution of their territories. This process prevents the communities from disintegrating and allows them to articulate again when faced with the need to build their houses and urbanize their neighborhoods. In the long term, this coordination leads the inhabitants to achieve autonomous and quality institutions and, above all, to be willing to mobilize their resources to defend themselves against external threats.

Finally, these findings leave some implications for our understanding of criminal governance schemes. First, violence is deployed as a valid alternative for shaping social order. In contrast to most of the specialized literature, which assumes that violence is not compatible with a type of social order, the evidence in this chapter shows that its use, direct or the threat of it, can constrain the alternatives that criminals and settlers have in each of their interactions. Therefore, it regulates the expectations about what will be the response to an action within the established limits or the deviation from them. The case of the *población* Santa Elena shows us that when the settlers are determined to protect their normative structure and maintain the autonomy of their institutions, the *pobladores* may opt for coercion and resistance. Secondly, when criminal organizations face a space with weakened normative structures, they may choose to capture them or implement violence as a mechanism of social control. This decision is conditioned by the level of embeddedness of drug trafficking groups.

Chapter V

Conclusions

Criminal governance is never complete without some form of interaction with communities. Much of the existing research has largely overlooked how criminal actors engage in divergent forms of governance that produce order from the spatial and social characteristics of the territories. This dissertation aims to broaden our lens to bring inhabitants and housing policy as central pieces of the emergence of social orders. The argument I have developed in this project examines how different housing policies draw differentiated paths on two key variables for social order: the social density of communities and the embeddedness of drug trafficking organizations. How these variables interact produces socio-spatial configurations that result in contrasting social orders, even though they are the same criminal group.

This research used a multimethod design that, on the one hand, invokes the logic of “natural process-driven experiments” (Arjona 2016) and, on the other hand, uses an in-depth case study using data from an intensive fieldwork of four peripheral *poblaciones* of the Metropolitan Area of Santiago de Chile. Through this novel design and a paired comparison of cases, identify why divergent social orders occur in two adjacent neighborhoods that the same criminal organization controls. I found evidence of how space has been produced and reproduced by different definitions of housing policy, both at the physical level and in how residents shape and appropriate social space. These conditions play a critical role in the formation of criminal governance schemes. First, through them, opportunities for *pobladores* to become permanent social actors over time are enhanced or eliminated. Second, it shapes the morphology of poor neighborhoods and encourages

criminal actors to decide to operate in those places, as well as the capacity for informal social control that the residents themselves can deploy.

In this concluding chapter, I briefly summarize the argument and the evidence I use to validate my theory. Then, I identify the theoretical and policy implications derived from the analysis and findings.

1. Summary of the argument and empirical findings

Conditionality of social order in the structure of the community

I argue that criminal groups and residents are equally interested in establishing dominance over the *población* in which they have a presence. However, the emergence of social order is a function of two factors: the social density of communities and the embeddedness of drug trafficking organizations. Thus, depending on how these factors are present in a neighborhood, there are four types of social orders. Hence, approaching criminal social orders through this lens is not only the emergence of order in neighborhoods with criminal organizations but also about the emergence of different forms of order.

Therefore, on one hand, when communities are cohesive, their local authorities are self-assigned and clearly defined, and their internal structures maintain autonomous mechanisms for their decision-making processes, we are in the presence of communities with high levels of density. But, however, this condition is not sufficient to ensure the shaping of a type of social order. The social density level is mediated by how criminals identify themselves and belong to a given community. Since it is necessary to consider two possible outcomes according to the level of embeddedness of drug trafficking organizations. First, criminal groups are rooted in the *población* in which they maintain illicit operations and manage to recognize the pre-existing normative scheme that the community had self-assigned; there are ties of sociability and kinship that act as facilitators for communication between inhabitants, criminals, and residents. In these cases, a co-

constructed social order is more likely to emerge. In the second route, criminal organizations are outsiders who do not have a sense of belonging to the *población* and do not identify themselves as members of the neighborhood. Given their status as born or raised there, drug trafficking organizations will prefer to establish their own dominance, and, for their part, residents will be willing to defend their position and local institutions. The result is a competitive social order. In this type, communities are able to deploy maximum authority and resources to protect the autonomy of their institutions and exercise their rules and norms in all areas of the *población*. Criminals, too, leave a confrontational relationship that structures expectations about the behavior of each actor.

On the other hand, when local institutions are weakened or non-existent, and their organizations and leaders are not recognized as the community's figureheads in the eyes of external agents, criminal groups will prefer to shape the social order unilaterally. Once again, however, the form that social order takes depends on the level of embeddedness of criminal groups in communities. If the trafficking groups are inhabitants of the communities and have an identity rooted in the territory, a co-opted social order is more likely to emerge. This is the case when criminal organizations prefer to shape the behavior of the inhabitants through existing community structures that, when weakened, can be captured with the investment of material resources and political concessions. On the other hand, when criminal groups are external to the communities, lacking kinship ties, socialization, and common experiences, a violent social order is more likely to emerge. Here, the physical threat or direct use of violence against the inhabitants is the main tool for regulating the behavioral expectations of the residents. This situation is more likely because the criminal groups know that the inhabitants do not have the resources that would allow them to modify the behavior of the criminal organization, and the latter has no incentive to negotiate the criminal governance scheme with the inhabitants.

The logic of the conditionality of the plural social order on community structure is that regardless of the organizational density of the communities, its effect is mediated by the level of embeddedness of criminal gangs in them. This brings renewed attention to explanations of social effectiveness (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Kornhauser, 1969; Sampson et al., 1997; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2001), particularly in moderating the

expected effect that Sampson and other theorists in this stream attributed exclusively to communities as a mechanism for reducing criminal activity in neighborhoods.

The long-term consequences of housing policy on social orders: socio-spatial conditions of criminal governance

Space is not an empty and neutral entity. On the contrary, it has an enormous influence on how criminal actors and residents interact to produce a type of social contract. I argue that housing policy has enduring legacies on the community structures adopted by popular neighborhoods. Building on Lessing (2021), I assume that criminal governance is "shaped by" state power as it substantially affects criminal groups' incentives and capacities to govern.

In this sense, space acquires a pervasive physical and social configuration according to the nature of the housing policy of each historical moment. At times, housing policy encourages insurgent forms of urbanization of the periphery (Caldeira 2017), while at others, it discourages the protagonism of the *pobladores*. In the former, a space production mode predominates in which its residents build their homes and neighborhoods and become citizens and political agents during this process. In the latter, housing policy is dominated by market logics that profoundly affect how residents inhabit space. In them, residents are conceived as secondary actors without agency in the planning and organizing homes, neighborhoods, and space.

I argue that housing policies play a crucial role in varying the dimensions of the social structure of communities. I identify three housing policies between 1965 and 1990 in Chile that acted as critical junctures: the '*Operación Sitio*' of 1965, the '*Política de Erradicación de Campamentos*' during the government of Jorge Alessandri and military dictatorship, and the 'Policy of subsidizing demand' in the first years of the democratic transition. Each of these public policies triggers a series of events with long-term consequences crucial to understanding the variation in the social density and embeddedness of drug trafficking organizations and, indirectly, the types of criminal social orders. First,

the recognition and opportunities for *pobladores* to constitute themselves as a pervasive social actor over time are enhanced or eliminated. Secondly, poor neighborhoods' morphology incentivizes criminal actors to decide to operate in those places. Third, the social connectedness of the inhabitants and their ability to create a collective identity among all its members rooted in the neighborhoods. This connection endures across generations and allows criminal gang members to identify as community members. Fourth, it encourages informal social control practices among their inhabitants and their neighborhoods.

Thus, housing policy alters the conditions under which the inhabitants become protagonists in constructing their neighborhoods and the socio-spatial configuration they acquire. In this regard, I identified two routes followed by the inhabitants in this sense. On the one hand, an insurgent form of urbanization of the periphery allowed them to design their own spaces, assume social control practices among their inhabitants, and root their identity in the neighborhood. On the other hand, market logic predominated the definition of new neighborhoods for the urban poor of the city. The *pobladores* were conceived as secondary actors who had to occupy the planned and organized space assigned by the technologies to achieve property ownership and reduce the housing deficit.

The difference between social or market production of space is fundamental to understanding the long-term effects of housing policy on criminal governance schemes. Through divergences in the dimensions of the social structure, which are inherited from the orientations and nature of housing policy, communities acquire or atrophy capacities that allow them to shape and govern their neighborhoods. Moreover, such divergences are maintained over time and produce consequences in how residents interact with and in the physical space. In sum, two lasting consequences are identified in how the inhabitants inhabit the housing solutions, which are distributed according to the type of production of space: the degree of territorial rooting and the urban morphologies acquired by the new neighborhoods. Both elements are present in the inhabitants' narratives and how they conceive their neighborhoods' physical and social space. Differences in the sense of territorial relevance and residential stability are frequently observed in interactions with

residents. They are associated with the mechanism of allocation of physical space for the development of housing solutions.

2. Implications

The theory and findings presented in this dissertation have implications for various questions about criminal governance, the role of communities, social orders, and housing policy.

First, the argument sheds light on some issues not addressed by the literature on criminal governance, particularly that space and communities are not neutral in the emergence of different arrangements of social order. Socio-spatial characteristics exert an enormous influence on the decisions that criminal groups make when structuring a type of territorial and population control. If the social density is weak or nonexistent, neighborhood residents lack a legitimized system of norms and leadership capable of articulating effective collective actions to address threats to their well-being and neighborhood coexistence, which is more likely to emerge violent social order. The evidence shows that traffickers base their behavior on the expectation that residents are unable to exercise collective resistance to their illicit activities and territorial control. On the contrary, if the inhabitants can deploy their authority as much as possible, the criminal group recognizes the bargaining power and is more motivated to align their expectations to the preexisting normative regime. However, in either condition, the existence of sociability and kinship ties, the status and the resident or non-resident status of criminals in a given *población* is key to transiting to different outcomes of the social order. In this sense, the key is how criminals can recognize and adhere to certain pre-existing normative social regimes and act in coordination with or confront these pre-established norms.

Second, the cases and their paired comparison have allowed us to move forward with respect to some assumptions established in the literature. In particular, the evidence and methodological design of a natural experiment allowed us to take full advantage of the differences that arise when considering the long-term effects of the housing policy that gave

rise to each *población* and to move beyond the notions that criminal governance arrangements vary according to the level of territorial competition, the form and organization of the criminal group, and the type of collusive pact with the state.

Third, empirical evidence also suggests that in each type of social order, there is a trade-off between the preferences of inhabitants and criminal groups. The mechanisms differ, but in each case, the actors have learned that any change in their preferences can lead to outcomes that weaken their current welfare. In this sense, the most subtle feature in the functioning of the types of social order analyzed is that both actors are willing to invest resources in maintaining or shaping the social control that prevails insofar as it allows them to predict and anticipate the actions that the other actor will deploy in maintaining or deviating from the norms and rules of conduct.

Finally, the argument and the empirical findings alert us to the need to build bridges between hitherto disconnected literatures: urban studies, housing policy, and criminal governance. Two main elements demonstrate the importance of this connection. On the one hand, the evidence from this research shows how housing policy and low-income housing solutions pursued by different governments leave long-term consequences on community structure and composition. This unintended effect of housing policy has been under-analyzed by a criminal governance research agenda that has not been able to connect different traditions and disciplines. In this sense, it is essential to understand how states actively participate in constructing conditions for the emergence of criminal governance schemes. In other words, physical and social space matter, and it is time to put it at the center of our theoretical attention when studying criminal governance arrangements. On the other hand, the orientation and nature of housing policy are critical to social order. The evidence from this research shows us that depending on how neighborhoods are shaped, communities may be better equipped to deal with interactions with criminal groups. This has a direct implication for the development of housing policies that ideally involve, in the first stages, the groups of settlers and homeless in the design of housing solutions and through collective mechanisms that allow them to shape their neighborhoods. In this way, a chain of virtuous effects would be produced that would not guarantee the non-permeability

of communities against drug trafficking but would provide them with the collective and spatial tools with which they can confront these organizations.

Appendix

Date of interview	Interviewee	Number	Wave of interviews	Pob
June 9, 2022	Community leader	1	1	ST
June 10, 2022	Presidential Delegate Province of Melipilla	2	1	Auth
June 12, 2022	Community leader	3	1	PD
June 12, 2022	Resident	4	1	PD
June 12, 2022	Community leader	5	1	ST
June 12, 2022	Community leader	6	1	ST
June 12, 2022	Community leader	7	1	ST
June 12, 2022	Community leader	8	1	ST
June 12, 2022	Community leader	9	1	LA
June 28, 2022	Resident	10	1	LA
June 30, 2022	Community leader	11	1	PH
July 20, 2022	Drug Trafficker	12	1	PH
July 20, 2022	Resident	13	1	PD
July 20, 2022	Resident	14	1	PD
July 20, 2022	Resident	15	1	PD
July 28, 2022	Community leader	16	1	PH
July 28, 2022	Resident	17	1	PH
July 29, 2022	Resident	18	1	PH
January 16, 2023	Resident	19	2	LA
January 20, 2023	Community leader	20	2	LA
January 20, 2023	Resident	21	2	LA
January 25, 2023	Resident	22	2	ST
January 25, 2023	Resident	23	2	ST
January 27, 2023	Resident	24	2	ST
January 27, 2023	Resident	25	2	ST
February 4, 2023	Community leader	26	2	PH
February 4, 2023	Resident	27	2	PH
February 11, 2023	Resident	28	2	PH
February 11, 2023	Resident	29	2	PH
February 12, 2023	Community leader	30	2	PH
February 12, 2023	Community leader	31	2	PD
February 12, 2023	Resident	32	2	PD
March 17, 2023	Resident	33	2	PD
March 17, 2023	Community leader	34	2	PD
March 21, 2023	Community leader	35	2	PD
March 21, 2023	Community leader	36	2	PD
April 5, 2023	Resident	37	2	LA
April 5, 2023	Community leader	38	2	LA

April 11, 2023	Community leader	39	2	LA
April 11, 2023	Resident	40	2	LA
April 13, 2023	Resident	41	2	LA
April 13, 2023	Resident	42	2	LA

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